Tsuyoshi Goroku: One Year Since the Invasion of Ukraine—What is Needed for a Resolution?

2023/03/08

It has been nearly a year since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine began. Everyone fears further prolongation, but at this point, there is no sign of President Putin stopping the attacks, and the Ukrainian side is prepared for a thorough resistance to defend their homeland. Ceasefire negotiations, which were held intermittently last March, have shown no prospect of resuming since they stopped in April following the discovery of massacres by Russian forces in Bucha, a town near Kyiv. There is still no end in sight for this war, which has already caused immense sacrifice and damage.

Looking back at the military situation over the past year, it can be broadly divided into three phases.

First, the large-scale Russian forces that had been massing around the Ukrainian border since the fall of 2021 began a full-scale invasion from three directions: north, east, and south. According to a report by the Royal United Services Research Centers and Institutes (RUSI), Russia had a plan to complete the operation and begin occupation within 10 days of the invasion, and to annex all of Ukraine by August. However, due to the unexpectedly strong performance of the Ukrainian military, the Russian army was forced to withdraw from the vicinity of the capital, Kyiv, at the end of March and redeployed its forces to the eastern Donbas region.

After the initial plan ended in failure, it was the Russian military, superior in firepower, that held the initiative from around April to July. While significantly exhausted by the stubborn resistance of the Ukrainian military supported by weapons from Western countries, the Russian side concentrated its forces in the east, gradually seizing major cities such as Mariupol and Severodonetsk, and expanding its controlled territory.

However, a change in this situation was seen after the end of August, when the Ukrainian side took the initiative. Following a successful large-scale counteroffensive in the eastern Kharkiv region in early September, the Ukrainian military swiftly recaptured the west bank of the Dnipro River in the southern Kherson region in early November, which had been occupied in March without significant fighting. As a result, the area under Ukrainian control recovered to approximately 83%, compared to about 76% of the entire country as of March. On the other hand, as the Russian military struggled, Putin moved to a partial mobilization at the end of September and declared the unilateral "annexation" of four southern and eastern provinces.

Since December, although fierce fighting has continued in the east, the tempo of combat has slowed as winter deepened, and the overall military situation is in a stalemate. At the time of writing (February 2023), Russia is launching a major offensive, but attention is focused on whether Ukraine can withstand this and how much territory it can recapture in the expected counteroffensive.

To begin with, in launching the full-scale invasion, Putin made at least two major mistakes.

The first was underestimating the Ukrainian people's will to resist. Therefore, Putin began the invasion with the naive expectation that the "special military operation" aimed at turning Ukraine into a vassal state could be completed in a short period.

However, according to a public opinion poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology Research Centers and Institutes, two weeks before the full-scale invasion, 57.5% of the population and 71.9% of men responded that they would "engage in some form of resistance (armed resistance, or civil resistance such as demonstrations, protests, marches, boycotts, strikes, and civil disobedience, or both)." Other surveys showed that many citizens were pessimistic about support from the West and felt they had to manage on their own first. For the people of Ukraine, the war with Russia had been ongoing since the spring of 2014, when Crimea was occupied. Furthermore, with large-scale Russian forces massing around the border since the spring of 2021 and tensions continuing for a year, it can be said that they had the preparedness and determination to stand up if the time came, even before the invasion.

This will to resist has continued even as the war has dragged on. According to a public opinion poll last December, 85% of respondents said that "Ukraine must not abandon its territory under any circumstances, even if the war is prolonged and the maintenance of independence is threatened." To break people's morale, the Russian military has continued to intentionally destroy homes, schools, and hospitals, and since October, has repeatedly attacked energy facilities to use winter as a weapon, but those calculations have largely failed.

Another major miscalculation was the unity of the Western countries supporting Ukraine. Looking at the response of Western countries to the invasion of Georgia in the summer of 2008 and the invasion of Crimea in the spring of 2014, Putin may have thought that this time, too, European countries—especially those economically dependent on Russia—would be unable to take bold sanctions. Furthermore, in recent years, NATO and the EU have been shaken by various issues, and he may have judged that the US's inward-looking stance and the fading of its leadership under the Biden administration remained unchanged, as symbolized by the chaos surrounding the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan.

