[Special Feature: How to Perceive China] Roundtable Discussion: How to Understand the Dynamics Driving China

Nearly a year and a half has passed since the world was struck by the COVID-19 pandemic. Amidst this pandemic, many countries have had their governance capabilities questioned by their citizens and are facing domestic political crises. Furthermore, domestic crises often tend to lead to aggressive and assertive foreign policies.

The US-China confrontation, which became apparent in trade around 2018, seems to have taken on an even more comprehensive aspect and is increasing in intensity following the pandemic. Awareness of national security has heightened, supply chains are being reviewed, and a movement toward decoupling is progressing in fields related to dual-use (military and civilian) technologies.

Furthermore, criticism from foreign countries, centered on Europe and the United States, is being directed toward human rights issues in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Hong Kong. Discussions regarding the construction of a post-COVID order will likely unfold while involving tensions and conflicts related to governance systems and the values and norms that support them.

In this phase of international politics, what I am concerned about to no small extent is that the discourse space in the world, and particularly in Japan, is falling into an overly simplified binary of anti-China vs. pro-China, democracy vs. authoritarianism, or national defense vs. economy, and that this may be undermining constructive and realistic discussions toward building a post-COVID international order.

What is needed now is an attempt to accurately grasp the country of China, the forces driving it, and the Chinese logic seen in individual phenomena, and based on that, to find ways to protect Japan's national interests while coexisting with China and building a global order.

This July marks the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China. Today, I would like to discuss China's trends by capturing them as dynamics woven by the Party Central, the state, and further by regions, the private sector, society, and the market, taking a long-term perspective.

First, it is essential to understand the state of society. Dr. Zheng, how do you view the response of the Party and government to this COVID-19 pandemic, and how people are perceiving it?

As you know, regarding the COVID-19 prevention system, I believe the Chinese government controls society considerably more than countries like the United States. Behind this is the fact that under the Xi Jinping administration, the construction of Party organizations has been strengthened at the "shequ" (residential areas consisting of several thousand households) level. This trend of Party organization building is largely based on the legacy of the Mao Zedong era.

During the Mao era, especially in the 1950s, society came to be organized comprehensively by the power of the state and administration. Specifically, the middle-class segments that existed before the establishment of the People's Republic of China, including local influential figures, were thoroughly crushed, especially after the Korean War.

Then, from the mid-1950s, as a result of the socialist construction movement, Party organizations were created down to the grassroots level of society. Also, in rural areas, a collective land ownership system was established. I believe these three points institutionally support the "shequ" construction under the Xi Jinping administration.

Particularly looking at the grassroots level of society today, in rural areas, wherever you go, there are Villagers' Committees and Villagers' Groups beneath them. These correspond to the levels of production brigades and production teams within the former People's Commune system. Basically, administrative villages were born under the collective land ownership system, and based on that, Party organizations govern rural society.

In urban society, "sub-district offices" (lower-level agencies of district governments in cities) and Residents' Committees beneath them are also firmly established. This type of system was also basically formed in the 1950s.

So, what is new about the Xi Jinping administration is that it is conducting grid management (Chinese: wǎnggéhuà guǎnlǐ) based on these administrative organizations created in the 1950s. Grids are created at the level of administrative villages and Villagers' Groups in rural areas, and at the level of Residents' Committees, housing complexes, and even individual "lou" (buildings) in cities. A management system has been created where supervisors for each grid are decided and cooperation between grids is strengthened. COVID-19 prevention activities are being carried out under this management system.

In other words, the degree of control is increasing. Another point is that control over social organizations and private enterprises that newly appeared after the Reform and Opening-up has been strengthened, and the scope of Party organization building has expanded to all directions, all departments, and all fields.

Regarding society's perception, I think there is considerable support from the public for the epidemic prevention system. The Xi Jinping administration has comprehensively put forward a policy of solving people's livelihood issues in particular, and there is support from the public in that regard. The poverty alleviation campaign is one example, as is the anti-corruption campaign.

So the Party organizations created down to the grassroots of society during the Mao era are being further expanded under the Xi Jinping administration. What is very interesting is that because this grid-based shequ management, subdivided down to individual apartment buildings, was established, China succeeded in containing the spread of COVID-19, and this seems to have brought about public trust and confidence in the Xi Jinping administration and the system.

What are your thoughts on this view, Dr. Zheng?

This is a difficult question. It might be okay to think that it leads to support for the regime as long as no other opposing forces emerge, but another important perspective is that of the everyday resident.

