[Feature: The Future of International Order] Roundtable: How Will the World Change After the Invasion of Ukraine?

This special roundtable discussion was originally scheduled to be moderated by our colleague, Professor Toshihiro Nakayama. However, very sadly, Professor Nakayama passed away suddenly on May 1st. I would like to express my deepest condolences to Professor Nakayama once again.

Now, three months have passed since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began on February 24th. Today, I would like to reconsider the significance of that invasion for the international order and look ahead to the future of that order.

First, I would like to start the discussion by looking at the current situation three months after the invasion. I think the key points for considering the future are why this situation occurred and what should have been done to prevent this invasion from happening. Mr. Ogushi, as an expert on Russia, what are your thoughts?

Why did Russia carry out such an invasion? As you know, the official war aims stated by Russia were to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, to demilitarize Ukraine, and to denazify Ukraine. Furthermore, the protection of the so-called People's Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, and the protection of Russians living within Ukraine, can be cited as official war aims.

Russia's obsession with Ukraine was very strong, based on Putin's own idea that Russians and Ukrainians are originally culturally close and one and the same. Therefore, I think he felt it was outrageous for Ukraine to join NATO, a military alliance that, from Putin's perspective, is anti-Russian.

Furthermore, demilitarizing Ukraine and ensuring it does not turn against Russia is understandable for the time being. However, what is often said to be incomprehensible is "denazification."

Since the political change at Maidan [Independence Square in Kyiv] in 2014, it is a fact that nationalistic tendencies have strengthened within Ukraine, whether or not one calls them neo-Nazi. In particular, when the Yanukovych administration was overthrown, quite radical nationalists were active and committed acts of violence.

I visited Kyiv and Donetsk Oblast in March 2014, and at that time, a group of radical nationalist youths called the Right Sector was being reported on extensively in Russia. They were being called "neo-Nazis," and they were active to a considerable extent. However, I think there was exaggeration in the Russian reporting.

At that time, I asked a Ukrainian expert, "Who exactly is the Right Sector?" Since that person was a pro-Maidan scholar, they said something like, "That's Russian propaganda, don't believe it. They're just football supporters."

At the time, I didn't quite understand the context of the phrase "football supporters," but intense football supporter groups around the world are like gang groups that follow football tours and engage in armed conflict with local supporters. It is a fact that they were active during the process in which the Maidan political change became violent.

Furthermore, in the subsequent war in Donbas, they achieved considerable military success against Russia. Initially, they did not have a good reputation among ordinary Ukrainian citizens because they were violent, but because they were active in the war against Russia, they were elevated to a kind of hero status, and it is also a fact that a trend emerged that allowed their use of violence.

Among them are people called Banderites. Bandera was a Ukrainian nationalist who led the Ukrainian independence movement during World War II and had very strong anti-Semitic and anti-Polish tendencies. These people cooperated in the massacre of Jews when the Nazis entered, and they also massacred Poles. After that, they also fought against the Soviet army. And it is certain that Banderism is latent to some extent among current Ukrainian nationalist people.

Furthermore, the Azov Battalion, which fought until the end in Mariupol. These nationalist people were central when the Ukrainian side recaptured Mariupol in 2014. Therefore, I think that is likely one of the reasons why Russia carried out what looked like an extermination operation in Mariupol this time.

The Ukrainian side says that when they incorporated the Azov Battalion into the national army, they conducted ideological screenings and excluded all those called radical neo-Nazis. However, it is certain that such radical nationalist tendencies were strengthening within Ukraine before the war. Of course, that doesn't mean it's okay to go to war, and it's strange to use that as a reason for war, but the Russian side used it as a justification for the war.

When Russia says "denazification," it means the exclusion of those so-called nationalist people.

We have had an explanation of the invasion's objectives from the Russian side, but from a European perspective, Mr. Hosoya, what are your thoughts?

I went to Poland just last week and exchanged opinions with Polish international political scientists and Russia experts, and was able to hear valuable opinions. I also went to the Warsaw Rising Museum, which was opened eight years ago, and learned about its heroic and tragic history.

The population of Warsaw before the Warsaw Uprising was 1.3 million, but the population after the uprising dropped to 9,000. In other words, 1.29 million people died or fled. If you ask who they were slaughtered by, it was the Russian and German armies. First, the Soviet Union attacked from the east under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and eastern Poland was invaded, and then the German-Soviet War began and Nazi Germany took control.

With the recent siege and attack on Kyiv by Russia, the first thing many Polish people remembered was this experience in Warsaw during World War II. In other words, many people assumed that Kyiv would eventually be thoroughly destroyed like Warsaw. However, Polish people are surprised that it didn't turn out that way. In other words, Ukraine resisted more than expected, and Russia's operations are not going as well as expected.

However, the opinion of Polish researchers was unanimous on one point: "Russia is relentless." In other words, they don't think Putin will easily stop military operations with this. They expect he will likely attack and destroy Kyiv again.

Traditionally, Russia creates puppet regimes in Poland and Ukraine and makes them its own sphere of influence. Furthermore, it relentlessly crushes any forces that resist. Behind this, I think, is the fact that Russia does not see Ukraine or Poland as "states."

