[Feature: Rethinking "Exclusionism"] Roundtable: What Can We See from the Structure of "Foreigner Issues"?

Today, I would like to discuss with everyone the movement in Japan referred to as "exclusionism." It feels as though Japan's political landscape has completely changed since around the Upper House election in July. The phrase "Japanese First" has gained attention, and political parties like Sanseito, along with the people responding to them, have begun to make overtly exclusionist claims. The so-called "foreigner problem" suddenly became a political point of contention and spread throughout society.

And just when one might have thought society would regain some calm after the election, a phenomenon as difficult to understand by common sense as the JICA Africa Hometown controversy occurred. Unfortunately, over the past six months, the mediascape and social conditions surrounding the word exclusionism have transformed, and I feel I am doing my best just to keep up.

However, this is of course not limited to Japan. Needless to say, there was the Trump administration in the US, and before that, so-called far-right exclusionist movements in Europe, starting with Germany. I also wonder if Japan has ended up in a similar situation to other countries, in a bad sense. I think there is also a perspective of how Japan's exclusionist situation is positioned within these global trends.

First of all, Mr. Ito, how do you perceive the situation in Japan today?

In April of this year, I appeared on an NHK documentary program that dealt with the issue of Kurdish exclusion. This was before Sanseito became a major topic, but in terms of the flow, something strange has been happening since 2023.

Of course, there were historical revisionist movements centered around Zaitokukai (Association of Citizens against the Special Privileges of the Zainichi) before that, but those were localized movements. However, once the Kurdish issue began in April 2023, there were approximately 26 million posts on X over two years, which is a figure on a completely different scale than before.

For comparison, the JICA Hometown controversy generated 4 million posts in one month. This is a kind of panic phenomenon, and I see it as a movement clearly different from previous historical revisionist or cultural approaches.

Analyzing online posts about the Kurdish issue, it repeats periods of "flaming" (online backlash) and periods of calm. During the flaming periods, issues of crime and public safety are always raised. There are many stories about anxieties regarding safety, such as a disturbance caused at a hospital or a crime being committed.

The calm periods are also very characteristic, focusing entirely on money—specifically, where their tax money is going. Stories like the Red Feather Community Chest being used for Kurds, or subsidies of 340,000 yen per month being given out. In this way, dissatisfaction over money and anxiety over safety are repeatedly discussed. Unlike the Zaitokukai-style historical or comfort women issues, many of these stories feel real to ordinary people. Based on those movements, we see the activities of Sanseito and the JICA controversy.

So, what was happening back in 2023? It was actually the depreciation of the yen. As the yen weakened to historic levels from 2022 onwards, foreign tourists and investors began pouring in. Under Abenomics, policies to promote inbound tourism were advanced, actively bringing in workers, investors, and tourists.

Compared to 2012, before Abenomics began, inbound travelers increased 4.4 times in ten years. Foreign workers also more than tripled, and the stock of investment has nearly tripled. Meanwhile, the percentage of Japanese people going abroad has decreased by 30%.

As foreigners enter alongside the weak yen, there are actually more complaints on social media about investment and tourism than about labor or immigration issues. The economy improved with the weak yen, leading to a cycle of yen depreciation, high stock prices, wage hikes, and inflation. Perhaps within that, people's status became bifurcated. It split between those who could benefit from the weak yen, high stocks, and wage hikes, and those for whom the weak yen meant nothing but hardship in daily life.

Collateral evidence for this is the "Dismantle the Ministry of Finance" protests occurring since this period. These also began in 2023 and spread significantly from December 2024. It is as if they are keeping pace with exclusionism. Since around this spring, the "Dismantle the Ministry of Finance" protests have also been taken over by Sanseito and have begun to advocate for things like the exclusion of foreigners.

The people gathering there are often those struggling with life, such as freelancers or the self-employed. While everyone initially said the Ministry of Finance was to blame, they have started saying that foreigners are to blame.

In this way, from around 2023, the extreme depreciation of the yen caused a bifurcation of the middle class. Within that, people receiving only the disadvantages of the weak yen began saying things like foreign investors and tourists are buying up luxury condos or water source lands, and calling to "Protect Japan." And because Sanseito turned these into an agenda, it spread massively this year. That is roughly the flow as I see it.

That was an excellent summary to start with, creating a foundation for our discussion. Hearing Mr. Ito's talk just now, what do you think, Mr. Mochizuki?

I felt once again that the times have truly changed all at once.

In Japan, in addition to the so-called "old-comers" originating from former colonial rule, people called "new-comers" have increased since around the 1990s. It was 2017 when I started "Nippon Complex Journey" with people from the certified NPO Japan Association for Refugees, but compared to the high level of interest in the recent Upper House election, I think there was relatively little interest, whether from the right or the left. That is precisely why I started the initiative, hoping to convey that people of various roots are living in Japan.