In other words, looking at the activities of Party organizations at the grassroots level, the Party organization is by no means just an apparatus for unilateral oppression; rather, it has also become an entity that governs daily life. Whether looking at the New Socialist Countryside construction or the poverty alleviation campaign, there is a part that is basically perceived by the public as "providing services," and I think there is a fusion between the state and society there.

For example, the use of health code apps can be cited as something that played a very large role in COVID-19 measures this time. To what extent is there wariness among people about their own movements and health records being turned into databases and managed by data?

With the development of communication technology in recent years, we have reached a situation where surveillance can reach the daily actions of people. Regarding the perception of this, I think it probably differs considerably depending on social class and level of education.

According to data released by the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) in September 2020, about 80% of netizens have a high school education or less. In contrast, those with a university education or higher account for less than 10%. I think many netizens accept and support this kind of management system. While there are intellectuals who point out problems with the current management system, their influence on public opinion is quite limited.

From Dr. Zheng's talk, it can be seen that the Xi Jinping administration's control and management of society has been strengthened while responding to the crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic. How do you view this situation, Dr. Iwama?

Since Dr. Zheng just spoke about the period after the founding of the People's Republic of China, I would like to compare it with society before that. Looking at it over a long span, I think there is a side to Chinese people where they live in a very free-spirited society.

This was true before the Republican period (pre-1949), and even today, there is a society like the one Sun Yat-sen described as "loose sand." On the other hand, as mentioned, administrative power is very strong. I think the combination of governing free-spirited people with strong administrative power has historical continuity, and perhaps this was seen in the COVID-19 measures as well.

On the other hand, Japan's COVID-19 measures were completely different; self-restraint and caution were required amidst very strong social peer pressure. In China, such self-restraint and caution would not have worked well. Looking at the historical background, they probably couldn't have done it any other way than this.

Furthermore, since tools for a surveillance society have been developing in China, I also got the impression that a new side of China as an IT-advanced nation was demonstrated this time.

In modern China, Western colonies and concessions were the models for epidemic prevention and hygiene, but with these COVID-19 measures, I think China has regained its confidence relative to the West.

Even if we say "Chinese society" in a single breath, there are characteristics for each region. Will these regional characteristics fade away with the strengthening of social control? For example, what about Shanghai, which is your field of study, Dr. Iwama?

Basically, I have a strong impression that people in Shanghai are accepting this management quite happily. Many people understand the issues of personal information, but from what I hear, many feel that the benefits are greater than that.

Dr. Iwama, you have deep knowledge of Chinese food culture. What is the reaction of people to the strengthening of control by the Xi Jinping administration that even steps into food culture, such as the ban on entertainment using public funds and the ban on food waste?

The "Clean Plate Campaign" (Guāngpán Xíngdòng) to empty plates and eliminate food waste started in 2013, and the Anti-Food Waste Law was enacted this April, which has been in the news in Japan as well. I was also interested in what people actually think of these policies of the Xi Jinping administration.

From Japan's perspective, it may look like the administration is high-handedly imposing new habits while considering environmental issues or food security, but in reality, that doesn't seem to be the case. Even in the private sector, the movement that it's better to reduce the number of dishes ordered or to pack leftovers to take home has gradually matured. It seems to have become a kind of rational habit because it avoids waste while still saving the host's "face." I get the impression that the administration just gave it a push.

Next, I would like to ask Dr. Kashima. In this COVID-19 pandemic, companies such as "BATH" (China's four major IT companies: Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, and Huawei) played a major role in the efficient management of society and the maintenance of people's lives, such as the development and operation of health codes. I think the pandemic may have caused some changes in the relationship between the government and state-owned enterprises, or between the government and private enterprises.

What kind of impact did the pandemic have on the Chinese economy? Also, what kind of changes did it bring to the relationship between the state and enterprises?

Since my own specialty is economic history research, it is difficult to say anything definitive about the current situation, but I believe the impact of this pandemic on the general direction of the Chinese economy or the Chinese government's economic policy was not that large.

As everyone pointed out, China's domestic response to COVID-19 seems to have progressed relatively quickly and smoothly as far as can be seen from the outside, and its recovery is likely fast even when looking at macroeconomic indicators. Therefore, as a result, the impact of the pandemic on the Chinese economy is small, and I believe that US-China relations are a larger and more long-term issue.

