[Special Feature: How to Perceive an "Immigrant Society"] The 2018 Immigration Control Act Amendment: On Its Policy Implications

2019/07/05

The "Act for Partial Amendment of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (hereinafter, the Immigration Control Act)," submitted to the Diet on November 2, 2018, was enacted on December 8 of the same year, promulgated on December 14, and came into effect on April 1, 2019. What meaning do these changes to the laws and regulations governing the entry, stay, and employment of foreigners hold for Japanese society? Should this amendment be interpreted as a historic policy shift, as is often claimed? Seeking an answer to this question, this article will outline my personal views on the policy implications of the 2018 Immigration Control Act amendment.

The 2018 Immigration Control Act amendment, whose centerpiece is the creation of the "Specified Skilled Worker" (particularly Type 1) residence status intended to help alleviate Japan's labor shortage, is frequently cited as a "historic shift" in this policy field. Under Type 1 of this residence status, it is possible to employ foreigners in 14 job categories. Foreigners who pass the relevant skills and Japanese language exams are eligible for acceptance, while those who have completed Technical Intern Training (ii) or higher are exempt from the exams. With a cap of 345,000 people to be accepted over five years, the industrial sectors where the scale exceeds 30,000 people include nursing care (60,000), food service (53,000), construction (40,000), building cleaning (37,000), agriculture (36,500), and food and beverage manufacturing (34,000)—all of which are considered to have serious labor shortages.

Under "Specified Skilled Worker" Type 2, employment is currently only permitted in construction and the shipbuilding/ship machinery industries. There is no upper limit on the stay, and family stays are permitted under certain conditions. Another difference between Type 1 and Type 2 is that for the former, it is legally mandated that the receiving organization (affiliated organization) or a registered support organization commissioned by it provide prescribed support to the foreign national.

Overall, can the current institutional change be called a "historic shift"? In considering the answer, several reservations are necessary. Let us organize this from three perspectives, including the assessment that it cannot necessarily be called such and the reasons why.

First is the quantitative effect of the 2018 Immigration Control Act amendment. As mentioned earlier, this amendment could increase the number of foreign workers by a maximum of 345,000 over five years. However, that scale cannot be called excessive. I would like to point out the fact that the number of foreign workers increased by approximately 180,000 in the single year from October 2017 to October 2018. In other words, more than half of the maximum number of workers to be accepted over five years through "Specified Skilled Worker" Type 1 was met in the single year before this status was introduced.

Let us assume the number of new arrivals under Specified Skilled Worker is roughly 70,000 per year on average. This could be an effective means compared to securing labor through other routes. However, the figure above refers to the number of entrants, and since the stay for "Specified Skilled Worker" Type 1 is limited to five years, even if the numbers initially continue to increase, the number of people leaving Japan will also begin to increase over the years. As a result, from a long-term perspective, the growth rate of foreigners working in Japan may slow down.

Second is the side effect of creating the "Specified Skilled Worker" status. If acceptance through this residence status becomes mainstream, there is a risk that the inflow of technical interns and international students seeking employment will dwindle. If such a trend emerges, the introduction of the "Specified Skilled Worker" status will not push up the total number of foreign-born workers as much as expected. However, it is unclear whether this kind of offsetting effect will occur. Technical interns will serve as a source of supply for "Specified Skilled Worker" for the time being, and furthermore, if many companies and employers continue to prefer the form of accepting technical interns with whom they already have experience, this situation will not apply.

Third is the limited nature of the impact at the macro level. This is clear when considering the scale of the Japanese labor market, where the number of employed persons exceeded 66 million as of March 2019. The newly supplied labor from overseas may be concentrated in specific industries in specific regions, such as the fishing industry in Hiroshima Prefecture, agriculture in Ibaraki Prefecture, or the food service industry in the Tokyo metropolitan area. Of course, for individual employers who rely on the "Specified Skilled Worker" acceptance quota, it will be utilized as an indispensable scheme for securing human resources. However, for the national economy as a whole, its effect remains localized.

On the other hand, the argument that this amendment to the Immigration Control Act is a major shift is also quite valid. As with the negative view, I would like to explain this from three points.

First, a historic and symbolic meaning can be found in the current amendment in that the Japanese government has permitted the acceptance of workers from overseas due to labor shortages—that is, it has opened the "front door." While it may not be possible to call it a complete break from previous policy directions, the significance of this point deserves emphasis. The amendment was a process of "normalizing," if not entirely, Japan's foreign worker policy, which had long been ridiculed as a "side door" by permitting the employment of "trainees," "technical interns," and "third-generation Japanese descendants."

