Misc

While the energy dominance strategy has drawn considerable attention following the launch of the second Trump administration, another wave of environmental regulatory reform is also underway: a review of the operational framework governing the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), the law that regulates chemical substances. The TSCA revision demonstrates the United States' remarkable capacity for self-correction in addressing the universal challenge of reconciling global industrial competitiveness with the maintenance of public trust in safety. The U.S. chemical industry is a driver of innovation, with direct exports alone accounting for 10% of total goods exports. In 2016, under the Obama administration, TSCA underwent a major overhaul. The original law, enacted in 1976, did not require comprehensive risk assessments for existing chemical substances, and the revision reflected a recognition that this had allowed many chemical products to circulate in the market without adequate safety verification. The most significant achievement of the reform was mandating that the EPA conduct risk assessments for both new and existing chemicals, thereby closing the regulatory gaps that had previously existed. However, implementation problems became apparent after the revision. TSCA requires the EPA to complete reviews of new chemical substances within 90 days, yet cases of non-compliance have proliferated. According to the latest report from the American Chemistry Council (ACC), 95% of the 436 new chemical substances currently under review have exceeded the 90-day limit, and 68% have already been pending for more than a year. The ACC warns that the normalization of review delays has accelerated the offshoring of chemical development and production to overseas locations, making the risk of shrinking domestic investment and employment increasingly tangible. When chemical substances produced in countries with less stringent regulations are incorporated into finished goods and imported into the United States, only articles containing specific substances of high concern are subject to regulation. No practical or effective mechanism has been established to prevent this regulatory leakage. The dynamic in which environmental regulations lacking international harmonization disadvantage domestic production while failing to prevent flight abroad mirrors the situation seen with carbon pricing and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). Industry is not simply calling for deregulation. The ACC has explicitly endorsed the TSCA reform and is asking for a review process that combines safety assurance with greater transparency and predictability. EPA Administrator Zeldin indicated in March that he was considering measures to accelerate and streamline the review process. An ACC survey found that 65% of Americans agree that modernizing regulations would promote domestic chemical manufacturing, while 74% agree that it is possible to craft practical policies that protect the environment and public health without sacrificing manufacturing jobs and competitiveness. This capacity for institutional self-correction in the United States holds important lessons for Japan. Japan continues to grapple with how to reconcile safety with economic efficiency and growth in the context of its decarbonization and nuclear energy policies. Prioritizing efficiency alone risks leaving future risk management inadequate, while an exclusive focus on safety could see the cost burden expand without limit, significantly impeding economic growth. Alongside rigorous, science-based risk assessment, the pursuit of an internationally harmonized regulatory framework is indispensable to achieving compatibility with industrial development.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has begun moving to rescind the Endangerment Finding (EF), which has classified CO2 as a pollutant under the Clean Air Act. A framework that has defined CO2 as an air pollutant for 16 years since its establishment under the Obama administration is now having its scientific foundations directly challenged under the second Trump administration. EPA Administrator Zeldin emphasized that eliminating the EF would remove what he called a "hidden tax burden" exceeding one trillion dollars on businesses and households. U.S. electricity generation relied on coal-fired power for nearly half its supply in the late 2000s, but that share has since fallen to roughly 16%. This decline reflects the enhanced competitiveness of natural gas driven by the shale gas revolution, the expansion of renewables, and constraints on new coal plant construction imposed by the EF. The decline in power generation demand — which had accounted for 90% of U.S. coal consumption — has substantially depressed domestic coal prices. Transportation bottlenecks from inland producing regions to coastal export terminals have prevented that coal from being redirected to export markets, causing it to accumulate domestically and widening the gap between domestic and international prices. Should the rescission of the EF invalidate the conditions previously required for the construction and operation of coal-fired power plants, coal could become cost-competitive with gas-fired generation and may even hold an advantage in certain regions. As demand expands from data centers — whose growth is already accelerating — and from manufacturing reshoring to the United States, coal-fired power could be reassessed as a viable option. Japan has conditioned the continued operation of coal-fired plants on high efficiency standards and the implementation