When looking at the direction of China's overall economic policy or changes in the Chinese economy by connecting the Republican period or earlier to the present, my impression is that the major flow has not changed much. For example, as policy goals, they emphasize economic growth and aim to overtake the United States in GDP, or they aim to upgrade the industrial structure from being centered on primary industry to being centered on secondary and tertiary industries.

As an economic history researcher, changes right in front of us are interesting, but I believe it is important to properly point out the parts that change slowly but surely.

Could you explain a little more about the parts that are slowly changing?

For example, modernization and industrialization have progressed since the late 19th century, but at the time the People's Republic of China was established, the proportion of workers in the primary industry was about 80%. That became 50% around the year 2000 and has recently finally dropped to about 25%.

All developed countries have experienced such changes in employment structure, but looking at China's long history as an agricultural country, I think it is a very important change that appears slow at first glance.

In your book, Dr. Kashima, you analyzed that the economy of Shanghai was largely defined by the legacy of the planned economy era even after the Reform and Opening-up.

There are various views among commentators on whether the Xi Jinping administration is currently trying to promote marketization or is rather moving in the opposite direction. In the process of China promoting marketization while carrying the legacy of the planned economy system, how do you position the current situation?

I think the current situation is difficult to understand if we use the axis of marketization versus planned economy. I don't think there will be a return to a planned economy from the current state, and it is not realistic from a cost perspective for the government to directly control every economic entity in the country. I think the form of placing the base in a market economy while controlling core industries as a whole—for example, proceeding while strengthening or loosening control over large enterprises—will not change.

How do they balance strengthening or weakening management toward private enterprises?

It's quite difficult, but rather than there being an absolute standard, I think it's a political judgment at each moment. For example, at a stage where technological development or economic activity is becoming active, the top leader might apply the brakes to things they deem dangerous from the perspective of political stability.

On the other hand, since they want to overtake the US in GDP, they must achieve sustainable economic growth. In that regard, if they judge that letting companies act freely will produce positive effects, I think they loosen the reins.

Next, Dr. Kawashima, we have touched upon the dynamics woven by the Party/state, society, the public, and enterprises. How do you think the Xi Jinping administration perceives this, and what kind of impact is it having on China's external behavior, which is also described as "Wolf Warrior diplomacy"?

First, as a premise, I think this pandemic has encouraged changes that have been occurring or made manifest things that have already been happening, rather than bringing about revolutionary changes to the world as a whole.

From the perspective of globalization, COVID-19 had a very large impact on the movement of people. Countries significantly suppressed fundamental human rights, such as restricting the movement of people for infection control. Not only China, but also France, Taiwan, South Korea, and many democratic countries dealt with the situation by restricting rights such as movement based on law. This is a global phenomenon, and there is an aspect where China is not unique.

Given that, how should we think about China? There was talk about intermediary groups earlier, but currently in China, the intermediary existence between the state and grassroots society is being broken down, and direct governance by the state and Party is being strengthened.

Looking at the history of modern China, during the Republican period, government governance loosened, and many intermediary groups emerged between the state and society. Then, as mentioned in Dr. Zheng's talk, socialist construction was promoted in the 1950s, and at that time, intermediary groups were crushed. However, during the Reform and Opening-up period, the state's management and control over society loosened and intermediary groups increased, but the Xi Jinping administration has crushed them again. However, the Xi Jinping administration did not simply suppress the private sector. It means they are trying to create a state where the official sector directly controls the private sector after clearly distinguishing between the two.

Private sector vitality is necessary. Representatives of the private sector like Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent are necessary, but the official sector controls them. Here, the difficult balance mentioned by Dr. Kashima becomes important. While the private sector leads in terms of technology, in areas necessary for governance, the balance between the official and private sectors is becoming even more important and difficult. This is the first point.

Secondly, Dr. Zheng spoke about support from the public, and Dr. Iwama mentioned that society is accepting management. This is very important. In other words, the public does not necessarily reject the strengthening of the state's management and control over society; in fact, the sense of affirmation from the side of society toward the state is not low at all.

Even regarding COVID-19 measures, they are doing relatively well with epidemic prevention, and the economy is coming back. Also, as Dr. Iwama said, while various policies may seem like impositions, there is an aspect where they actually support things that were already being done on the side of society.

What are your thoughts on the impact on foreign policy?

The Belt and Road Initiative is exactly like this; while it seems like the center is managing it in a unified way, there are actually countless projects being done individually by state-owned enterprises and local governments. The aggregate of those was "China's" way of relating to the outside.

