Yukichi Fukuzawa's Theory of Intellect and Virtue: Focusing on the Connection with J.S. Mill

My name is Anzai, and I have just been introduced. Today, I would like to speak about "Yukichi Fukuzawa's Theory of Intellect and Virtue" in relation to John Stuart Mill.

Since our time, it has been said of Mill that "as an economist, there is nothing to see in Mill." However, in the history of political thought and political science, he remains a shining figure even today. In particular, works such as "On Liberty," which Yukichi Fukuzawa read closely, "Utilitarianism," and "The Subjection of Women" are still read as classics today.

The reason I am introducing the theory of intellect and virtue here today is that there are some aspects that were slightly under-explained in my book "The Intellectual Sources of Yukichi Fukuzawa" (Keio University Press) published last year. Also, Konan University, where I worked, grew out of the old Konan High School, which was established through the efforts of Kansai business leaders such as Hachisaburo Hirao and the second Chubei Itoh. This school focused on character education. Character education specifically tends to become a theory of moral education. This leads to the question of what happens to the issue of intellectual education.

As an aside, Hirao's wife, Suzu, taught music at the Keio University Yochisha Elementary School and influenced the educational aspects of music and moral education for Fukuzawa as well. I heard from Ms. Fumiko Shirai, who was a teacher at the Yochisha, that this also led to the creation of the Wagner Society, which sang earlier. For such reasons, I decided to take up Yukichi Fukuzawa as a thinker who is very helpful in considering the relationship between intellectual education and moral education. Since he is a subject of research here, he is a "teacher" in the sense that there is much to learn from him, but I will omit the honorific title of "Sensei."

"A new world requires a new political science." These are the words of Alexis de Tocqueville, who had a great influence on J.S. Mill. Tokujirō Obata translated a portion of them, and Fukuzawa also made use of them. In the 1880s, Fukuzawa read "Democracy in America" closely, though not the entire work. Those words appear in the introduction, and Fukuzawa attached a sticky note there. However, it is said that around 1873, Tocqueville was quite a topic of conversation among intellectuals and was being read, so it is likely that Fukuzawa had known about Tocqueville for some time.

Until then, the Confucianism that Fukuzawa had targeted for criticism mostly consisted of scholars who followed Neo-Confucianism. The basis of that Confucianism is "cultivating oneself and governing others," or "cultivating the self, regulating the family, governing the state, and bringing peace to the world." This is the political philosophy discussed in "The Great Learning," one of the Four Books and Five Classics. It is a commonly stated thesis, as noted by Kenji Shimada and others, that Confucianism is precisely the political philosophy of "cultivating the self, regulating the family, governing the state, and bringing peace to the world."

However, should "cultivating the self and regulating the family" and "governing the state and bringing peace to the world" really be treated as continuous thinking? Fukuzawa presents such a doubt. The issue of "cultivating the self and regulating the family" is a matter of individual emotion. The issue of "governing the state and bringing peace to the world" is a matter of politics. Unless one also learns the principles inherent to politics, everyone ends up focusing only on "cultivating the self and regulating the family."

In other words, this becomes a theory of the unity of church and state, and the momentum toward moralism becomes stronger. Generally, humans are weak toward moralism. Even regarding current politics, people often criticize individual conduct rather than performance or policy ability. However, Fukuzawa says, "Wait a minute." In the new world of civilized society, the political science of ancient China—the reigns of Yao, Shun, and Yu—will not do. In that era, there was certainly a view that everything could be settled through "cultivating the self and regulating the family." But Fukuzawa criticizes this.

What is necessary for the new civilized world? It is that "to apply the intangible things within to the tangible government appearing without, to handle the human affairs of the present age with the ways of antiquity, and to try to control the common people with sentiment must be called the height of infatuation" (An Outline of a Theory of Civilization, Vol. 2, Chapter 4. Subsequent citations are from the same book unless otherwise noted). In other words, a science concerning the politics of "governing the state and bringing peace to the world," distinguished from "cultivating the self and regulating the family," is necessary. This is a critique of the unity of church and state.