of CCS, hydrogen co-firing, and ammonia co-firing, as it seeks to reconcile its international commitments under the Paris Agreement with domestic energy policy. Price differentials relative to hydrogen and other alternatives are expected to be subsidized for a certain period, but it remains unclear who will bear that cost — and most citizens are likely unaware of the cost increases promised to arrive in two years. The effective electricity price gap between Japan and the United States currently stands at approximately 2:1, widening to 2.2:1 across total final energy consumption (FEC). If Japan maintains its current policies and imposes additional burdens on coal-consuming industries, while the United States eliminates CO2 compliance costs for coal-fired generation and coal's share of power generation recovers by five percentage points, the price gap would exceed 2.3:1 for electricity and 2.8:1 for FEC. Under such pricing conditions, industrial hollowing-out in Japan would become increasingly difficult to avoid. The Japanese government has positioned the "3E+S" framework as the foundation of its energy policy, yet has placed excessive weight on CO2 emissions reduction while giving insufficient consideration to economic viability. The narrative that "failure to decarbonize will lead to a loss of competitiveness" is widely repeated, but the gap with reality is substantial. Openly debating and executing a policy shift — as the United States is doing — would entail significant political costs in Japan. Nevertheless, at a minimum, suspending current regulations on coal-fired power would represent a rational course of action. With the consumer price index rising more than 3% year-on-year, deferring decarbonization could be expected to deliver a suppressive effect of roughly one percentage point on inflation over the medium to long term.

The Japan-U.S. summit between Prime Minister Takaichi and President Trump produced a joint fact sheet on bilateral investment that outlined a framework for cooperation on nuclear energy development and energy infrastructure investment. As Japan works to align its energy policy with the U.S. administration's energy dominance agenda, a broader shift away from decarbonization policy may follow. Such a shift would not only serve to deepen the Japan-U.S. alliance but could also lay the foundation for realizing Sanaenomics, Prime Minister Takaichi's economic growth-oriented agenda. The area Prime Minister Takaichi placed greatest emphasis on was the expanded utilization of nuclear power, with a notable feature being her commitment to not only new construction and capacity additions but also the early commercialization of next-generation advanced reactors and fusion energy. Going forward, however, two points warrant careful attention in advancing nuclear energy. The first is that promoting nuclear power is no longer compatible with decarbonization policy. Under current policy, the push for nuclear has been justified by its value as a low-carbon power source, but nuclear energy's far greater value lies in its capacity for stable supply. In Europe, where ideals were pursued ahead of any internationally coordinated framework for equitably sharing the burden, and in Japan, which followed suit, the hollowing-out of energy-intensive industries has become strikingly pronounced over just the past few years. Once such industries relocate abroad, they do not return easily. The continuation of decarbonization policy is also diminishing the value of nuclear power itself, by driving away the very industrial consumers that depend on stable supply. Nuclear energy only makes sense atop a strong industrial base, and halting the erosion of that base must be treated as an urgent priority in any effort to revive a robust economy. The second point is the need to once again separate technology development support from energy policy proper. Supporting research and development is a legitimate role of government, but the success of those efforts should not be baked into energy policy as a given, given its profound impact on the real economy. Even if fusion energy comes online decades from now, the electricity price achievable even under the most optimistic scenario — where all currently envisioned technologies succeed — is expected to be roughly on par with existing nuclear plants. We are not heading toward a world where electricity prices approach zero. Prime Minister Takaichi stated her strong opposition to "covering Japan's beautiful landscape with foreign-made solar panels" and called for a thorough "housecleaning" of renewable energy subsidy schemes. Alongside this, she indicated support for the development and deployment of perovskite solar cells, but the dilemma remains: even if domestically produced, expensive panels would ultimately expand the burden on electricity consumers. The primary factor behind defeat in competition with China is neither labor costs nor managerial efficiency — it is the highly predictable demand artificially created by policy. Chinese companies can sustain a game of chicken until private-sector competitors from democratic nations are forced to withdraw, then "wait for their moment" to recover losses after rivals exit the market. It is the decarbonization policies of advanced economies that have sustained the viability of business models that disregard the cost of capital. The U.S. policy shift will dissolve this artificially engineered predictability and return demand to consumer sovereignty. Calls for domestic production while maintaining decarbonization policy will amount to nothing more than castles in the air.