Compared to that time, I feel that the themes of immigration and foreigners being featured in various media has increased considerably, but at the same time, I think representations that lead to bad forms—the current exclusionist forms—have also increased. From the standpoint of someone who has put out various messages, I feel very sad and regretful.

I also feel that the changes recently, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic, have been very large. As Mr. Ito said, there are parts where society has changed structurally due to the weak yen and inflation. Additionally, what is important in Japan's case is that the acceptance of foreign workers has been promoted under LDP-Komeito administrations, such as the Abe administration.

While accelerating acceptance through programs like Technical Intern Training and Specified Skilled Worker, they suppressed movements from some more right-wing politicians and supporters who ideologically do not favor the acceptance of foreigners and asked, "What about that?"

However, recently, because the LDP itself has become very weak, it seems they can no longer suppress the parts they previously held back. It is a phenomenon where some people who originally voted for the LDP are flowing to the more right-wing Sanseito, while at the same time, the LDP is losing a large number of seats.

If Sanseito had only won, say, two seats in this election, I don't think the attention on themes like immigration and foreigners would have risen this much. But when radical claims gain a certain level of legitimacy through opinion polls and election results, an atmosphere is created where other parties feel they must also say something about that issue, and the whole shifts further to the right in the form of "we are doing what we can too."

The weakening of existing parties and the growth of more right-wing parties or political forces is a global phenomenon, and I think there are similarities to the Republican Party in the US and the situation in various European countries. Recently, the LDP president and Prime Minister changed to Sanae Takaichi, who is trying to pull the group that once left for the right back to the side of the existing party.

In addition, when looking at this situation, we tend to focus on people who have a strong "accelerator" for discriminatory feelings and exclusionism, but I think we also need to pay attention to people whose "brakes" are not working. For example, even if they are slightly concerned about the exclusionist parts of a Trump or Takaichi administration, there might be quite a few people in the group who think, "Well, it's fine because stock prices will go up."

Even in the US, there are a fair number of people among Republican supporters who think the strict crackdown on immigrants by ICE (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement) is going too far, yet Trump's approval rating does not drop significantly. They feel it can't be helped if the rights and freedoms of people they have drawn a line against as "different from themselves" are restricted. I am also concerned about the spread of that kind of sensibility.

What about you, Mr. Hayashi?

Since the Abe administration, the policy of not taking an "immigration policy" that leads to the permanent settlement of foreigners has been inherited by each administration. From the perspective of the citizens, there is likely a feeling that before they knew it... the number of foreign residents was nearly 4 million, and permanent residents exceeded 900,000. I believe the responsibility of the government is not small for fostering a simple sense of discomfort or a feeling of being deceived among the public, like "Wait, there are this many?"

As a Zainichi Korean ("Zainichi"), it is poignant that the target of hatred, which was consistently us until the 2010s, has shifted in a landslide toward Zainichi Kurds and, by extension, Chinese people. Even looking at hate speech, conspiracy-theory-driven slander that Zainichi once received is now being directed at other foreigners. I feel a literal sense of déjà vu.

In the 2010s, hate speech and protests occurred one after another in Tsuruhashi, Shin-Okubo, Kawasaki, and other areas. With the Hate Speech Elimination Act passed in 2016 and hate speech on the streets targeting Zainichi becoming less prominent, is the pattern that they have jumped onto a new target?

If that's the case, it wouldn't be strange if people grew even more tired of Zainichi. The term Zainichi mainly refers to Special Permanent Residents, and while other permanent residents are increasing, our number is well below 300,000 and will not increase. Yet, if you open X and search for "Zainichi," a horrifying string of words meets your eyes.

Even in the "Dismantle the Ministry of Finance" protests, there were scenes where conspiracies involving the Ministry of Finance and Zainichi were linked. It's a comedy at this point. It's as if the subculture of "Zainichi certification"—labeling people or organizations you don't like as Zainichi—has gained legitimate citizenship. During this year's Upper House election, it didn't even become major news when the leader of Sanseito uttered a typical discriminatory word once directed at Zainichi.

People have become accustomed to swimming in a sea of hate speech, but I feel it's dangerous. Even if it's a comedy, I absolutely want to distance myself from laughter obtained by oppressing people and making them a public sacrifice.

Regarding the hate surrounding Kurds, Mr. Ito mentioned that 2023 is a starting point. In that year, the 100th anniversary of the Great Kanto Earthquake, Chief Cabinet Secretary Matsuno stated that no records could be found within the government regarding the massacre of Koreans during the earthquake. As has already been pointed out, this view is inaccurate. Also, at the end of that year, a Nissin Foods commercial featuring a celebrity with Korean roots faced a backlash, and a boycott was called for.