In the Edo period, the ruling class was the samurai. Therefore, the bushi correspond to what we would call bureaucrats today. They were different from the fighting bushi of the Sengoku period. Without bureaucratic literacy, it was impossible to handle administration, so Confucian scholars urged them to also learn the thought of the Chinese literati (shidaifu).

In that sense, engaging in politics was the main concern of the bushi, the old ruling class. Fukuzawa criticizes this with the civilized world in mind. "Whatever name one gives to politics, it is ultimately one item within jinkan kosai (society)" (Vol. 1, Chapter 3). This essentially means that politics is also a part of society; it is not everything. Therefore, he tells the shizoku (former samurai) who lost their jobs to be active in various fields. He enlightens them by incorporating the ideas of Mill, Guizot, or Smiles, famous for "Self-Help." Governance must not be left solely to officials. He says that for those who were shizoku to have a place to be active in private domains other than politics is precisely the politics of civilization.

Civilization is also a mental matter. In other words, he says that the progress of morality (moral) and wisdom (intellectual), which form the spirit, is necessary. This is primarily a citation from Henry Thomas Buckle's "History of Civilization in England," a book widely read at the time. It is the "progress of man's intellect and virtue." Rather than a theory of moral education politics based on Confucianism, it is the presentation of a new political science based on "intellect" to replace Confucian political philosophy.

Later, seeing the movement to revive the theory of moral education based on "Confucianism," Fukuzawa preached the necessity of "political science as a science" to replace Confucian political science, using knowledge obtained from Mill's essays on political economy and logic to resist it.

This is also a matter of practical political science and theoretical political science, but at this time, Fukuzawa argued that Confucianism was a political science that was 70% political science and 30% ethics, and as seen in An Outline of a Theory of Civilization, he rejected Confucianism as a book of ethics that enhances the value of philosophy. In the "political science as a science" that Fukuzawa aimed for, I believe there is a background of statistical issues and theories of remote and immediate causes learned from Buckle and others. And this is also a matter of the progress of wisdom.

The issue of progress from the "heart that thinks of the country" (what Tocqueville calls "instinctive patriotism," Obata's translation) to the "reason that thinks of the country" (what Tocqueville calls "reflective patriotism," Obata's translation). Fukuzawa must have been convinced that unless this "reason that thinks of the country" was cultivated, one could not survive in the civilized world, keeping in mind Confucian political philosophy which tends to fall into the unity of church and state. Thus, while reading Mill, he must have also recognized the necessity of "binocularism" to obtain certainty in perception, namely "reason."

Binocularism, in Fukuzawa's words, is to "be able to open both eyes and see the merits of others" (Vol. 1, Chapter 1). This means to pay attention to the other person's position and opposing arguments. Through this, many-sided debate occurs, and if the ways of thinking of various people are discussed, freedom is born there. He says such a comparative perspective is important. Mill argues that considering opposing arguments makes one's own way of thinking certain in a debate. And it also leads to the acquisition of wisdom. He says that is the nature of human intellect.

Of course, even in the Edo period, there were figures who pointed out the importance of "remonstrance," which could be called an opposing argument. For example, Hori Keizan's "Sage." Hori Keizan corresponds to the teacher of Motoori Norinaga. Then there is Yuasa Jozan's Bushido. "The fact that Toshogu (Ieyasu) accepted remonstrance." Yuasa says that rather than dying in battle before one's master, the person who offers remonstrance is more important, and that is Bushido. Furthermore, regarding other possibilities of interpretation, the "Nihon Shoki" also presents alternative interpretations with the phrase "One book says." Moreover, in the Edo period, books were published as single volumes that allowed for the comparison of various commentaries on the "Analects," such as those of Neo-Confucianism, Jinsai school, and Sorai school.