The atlatl, a spear-throwing device used during the North American Archaic period, not only increased projectile velocity, range, and accuracy compared with hand-thrown spears, but experimental evidence also suggests that it statistically reduced differences in physical strength between men and women, allowing a wider range of individuals to participate in hunting activities. In the twenty-first century, could artificial intelligence become a modern atlatl that similarly narrows capability gaps? The Industrial Revolution, the electrification revolution, and the information revolution may once again converge through technological advances such as AI, potentially producing structural transformations on an unprecedented scale. At the SBI Institute for Financial Economics, the authors have developed a high-resolution general equilibrium model (BIP) and conducted scenario analyses of the Japanese economy in 2040, exploring the possibility of nominal GDP approaching one quadrillion yen. Technological innovation driven by AI is often discussed in connection with concerns about job losses and widening income inequality. However, scenario analyses using the BIP model suggest that even under accelerated innovation scenarios, large-scale employment declines in manufacturing and finance can be macroscopically absorbed through job creation in other sectors accompanying faster economic growth. Technological innovation raises the productivity of older workers and women, and even as working hours decline, hourly wage rates rise faster than the average, expanding total labor income. In terms of distribution, the results differ from the conventional narrative of skill-biased technological change: broad wage increases, including among blue-collar workers, lead to a declining share of low-income groups. AI-driven technological innovation therefore has the potential to reshape social structures as a modern atlatl. The equalizing effects attributed to the ancient atlatl did not arise automatically; they functioned only when appropriate social conditions existed. Whether AI can serve as a modern atlatl likewise depends heavily on the development of social and institutional capital. In scenarios of innovative growth for the Japanese economy, increases in value added appear primarily in the service sector, yet the core growth mechanism remains rooted in manufacturing. The effective realization of technological innovation requires the revitalization of production networks centered on manufacturing. Data centers—essential for meeting the expanding demand for information services that support this ecosystem—depend fundamentally on affordable and stable electricity supply. In economies where electricity prices are volatile and supply margins are limited, AI investment tends to amplify intersectoral distortions, preventing the expected economy-wide productivity gains from emerging. Current decarbonization policies move in the opposite direction. Institutional frameworks such as the GX-ETS, introduced without sufficient international coordination, increase uncertainty regarding both electricity prices and supply, severely undermining investment predictability for industry and data centers. In energy-intensive manufacturing sectors, subsidies are directed toward technological development with uncertain demand prospects while production activities are simultaneously incentivized to relocate overseas. Technological innovation cannot take root without the necessary social and economic conditions. A failure of energy policy, therefore, is effectively equivalent to depriving society of AI as the modern atlatl.

This plan was formulated by a non-governmental group of researchers and practitioners who share a common concern that Japan's current decarbonization-centric energy policy is structurally undermining the nation's security foundations and economic growth. The sixth edition, dated September 6, 2025, makes no changes to the analytical framework or eleven-point policy recommendations established in the fifth edition (version a, July 22, 2025), and instead introduces a major new chapter and updates throughout. The most significant addition in the sixth edition is a new chapter: "I.2. The Sociology of Anthropogenic Warming Theory." The chapter comprises three sections — "I.2.1. The Danger of Justice," "I.2.2. The Danger of Politics," and "I.2.3. The Non-Absoluteness of Scientific Authority" — and offers a historical-sociological analysis of how decarbonization ideology has been formed and propagated. This addition prompted a restructuring of the current-situation section: the prior I.1 content is now organized under I.1.1 through I.1.4 as subsections of "I.1. The Emerging Harms of Decarbonization Policy," and the material on the global retreat from decarbonization (formerly I.6–I.7 in the fifth edition) is consolidated as "I.3. The Global Retreat from Decarbonization Policy." The eleven policy recommendations are carried forward unchanged from the fifth edition: restoring electricity prices to pre-earthquake levels (¥14/kWh for industry; ¥21/kWh for households); raising nuclear power's share to 50% at the earliest opportunity; ensuring CO₂ regulations do not impede the stable use of fossil fuels; halting the large-scale deployment of solar power; avoiding obstruction of the automotive industry through premature EV mandates; prioritizing cost reduction over accelerated deployment of fossil-fuel alternatives; abolishing excessive energy-efficiency regulations; returning the electricity sector to a vertically integrated structure; strengthening energy stockpiling and infrastructure defense; eliminating CO₂ aggregate targets and sectoral allocation; and withdrawing from the Paris Agreement in favor of a Japan-U.S.-led "Energy Dominance Agreement." The international context established in the fifth edition — including the Trump administration's re-withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the de facto repeal of the IRA, political shifts in the UK and Germany, and Japan's enactment of the amended GX Promotion Act in May 2025 — is fully carried forward.