President Putin clearly said, "Ukraine is not a state to begin with," but I consider this to be a 19th-century view of the international order. In other words, an international order is created through the rule of great powers, and the survival of small countries is determined solely by the intentions of the great powers. If a great power says they "may survive," they can survive; otherwise, they are ruled by military force and a puppet regime obedient to the power is created.

This 19th-century, great-power-centric power politics view of order exists on one side. On the other hand, in the 20th century, we have protected the norm that even small countries have the right to survive as sovereign states. This is the Covenant of the League of Nations and the basic principle of the UN Charter. I believe the core of the 20th-century international order was basically that sovereign states gain the right to survive through the principle of self-determination and sovereign equality, and that collective security imposes sanctions on countries that commit aggression against them.

Therefore, my view is that we should not look at this war as a "war between Russia and Ukraine." In other words, it should be seen as a conflict between a 19th-century, great-power-led power politics view of international order and the position of defending the liberal international order that developed in the 20th century. Therefore, the assessment that Ukraine is a puppet of the United States and that this war is a conflict between the United States and Russia is a typical pitfall of the 19th-century worldview.

That is a view of the international order as seen from Russia; in other words, we should not tolerate that view of order. Instead, Ukraine has the right to self-determination, is fighting against Russia of its own will, and is seeking the right to survive as a sovereign state. So, the moment you say it is a puppet state of the United States, you end up defending a Putin-like, 19th-century view of the international order.

Therefore, I think it was a correct statement when Prime Minister Kishida said the day after the invasion that it was "an act that shakes the very foundations of the international order." In other words, this is not a bilateral war between Russia and Ukraine. It is a conflict over the principles of the international order.

You have spoken from a broad perspective on how to view this war. Next, Mr. Mori, please.

I would also like to state two points from a relatively broad perspective for now. The first is about order, and the second is about strategy.

The issue regarding order overlaps with what Mr. Hosoya just said, but I think this Ukraine issue has very sharply highlighted the problem of how to respond when a great power emerges that attempts to unilaterally change the "status quo" in the sense of the current international order through force.

The significance of Russia's aggression against Ukraine from the perspective of the international order includes, first, the violation of Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter, which is a fundamental principle of the post-war international order, and second, the serious violations of international humanitarian law, such as atrocities and mass killings of unarmed civilians in Ukraine. I think these two will be regarded as challenges to the order.

In response to the violation of these fundamental principles that underpin the current order, 141 countries voted in favor of the resolution condemning Russia. However, the number of countries imposing sanctions for violations of international law is limited to about 40. Therefore, the reality is that when the international order is broken, only about one-fifth of the world's nations are countries that will enforce the rules at a cost to themselves against the violating country. The reality that the order is being sustained by such a limited number of liberal democratic states has become clear.

In this situation, will Russia, which possesses nuclear weapons, succeed in making the change of the territorial status quo through the inhumane use of force a fait accompli, even while being sanctioned? Depending on how this ends, the security environment of countries around the world and the dynamics of international politics may change.

Second, it has become clear that for countries adjacent to China and Russia, the cost of maintaining their own independence and peace is extremely high without an alliance with the United States. As shown by the movement of Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership, anxiety is rising considerably. In Taiwan as well, vigilance toward China seems to be higher than ever before.

The United States cannot "deter" everything for small and medium-sized countries facing extreme choices: whether to enter into a subordinate relationship under a hegemonic power, or to fight even at the cost of great sacrifice to protect their independence while receiving support from the United States and its allies. The question is what kind of strategic options can be provided to those vulnerable small and medium-sized countries by nations that advocate for a free and open rules-based order and find peace and prosperity within it.

I would like to speak from the Chinese perspective. By observing China's actions regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine, I think we can understand how China evaluates the existing international order and how it intends to show its own position within it. I will present two points of discussion.

One is China's perception of the United States. Just before the invasion of Ukraine, China and Russia exchanged a joint statement proclaiming "friendship without limits." The international community was interested in the extent to which China would remain "pro-Russian." In fact, looking at China's words and deeds during this period, the axis of its diplomacy is not so much pro-Russian as it is "countering the US"—even if not calling it anti-American, it is in opposition to the United States. These three months confirmed that the axis of Chinese diplomacy is its relationship with the US.

The other point is that China was calmly observing the actions of the international community. As a Vice-President of the Security Council, China's actions were key to effectively sanctioning Russia, which is in a position to defend the fundamental principles of the post-war international order. During these three months, China has not supported Russia's actions. On the other hand, while taking the position of not aligning with the international community's labeling of Russia's actions as "aggression," not condemning Russia, and not supporting sanctions, China itself was watching to see exactly how far the international community would go along with sanctions against Russia.

While it was natural for the United States and European countries to move toward sanctions against Russia, China was constantly observing what kind of position the Global South—such as Southeast Asia, Africa, and South America—would take. In the process, China itself gained a kind of conviction. In other words, the world is not necessarily one with the United States and Europe; there is another vast space between the United States and its own country.