However, by making Neo-Confucianism the official orthodox study through the Kansei Prohibition of Heterodox Studies, many Confucian scholars came to follow Neo-Confucianism. There, they valued "cultivating the self, regulating the family, governing the state, and bringing peace to the world." Many scholars ran toward moralism, and Fukuzawa emphasized that this would not pass in the new world of civilization. He stressed that the issue of cultivating the self and regulating the family is separate from the issue of governing the state and bringing peace to the world.

Next, we move to the issue of public opinion and habit. What is the discussion of the people within the country, or public opinion? It is "the state of intellect and virtue distributed among the people in that era" (Vol. 2, Chapter 5). This generally becomes "appearance" (teishai) through habit. Or it becomes a "state of stagnation and non-flow." As seen in the phrase from the Edo period, "Everything according to the regulations of Lord Gongen (Ieyasu)," people are bound by past habits. This is "conservative and makeshift." That is considered reason.

However, Mill calls such things the despotism of custom and wonders if they lead to a state of eternal stationariness. Therefore, Mill emphasizes in "On Liberty" the necessity of standing in a leading position to guide discussion to a noble level. He also says that a majority opinion is the same as having no opinion. Mill says the greatness of England is a collective greatness. However, when it reaches the despotism of custom, it falls into collective mediocrity. Therefore, regarding measures to raise the level of public opinion, he says that the exertion of individuality and the cultivation of great characters, or the cultivation of spiritual nobility in the common people, are extremely important.

Fukuzawa argues that the sin of Confucianism is that it makes people mental slaves. However, as to whether all habits are bad, that is the good point of binocularism. He states that a habit where intellectual power gains authority would be "a boundless blessing if it makes the crude patriotism of those people dense, makes the immature mature, and thereby protects our national polity" (Vol. 2, Chapter 5), and there he considers the meaning of habit again.

As mentioned earlier, the "reason that thinks of the country" is more necessary than the "heart that thinks of the country." Because the heart that thinks of the country centers on the Confucianists' "cultivating the self and regulating the family," he says instead to think more globally and that it is necessary to cultivate the "reason that thinks of the country."

The public opinion of Western countries is more noble than the individual talent of each person, and they engage in theories and actions that seem beyond their character. Fukuzawa says this in response to Mill's point that the greatness of England lies in its capacity for cooperation, and in that sense, its public opinion is superior. Fukuzawa discusses the public opinion of Eastern countries as "those who utter foolish theories unsuited to their wisdom and exhaust themselves in unsuited clumsiness" (Vol. 2, Chapter 5).

Regarding the difference in habits, the method of public deliberation "has formed its custom through the habits of generations since tens or hundreds of years ago" (ibid.), and it has become a folkway. "Reaching today, they do things without knowing." He says that habit, when the same thing is done for a long time, becomes a second nature, and one does things unconsciously. This itself is "Habit is second nature," but habit is not nature or natural. It is artificial, something made by people. Therefore, the possibility of change is higher than in nature.

Nature is something that cannot be changed for the time being. Therefore, he distinguishes between the issues of nature and artifice. Thus, he points out that Mill's "despotism of custom" is a characteristic of the East, and Mill says that it is an eternal yesterday and that Eastern countries have no history. However, in another aspect, Mill preaches the significance of "the steady habit." He says that if the correction of errors and certainty are habituated, one can reach certain perception rather than being a mental slave.

Fukuzawa sighs that the reason Japanese people do not do so is that they are "controlled by the habit of no-discussion, content with an improper peace, not opening the mouths that should be opened, and not raising the arguments that should be raised" (ibid.). Therefore, he criticizes this and suggests habituating discussion to make judgments of things certain.

He continues, "Contending for profit was a forbidden phrase for the ancients, but contending for profit is precisely contending for reason" (ibid.). Contending for profit has a broad meaning including the profit of interests, but in the world of Confucianism, it generally has a negative image. Therefore, many Confucianists have a bad image of profit. However, looking at civilized countries, that is not the case. Contending for profit is also something that accords with reason.