This plan was formulated by a non-governmental group of researchers and practitioners who share a common concern that Japan's current decarbonization-centric energy policy is structurally undermining the nation's security foundations and economic growth. The Japanese government's 7th Strategic Energy Plan, adopted by cabinet decision on February 18, 2025, along with its next-cycle NDC (targeting ▲60% by FY2035 and ▲73% by FY2040 against FY2013 levels), reaffirms the existing decarbonization trajectory without evidence-based justification. This plan is presented as a comprehensive alternative. It advances "Energy Dominance" — the abundant, stable, and affordable supply of energy — as its guiding principle, and calls for a fundamental reorientation of Japanese energy policy toward security and economic growth. The most significant addition in the 5th edition is the introduction of two new chapters in the current situation section: "I.6. Decarbonization Is Not a Global Trend" and "I.7. The World Is Returning to Low-Carbon Fossil Fuels." These chapters systematically document the dramatic shift in international conditions, including: the inauguration of the Trump administration in January 2025 and the United States' formal re-withdrawal from the Paris Agreement; the de facto repeal of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and a sweeping rollback of fossil fuel development regulations; the UK Conservative Party's declaration of a blank-slate review of its 2050 net-zero target; the rise of the AfD as Germany's second-largest party, reflecting voter backlash against energy cost increases driven by decarbonization policy; and China's continued expansion of coal-fired power capacity. These developments are juxtaposed against Japan's decision to press ahead with GX legislation (amended in May 2025), disregarding international trends. The proposal retains its eleven-point policy framework: restoring electricity prices to pre-earthquake levels (¥14/kWh for industry; ¥21/kWh for households); raising nuclear power's share to 50% at the earliest opportunity through restarts, life extensions, and new construction; ensuring that CO₂ regulations do not impede the stable use of fossil fuels; halting the large-scale deployment of solar power; avoiding the obstruction of automotive industry growth through premature EV mandates; prioritizing cost reduction over accelerated deployment of fossil-fuel alternatives; abolishing excessive energy-efficiency regulations; returning the electricity sector to a vertically integrated structure; strengthening energy stockpiling and infrastructure defense; eliminating CO₂ aggregate targets and sectoral allocation; and withdrawing from the Paris Agreement in favor of a Japan-U.S.-led "Energy Dominance Agreement." EV-related data has been updated to reflect the latest figures, including Toyota's sales of approximately 10.27 million vehicles in FY2024 (April 2024–March 2025). The nuclear chapter (Section II.2) has been substantially expanded with new discussion of scientific assessment of low-dose radiation risk, the role of emergency scientific advisory groups, uranium resource sustainability, and the knowledge-base function of research institutions. The electricity system reform sections (Section II.8) — analyzing the structural mechanism by which vertical unbundling leads to chronic underinvestment — are carried forward from the third edition. On the international framework, with U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement now a realized fact under the Trump administration, the proposal's call for Japan to follow suit and co-lead a new "Energy Dominance Agreement" is advanced with a strengthened empirical foundation.

