[Feature: Future Mobility Society] Daisuke Tanaka: Where Do You Want to Go in the Future Mobility Society? — On the "Tangibility" of Smart Cities

One example of a future mobility society is likely Toyota Motor Corporation's "Toyota Woven City," which opened this year. Often referred to as a "test course for future mobility," this demonstration city is being built in Susono City, Shizuoka Prefecture, to test advanced technologies such as AI, robots, autonomous vehicles, and drones. It serves as a model case for a "smart city" for Toyota—a company that evolved from automatic looms to automobiles in the 20th century and aims to transform into a "mobility company" in the 21st century.

Expectations for the future of mobility overlap with the image of the smart city. Discourse regarding smart cities spans widely across politics, economy, and academia, ranging from positive proposals to critical debates. If we broadly define a smart city as "urban policy that attempts to solve issues through ICT (Information and Communication Technology)," the scale, type, and entities involved in its conception and implementation are so diverse that there is insufficient space to cover them all here. At the "Expo 2025 Osaka, Kansai, Japan," related content is being showcased at multiple booths, and many images of the future of mobility can be found on their website.

While discourse and images regarding the "future mobility society" overflow in this manner, a certain "lack of tangibility" regarding smart cities is also frequently discussed.

In the TV Tokyo BIZ segment "[I Went to Woven City] Is Toyota's Demonstration City Just a Normal Town?", it is described as "not having the image of an advanced city as much as initially expected" and as a "normal town." On the other hand, the report emphasizes its significance in Japan—a country where it is not as easy to conduct demonstration experiments on public roads as it is in China—and discusses how to monetize it and how to expand this smart city.

Sociologist Shinsuke Sayuki, who visited "Kashiwa-no-ha Smart City" (where Toyota-affiliated companies participate in public transport experiments), also remarked with some disappointment: "There was a scene of a normal town I had seen before. (...) I experienced only déjà vu and stepped outside" (2023, *Decoding Platform Capitalism*, Nakanishiya Shuppan). He argues that a "smart city that looks like a normal city visually and is invisible as a smart city—a smart city that you cannot feel no matter how much you walk" is nothing more than a technology-centric entity built on business logic and turned into a black box. Rather, he suggests it should be considered from the perspective of a community where citizens are actively involved.

Since the 21st century, numerous keywords expressing the future mobility society have appeared, such as "MaaS," "CASE," and "Society 5.0." This vigorous discourse is likely a resurgence of the "Information Society Theory" seen since the 20th century, which repeatedly incited technological determinism—the idea that technology changes society—to induce capital (Toshiki Sato, 2010, *Society Dreams of Information*, Kawade Bunko).

Business-oriented and community-oriented opinions on the "smart city" that offers a glimpse into the future of mobility share a commonality: a "lack of tangibility." In the first place, information technology processes, transmits, and stores information as electricity, electrons, and radio waves, most of which lack the texture of physical space. This may be why discourse about the future, or images and experiences like games and theme parks, are being created one after another as if to fill a (investment) void. Even so, how should we think about this lack of "tangibility" in the mobility society?

The "future mobility society" is not limited to cities. However, the urban population, which was only 30% in 1950, reached 55% in 2018 and is predicted to reach 68% by 2050 (United Nations, "World Urbanization Prospects: The 2018 Revision"). Furthermore, modern urbanization is progressing not only through population shifts but also through the interdependence of global infrastructure involving industry, transportation, logistics, communications, resources, energy, waste, and the natural environment. Geographer Neil Brenner and others describe this as "Planetary Urbanization." "The capitalist form of urbanization is gradually crossing, swallowing, and replacing the old dividing lines between urban and rural areas, spreading everywhere across the entire surface of the earth, and even extending into the ground and the atmosphere" (Translated by Shu Hirata and Nozomi Semba, 2014=2018, "Urban Revolution?", *Space, Society and Geographical Thought*, No. 21, Osaka City University). They also state that such "planetary urbanization" creates patchy, uneven urbanization and social disparities.

