著書

This book is the leading reference on Cambodian private international law in English. The chapters systematically cover the whole of Cambodian private international law, including commercial matters, family law, succession, intellectual property, competition (antitrust), and environmental disputes. The chapters do not merely cover the traditional conflict of law areas of jurisdiction, applicable law (choice of law) and enforcement. They also look into conflict of law questions arising in arbitration and assess Cambodia's involvement in the harmonisation of private international law globally and regionally within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Similarly to the other volumes in the Studies in Private International Law - Asia series, this book presents the Cambodian conflict of laws through a combination of common and civil law analytical techniques and perspectives, providing readers worldwide with a more profound and comprehensive understanding of the subject.

One of the main objectives of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is to promote the economic prosperity of its member states by enhancing their economic cooperation. This aim has probably been achieved in some countries along the Mekong River, especially in Cambodia, which has been a member of the initiative since 2013. China is now the dominant source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Cambodia, and its infrastructure projects, such as the Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone, have been accelerating the economic integration of Cambodia and China. Despite this backdrop, harmonisation of private international law rules does not appear to be the norm between the two countries, especially in relation to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Due to its stringent reciprocity requirements, Cambodia has reportedly never recognised or enforced court decisions issued in China (or elsewhere). However, such requirements may curb Cambodia's business ties with China, although the country has strived to develop them since the launch of the BRI. Thus, Cambodia's reciprocity requirements do not appear to conform with its strong interests in BRI. This chapter considers Cambodia's ambivalent attitude to legal harmonisation with China, examining Cambodia's recognition and enforcement regimes for foreign judgments. It suggests that the Cambodian judiciary is encouraged to moderate its rigid reciprocity standard on judgments issued by Chinese courts.

In parallel with their strong economic growth99*Growth, Asian jurisdictions have scaled up campaigns against bribery and other illegal misconduct by foreign investors by adopting international anti-corruption frameworks. Nonetheless, corruption remains common in many places and there is also still a lack of consensus on the influence of corruption and illegality over foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as in investor–state arbitration cases. There is also a paucity of literature considering how Asian countries have dealt with such serious misconduct by foreign investors. The foregoing chapters have started to fill the gaps, finding that there are some ‘Asian approaches’ to corruption and bribery in investment arbitrations: some individual jurisdictions have started to address the issues of corruption and illegality through treaty (re)drafting and/or investment disputes. However, a uniform Asian approach towards corruption and illegality in investment arbitration has not yet been established. Thus, this chapter proposes a roadmap for a more harmonised regional approach to corruption and illegality in Asian investment arbitration. It recommends that Asia1*Asia should (1) establish a forum for all jurisdictions to discuss corruption and other serious misconduct involved in FDI, (2) develop more unified rules on corruption and illegality specifically in Asian investment arbitration and (3) consider creating an independent institution99*Institutions or permanent court to better handle Asian investment disputes—not necessarily limited to allegations of corruption and illegality.

Japan emerged from the 1980s as a leading net exporter of foreign direct investment, with very little corruption. Since 2001, it has accelerated ratifications of standalone bilateral investment treaties as well as investment chapters in free trade agreements. Almost all allow foreign investors from the home state to directly initiate investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) arbitration against host states to get relief from violations of substantive treaty commitments. Japan’s investment treaty practice on corruption and illegality is intriguing. First, from around 2007, its treaties have often urged host states to take measures against corruption. This should help Japan’s1*Japan outbound investors. Second, Japan’s treaties have been less consistent in expressly limiting their protections to foreign investments made in accordance with host state laws. This can again benefit Japanese outbound investors as claimants, as the absence of a legality provision renders more difficult defences from host states, which typically have more corruption than in Japan1*Japan. Japan may adopt more and clearer legality provisions if subjected to more inbound ISDS arbitration claims and/or if claims by Japanese outbound investors are mostly against well-governed host states with little scope for corruption. Yet both types of claims remain few. The shift may therefore come more from other counterparty states pushing for such legality provisions and Japan agreeing in its future treaties to demonstrate its overall commitment to combatting corruption, and to preserve the legitimacy of the ISDS arbitration system.

Bribery and other serious illegal behaviour by foreign investors face wide condemnation in any society. Yet there remains a lack of consensus on the consequences of corruption and illegality affecting international investment, and especially in investment arbitration—a transnational procedure to resolve disputes between a foreign investor and a host state. A core issue is whether a foreign investor violating a host state's law should be awarded protection of its investment, as per its contract with the host state and/or the applicable investment or trade agreement between the home state and the host state. Some suggest such protection would be unnecessary, as the investor committed a crime in the host state, while others attempt to establish an equilibrium between the investor and the host state. Some others claim to protect investment, invoking the sanctity of promises made. This book explores Asian approaches towards the issue, setting it in the wider political economy and domestic law contexts. It also considers the extent to which significant states in Asia1*Asia are or could become ‘rule makers’ rather than ‘rule takers’ regarding corruption and serious illegality in investor–state arbitration.