However, that diversity was suppressed during this pandemic. When that happens, the ideals and thoughts of "diplomacy" by the Chinese government come to the fore, and it looks like those words and the reality are getting closer. The discrepancy between words and reality, or the diversity that was widely seen before COVID-19, has changed. This can be cited as the first characteristic.

The second point is that this year is the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party, next year is the Party Congress where the General Secretary's term will be extended or he will assume the Party Chairmanship, and the year after that will be the extension of the State Presidency—it is a politically sensitive period. Not only Xi Jinping but also diplomats will act politically. That is precisely why diverse interests are not reflected much, and words become political and simplified. That is likely what leads to "Wolf Warrior diplomacy" (the high-pressure diplomatic style taken by Chinese diplomats).

To add one point, there is talk that the Chinese governance model might spread to the world following the success of suppressing COVID-19. However, I don't think that will happen. As Dr. Zheng said, there are almost no other emerging countries that have a management and surveillance system that goes from sub-district offices to Residents' Committees, and further down to the level of residential compounds and buildings.

Also, when the exchange of people returns, I think it's exactly as Dr. Kojima said at the beginning: we must not be bound by a binary discourse space. However, in China's case, as I just mentioned, a politically sensitive period will arrive from 2021 to 2023, and in addition, the administration rarely negates itself, so the current state of consistency between words and deeds in diplomacy may continue for a long time. If that happens, Chinese diplomacy may become self-binding and, conversely, face a difficult situation. I think the challenge then will be how the international community receives China.

The Xi Jinping administration, especially entering its second term, has gained confidence in its own governance system and has appealed to both domestic and international audiences that it will push forward with it. Wouldn't the fact that they suppressed this pandemic relatively well give persuasiveness to the superiority of the one-party rule system over the liberal democracy advocated by the "West," encourage the confidence of the Xi Jinping administration, and promote China's offensive in diplomacy?

In March of this year, Xi Jinping said at a subcommittee of the Political Consultative Conference that young people from now on will not look up at the world but will be able to look at the world from the same eye level. Yang Jiechi, who skillfully received those words, declared, "The United States is not qualified to speak to China from a position of strength. The Chinese people won't buy that," and received applause within China. This, too, is likely a symbol of self-affirmation.

Regarding Hong Kong as well, they prioritized the logic of national security, put to the fore the obsession that a color revolution (democratization movement) might enter Hong Kong and then mainland China, and suppressed the movement by enacting the National Security Law.

However, as Xi Jinping had to say, "a China that is loved and trusted by the world" (remark at the Central Committee in May), the deterioration of sentiment toward China in countries around the world is remarkable. This is true not only in developed countries but also in ASEAN and elsewhere. However, these words of Xi Jinping are saying to think about the method without changing the policy, and he is not self-criticizing.

So far, we have discussed the dynamics of the Party/state, society, the public, and enterprises that have come to light amidst the pandemic and US-China confrontation, keeping in mind what kind of logic is unique to China. However, I believe that within China's response under a situation that could be called internal troubles and external threats, we can find not only points of contention unique to China but also universal themes for all of humanity that we should consider when creating a post-COVID order.

For example, how to utilize personal data. How should the use of big data for administrative efficiency and improvement of people's livelihoods be balanced with the protection of privacy? To what extent should restrictions on freedom to maintain order be permitted? What kind of relationship should the Party/state build with companies that support innovation and economic development? All of these are problems that not only China but we also face similarly. It is easy to criticize China's response, but the reality is that the critics do not have the answers either.

Can we really build an order together with China? To what extent is there room to dialogue with China regarding these points? I would like to ask everyone.

Looking at the flow of economic development so far, I don't think there can be development of the Chinese economy in an isolated state, so I think we have no choice but to have a dialogue.

It is true that the Party's claims now comprehensively put forward China's uniqueness. However, when considering what elements will drive the development of the Chinese economy in the future, due to the declining birthrate and aging population, it will hardly be possible to rely on the population bonus anymore. Furthermore, public fiscal expenditure will become an enormous figure due to the aging population. If that happens, international economic cooperation will become even more important for the Chinese economy in the future.

The second point is that while speech control is strengthening looking at the anti-corruption campaign and recent management under the current Xi Jinping administration, on the other hand, looking at the content of the Socialist Core Values advocated by the administration, I think there might be room left for dialogue.