This plan was formulated by a non-governmental group of researchers and practitioners who share a common concern that Japan's current decarbonization-centric energy policy is structurally undermining the nation's security foundations and economic growth. The Japanese government's 7th Strategic Energy Plan, adopted by cabinet decision on February 18, 2025, along with its next-cycle NDC (targeting ▲60% by FY2035 and ▲73% by FY2040 against FY2013 levels), reaffirms the existing decarbonization trajectory without evidence-based justification. This plan is presented as a comprehensive alternative. It advances "Energy Dominance" — the abundant, stable, and affordable supply of energy — as its guiding principle, and calls for a fundamental reorientation of Japanese energy policy toward security and economic growth. The most significant addition in the 5th edition is the introduction of two new chapters in the current situation section: "I.6. Decarbonization Is Not a Global Trend" and "I.7. The World Is Returning to Low-Carbon Fossil Fuels." These chapters systematically document the dramatic shift in international conditions, including: the inauguration of the Trump administration in January 2025 and the United States' formal re-withdrawal from the Paris Agreement; the de facto repeal of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and a sweeping rollback of fossil fuel development regulations; the UK Conservative Party's declaration of a blank-slate review of its 2050 net-zero target; the rise of the AfD as Germany's second-largest party, reflecting voter backlash against energy cost increases driven by decarbonization policy; and China's continued expansion of coal-fired power capacity. These developments are juxtaposed against Japan's decision to press ahead with GX legislation (amended in May 2025), disregarding international trends. The proposal retains its eleven-point policy framework: restoring electricity prices to pre-earthquake levels (¥14/kWh for industry; ¥21/kWh for households); raising nuclear power's share to 50% at the earliest opportunity through restarts, life extensions, and new construction; ensuring that CO₂ regulations do not impede the stable use of fossil fuels; halting the large-scale deployment of solar power; avoiding the obstruction of automotive industry growth through premature EV mandates; prioritizing cost reduction over accelerated deployment of fossil-fuel alternatives; abolishing excessive energy-efficiency regulations; returning the electricity sector to a vertically integrated structure; strengthening energy stockpiling and infrastructure defense; eliminating CO₂ aggregate targets and sectoral allocation; and withdrawing from the Paris Agreement in favor of a Japan-U.S.-led "Energy Dominance Agreement." EV-related data has been updated to reflect the latest figures, including Toyota's sales of approximately 10.27 million vehicles in FY2024 (April 2024–March 2025). The nuclear chapter (Section II.2) has been substantially expanded with new discussion of scientific assessment of low-dose radiation risk, the role of emergency scientific advisory groups, uranium resource sustainability, and the knowledge-base function of research institutions. The electricity system reform sections (Section II.8) — analyzing the structural mechanism by which vertical unbundling leads to chronic underinvestment — are carried forward from the third edition. On the international framework, with U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement now a realized fact under the Trump administration, the proposal's call for Japan to follow suit and co-lead a new "Energy Dominance Agreement" is advanced with a strengthened empirical foundation.

This policy proposal was formulated by a non-governmental group of researchers and practitioners who share a common concern that Japan's current decarbonization-centric energy policy is structurally undermining the nation's security foundations and economic growth. As 2024 marks the year in which Japan's 7th Strategic Energy Plan is to be formulated, the proposal warns that the government's drive to further intensify decarbonization under the banner of GX (Green Transformation) — without evidence-based justification — risks compounding existing policy failures. Advancing "Energy Dominance," defined as the abundant, stable, and affordable supply of energy, as its guiding principle, this non-governmental proposal offers a comprehensive alternative to the official planning process. The fourth edition incorporates updated figures and expanded analysis reflecting the latest domestic and international developments as of May–June 2024. On the international EV policy front, the edition details the plateauing of EV sales in North American and European markets, the wave of production adjustments by major Western automakers, survey data showing that 85% of global consumers still prefer internal combustion engine vehicles, and the surging worldwide demand for hybrid vehicles in