There are not a few exclusionists who are emboldened by the attitude of the government or local municipalities that can be taken as historical denial. While the number of Zainichi decreases, I am observing a somewhat ironic situation where "Zainichi certification" is consumed as if it were an Oogiri (improv comedy game) and naked hate speech flies around the internet.

Certainly, "Japanese First" contains the intention to smoke out others by saying, "You're not actually Japanese, are you?" The so-called Zainichi-certification logic is visible beneath the surface. I think there is a very strong discursive continuity there.

On the other hand, as Mr. Mochizuki said, it is also true that the brakes are no longer working. Of course, there have always been people running wild, but there may be an aspect where the situation has become such that no one can apply the brakes.

Mr. Mori, you have been staying in Europe for a while and have just returned; what did you think of the situation in Japan?

The situation in Japan was reported quite a bit in Europe, and I thought things had become quite intense. Upon returning, I felt there were changes beyond my imagination. Foreign nationals among my friends, colleagues, and students are feeling very terrified. They told me that things have truly changed and it's very scary, which led me to understand the seriousness.

What really surprised me was that so many different people are joining the controversy. I think there is the issue of volume that Mr. Ito mentioned earlier, but I feel there has been some kind of qualitative change.

The expansion of exclusionism has been happening in France for over 40 years. Discussion on this issue tends to gather around the feelings of those who lean toward exclusionism, but on the other hand, I feel we need to more properly discuss the impact on those targeted by exclusionism—the victims and those who could become victims—and the fear they feel.

In other words, I feel we must place the discussion of how to support those who are fearful due to exclusionism at the center and think about it more than ever. In Europe, research has revealed that as exclusionist discourse spreads, those targeted by exclusionism suffer truly immeasurable damage in terms of mental health, physical health, and life planning.

Also, even when we say exclusionism, it is necessary to note that not all foreigners become targets of attack. I live in Kyoto and feel the power of inbound tourism keenly, but recently, the central area has become a playground for tourists from the West, and there are shops with no local customers at all. Now, if you ask whether exclusionists attack those white tourists, that is not necessarily the case. Exclusionist feelings tend to be directed toward people placed in weak positions within so-called racial relations or various power dynamics.

Earlier, Mr. Ito mentioned the connection with the "Dismantle the Ministry of Finance" protests. When we say exclusionism, it is generally thought to be a view that people or things coming from abroad are a threat to one's own country, but that perception is not sufficient. When exclusionists say "Japanese First," care is needed regarding the point that the "Japanese" included there does not mean everyone with Japanese nationality.

The targets of French exclusionists are some immigrants, people who defend immigrants, the left wing, and the poor. From that perspective, the welfare bashing that spread in Japan around the 2010s can also be considered continuous with the exclusionism spreading now. In other words, it is necessary to understand that exclusionism does not only exclude foreigners, but is an ideology that creates and tries to exclude internal enemies, and that includes Japanese people as well.

I think many different points have been raised. First, I would like to ask about the perspective of the parties involved. Certainly, it is not only foreign nationals who feel fear; as you just said, there are people who can become targets in various ways.

The impact also extends to people who have Japanese nationality but are told they are "not truly Japanese" or are categorized as "not patriots." I think there are psychological and actual negative effects on people who might be told, "You're not actually Japanese, are you?" Mr. Mochizuki, what do you think?

As Mr. Hayashi also said, while there are recent changes, Japan was originally a cold society, and from the perspective of the parties involved, I think the fear felt at various times has always existed. Even within the same category of "foreigner," appearances and experiences differ from person to person, but individual experiences—such as no one sitting in the seat next to them on the train or receiving various forms of verbal violence—have existed unchanged for a long time. On top of that, in the current social media situation, attacks and hate against immigrants and foreigners are more easily visualized, increasing the negative impact on the parties involved.

In addition, for example, in the 2010s, I think there were many people on the majority side who used social media to understand the circumstances of minorities and the situation of discrimination and to stand against it together. However, there is likely a trend where some of those people are attacked with things like "What's behind you taking the side of foreigners?" and are gradually exiting.

I think it's unavoidable that not everyone can continue to speak out continuously, but to the parties involved, it may look—at least on social media—as if enemies are increasing while allies are not.

Even within the same majority, there are those who step hard on the accelerator of exclusionism and those whose brakes don't work that well. And there are those who want to apply the brakes but fear wins out, and those who continue to step on the brakes. I think we need to think about how to change the situation where the nature of such structures is shifting in a bad direction overall.

There are people who might fall silent amidst the backlash. It means it's becoming difficult to stand in an ally-like position.