Second, acceptance through "Specified Skilled Worker" could be expanded in its application in the future. Let us look back at the history of the acceptance of technical interns, which could be called synonymous with foreign workers in Japan. It began in 1993, about a quarter-century ago. When the system was launched, the number of permitted job categories was less than 20, and the scale of acceptance was about several thousand people per year. "Employment" was limited to a maximum of one year (about two years if combined with training).

Currently, 80 job categories (144 types of work) are open to technical interns. Furthermore, employment is permitted for up to five years, including a temporary return home. In the most recent year of 2018, the number of foreigners entering as technical interns reached 150,000. There is no guarantee that the developments observed in technical internship will not appear specifically for "Specified Skilled Worker." Depending on the future situation, the possibility that this residence status will significantly "transform" cannot be denied.

Third is the issue of the awareness of companies and employers. Not a few people and organizations were stirred by the creation of the "Specified Skilled Worker" status through the 2018 amendment. According to reports, applications for "Registered Support Organizations" exceeded 1,100 by April 19. Even now, the mood in Japan to welcome workers from abroad with open arms is by no means strong, but recent series of public opinion polls by media outlets regarding the pros and cons of accepting foreign workers show that, in many cases, respondents who answer "in favor" or "somewhat in favor" constitute a majority.

The psychological impact of the public recognition of foreign employment in fields where acceptance had not been openly promoted cannot be ignored, even if it cannot be visualized. Actively appointing foreign-born workers is emerging as a given option for more companies and employers than before. It is no longer an irregular or exceptional means of securing human resources. I would like to point this out as one aspect that will likely characterize the Reiwa era.

I personally hold the view that the introduction of "Specified Skilled Worker" Type 1, the centerpiece of the amended Immigration Control Act, may have produced accompanying institutional by-products. These by-products are: first, the mandatory "support" for Type 1; second, the establishment of Type 2 (alongside Type 1), which allows for an indefinite period of stay as long as employment continues and permits family sponsorship and permanent residency; and third, the compilation of the "Comprehensive Measures for Acceptance and Coexistence of Foreign Human Resources," for which a budget of over 20 billion yen was allocated during the same period.

One of the background circumstances for creating the "Specified Skilled Worker" status was a series of criticisms against the frequent violations of the Labor Standards Act, poor working environments, and the exploitation of workers that sometimes drove them to disappear under the Technical Intern Training Program. Additionally, moral condemnations of the principles of prohibiting family sponsorship and preventing permanent residency prescribed by that system come to mind. Both were discussed to varying degrees in Diet deliberations over the amendment and were frequently covered by the media. This process can be said to have required that the planning of Japan's foreign worker policy—or what the government denies is "immigration policy"—include measures and rules that can respond to these issues, at least formally.

The main focus of this amendment was originally supposed to be securing the necessary amount of labor "power" in the necessary workplaces for the necessary period, nothing more and nothing less. However, in establishing a new residence status as a revamped version or an extension of the Technical Intern Training Program, which has long invited numerous criticisms and doubts from many quarters, if policy planning proceeded by pushing only the aforementioned "necessity" to the forefront, opposition and friction from the surroundings would not subside, hindering the legislative process. Even if a policy to invite workers from abroad is primarily an expression of the pursuit of national interest, in order to neutralize this kind of self-serving logic even slightly, a certain degree of liberalism and humanity is required in the institutional design. This requirement may have been reflected, as a kind of political sense of balance, in the "support" as an obligation, the "Type 2" status that allows for the possibility of family sponsorship and permanent residency albeit with conditions, and the "coexistence" measures accompanied by a 20-billion-yen budget.

This is, of course, nothing more than my speculation and lacks firm evidence. Regardless of the appropriateness of my personal view, what should be measured are the substantive effects these "by-products" may have on Japanese society in the future. That is, will the support improve the working environment of the individuals concerned? What will be the number of foreigners who obtain Type 2 status and their retention rate in Japan? Will the "Comprehensive Measures" contribute to the progress of coexistence? Ultimately, will it lead the relationship between foreigners and the host Japanese society in a healthy and friendly direction? Whether the 2018 amendment is a "historic shift" will be judged in later years from these perspectives as well.

I do not possess the ability to predict the social consequences of this series of developments surrounding the amendment. Many people around me believe that the situation allows for no optimism at all. Compared to my speculation about the "by-products" of this amendment, this seems like a much more moderate view.