As a concrete example, Adam Smith enriches the country in a way that accords with reason by appealing to self-interest. And Buckle argues that this brought about free trade and ended wars. Fukuzawa also focuses on that. Therefore, it is no good if there is "no spirit to discuss the interests of the region as a person of a nation," so "unless there is the courage to value the honor or disgrace of oneself as a single individual, discussing anything is merely useless." The honor or disgrace of a single individual is what Mill calls "the sense of dignity." This becomes the momentum for self-respect, or "independence and self-respect."

There, Fukuzawa says, "Since it was lost due to habit, the method of recovering it also cannot be achieved unless it is due to habit." Here, it is important to change habits. In that case, things like individuality as Mill says are important, and such people will initiate new habits and perform wise acts.

Now let us consider the "Distinction between Intellect and Virtue" (Vol. 3, Chapter 6), which is said to have applied Buckle's "History of Civilization," the main subject for today. According to someone who researched the draft of An Outline of a Theory of Civilization, it is pointed out that Fukuzawa took considerable pains to write the "Distinction between Intellect and Virtue."

As I mentioned earlier, civilization is mental progress. He asserted that moral and intellectual are essential. A person like Buckle is hardly read today, but at the time he was enormously influential, reaching even literary giants like Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is sometimes called a thinker who was read instantly and disappeared instantly, but he was also a disciple of Mill, and in that sense, I think there is also Mill's influence. In Mill's case, he emphasizes virtue rather than moral.

In any case, I think this is an analysis using the existing Chinese-derived term "intellect and virtue" (chito-ku) unique to Fukuzawa. As far as I have seen, there is no such analytical theory in Buckle. Fukuzawa there divides moral as the etiquette of the heart into private virtue and public virtue. Private virtue belongs to the inner heart, such as chastity, purity, humility, and honesty. Public virtue belongs to human intercourse and society, such as a sense of shame, fairness, impartiality, and bravery. I think this comes from Mill's theory of private and public virtue. Mill refers to private virtue as self-regarding virtues and public virtue as social regarding virtues, and since Fukuzawa translates social as "within jinkan kosai (society)," I think he is capturing Mill's intention. Mill does not look down on self-regarding virtues but argues that they are secondary compared to social virtues.

Of course, there is also the term social morality, and Mill also uses the morality of private life, but Mill skillfully divides them into self-regarding virtues and social regarding virtues. I think it can be said that Fukuzawa clarified a distinction not found in Buckle by making use of "The Great Learning," "The Doctrine of the Mean," etc., with reference to Mill.

And for "intellect," he defines it as "the function of thinking about things, understanding things, and comprehending things" (Vol. 3, Chapter 6), and divides this into two: "private intellect: the function of investigating the reason of things and applying it" and "public intellect: the function of discerning the weight and size of human affairs, putting the important and large first and the light and small later, and observing the time and place." The terms private intellect and public intellect themselves exist as traditional Chinese-derived words. Fukuzawa makes good use of them. At that time, I think Fukuzawa probably applied Mill's "regarding" to "intellect" as well.

Originally, the Chinese-derived term private intellect meant "unfair wisdom, narrow thinking" and appears in works like "Han Feizi." Or Zhu Xi also said, "Exerting the heart does not destroy private intellect." In that sense, it belongs to the private domain. And "public intellect" in traditional usage means "the meaning of being well-known in the world."

What is important is Fukuzawa's idea that in moving from the peace of barbarism to the peace of civilization, one must expand "private intellect and private virtue" into "public intellect and public virtue." In that case, the function of "so-mei ei-chi" (recognition of external things and internal thoughtfulness) is necessary. This is a phrase that appears in "The Doctrine of the Mean." Therefore, the "highest sage of the world" ultimately reaches public intellect and public virtue through this wisdom. This is the "great virtue" that appears in Chinese-derived terms. In that sense, great virtue and wisdom are in an inseparable relationship.