The Socialist Core Values list "prosperity, democracy, civility, and harmony" as values the state should aim for. Values that should be cherished in society are "freedom, equality, justice, and the rule of law." Values that individuals should uphold are "patriotism, dedication, integrity, and friendship." There is a possibility of dialoguing with various countries or doing something jointly according to changes in the situation.

The third point is that the grid management I mentioned earlier will likely require enormous fiscal expenditure. The activity expenses of Party members are borne by their workplaces and the government's budget, and I think the poverty alleviation campaign also must have cost an enormous amount. In this campaign, a total of 3 million cadres were mobilized, and 255,000 work teams (temporarily organized and dispatched task teams) were sent to villages. Furthermore, since Xi Jinping currently emphasizes people's livelihood issues, in terms of public health, more than 90% of the citizens are already covered by health insurance and the like. With the progression of the aging population, that burden will also increase.

On the other hand, the problem of local debt remains serious. Local debt, which started from investment in township and village enterprises (rural enterprises at the township and village level) in the 1980s, became even more serious due to land development in the 1990s, and I don't think it has been resolved even after 2000.

Furthermore, as another problem, the fragmentation of information can be cited. The progress of informatization does not necessarily mean that diverse information reaches everyone. Under the current system, local cadres work under considerable pressure. In order to be a good Party member, provide good service, and show loyalty to the Party, there must be a question of to what extent problems that occurred at the local grassroots level are reflected at the central level.

The fragmentation of information is also brought about by insufficient dialogue with history. For example, in recent years, far-left discourse that seems to defend the Proletarian Cultural Revolution has emerged. It is the administration that is suppressing that discourse, but the problem of how to dialogue with history remains.

So the Xi Jinping administration, which puts socialism to the fore, has content that is relatively flexible and based on universal values, and it plays a role in suppressing far-left movements in society?

That's right. However, in a situation where things are managed like this, a major rebellion from society will likely not occur. Even if collective protests are born, I think it is almost impossible for them to link up with other groups and turn into anti-government activities.

What is your view, Dr. Iwama?

It is a difficult question, but I feel that China currently lacks a certain spirit of self-criticism regarding ethnocentrism. There is a concept called cultural relativism, which has been a kind of common sense in Japan and South Korea since around the 1980s and is taught in schools. In short, it is the idea that the values of cultures are equal, so it is impossible to assign rank or superiority/inferiority from the outside, but this does not yet seem to be common sense in China.

Another concept is multiculturalism. This is the idea of respecting different ethnic cultures and aiming for coexistence and co-prosperity. This has taken root in the Sinosphere, such as in Singapore and Taiwan, since around the 1990s, but it feels like it has a somewhat weaker presence in mainland China. Throughout the 20th century, China has a history of building a nation-state basically within the framework of the "Zhonghua Minzu" (Chinese nation), and that remains a dominant and strong ideology today. This way of thinking is also reflected in policies toward the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. There is a strong assimilationist tendency.

However, that does not mean China completely fails to understand these concepts. The Chinese government is actually very sensitive to public opinion and incorporates new ideas. As Mr. Zheng mentioned, China has been skillful in moving to calm radical public opinion.

In recent years, Great Han Chauvinism has been rising again. Great Han Chauvinism essentially discriminates against ethnic minorities and centers on the Han people. This is something that Chinese leaders, starting with Mao Zedong, have long criticized, and even in recent years, it has not been affirmed. For example, there is a growing movement called the Hanfu movement to revive pure Han ethnic clothing. However, the Chinese government does not affirm such things.

Also, in areas like Guangzhou where there are many people of African descent, slogans like "cultural integration," a kind of multiculturalism, have been seen.

So, I also get the impression that China is exploring its own version of multiculturalism and cultural relativism. However, it is not thorough, or at least the awareness is weak compared to other East Asian countries. I hope that as these discussions deepen, things will change slightly.

Cultural relativism is a value directly linked to human rights issues in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. Is the reason it hasn't taken root in China due to the characteristics of society, or is it due to policy?

I can't say for sure, but it might be influenced by patriotic education. However, I don't think you can say that cultural relativism or multiculturalism won't take root unless there is democratization. Singapore is an example of that. There are quite a few intellectuals who think critically about ethnocentrism, so I feel it would be good if awareness spread through more teaching in schools and other means.

Mr. Kashima, what are your thoughts?

Currently, China's influence in the international economy has become very large, and I don't think any country can ignore its relationship with China.