which Japan holds a decisive competitive advantage. On the domestic energy cost front, updated statistics illustrate that the cumulative burden of renewable energy surcharges and GX-related levies on households and industry remains at elevated levels in 2024, with no meaningful relief in sight. The proposal is organized around eleven policy recommendations. First, electricity prices should be restored to pre-Great East Japan Earthquake levels (¥14/kWh for industry; ¥21/kWh for households), accompanied by the abolition or reduction of energy taxes and surcharges. Second, nuclear power's share of total generation should be raised to 50% at the earliest opportunity through restarts, life extensions, and new construction. Third, the stable use of fossil fuels must not be impeded by CO₂ regulations. Fourth, the large-scale deployment of solar power — beset by human rights concerns, poor economics, and disaster safety risks — should be halted immediately. Fifth, the premature promotion of EVs, which threatens Japan's automotive industry as a pillar of the national economy, should not be adopted as policy. Items six through ten call for prioritizing cost reduction over accelerated deployment of fossil-fuel alternatives, abolishing excessive energy-efficiency regulations, returning the electricity sector to a vertically integrated structure, reinforcing energy stockpiling and infrastructure defense, and eliminating CO₂ aggregate emission targets and sector-level allocation. The electricity system reform sections introduced in the third edition (Section II.8), including "II.8.1. Pre-Earthquake Electric Power System Reform" and "II.8.2. Post-Earthquake Electric Power System Reform," are further developed with reference to the latest statistical evidence, deepening the analysis of how vertical unbundling has eliminated long-term supply obligations and structurally suppressed investment. On the international front, the proposal advocates withdrawal from the Paris Agreement — judged to be deadlocked by unachievable targets and a North-South divide — and calls for the establishment of a Japan-U.S.-led "Energy Dominance Agreement." By maintaining the stable utilization of fossil fuels free from binding aggregate emissions constraints, the proposal argues that Japan can avert industrial hollowing-out and pursue the fundamental policy transformation necessary to rebuild a resilient and prosperous national economy.

This policy proposal was formulated by a non-governmental group of researchers and practitioners who share a common concern that Japan's current decarbonization-centric energy policy is structurally undermining the nation's security foundations and economic growth. The proposal advances "Energy Dominance" — defined as the stable, large-scale supply of affordable energy — as its guiding principle, and calls for a fundamental reorientation of Japan's energy policy framework. Building on the second edition's treatment of green economic security, the adverse impacts of offshore wind deployment, and a critical assessment of climate modeling, the third edition newly systematizes the historical background and structural problems of Japan's electricity system reforms. Two dedicated sections — "II.8.1. Pre-Earthquake Electric Power System Reform" and "II.8.2. Post-Earthquake Electric Power System Reform" — have been added to provide a detailed account of the reform trajectory. Particular attention is given to the structural mechanisms by which vertically unbundled market reforms, including the separation of power generation and transmission, have discouraged long-term, planned investment in electricity infrastructure, thereby contributing to deteriorating supply reliability and rising electricity costs. Drawing on this institutional analysis, the proposal argues that reconciling supply stability with affordable electricity pricing requires not sole reliance on market mechanisms, but appropriate state involvement and a reconstituted investment environment. As a concrete numerical target, the proposal sets the restoration of electricity prices to pre-Great East Japan Earthquake levels (¥14/kWh for industrial users; ¥21/kWh for households), to be achieved primarily through an early increase of nuclear power's share in the generation mix to 50%. The proposal further recommends curtailing the large-scale deployment of solar power and revisiting the accelerated promotion of EVs, both of which are judged to threaten grid stability and the international competitiveness of Japan's core industries respectively. On the international front, the proposal advocates withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the establishment of a new Japan-U.S.-led "Energy Dominance Agreement." By maintaining the stable utilization of fossil fuels free from binding aggregate emissions targets, the proposal argues that Japan can avert industrial hollowing-out and pursue the policy transformation necessary to rebuild a resilient and prosperous national economy.

