[Special Feature: The Future of International Order] Michito Tsuruoka: NATO After the Cold War—The Search for Order and Remaining Challenges

2022/07/05

More than 30 years have passed since the end of the Cold War in Europe. Because the Cold War and its conclusion were such monumental events, the subsequent era has been referred to as the "post-Cold War" period. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, there is an increasing debate that the post-Cold War era has come to an end. So, what exactly was the post-Cold War period in the context of European international relations, particularly regarding the security order?

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an alliance between the United States and Europe, has played a central role in European security. Attention to NATO's role has also increased surrounding Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It is certain that Euro-American security will continue to evolve with NATO as its axis.

Therefore, this article looks back at the transition of NATO's role during the period known as the post-Cold War era, and analyzes how the European security order was formed and what problems it simultaneously faced.

What emerges overall is the image of NATO flexibly changing its roles and activities in line with the objective of ensuring the security of its member states. At the same time, an important aspect of the post-Cold War era was the inability to find an answer to the challenge of how to integrate Russia—which exists as part of Europe yet possesses strongly heterogeneous elements—into the European order.

If NATO was a Western military alliance meant to fight the East-West Cold War, its maintenance after the Cold War might not have been inevitable. In fact, immediately after the end of the Cold War, there were active debates suggesting that an alliance whose role had ended should be dissolved, and predictions that it would inevitably collapse.

However, by the time the Cold War ended, it could be said that NATO's survival was already a foregone conclusion. To begin with, NATO was not an organization aimed solely at dealing with the Soviet military threat; it was also a community of values where the US and Europe, sharing common values, pledged to unite. NATO has called itself a "politico-military alliance." The emphasis lies in the inclusion of "politics," rather than being a mere military alliance.

Furthermore, the fact that German unification was realized in October 1990—before the final outcome of the end of the Cold War was decided—through the method of a unified Germany belonging to NATO, set the direction for NATO's centrality in the subsequent European order. As the European order experienced unprecedented transformation, NATO became a bastion for maintaining stability and predictability.

Additionally, although the Soviet Union collapsed, the reality existed that its successor state, Russia, continued to exist on the European continent as a major power possessing a vast number of nuclear weapons on par with the United States. This came to be recognized as a security risk, along with the destabilization of conflicts in regions surrounding Europe. As long as this was the case, the immediate dissolution of NATO was not a realistic option for European countries. In fact, there is no evidence that the dissolution of NATO was ever considered as a realistic issue at the government level, as opposed to public debate.

Ultimately, NATO continued due to the necessity of maintaining cooperation between the US and Europe and among European nations, the need to address risks related to Russia and regional conflicts, and the lack of other reliable alternatives. It is easy to criticize that a pan-European order should have been sought using the end of the Cold War as an opportunity. However, ensuring security is a heavy responsibility for any government, and in the midst of an uncertain future, one cannot lightly say that something already established and successful should have been discarded.

Having stood at that starting point, NATO's post-Cold War era experienced a change in the alliance's objectives. With the clear threat of the Soviet Union gone, NATO pivoted toward addressing multifaceted risks in its 1990 Strategic Concept, but it soon faced changes that exceeded initial expectations.

This was the crisis management (peacekeeping) mission in the former Yugoslavia. Starting with the deployment of troops for the implementation of the Bosnian peace agreement established in 1995, and conducting airstrikes against Serbia in relation to Kosovo, NATO transformed into an "alliance in action." This was a new experience for NATO, which had spent the Cold War era as an "alliance in existence" primarily focused on deterrence, but multilateral planning and operational execution were exactly what NATO had prepared for since the Cold War, and NATO came to demonstrate its inherent capabilities.

However, that was still a story restricted to the Euro-Atlantic region. Moreover, even the former Yugoslavia was considered "out of area," and there was debate at the time regarding how far the alliance should involve itself.

What forced a change in that situation was the series of terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which stipulates collective defense, for the first time in history, and supported the United States in various ways. While only a few countries, such as the UK, actually participated directly in the attacks against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, from August 2003, NATO took command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) based on a UN mandate. Through this, NATO became fully involved in Afghanistan, and the alliance's scope of activity greatly exceeded the Euro-Atlantic region.