On the other hand, from China's perspective, in the flow of modernization and industrialization of the Chinese economy since the late 19th century, China has received many benefits from the international economy, especially since the reform and opening-up policy of 1978. Of course, there are aspects where the international economy has also benefited from China. I believe the leaders of the Communist Party are well aware of this.

The point is whether the Communist Party leaders weigh the benefits they have gained from a cooperative relationship with the international economy against the necessity of taking a hardline stance externally, and judge whether the latter has enough value to risk losing those benefits, or how much loss of benefit they consider acceptable.

In terms of diplomacy, there is a possibility that what was said yesterday changes today. No one in the world expected the US-China rapprochement in the 1970s. Until just before that, China had been criticizing US imperialism and so on.

The Communist Party of China has the flexibility to change its stance immediately if it recognizes that the lost merits would be very large, and I think the ability to make such dynamic policy shifts is one of its strengths.

On the other hand, it is also possible that the current leaders of the Communist Party believe they can maintain their own economic development even if the benefits received from international economic relations decrease. Whether that will succeed is unknown, but I think one of the major factors swaying the trend is indeed the judgment of the Communist Party leaders.

Mr. Kawashima, what are your thoughts?

The point is whether some of the issues that emerged during the pandemic will become universal after the pandemic.

Politically speaking, there were parts where human rights, democracy, freedom, and diversity were suppressed, and in China, this appeared as the Uyghur and Hong Kong issues. From China's perspective, they say these are traditional national security issues, and they are suppressing them because there might be a color revolution in Hong Kong or terrorism and independence movements in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

The cultural relativism Mr. Iwama mentioned certainly hasn't taken root much in China until now, but on the other hand, there is a logic of diversity in the Chinese sense, and Mao Zedong shouldn't have denied that. It seems that this is being gradually suppressed during this pandemic. This is likely a common phenomenon in many countries. In other words, whether it is multiculturalism, pluralism, or cultural relativism, it seems they are shrinking somewhat globally under COVID-19.

That is why there is the question of whether it is enough to just say it was wonderful because they managed it well and suppressed the virus. That could lead to the argument that it's better not to have diversity. What is important is how to maintain human rights and freedom as much as possible and how to return them to their original state from now on.

Regarding the economy, the flow of people has stopped, and decoupling is posing new challenges. Despite the international division of labor expanding this much and China being linked to the world through supply chains, during the pandemic, countries started saying they would make masks in their own countries, partially abandoning the international division of labor. In addition, the US and China are engaging in decoupling, pushing the logic of economic security rather than the international division of labor. Even so, economic interdependence is strong, so full decoupling cannot be done easily.

How will the world economy regain a system of cooperation and coordination in the future? China depends on the international economy, and the world depends on the Chinese market. This is a challenge for China and a challenge for the world. We cannot ignore the world's second-largest economy, so even if we decouple in high-tech industries, we can never abandon the possibility of moving together with China in international relations.

Furthermore, Mr. Zheng mentioned the population issue; there is no longer a demographic dividend, and it will be impossible to earn through population. That is exactly why China proceeded with infrastructure construction in high-tech fields like 5G even during this pandemic. Social implementation proceeds rapidly in China. The construction of high-tech, "efficient" living spaces like smart cities is progressing.

In democratic countries, when implementing social changes, various processes such as consideration for personal information are followed, but in China, these proceed without such processes, with the pandemic acting as a tailwind. A lot of data is being collected in China, and there is much to learn from it, but advanced countries cannot directly apply those results. How a new "appropriate" social order should be conceived, supported by numerical evidence, is also a big question.

I believe that how to learn from the "convenience" of the unmanned and automated society in an aging society presented by China, without simply dismissing it because China is socialist and different from us, is a challenge that has become even clearer during this pandemic.

Mr. Kawashima has just organized the points for us. The appropriate use of technology in national governance, values like human rights and freedom versus cultural relativism, and global markets versus security—all of these are important when considering the post-COVID order.

So finally, I would like to ask about how China's governance will develop after COVID-19 and what factors will determine that direction, focusing on points related to your own research fields.

Will the control and management of society that was strengthened during the pandemic be maintained in the future, or will it loosen to some extent? Where do the factors that determine this lie?

I think the high-technology challenge Mr. Kawashima mentioned is very significant. It takes high costs to maintain the management system. The question is how far the development of high technology can drive the economy as the demographic dividend disappears.