I'd like to ask Mr. Ito here: we often hear stories of someone close suddenly becoming exclusionist or starting to engage in "Neto-uyo" (internet far-right) behavior. How should we think about this?

On another TV program, they are doing a project about parents becoming Neto-uyo. These cases are truly common, and it's not just parents but children too. In other words, the fact that this many right-wing racists have appeared on the streets means they are naturally inside the home as well.

When conducting interviews, I find that circumstances within the home are a major factor. There are examples where someone became right-wing in rebellion because their parents were left-wing, or where a father lost his place in the house because both his wife and daughter were feminists and he became a racist. Isolation within the home is quite often the cause.

I feel that our future battle should be fought not on the streets but within the home. Moreover, this is not a battle but a dialogue. Why do they feel that way within the home? We need to have proper discussions one by one and continue the dialogue while understanding each other within the family.

Actually, the Sanseito-style agenda is very strong. In short, there are many arguments that emphasize being "ordinary people." It's a logic that says, "You, who are ordinary people, are suffering because of some cause."

For example, Sanseito has many supporters among housewives, and they say things like, "It's okay to be a full-time housewife." They say, "You, an ordinary Japanese person, are having a hard time but you are not wrong. I will help you," emphasizing that they are normal, decent, and in the middle, giving them confidence. Then, isolated people easily take that at face value.

Sanseito's agenda is originally quite left-wing on the surface. The entry points are very decent, such as doing proactive fiscal policy or giving 100,000 yen for childcare. Then, they turn it into a story about how decent things are being attacked by those around them. Stories like foreigners invading Japan, filling it with mega-solar panels, and hijacking Japan's energy. Quite a few people think, "That's right." Such phenomena are happening within the home. It's not a story of suddenly becoming far-right.

We are the only ones who think Sanseito is far-right. The people themselves don't think they are right-wing or exclusionist at all. They just want to protect their safe lives because they are being threatened. And they are being made to feel that they are being treated unfairly in various ways and are isolated.

This kind of thing is deeply permeating "ordinary people." Then a specific influencer links it to racism and hypes it up, and everyone attacks the target. Extremely ordinary people are doing this quite normally.

The supporters are truly ordinary people. It's a phenomenon happening among the self-employed who have no place to turn, or those who are isolated within their families. When viewed collectively, it looks like exclusionism. In fact, victims are produced, but in the hearts of each individual, they don't intend to be attacking. That is the truly terrifying part.

Attacks incited by influencers stem from the sense of agency within each perpetrator, but the agency of the victim is not seen at all. They think they are doing something normal and natural. They have no imagination at all for what that will mean for the victim. After all, the complex agency of the victim is not visible on social media.

When you listen to people at Sanseito town meetings, they say things like, "We're doing club activities." People without a network gather because it saves them. That accumulates and takes this form. Racists don't exist from the start.

I feel that what prevents actions leading to such harm is dialogue within the family or dialogue with neighbors.

Mr. Mori, hearing that, how does it compare with the situation in France or Europe?

I listened with empathy to the point that they are not exclusionists or racists from the start. I think that is important as a starting point for making the current situation even slightly better.

The situation in France has many different cases. Last year, I also wrote in Iwanami's "Sekai" that support for the far-right is spreading even in rural areas. In order to survive in declining regions and secure a place in the community, being far-right becomes proof of being a decent human being.

On the other hand, compared to 40 years ago, the mainstreaming of the far-right has progressed significantly in France. Within that, it is important to capture the point that anti-immigrant policies and exclusionism advocated by the far-right have permeated the central government, which traditionally criticized the far-right.

What is recently drawing attention in France is that so-called billionaires who support far-right ideology are expanding their influence in the media. For example, Vincent Bolloré has been acquiring media outlets one after another, and discourse that never appeared in major French media before is becoming commonplace. By buying up TV stations, radio stations, and major publishing groups, he is expanding far-right influence on the media. I think this also connects with the billionaires within American Trumpism, and we cannot overlook this "exclusionism from above" through the media.

Speaking of "exclusionism from above," exclusionism by the state is also an important point. In France, Muslims from former colonies have been continuously targeted by exclusionism. Until a certain period, policies were carried out as if there were good Muslims who assimilate into France and those who do not, but the situation changed significantly after the 2015 simultaneous terrorist attacks.

To give one example, there was a civic group called the Collective Against Islamophobia in France that counted the number of cases of discrimination against Muslims. It was not radical at all; it simply compiled discrimination data and supported the legal battles of those who suffered discrimination. However, a few years ago, that group was forced to dissolve by the state.

In this way, it is also important to see the pattern where exclusionism from above by major media and the state gives a stamp of approval to grassroots exclusionism. In fact, as state exclusionism strengthens in France, hate crimes such as the murder of a believer at a mosque have occurred this year as well.