As examples of the function of public intellect, Fukuzawa cites Watt's steam engine and Adam Smith's economics. He says these are examples of how wisdom completely changed the face of the world. Furthermore, as an example of possessing both intellect and virtue, he says that Clarkson, who abolished the evil law of the slave trade, used intellect as a tool to expand virtue—that is, he became a bearer of public virtue. He also argues that Howard, who worked to improve the abuse of prisoners, was the same. Clarkson and Howard are figures he took up in "Doumou Kyousou" (Lessons for the Young), but I think he brought them up again to explain public intellect and public virtue in an easy-to-understand way.

Fukuzawa considers that in Japan, morality (tokugi) is regarded as an individual's private virtue that exists within, possessed by a passive person. Also, as Mill says, as a general theory, the doctrine of passive obedience in Christian morality is negative rather than positive, and moralists and the general sympathy of humans find it easier to accept being passive.

However, Fukuzawa argues that the function of wisdom must be active. Fukuzawa noted in a section of Mill's "Utilitarianism" that especially those who learn must be active. Or, Fukuzawa first translated Chambers's "Political Economy," and there too he learned the meaning of active.

Though not from Buckle, he says that morality has not changed since ancient times and does not progress. Fukuzawa says this in response to comparing the Ten Commandments and the Five Relationships—Moses' Ten Commandments and Christian morality with the Five Relationships in the Analects.

However, wisdom is such that "once a physical law is invented and told to people, it immediately moves the hearts of a nation, or if the invention is great, the power of one person can completely change the face of the entire world" (Vol. 3, Chapter 6). The efficacy of private virtue is narrow, while the function of wisdom is broad. He asserts things like "Morality expands its territory and emits its light according to the function of wisdom."

Morality is affection and not a rule. However, the issue of rules arises in wisdom. That is for the purpose of organizing the order of things, on the premise of human error, for the purpose of preventing human evil; to control the evil hearts of people, rules are after all necessary, and that is a matter of wisdom.

However, since Fukuzawa possesses binocularism, he does not completely ignore private virtue. In "Gakumon no susume" written around the same time, there is a sentence using a very interesting expression, "Inventory of Intellect, Virtue, and Business" (Part 14). Also, "Do not forget the private virtue of benevolence while intoxicated by the public opinion of economy" (same part). It means you must not forget private virtue. So while the power of intellect and virtue certainly cannot be fully measured by calculability, he preaches the inventory, giving the reason that it is the same as the power of muscles and bones and is not unmeasurable. He says, "In one year, I did these things," and that includes the matter of wisdom.

Mill said that pleasure is a matter of quality. Also, there is the question of whether calculability is truly possible. Bentham puts calculability at the forefront with "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Certainly, Fukuzawa says that although the power of intellect and virtue cannot be measured by balance and measure, it is the same as the power of muscles and bones and is not unmeasurable, and he preaches the inventory with reasons.

What happens if one forgets private virtue? In Confucianism, there was a school of study in Japan that emphasized "governing the state and bringing peace to the world" within "cultivating the self, regulating the family, governing the state, and bringing peace to the world." That is the Sorai school. The Sorai school discusses only the affairs of the world and the state and ignores the theory of private virtue. Matsudaira Sadanobu decided that this would not do and valued Neo-Confucianism as the orthodox study through the Kansei Prohibition of Heterodox Studies. The Sorai school asserted the inherent nature of politics as distinguished from ethics and criticized the moralism of the unity of church and state. I believe that Masao Maruyama's writing of his assistant thesis explaining the significance of the Sorai school during the war, with the critique of the moralism of the unity of church and state in mind, also had Fukuzawa's awareness of the problem.

However, being able to correct errors through inventory is a matter of the dignity of humans as intellectual beings, which Mill emphasizes. As humans are called the soul of all things, they can notice their own errors and correct them. That is important. I think Fukuzawa is saying "Inventory of Intellect, Virtue, and Business" including such points.