This policy proposal was formulated by a non-governmental group of researchers and practitioners who share a common concern that Japan's current decarbonization-centric energy policy is structurally undermining the nation's security foundations and economic growth. The proposal advances "Energy Dominance" — defined as the stable, large-scale supply of affordable energy — as its guiding principle, and calls for a fundamental reorientation of Japan's energy policy framework. Building on the second edition's treatment of green economic security, the adverse impacts of offshore wind deployment, and a critical assessment of climate modeling, the third edition newly systematizes the historical background and structural problems of Japan's electricity system reforms. Two dedicated sections — "II.8.1. Pre-Earthquake Electric Power System Reform" and "II.8.2. Post-Earthquake Electric Power System Reform" — have been added to provide a detailed account of the reform trajectory. Particular attention is given to the structural mechanisms by which vertically unbundled market reforms, including the separation of power generation and transmission, have discouraged long-term, planned investment in electricity infrastructure, thereby contributing to deteriorating supply reliability and rising electricity costs. Drawing on this institutional analysis, the proposal argues that reconciling supply stability with affordable electricity pricing requires not sole reliance on market mechanisms, but appropriate state involvement and a reconstituted investment environment. As a concrete numerical target, the proposal sets the restoration of electricity prices to pre-Great East Japan Earthquake levels (¥14/kWh for industrial users; ¥21/kWh for households), to be achieved primarily through an early increase of nuclear power's share in the generation mix to 50%. The proposal further recommends curtailing the large-scale deployment of solar power and revisiting the accelerated promotion of EVs, both of which are judged to threaten grid stability and the international competitiveness of Japan's core industries respectively. On the international front, the proposal advocates withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the establishment of a new Japan-U.S.-led "Energy Dominance Agreement." By maintaining the stable utilization of fossil fuels free from binding aggregate emissions targets, the proposal argues that Japan can avert industrial hollowing-out and pursue the policy transformation necessary to rebuild a resilient and prosperous national economy.

This policy proposal was formulated by a non-governmental group of researchers and practitioners who share a common concern that Japan's current decarbonization-centric energy policy is structurally undermining the nation's security foundations and economic growth. The proposal advances "Energy Dominance" — defined as the stable, large-scale supply of affordable energy — as its guiding principle, and calls for a fundamental reorientation of Japan's energy policy framework. The second edition substantially expands upon three areas: the concept of "green economic security" examined in the context of China's industrial and economic strategy; the adverse economic impacts of large-scale offshore wind deployment on the Japanese economy; and a critical assessment of contemporary climate science modeling. As a concrete numerical target, the proposal sets the restoration of electricity prices to pre-Great East Japan Earthquake levels (¥14/kWh for industrial users; ¥21/kWh for households), to be achieved primarily through an early increase of nuclear power's share in the generation mix to 50%. The proposal further recommends curtailing the large-scale deployment of solar power, which is judged to compromise grid stability, and revisiting the accelerated promotion of electric vehicles (EVs), which threatens the international competitiveness of Japan's core industries, including the automotive sector. On the international front, the proposal advocates withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, which it regards as lacking realistic achievability, and calls for the establishment of a new Japan-U.S.-led international framework designated the "Energy Dominance Agreement." By maintaining the stable utilization of fossil fuels free from binding aggregate emissions targets, the proposal argues that Japan can avert industrial hollowing-out and pursue the policy transformation necessary to rebuild a resilient and prosperous national economy.

This policy proposal was formulated by a non-governmental group of researchers and practitioners who share a common concern that Japan's current decarbonization-centric energy policy is structurally undermining the nation's security foundations and economic growth. The proposal advances "Energy Dominance" — defined as the stable, large-scale supply of affordable energy — as its guiding principle, and calls for a fundamental reorientation of Japan's energy policy framework. As a concrete numerical target, the proposal sets the restoration of electricity prices to pre-Great East Japan Earthquake levels (¥14/kWh for industrial users; ¥21/kWh for households), to be achieved primarily through an early increase of nuclear power's share in the generation mix to 50%. The proposal further recommends curtailing the large-scale deployment of solar power, which is judged to compromise grid stability, and revisiting the accelerated promotion of electric vehicles (EVs), which is seen as threatening the competitiveness of Japan's core automotive and manufacturing industries. On the international front, the proposal advocates withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, which it regards as lacking realistic achievability, and calls for the establishment of a new Japan-U.S.-led international framework designated the "Energy Dominance Agreement." By maintaining the stable utilization of fossil fuels free from binding aggregate emissions targets, the proposal argues that Japan can avert industrial hollowing-out and pursue the policy transformation necessary to rebuild a resilient and prosperous national economy.