In response to 9/11, NATO established and practiced a new principle: "wherever needed." However, in responding to the Iraq War in 2003, NATO experienced a serious internal division between countries like the UK and Central and Eastern European nations that supported the US, and countries like Germany and France that strongly criticized the US.

Nevertheless, for NATO as a whole, a rough consensus existed that the role of the military in the new era was no longer territorial defense, but rather crisis management like in the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, and expeditionary missions. The period from the 1990s to the mid-2000s was such an era. Collective defense had receded into the background. To put it another way, the priority of deterrence and defense against Russia remained low.

What forced a reconsideration of those premises was the Russo-Georgian War in August 2008. In that war, Russia invaded Georgia and unilaterally declared the independence of two regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Although Georgia is not a NATO member, the result was a renewed recognition of the necessity of territorial defense in various countries. The fact that the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept re-emphasized collective defense as the first pillar was part of that trend.

Subsequently, Russia's aggressive stance became more apparent, including the illegal annexation of Crimea in Ukraine in 2014 and intervention in the Donbas. As a result, NATO could no longer continue to treat Russia as a partner as it had previously, and repositioned it as a target for deterrence and defense.

The rotational deployment of NATO troops to the Baltic states and Poland decided at the Warsaw Summit in July 2016 ("Enhanced Forward Presence"), and the "Four Thirties" presented at the Brussels Summit in June 2021—a plan to ensure 30 naval combatants, 30 maneuver battalions, and 30 air squadrons within 30 days in the event of an emergency—are, of course, all measures taken with Russia in mind.

Immediately after the annexation of Crimea, NATO also focused on "hybrid warfare" utilizing information warfare and cyberattacks that do not reach the level of using military force, but since then, NATO has shifted its weight toward preparing for high-end, large-scale military contingencies.

However, confronting Russia head-on militarily is a heavy burden for NATO as well. Therefore, this strengthening of the deterrence and defense posture against Russia did not proceed in a straight line. The honest feeling was that if they could avoid doing it, that would be best. Consequently, the reality of NATO was that it continued to hold wishful thinking that "Russia surely won't take any further action," and proceeded with responses in a piecemeal fashion.

However, the destination of that path was the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. For NATO, even for the defense of member states, there was no choice left but to strengthen collective defense.

Occurring simultaneously with the aforementioned transitions of NATO was the enlargement of its membership. And that is precisely what has shaped the post-Cold War European order. NATO membership, which was 16 countries at the end of the Cold War, has increased to 30 today. If the membership of Finland and Sweden is realized, it will be 32.

What brought this about was, quite simply, the existence of countries wishing to join NATO. Because there were countries that wanted to enter, NATO responded. Furthermore, NATO was not at all positive about accepting new member states initially.

The reasons NATO was reluctant to expand were, first, consideration for the relationship with Russia. With Russia opposing NATO enlargement, they had to weigh the cost of deteriorating relations with Russia against the benefits of NATO enlargement. Even within the US, among thinkers called realists, the argument that "Russia (and the relationship with it) is more important than Central and Eastern Europe" was not uncommon. George Kennan was a representative example.

Second, accepting new member states into NATO means expanding security commitments to new countries. The ultimate guarantor of collective defense in NATO is, in reality, the United States, and for the US, NATO enlargement has the aspect of an increased burden. It is understandable that even within the US, the Department of Defense was reluctant about NATO enlargement.

Nevertheless, led by Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, the voices seeking NATO membership only grew stronger, and the reality was that NATO could no longer resist them. Those countries sought NATO membership as a symbol of their "return to Europe," while simultaneously ensuring security with Russia in mind.

This duality is important. Ensuring security was vital, and from that perspective, NATO membership was synonymous with receiving a US guarantee. On the other hand, it is difficult to say that the threat perception of those Central and Eastern European countries toward Russia was high throughout the 1990s. This is because, ultimately, NATO ended up deferring the formulation of official contingency plans for new member states, and although dissatisfaction leaked from countries like Poland, those countries themselves did not proceed with preparations for contingencies with Russia in mind. Since there was no sense of urgency in terms of security, it was natural for the weight of the political aspect—the return to Europe—to increase.