I will touch slightly on the ambivalence of virtue. It is the issue of the difference between moral and virtue. In some cases, both are called the same "virtue" (toku), but it seems that not only Mill but also Fukuzawa knew the difference in nuance between the two. Moral comes from mores, which essentially has customs and folkways as its etymology. At that time, "moral science" was often used, and this term also included the meaning of "social science." On the other hand, virtue originates from individual bravery. Virtue is used in the sense of morality for participating in a political community.

In the draft of Fukuzawa's An Outline of a Theory of Civilization, he says "passive virtue," so the reason he did not use morality there is probably because Fukuzawa was aware of the idea of virtue. Thus, when considering the dignity that is an individual human quality, he uses virtue. And the existence that can correct errors is also virtue.

In conclusion, the constant cultivation toward possessing both intellect and virtue is the essence of civilization for Fukuzawa. That is, "to polish wisdom and cultivate virtue to rise to a noble position for humans." This spirit also exists in Mill's "On Liberty," and Fukuzawa values it very highly. He says that humans must be noble.

As for what nobility is, Fukuzawa wrote "noble feeling" in his notes on Mill's "Utilitarianism." I believe that this "noble feeling" is where Fukuzawa's thought comes out most clearly. The following is that note:

Noble feeling, or the noble spirit, is the same as a young plant and easily disappears due to social status. However, if you think about it well, it does not wither away completely. Interacting with people awakens the noble feeling. Therefore, he says that to strive to cultivate it, people need to associate with each other as human beings. This note on Mill's "Utilitarianism" is also used on the cover of my book "The Intellectual Sources of Yukichi Fukuzawa," and I think it represents Fukuzawa's view of Mill, or Fukuzawa's own thinking, very well. It is also a matter of qualitative pleasure. Pleasure is a matter of quality; this was also in Fukuzawa's mind. At the same time, Fukuzawa had in mind the beginning of the "Analects": friends who studied together coming from afar to meet, not minding the distance. Is it not a joy? To talk without getting angry even if not known by others. "Is he not a junzi (gentleman)?" The English translator translates it as "true gentleman." A true gentleman is a possessor of noble feeling. Fukuzawa's interpretation of the "Analects" is a difficult problem, but I think this is an easy-to-understand example.

Reflecting on what was learned and occasionally meeting fellow alumni or people one once studied with to confirm the noble spirit, the noble feeling. Such things are important. It is important for those who were fellow alumni or those who studied together to meet and cultivate the noble feeling anew. That is social interaction. Fukuzawa often speaks of the necessity of social interaction, and this is a part of it.

In Part 17, the final chapter of Gakumon no susume, it says, "As a person, do not have a blind prejudice against people." It can be interpreted as saying that any person has a desire to be noble, so you should associate with them. It may indeed require effort to reach nobility. Nowadays, there might be a sense that it is a bit uncool to make an effort to become noble, but Fukuzawa repeatedly asserts that the human world must level up. That is true even for schools. Leveling up is necessary everywhere. Noble feeling is sometimes translated as aristocratic spirit, but he is saying that it is necessary to level up in every field.

jinkan kosai (society) is necessary in that sense. Guizot and Mill also emphasize this. Therefore, Fukuzawa also learned that greatly and emphasizes it.

As mentioned in the President's talk, I believe that reading An Outline of a Theory of Civilization today is becoming increasingly important, especially looking at recent international affairs. There, I want people to think about what reason is. What is the reason that is internationally valid? It is fine to pursue national interests through deals, but is that in accord with reason? Unless we think about such things, it will truly become a world of the law of the jungle. To prevent that, I believe there is much to learn from An Outline of a Theory of Civilization.

Thank you very much for your kind attention.

  (This article is based on a commemorative lecture given at the 191st Yukichi Fukuzawa Birthday Commemoration held on January 10, 2026. The original text of Yukichi Fukuzawa was based on the "Collected Works of Yukichi Fukuzawa" (Keio University Press).)