The smart city concept can be understood as a pioneering attempt to create a miniature of the "urbanized earth" in a specific region. As "planetary urbanization" progresses, the platform of the smart city is marketed worldwide as a package of lifestyle infrastructure. Since 2018, Toyota has also referred to itself not just as an automobile manufacturer but as a "mobility company," striving to be a "mobility service platformer." This can be seen as following Daimler AG, which advocated for being a mobility provider under the acronym "CASE" (Connected, Autonomous, Shared & Service, Electric).

According to economist Nick Srnicek, platforms like Big Tech (Google, Apple, Facebook (now Meta), Amazon, Microsoft) are, in short, a new type of firm. They are characterized by providing the infrastructure to intermediate between different user groups, displaying a monopoly tendency driven by network effects, using cross-subsidization to draw in different user groups, and having a core architecture designed to govern the possibilities of interaction (Translated by Kantaro Ohashi and Takumi Imura, 2016=2022, *Platform Capitalism*, Jinbun Shoin, p. 60). Platforms are not just a means to monopolize, extract, analyze, use, and sell data. The major companies governing them are becoming "owners of social infrastructure," including the physical environment (ibid., 129). Consequently, firms from different platforms tend to "converge" (ibid., 128) into similar entities. User lock-in is exposed not to competition within existing industries, but to competition from outside. Therefore, Big Tech from the information space and Toyota from the physical space will intersect, collaborate, and compete to become platforms as social infrastructure.

On the other hand, if the monopoly of platforms creates uneven urbanization and social disparity/exclusion, "smart cities" will become nothing more than "enclaves" for the elite or gated communities. Criticism against Big Tech seizing control of these platforms remains strong.

For example, it is well known that Sidewalk Labs, a sister company of Google, launched a smart city project in Toronto, Canada, which ended in failure. The trigger was privacy issues regarding the collection of personal information. This highlights the structural problem of private companies installing, managing, and operating cities as public spaces. It is difficult to entrust matters related to residents' lives to a corporate organization that might immediately cut losses and withdraw if it becomes unprofitable. Furthermore, if residents become entirely dependent on a company for their lives, they may be forced to follow the company's dictates. This situation is also described as "Techno-Feudalism" (Yanis Varoufakis), where "Big Tech = Lords" extract "rent" from "users = serfs." In that sense, the invisibility of smart cities can be called the invisibility of power.

As shown, images regarding the future of mobility are diverse. The future is constructed by each person's "future vision"—what should be (norms), what they want to be (hopes), and what will likely be (predictions)—while referring to the past and present. People look back at the past, use a "future vision" as a guide, and proceed with current actions. However, it does not mean it will be realized exactly as imagined. There can be various norms, hopes, and predictions, and they may contradict or conflict with each other. Sometimes resources for realization are insufficient, or unexpected factors arise. Therefore, the "future vision" is revised each time, and current actions are changed. As a result, the future that appears is uncertain. Nonetheless, the future is not a completely free, unpredictable, and accidental open system. While incorporating predictions of population shifts, the natural environment, economic fluctuations, political situations, and technological evolution, how do we conceive and realize desirable social transformation? Amidst the entanglement of norms, hopes, and predictions of diverse actors and complex variables, we move forward toward a feasible future that falls within a certain range.

For example, sociologist John Urry views such a future as a "complex system" and examines the future of cities and mobility through four scenarios (Translated by Naoki Yoshihara, Masaya Takahashi, and Ayami Otsuka, 2016=2019, *What is the Future?*, Sakuhinsha).

The first is the "High-Mobility City." In this future, high-speed movement is expected to spread rapidly horizontally and vertically through cargo transport by drones, elevators in skyscrapers, autonomous driving, and aerial vehicles.

The second is the "Digital City." This can also be called a smart city. It is a city where remote communication takes place in real-time, screens are ubiquitous, and big data is constructed through a massive number of sensors. On the other hand, in such a future, people may no longer need to live anywhere, and "counter-urbanization" might occur. Many people would not so much "live" in the city as "visit" the digitized city as a stopping point.

The third is the "Liveable City." Due to the spread of electronically and electrically integrated miniaturized vehicles (bicycles, buses, etc.) and sharing systems, neighborhood life where living and working are mixed and slow movement will spread. Reflecting on motorization, car-free cities will be realized, creating "post-suburban" neighborhood life that downsizes sprawled cities. Specifically, the spread of MaaS (Mobility as a Service)—a service that allows users to search, book, and pay for a combination of multiple transportation methods using ICT—can be cited. In Helsinki, Finland, where it originated, private car use is reportedly decreasing while public transport use is increasing. This also includes various attempts that could be called "anti-motorization," such as "walkable cities" and "cycling cities" currently spreading in various locations.