Moving forward a bit in time, Finland and Sweden, which had long maintained military non-alignment in Northern Europe, applied for NATO membership in May 2022. The direct trigger was the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but what was important for those countries was the "freedom to choose alliances." This was a principle recognized in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) since the Cold War era. However, in December 2021, Russia demanded a halt to further NATO enlargement in new treaty proposals to NATO and the US. This was exactly what threatened the right to choose alliances, and concern grew in Finland and Sweden.

However, at that point, both countries were not thinking of a short-term application for NATO membership. But for both countries, which had thought they would "decide on NATO membership when necessary," the emergence of the concern that they might not be able to enter when necessary was an extremely serious situation. NATO was conscious as an option for when it became necessary, even for non-member states.

There were two major enlargements of NATO after the Cold War: the first in 1999 when the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined, and in 2004 when the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined. Given that Russia had opposed NATO enlargement, a "settlement" was made with Russia in advance of each expansion.

Before the 1999 enlargement, the NATO-Russia Founding Act was agreed upon in May 1997, and the NATO side expressed its intention that the defense of new member states would be handled through reinforcements rather than the "additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces." Also, before the 2004 enlargement, the Rome Declaration was agreed upon in May 2002, and the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was established.

Russia, for its part, likely recognized that since it did not have a veto over NATO decisions, simply continuing to oppose them would not be beneficial, and so it moved into a struggle over conditions. It is a history of reaching compromises even without agreeing to NATO enlargement. Moreover, Vladimir Putin was already president in 2002.

Still, from Russia's perspective, since it was in a weak position in terms of the balance of power with NATO and the US, there may be an aspect that it had no choice but to reluctantly accept NATO enlargement. If that is the case, it follows that as its national power increases, it would seek a transformation of the relationship with NATO and, furthermore, the European order.

And this point, coupled with the way the Cold War ended, has continued to be a challenge for the US and NATO sides as well. This is because, of the two major problems surrounding the European order, the "German problem" saw a final resolution by incorporating a unified Germany into NATO and the European Union (EU), but there was no clear answer to the other one, the "Russia problem." Like Germany, or even more so, Russia was an entity too large to be positioned within Europe, and if handled incorrectly, it was a power that could destroy the European order.

Toward post-Cold War Russia, expectations grew in the US and Western Europe for it to progress in democratization and market economy and be reborn as a European-style modern state. Based on that, various forms of support were provided, but ultimately, a relationship of "neither too close nor too far" continued. From Russia's perspective, it means that the US and Europe ultimately tried to exclude Russia, but for the US and Europe, Russia distanced itself.

Even so, it might have been better compared to the confrontation of the Cold War era, but a stable order was never built with Russia. Furthermore, regarding Ukraine, although a decision was made at the 2008 NATO Summit that it would become a member state in the future, there was no progress in the membership process after that, and a state of limbo continued. This must be admitted as a limit of order formation by NATO.

In a situation where it had gathered more than 100,000 troops on the Ukrainian border, in December 2021, Russia presented draft treaties to NATO and the US that included demands to return NATO's force posture to its May 1997 state and to prohibit further NATO enlargement. This was a fundamental challenge to the European security order formed around NATO after the Cold War, and an attempt to undo the "post-Cold War" era.

Following the invasion of Ukraine, NATO is moving toward strengthening its deterrence and defense posture against Russia, such as by reinforcing NATO units deployed in the Baltic states and Poland. If the membership of Finland and Sweden is realized, the encirclement of Russia by NATO as a whole will be further strengthened.

While it looks like a new era for NATO, it is merely a symptomatic treatment to deal with the immediate threat from Russia. It cannot yet be said for certain that NATO's determination to return to a Cold War-like situation and confront Russia in the same way it confronted the Soviet Union has solidified. This is because the cost is too high for the NATO side as well.

How to handle Russia, a fellow occupant of the European continent, will remain a challenge for NATO even after the Russia-Ukraine war concludes in some form. Furthermore, China comes into view beyond that. This is because, while the greatest threat in the short term is Russia, China will become a challenge in the medium to long term. The invitation of Japan and others to the June 2022 Summit was in that context, and NATO's journey of transformation will continue.