Indeed, in Japan as well, while the government claims to distance itself from exclusionism under the name of an "orderly symbiotic society with foreigners," it is moving forward with the exclusion of foreigners deemed not to contribute to the national interest. Also, the keyword "dog whistle" by politicians is drawing attention.

I'd like to ask Mr. Hayashi: the discrimination and exclusionism within the family that Mr. Ito mentioned have been ubiquitous themes in the reality lived by Zainichi Koreans, as represented by marriage discrimination. Looking at the history Zainichi have walked so far, how should we think about the previous talk of people who have difficulties in family relationships regaining their sense of self through something like club activities, which then leads to exclusionism?

I studied at Japanese public schools for elementary, middle, and high school. In my childhood, I was lectured by relatives to learn the Korean language properly and to heighten my ethnic consciousness. I hated that so much that I spent my teens avoiding "things that are Korean."

Looking at the current situation of Zainichi based on that experience, I feel that the opportunities for Zainichi, who have been continuously exposed to exclusionist words and actions, to be made aware... of being Korean are increasing. While some may not have been very conscious of being Korean, some may fundamentally re-examine it. In order not to lose to stingy hate speech, it wouldn't be strange for someone to try to reconstruct their ethnic identity. Whether that is good or bad is another matter, but for young Zainichi who are proficient with social media at their fingertips, painful situations continue.

As long as one bears the politics of a country, "Japan First" is rather natural, but when "Japanese-First" becomes a point of contention, my heart wavers. The problem is that the proposals put forward under that slogan are more or less based on conspiracy theories or misinformation. Things like foreigners "sucking up public money" or that over 30% of households receiving welfare are foreign nationals (actually less than 3%)... the list is endless.

I am a Zainichi Korean who once changed from "Chosen" (Korean) registration to South Korean registration. Hate speech certainly hurts, but if I may say so without fear of being misunderstood, I am prepared for the hurt. I want to maintain the mental leeway to dryly observe the times, thinking, "A novel phrase has been added to the long list of hate speech that has flown around in postwar Japan!"

What I feel most poignantly is the situation of children of mixed roots who are native Japanese speakers and have grown up as Japanese under Japanese nationality. I think many children will have increased existential anxiety, wondering, "Am I included in the 'Japanese' of Japanese First?"

Sanseito's draft for a new constitution (Article 19) includes a discriminatory clause regarding "naturalized" Japanese people. There are people who seem likely to fall through the cracks of the "ordinary" Japanese people imagined by those who advocate Japanese First. I can only imagine the sense of urgency felt by those people who are being recklessly incited. Probably many people go about their daily lives pretending to be as energetic as usual. But they might be living days where they breathe a sigh of relief only when they get home. Because casual sympathizers of Japanese First and exclusionism are naturally within their living spheres as well.

I myself was once a deliberate "assimilationist." Even now, I live every day hand-in-hand with Japanese people, and as a citizen even if not a national, I don't want to easily give up on Japan. People who seem likely to fall through the cracks of ordinary Japanese might also be somehow living through a kind of halfway position, days of being neither here nor there. In an era where ethnic identity easily becomes radicalized and one is pressed to make things black and white, I believe we must support those who maintain such a stoic middle ground.

You say halfway, but that is exactly what so-called "symbiosis" has aimed for. Not swinging toward counter-discourse, and of course not exclusionism, but aiming for something in between. I also feel very strongly that it is becoming increasingly difficult to have the sense to positively evaluate that "halfway-ness."

Many students of mixed roots take my classes at Keio, and I feel that the moments where their difficulty in living is glimpsed through their remarks in class, assignment reports, and expressions while listening to lectures have increased.

How do you feel, Mr. Mochizuki?

The word and concept of "Japanese" is polysemic, and there are times when the institutional parts like Japanese nationality and the image parts regarding appearance and language overlap or do not overlap.

On top of that, considering the reality of the changes happening in Japanese society, I think we must first make it possible to broaden the scope of "Japanese" in the sense of Japanese nationality. The current Nationality Law is based on jus sanguinis (right of blood), so children of foreign parents are not granted Japanese nationality even if they are born in Japan. We must move toward broadening this, and other countries, for example Germany, have changed in that way.

In Japan, even before realizing such institutional changes, something like Sanseito has already appeared at that stage. In the US, Trump says he wants to end jus soli (right of the soil) and is trying to turn back the clock, but institutionally, Japan is where that clock has already been turned back to.