From a historical perspective, I think Xi Jinping's management system owes a lot to the legacy of the Mao Zedong era. However, the legacy of the Mao era is a double-edged sword, and I think it will reach its limit at some point.

For example, regarding the collective ownership of rural land, I see this system as having contributed to social stability. Based on this system, in the 1980s, the rural economy developed through a unique method, with township and village enterprises as the driving force. In the 90s, there were inequality issues such as farmers losing land, but overall, because the management rights of farmers over the land were stable, it did not create a situation of mass displacement. Collective land ownership rather served as a safety net when migrant workers in cities lost their jobs. Under current policy, farmers' management rights over land will remain unchanged for the next 30 years.

On the other hand, I think this policy might hinder the progress of large-scale land management and agricultural mechanization. There used to be quite a bit of discussion on this issue, but recently such discussions seem to have faded.

Another point is that since the Party covers all of society, its responsibility is also great. The issue of how to maintain unity within the Party will arise. Local-level officials do not necessarily report information upward faithfully, so how to transmit information is important.

And when a problem occurs, unlike in Japan or the US, under a one-party system, criticism tends to be directed at the Party or the government, so I think risks and instability lurk in that area.

Mr. Iwama, what are your thoughts?

Regarding social issues, I have nothing to add to what Mr. Zheng and Mr. Kawashima said, so I would like to talk specifically about cultural aspects.

Whether cultural relativist thinking will take root is difficult to say, but if there is such an opportunity, I think it is the chance to interact with foreign countries.

I think China has some weaknesses in soft power. I am in the Faculty of Letters, and again this year, few students are writing graduation theses on Chinese history. Students in the Faculty of Letters choose research themes based on interest in culture, so current China is not very popular. In terms of popular culture—dramas, music, and so on—I think Japan and South Korea are still more advanced.

However, in recent years, if you look at where the entertainment industry, museums, and art galleries are most prosperous, it is completely China, with funds flowing in that are incomparable to Japan. Also, for the past 10 years or so, China has been studying South Korea very hard as a model for the cultural industry, so I feel that the "China Wave" following the "Korean Wave" might not be as far off as one might think.

Another thing regarding soft power is the topic of Confucius Institutes. When people mention Confucius Institutes, the talk immediately turns to propaganda or brainwashing. However, there are various such cultural exchange organizations besides China's, like the British Council or Japan's Japan Foundation, so it feels a bit one-sided for China's to be immediately called propaganda or brainwashing.

However, for Confucius Institutes to become more accepted, it will be important for multiculturalist and cultural relativist thinking to permeate, so that the culture of the partner country is naturally respected. I have a hopeful observation that through involvement with foreign countries, discussions on Chinese-style multiculturalism and cultural relativism will gradually mature.

I'll ask Mr. Kashima. In order for China to carry out the reforms necessary for economic development, for example, even if it aims to join the TPP, I think a certain amount of external pressure is necessary. What factors do you think will influence China's future economic policy?

It is quite difficult to provide an overall outlook on the factors affecting the Chinese economy, so I will present a few individual points that I am interested in when considering the future Chinese economy.

First, the soft power Mr. Iwama mentioned is a very important point, and economically it relates to the content industry. Generally, one pattern for the development of Chinese international companies is to gain strength in a relatively protected domestic market and then go out into the world.

That point could also apply to the content industry. Looking at movie box office revenues during China's May 2021 Labor Day holiday period (May 1–5), in just five days, the total for all of China was over 1.6 billion yuan (approx. 25.6 billion yen), with the top-ranked "My Love" (Ni de hun li) reaching 650 million yuan (approx. 10.4 billion yen).

"My Love" seems to be a remake of a Korean film, but many movies made within China also ranked, and they are generating that much box office revenue in the domestic market alone. There is a possibility that they will gain strength with the domestic market as a base, and then excellent content will be exported.

The game industry is also quite strong; Chinese-made games can be seen among free download games for smartphones and tablets, and Japanese children might be playing Chinese games without even knowing it. It is possible for China's soft power to spread throughout the world in this way.

Also, what I am very interested in regarding the current US-China confrontation is how the Chinese government's long-term official criticism of the United States will affect the psychology of Chinese youth as the confrontation intensifies. For Chinese youth until now, studying at an American university was a goal in terms of academic background. Children of Communist Party leaders also study in the US.