The fourth is the "Fortress City." This is where the wealthy and elite form fortified cities like "enclaves." Urry likely has in mind gated communities with advanced security, such as those in the United States. Outside the fortress cities, wild zones spread where the poor are excluded, public safety deteriorates, and animals roam. Waste and carbon dioxide are also pushed onto poorer regions. To avoid such danger zones and protect the fortress cities, private security and military industries are organized, leading to a "New Middle Ages" where new wars and conflicts over scarce resources occur frequently.

According to Urry, the first scenario faces question marks regarding the realization of a low-carbon energy transition that can support total high-speed movement. Digitalization in the second scenario will likely progress, but it is expected to involve monopolies by digital companies. The third scenario would likely unfold during a global recession when it becomes clear that catastrophes due to climate change were caused by high carbon emissions. He suggests that the most likely future is the fourth, the fortress city, which already exists as a reality.

It is impossible to foresee which one is correct, and they overlap considerably. For instance, there are common factors such as changes in the natural environment and the development of information technology. On the other hand, the consequences vary: (1) the transformation of cities into giant facilities (high-rise/fortified), (2) the shrinking of cities, and (3) counter-urbanization. As mentioned earlier, the norms, hopes, and predictions of various actors will likely entangle and settle within a certain range. Let us summarize the trends as follows.

According to Urry, after the appearance of railroads in the 19th century, "public mobilization" (Translated by Naoki Yoshihara and Yoshitaka Ito, 2007=2015, *Mobilities*, Sakuhinsha, p. 138) began, where large numbers of people were packed into mechanical transport. As society shifted from traditional to industrial, mechanized public transport developed, and large numbers of people moved from wide areas, forming high-density, high-fluidity metropolises.

Furthermore, automobile ownership in the latter half of the 20th century accelerated private desires to express individual freedom and show differences from others. It is well known that in American cities in the early 20th century, streetcars as public transport were excluded through the activities of automobile-related companies. In conjunction with this, consumers' "vanity" and "desire" to "own/drive the same/different car as everyone else"—much of which was created by advertising and promotion—accelerated, and automobiles became widespread. Motorization and urban suburbanization progressed as "private mobilization," so to speak.

Future visions of mobility since the 21st century are attempting to reverse this. In other words, a return from the 20th-century automobile society with a high environmental load formed by the acceleration of "private desire" to a 21st-century society centered on "public transport" with a low environmental load that adjusts and aggregates various speeds using information technology. Whether the main drivers are platform companies like Big Tech and Toyota, local governments/communities like Helsinki, or the government as in Society 5.0, and how they will be combined, is still unknown. However, the retrospective direction of the concept—from decarbonization and informatization, from "linear acceleration" to "pluralistic speed," and from "private transport" back to "public transport"—is common.

While the major flow described above has become visible, one thing that concerns me here as a factor influencing it is the lack of tangibility of the smart city mentioned at the beginning.

Future mobility will be more convenient, safer, and more eco-friendly—of course, such "correctness" is important. It is also important to avoid undesirable futures by raising a sense of crisis through dystopian images, such as the catastrophe of climate change or the penetration of a controlled society, as Urry does.

However, is modern "future mobility" not seeking a future without knowing the location and concrete form of popular needs and desires? Political, economic, and technical discourse and images regarding the future of mobility, such as "we should go this way" or "we can go this way," are overflowing. And the concept of informatized "pluralistic and public mobility" is generally shared. But has our question of "where and how do we want to go" been left behind? Precisely because we can no longer treat people uniformly and cannot draw the "future" linearly, diverse future visions, including retrospective ones, are flooding in. This may be a phenomenon common to developed countries where high growth has ended and the impact of technological evolution is harder to expect than before.

That is why the range of the future mobility society expands or narrows depending on our needs and desires. It may go off track or stop progressing. What is important is our future vision of "I want to go here, in this way." Far? Near? Fast? Slow? Frequency? Means? Options for what kind of tangibility we feel there are already beginning to be prepared.