Sanseito has even started saying things like people should not be allowed to become civil servants until three generations have passed since naturalization. In Japan, where the original foundation starts from a low point, if we adopt the backlash trends spreading in the world, there is a possibility that the situation will become even worse. Regarding the nature of exclusionism from above, there is concern that in Japan, too, policy changes might occur due to far-right parties like Sanseito putting pressure on the government and ruling party from an outsider position. At the same time, as in the US, if the far-right enters the very center of power and various policies are directly executed, I feel—looking at American society now—that the impact is on a completely different scale.

Recently, Charlie Kirk, a conservative activist very close to the Trump administration, was assassinated, and after that, the administration side picked up people who wrote critical things about Kirk on social media and is trying to silence them by attacking them by name in a dog-whistle fashion. In addition, they go as far as using state power directly by firing government employees for the same reason or, if the speaker is a foreigner, taking away their visa.

It was truly fast for the US to come this far. Not even a year has passed since Trump's second term began, but the Trump administration is showing that they can do this much in that short period, and that even so, a certain level of support remains unshaken. In Japan, too, I am concerned about movements trying to cause similar changes, saying that things are going well in the US in this way.

To summarize the discussion so far, exclusionism has two aspects: one where people who consider themselves "ordinary" seek recovery from a certain kind of hardship in life, and another where organizers, influencers, politicians, or billionaires skillfully incite and mobilize them. Analytically, it is necessary to distinguish between the two. We must not view it monolithically, thinking it's all the far-right, or conversely, that it's all just ordinary people.

In addition, we need to consider both how to engage in dialogue with the everyday exclusionism of people who think of themselves as "ordinary," and how to counter the exclusionism that is carried out institutionally.

Therefore, I would like to move the conversation toward what kind of clues or directions for a breakthrough might exist for coexistence.

At the beginning, Mr. Ito mentioned that when things flare up, there is a sense of anxiety about safety or public order, and when things are calm, welfare chauvinism emerges. I believe the issues of security and welfare exclusionism are trends that emerged in Europe, but in places like France, there is also a long history of people resisting them. Ms. Mori, what is the current situation and strategy for those countering exclusionism in France?

Hearing Mr. Shiobara's summary, I have two points. In current politics, for example, the Trump administration took power in the US, and in France, the far-right holds significant influence in parliament. However, at the same time, I feel there is a slight gap between this political situation and society.

In France, the National Consultative Commission on Human Rights, which has conducted annual panel surveys since the 90s, releases a report every year measuring the tolerance index. What's interesting is that compared to 35 years ago when the survey began, while the far-right has clearly expanded its power politically, the results show that tolerance toward others is higher now than it was in the 90s.

For example, in response to questions about whether one would accept their child marrying a Black person or whether foreigners should be granted the right to vote, the index was 50 in the early 90s, but in 2022, when the far-right made a huge leap in France, it reached a record high of 68. It is interesting that the vote share of political parties and society do not necessarily show the same movement.

There was mention of the increasing number of young people with mixed roots in Japan. In fact, in France as well, compared to 50 years ago, international marriages have increased, and the number of people with mixed roots has grown exponentially. While the power of exclusionist parties is expanding, in society, the reality is that couples of different races, such as Black and white, are becoming commonplace. I think this overlaps with the reality in Japan to some extent.

When we have discussions in university classes, some students speak out boldly with exclusionist remarks. But at the same time, there are students who think deeply about coexistence and anti-discrimination—to the point where I wonder if I could have thought that thoroughly when I was a student—and students with diverse roots who speak from completely different angles.

Secondly, Mr. Ito mentioned the gap between those who profited from the weak yen and those who did not. Currently, in large metropolitan areas, real estate prices have truly risen, and the housing shortage is becoming serious. I think the dismantling of the middle class is a major issue.

I believe exclusionist politics can attract people at a very low cost, but at the same time, movements seeking social policies that can improve people's living conditions are also occurring at the metropolitan level. I am particularly noting the phenomenon over the past decade or so in cities like Paris, Berlin, and London, where housing issues have become a campaign issue in mayoral elections, and progressive forces have won.

In that regard, the movement centered on affordability (whether housing, etc., can be bought at a reasonable price) in Zohran Mamdani's New York City mayoral campaign is truly attracting global attention (*Mamdani subsequently won the mayoral election).

The videos they made, where they go to talk to people who switched to supporting Trump in the presidential election, are very interesting. There, you can catch a glimpse of Mamdani's attempt to listen and connect the discourse of people who voted for Trump away from exclusionism and toward the improvement of quality of life.

If you only look at national-level politics, such movements are hard to see, but if you focus on locality, various attempts are being made. It will be important to open up new horizons through a local turn.