In reality, however, Western countries, centered on the G7 and the EU, quickly imposed extensive and large-scale economic sanctions on Russia. Since then, even as Russia has used various means such as energy to shake them, the sanctions have been maintained and strengthened. Furthermore, large-scale support for Ukraine has been implemented; according to the Kiel World Institute for Economic Studies, as of the end of last November, the total amount of pledged support in the military, humanitarian, and financial sectors exceeded 113.1 billion euros.

After his initial plans failed, Putin seemed to aim for "Ukraine fatigue" to arise in Western society due to the prolongation of the war, but at this point, the situation has not reached the serious level that was feared; rather, the level of support is increasing in both quality and quantity. While the possibility of such "fatigue" arising in some countries in the future cannot be denied, there is a general consensus among major countries to "continue supporting Ukraine for as long as necessary."

Furthermore, what likely was unexpected for Russia was the support in terms of weapons, training, and intelligence that Western countries have continued since the beginning of the invasion. Initially, the focus was on weapons to repel the Russian military, such as anti-tank missiles, but support was gradually strengthened, and the Ukrainian military was eventually provided with weapons essential for recapturing territory. Finally, in January 2023, Western countries took the step of providing Western-made main battle tanks, which they had initially been cautious about. From the perspective of the West, while needing to balance the avoidance of direct conflict with Russia and support for Ukraine, support was initially limited due to fears of escalation. However, as the situation where NATO and Russia are mutually deterred continued, it can be said that Western countries have carefully increased the level of weapons support while watching Russia's moves.

This war would end if only Putin stopped the indiscriminate attacks and decided on a full-scale withdrawal of the Russian military. However, such an optimistic scenario is difficult to envision at present. Also, while there are calls for negotiations, what Putin originally sought was the vassalization of Ukraine. It is unclear whether that objective has been revised downward, and it is not even known if a "deal" is possible in negotiations. President Zelenskyy presented five conditions for resuming negotiations last November (1. Restoration of Ukraine's territorial integrity, 2. Respect for the UN Charter, 3. Reparations for war damage, 4. Punishment of war criminals, 5. Guarantees that aggression will not happen again), but these are incompatible with Russia's position, which excludes the four southern and eastern provinces it unilaterally declared "annexed" from the scope of negotiations.

With Russia having no intention of abandoning its goals of aggression, from Ukraine's perspective, there is no choice but to use force to drive the Russian military out of its borders to restore territorial integrity. In a poll by the Rating Group, as of last November, 85% of Ukrainians answered that "victory" means the recapture of all territory, including Crimea. In the future, while a debate may arise among countries supporting Ukraine over whether to support the recapture of Crimea by force, the key for Ukraine will first be whether it can liberate by force the approximately 10% of its territory that has been occupied by Russia since February 24, 2022, and has not yet been liberated. In this context, what the Zelenskyy administration is requesting to prevent further prolongation of the fighting is further military support, including fighter jets and long-range missiles. It will become increasingly important whether Western countries can continue the provision of weapons, which can be called a "lifeline" for Ukraine, and whether they can take the step of providing the aforementioned weaponry.

In addition to the provision of weapons, the Ukrainian side is strongly requesting long-term security guarantees from supporting countries in preparation for future negotiations. Regardless of how the war stops or ends, unless the possibility of Russia attacking Ukraine again after a period of "post-war" is eliminated, Ukraine cannot feel secure, and Europe cannot regain stability.

Regarding the challenge of how to guarantee Ukraine's security, the best option among the Ukrainian people is considered to be NATO membership. However, with no prospect of that in the short term, the Zelenskyy administration, together with a team led by former NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, announced the "Kyiv Security Compact" proposal last September. This is a legally binding framework to temporarily guarantee the country's security until Ukraine joins NATO or the EU, and it proposes various measures to improve Ukraine's deterrence and defense capabilities against Russia.

As for "guarantor countries," they are divided into a "core group" that provides military guarantees and a "broad group" that provides non-military guarantees centered on a sanctions mechanism. In addition to the West, Canada and Australia are mentioned for the former, while the G7 (including the EU and Japan) and South Korea are mentioned for the latter.

It is unclear what will happen to negotiations regarding this proposal in the future, but how the restored security of Ukraine can be maintained with an eye toward the "post-war" period will be the key to restoring and maintaining the stability of the European order as a whole. If this fails, Europe will continue to face the risk that fighting could flare up again at any time for decades to come.