In the future, how will young Chinese people, especially children around elementary, middle, and high school age who will be considering university, perceive the US and interact with it? Will they still aim to study in the US? I think this issue is interesting to watch in the long term.

And one more thing: the development of IT technology and central-local relations. Earlier, the topic of government control over the people came up, but what is interesting from the context of Chinese history is how the development of control technology through digitalization and IT will affect the central government's control over local bureaucrats and local Party officials.

Traditionally, how the center controls the regions has been a major challenge of governance in China, but the development of control technology through digitalization is likely to have the effect of strengthening the central government's control over the regions. If so, what impact will it have on the previous style of governance within China, especially control within the officialdom? I think this is a very important theme.

Mr. Kawashima, will the diplomacy you mentioned earlier, where ideology is pushed to the forefront, change as economic exchange becomes more active after COVID? If China were to shift its diplomatic style again, what would be the trigger?

There are things that could be turning points for China in the future. Even in high-tech industries, it's about whether the Communist government can create a living environment where engineers want to stay in China.

The focus is on whether diversity can be regained in diplomacy, but that will be difficult for the time being. Even if the private sector regains diversity, it seems it will take time for that to eventually be fed back into the government's external actions.

Since everyone from agricultural migrants to individual companies and local governments is moving according to their own logic, it will be reflected in the central government to some extent. However, if the Party center is hardened, there will be limits to the feedback.

For example, the 100,000-plus Africans who were in Guangdong, whom Mr. Iwama touched upon earlier—their numbers plummeted under COVID. During the process of infection control, rumors spread locally that infections were spreading among Africans, and Guangdong authorities cracked down on them all at once. The method was "rough," and there was intense backlash from local Africans and from media in African countries that received the news. To what extent was this case fed back?

Confucius Institutes are another example. In developing countries, Confucius Institutes are doing quite well because if local students learn Chinese, study in China, master the language, and return home, they can get jobs at local Chinese companies. However, doing the same in advanced countries doesn't yield results because students don't necessarily want to go to Chinese companies. Therefore, criticism of Confucius Institutes erupted in advanced countries.

How much feedback is being given on this matter as well? Xi Jinping says China will become "lovable," but for that, feedback from the field is essential.

On the diplomatic front, China says it will create a new type of international relations. But are the voices of dissatisfaction from within the country and the voices from foreign countries reaching them? The question is whether they have that much coordination ability and flexibility.

It might be tough until around 2023, which is politically sensitive, but after that, if Xi Jinping extends his term, he might be able to readjust when he has a bit more breathing room. If he can't do it then and his perception remains out of sync with society and foreign countries, I think it will be very difficult.

What will be the deciding factor in whether Chinese diplomacy can regain its resilience?

If I knew that, I think you could become the President of the country, Mr. Kojima (laughs). Currently, they are confirming the loyalty of 95 million Party members, but it will be necessary to adjust so as to draw out so-called "spontaneity" by skillfully utilizing big data and the like, rather than just using such psychological pressure.

Xi Jinping's "lovable" remark also shows that while he knows they are disliked, he cannot say they "made a mistake." I doubt whether resilience can be recovered with such an attitude.

Another issue that will become a problem is the fiscal issue mentioned by Mr. Zheng. They won't be able to give what they don't have, and if local finances face a crisis, the options for local governments will decrease and they will become rigid, and domestic public opinion may also lose diversity.

And the worst-case scenario is that Xi Jinping's dream, the Communist Party's dream, and China's dream fall apart. Therefore, as Xi Jinping, he must always grasp the dreams of the Party and society and keep them aligned. If he can do this, flexibility can be guaranteed. If he doesn't notice they are out of sync, or thinks it's okay if they are, then we can no longer expect resilience.

A rigid Party-government was created during the pandemic, and it is becoming even more rigid this year, a political year marking the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party. However, as far as I can hear from everyone's talk, the vitality of the soft civil society and the people living resiliently is maintained, and it is predicted that they will start moving again once the pandemic and the political year have passed.

What will be asked of the Communist Party regime is whether it can indeed have the power to scoop up such vitality and diversity and turn it into the nation's vitality. If I were to interpret what Mr. Kawashima said in my own way, it probably depends on how much space can be secured for regions, companies, and people to pursue their dreams with some degree of freedom while demanding loyalty to Xi Jinping, and how much they can respond to their demands. When that is secured through domestic and foreign policy, Xi Jinping's dream and the Communist Party's dream may become the dream of the Chinese people.

Thank you very much for today.