Regarding tolerance, I think there are two issues: cultural and economic. Organizations like Keidanren are culturally liberal and actively try to embrace diversity because they need the labor force. On the other hand, economically, they are neoliberal, on the right. This is actually the mainstream in Japan, and young businesspeople are culturally liberal and have quite high tolerance for diversity. On the other hand, economically, they do not agree with redistribution. This line, represented by figures like Takafumi Horie and Hiroyuki, has basically been the mainstream for a long time.

However, many people are now emerging who cannot keep up with this line. Neoliberalism requires a certain amount of competition and investment. But people who don't even have the capital for investment are appearing; they move toward anti-neoliberalism and become pro-redistribution economically. They favor proactive fiscal policy. And then they become very intolerant culturally. I feel that among young people, both the neoliberal type and the Sanseito type are emerging.

In that sense, this issue of tolerance is very complex, and it is necessary to consider both cultural and economic issues. In this context, Sanseito and Ms. Takaichi skillfully use exclusionism within a kind of economic policy. In other words, they focus on the so-called lower-middle class. Not the poor, but the lower end of the middle class. Ms. Takaichi explicitly said that to help those slightly above welfare recipients, she would instead make receiving welfare stricter. This lower-middle class is a very large volume zone, and Sanseito and Ms. Takaichi are trying to make it their voting base.

Behind this is the situation where the lower-middle class is suffering. The reason they are suffering is that due to the bifurcation of the middle class, the upper-middle class is profiting and a new wealthy class is emerging. Since there is no scheme to take taxes from them, they are left completely alone, and policies like Abenomics have precisely nurtured that group. However, if you try to make the lower-middle class your voting base instead of that group, exclusionism has great utility.

But this is not a plus for Keidanren. In other words, women, the elderly, and foreigners are all needed as labor. There are cultural and economic issues, and when you combine various actors on the economic side, it is important to verify how this exclusionism is being utilized.

If we can find the seeds of resistance against exclusionism as a social or media movement, where would they be in Japan today?

Regarding social movements, I think people in old media, such as television stations and newspapers, currently have a stronger awareness of this issue than those on SNS.

This stems from the fact that during last year's Hyogo Prefecture gubernatorial election, people at TV stations were heavily attacked as "mass-gomi" (mass media trash). I have had discussions with people from various newspapers and local TV stations, and many in the mass media have a sense of crisis, not just about the issue of exclusionism, but about what the mass media can actually do.

In the past, when Zaitokukai was popular, I asked someone at NHK why they didn't cover it, and they said something like, "That's a bit dirty." But it's different now. Media people are thinking about various things with a sense of urgency, such as how to express the problem of exclusionism on TV or in newspapers. I think that might be a new movement, and there is a possibility that things will start to move in various ways.

Indeed, although not as much as Mr. Ito, when I am interviewed recently, everyone is quite serious, and there are many young reporters; I feel their enthusiasm that something must be done. It might turn into something like the counterattack of the old media.

Next, Mr. Hayashi, from your position as a teacher, which is your main profession, where do you find a breakthrough or possibility?

Schools are a microcosm of society, so naturally, students' roots are diverse. On the other hand, the norm that the teacher standing at the podium should be Japanese is deep-rooted in the public education industry. Except for a very few local governments, foreign nationals cannot become "regular teachers" (kyoyu) at public schools and work as "full-time lecturers without a fixed term of appointment."

As a "regular teacher" working at a private school, I intend to do what I can. For the students, I might be the first foreigner they encounter. I fear that if I am a lousy teacher, it might lead to a bad image of foreigners as a whole. This doesn't mean I'm subservient to the students, but I find myself trying to be a people-pleaser. If trust in foreign teachers is reasonably strong, it might, in turn, give confidence to students with mixed roots.

Of course, the fact that I carry such pressure is itself proof that minorities are being oppressed. Even so, when the students become adults, if they remember that "there was such an interesting teacher," it might serve as a dose of painkiller to soften future xenophobia. It is said that "education is an investment in the future," and that resonates more heavily for minority teachers.

If adults still use the word "gaijin," children will use it without hesitation. Topics like the local area being taken over by "gaijin" are things you hear during recess at any school. As long as adults make it a topic, such lines come out casually and without malice. Rather than nodding in agreement or simply condemning it, I want to keep thinking about what I can do.

In my work as a critic, which is connected to education, I feel I have no choice but to build up sound arguments. Even prominent opinion journals, including Mita-hyoron (official monthly journal published by Keio University Press), are likely rarely read by aggressive exclusionists. However, mass-producing extreme arguments aimed at impressions will only leave tomorrow dark. Sound arguments are often plain and lack flashiness. But it is much better to build them up. I want to find hope in their slow-acting nature.

One of my favorite phrases is "Alter rather than Anti" (Ghassan Hage). In the Japanese context, I interpret it in my own way like this: rather than baring one's antagonism toward exclusionism and becoming extreme with a demonic look, one should forgive where forgiveness is possible while keeping the flame of anger alive, and look for other better solutions together. We are like people doing a three-legged race at a sports festival held in the schoolyard of society. Even if it's a partner you don't like, if that person falls, you fall too. To avoid falling for nothing, we have no choice but to put our heads together.

If possible, I don't even want to close the channels with supporters of parties that advocate exclusionism. If I am blessed with the opportunity to eat together, I want to share a hot pot. There might be a tiny bit we can understand about each other. Or I might just be showered with the muddy water of hate speech. Even so, even if we end up parting after a fight, we might be able to understand each other in the sense of "there are things we can't understand about each other."

I would like to ask Mr. Mochizuki first about how he views the movement in the New York City mayoral election that Ms. Mori mentioned.

Another point, following Mr. Hayashi's discussion, is that while the subjectivity of the perpetrator side is being pushed to the forefront, imagination toward the subjectivity of the victim side is increasingly lacking. I think there is a complexity in the subjectivity of people on the minority side. That precisely connects to what Mr. Mochizuki has been working on in "Nippon Fukuzatsu Kiko" (Japan Complex Travelogue). Once again, what are your thoughts?

I also saw the video Ms. Mori mentioned, filmed in an area where Mamdani swung toward the Trump side. The main topics were affordability and Gaza. While many people are suffering from the rising cost of living and voted for Trump because of economic expectations, he is expanding support by strongly putting forward the message of "changing to an affordable New York" from a progressive standpoint.

At the same time, I think there are circumstances unique to New York. This city has many young, liberal students. Also, unlike Japan where children of immigrants cannot have Japanese citizenship, in the US, children born in America become US citizens, so people with immigrant roots can vote, and in New York, those votes amount to a significant number. Mamdani's own roots are in India and Uganda, and people from various Asian and other backgrounds are gathered behind him.

Looking at Japan, unlike the US where urban areas like New York are strong bastions of liberals and progressives, as can be seen from the results of the LDP presidential election, Ms. Takaichi is actually strong in urban areas. Looking at Governor Koike in Tokyo, the situation is that she continues to intentionally look away from the massacre of Koreans during the Great Kanto Earthquake, which is quite different from New York. How Japan's urban areas change politically will be very important for Japan's future. Changing the system so that second-generation immigrants and beyond can have Japanese citizenship would also affect that.

One thing I am slightly concerned about is that in the US, the percentage of people who own stocks is very high. It is said that more than half own stocks or something similar in some form, and it's not limited to the wealthy or middle class. For example, many Uber drivers are immigrants, and I've seen them keep a stock app open next to their map app, repeatedly doing short-term trading. In a society where the worldview that it's important to earn extra through small transactions while life is hard has permeated, if a politician is perceived as "anti-business," they could lose support for that alone.

I don't think that situation is unrelated to the background of the increasing proportion of Trump support among Hispanics and Black people in last year's presidential election. Recently, crypto assets are also spreading, and the Trump administration is focusing on them. If one's own assets increase even a little under the Trump administration, they might tolerate undocumented immigrants suffering—isn't there such a dynamic?

In Japan, too, it is said that wages aren't rising, so let's build assets using NISA and the like. Since the Nikkei average has already risen by 20% this year alone, as the number of people holding financial assets increases, the attraction of such things must be very strong. I am concerned that people who gently hold liberal ideas in their hearts might peel away due to financial motives.

Regarding the subjectivity of victims, I have so far delivered as much raw voice as possible in the form of an interviewer of the parties involved. I want to continue that and have as many people as possible read it. At the same time, it is a fact that the difficulty of delivering complex realities with the person's name and face shown is increasing.

In the package of far-right discourse popular in the world, they attack immigrants, transgender people, and welfare recipients alike. The thinking has become that instead of doing politics for society as a whole, it's fine to make enemies of half the people as long as the other half gives you their votes. I think it's also important to expand and connect the way victims of exclusionist movements are perceived.

While each person finds the harm they are receiving, they should not turn it into harm against someone else. If we can connect that to a form of politics or information dissemination, there might be hope.

Mr. Hayashi brought up the word "Alter." Precisely how can we launch political and social alternatives that counter the political utility of exclusionism? If the current form of speculative capitalism is the problem to begin with, can we envision a direction like post-capitalism? I think we must consider where to find such large alternatives.

At the same time, there was also the raising of the issue of the importance of building up sound arguments and everyday dialogue, including within families. Of course, there are difficulties. Perhaps the key is rather the internal complexity within oneself? Finding a channel to connect with others through an awareness of one's own minority status or vulnerability. That would mean a need for repeated, steady dialogue for that purpose.

I think we were able to have a very fruitful discussion. Thank you very much for today.