China, having chosen such actions, can hardly be said to be playing a role in defending the post-war international order. There, the next question emerges: how does China perceive its own reputation risk? I think this point will be a major topic of discussion in looking ahead to the future of the international order.

I would like to raise about three issues from the perspective of the international order and the security order.

One keyword is the return of classical warfare. I, too, never imagined that in the 21st century, a great power would deploy a large-scale ground operation against a neighboring country with which it shares a border. The reason I began studying security was the Gulf War in 1991; seeing the footage of the multinational force, centered on the US military, unilaterally attacking the Iraqi army left a vivid impression on me that this was the future of warfare.

However, this year's war by Russia gives the impression of watching a poorly made war from the past. Until last year, I thought that in modern warfare, cyber and information warfare would become the norm, and combat involving physical clashes would be decided in a short period. However, in reality, a classical and long-term combat completely different from that is unfolding. This shock is the first point.

The second point is why this war could not be prevented. The Cold War could be the Cold War because the fear of escalation—that a direct war between the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, could destroy humanity through nuclear war—was always right in front of us. It was deterred precisely by the fear of nuclear war.

I think Russia's invasion of Ukraine was decided on the assumption that the invasion and occupation would be completed in a short period, and that during that time, the US and NATO would not be able to intervene militarily. Russia proceeded with the invasion while carefully hinting at the use of nuclear weapons and suggesting a Third World War. It also looks like a war that Russia deployed while unilaterally deterring NATO.

In reality, the war has reached a stalemate due to the resistance of the Ukrainian army, and NATO countries are supporting Ukraine by providing weapons and information. It is clear that Russia underestimated the consequences of this war. However, it was not possible to include such consequences in Russia's calculations in advance.

The third point is that we are at a crossroads for the international order. Russia is openly ignoring principles such as territorial integrity and respect for sovereignty to invade another country. This is a blatant violation of the UN Charter. If the international community cannot impose an effective penalty for this act, we will truly return to the world of "Leviathan."

Certainly, Russia's previously sought goal of preventing NATO expansion has failed, and Finland and Sweden have accelerated their moves to join. Also, Ukraine will likely never return to Russia's sphere of influence. Furthermore, unprecedented economic sanctions have been imposed on Russia. However, even so, three months have passed and we have not yet been able to drive Russia to a complete defeat.

The reason Russia cannot be cornered is largely because, in addition to the continuing military stalemate, as Mr. Kamo said, the unity of the international community opposing Russia is not strong enough. China continues to trade, and India not only does not align with the international community but is also rushing to purchase energy. Looking at it that way, I feel that the international community does not sufficiently share a sense of mission to impose a penalty for breaking the international order.

The question that the international community does not necessarily share the awareness that the international order is being greatly shaken is undoubtedly an extremely important point in discussing the future of the international security and international cooperation system.

I think you have said something very important. In other words, the fact that the international community has not been able to give a sufficient penalty to Russia will lead to the destabilization of the international order in the future.

What comes to mind is the Manchurian Incident in 1931. When the Manchurian Incident occurred, it was naturally a violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations to a considerable extent, but in the end, the international community and the Council of the League did not recognize it as an act of aggression. Seeing that, great powers learned, in a sense, that when they take military action, the international community cannot impose sufficient sanctions against it.

After that, in 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia (Abyssinia). In response, the League of Nations did recognize it as aggression in the Council, but in fact, it imposed almost no sanctions.

Hitler emerged after this. There was a foundation where the international community could not impose sufficient sanctions—in other words, when a great power with military force acted, each country thought of its own interests, and economically, they could continue the trade that forms the core. Militarily, they disliked their own country making sacrifices for the security of other countries.

In today's terms, the threat of using nuclear weapons has ultimately led to a very cruel question for any country, including the United States: is it worth saving Ukraine even at the cost of a nuclear war?

Therefore, as I mentioned earlier, the war in Ukraine is also extremely important, but at the same time, what the international community, including China, learns from watching it and how it affects subsequent principles of action and norms will have an even greater significance.

Mr. Hosoya, what are your thoughts on the specific restructuring of the European security system?

The current situation can also be considered a consequence of the stumbling in creating a stable European security order during the 30 years since the end of the Cold War. At the end of the Cold War, there was an attempt to create a more inclusive security and order that would encompass all of Europe, based on the CSCE (later OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), using the term "Common European Home" as President Gorbachev did at the time.

Furthermore, with France at the center, there was an attempt for Europe to create a security order independently and autonomously. This centered on the EC and EU. In contrast, with the US and UK at the center, there was an attempt to create a European security order based on the values of free democracy with NATO as the axis.

In the end, the US-UK style security order centered on NATO became the foundation of the post-Cold War order. However, from a European perspective, neither the US nor the UK is a continental European state. Therefore, it can be said that continental Europe ultimately stumbled in creating a security order autonomously. In other words, France, Germany, and Russia were unable to autonomously create an inclusive security order.

In a sense, I think the closest thing to that was "Minsk II" in 2015. With France, Germany, and Russia at the center, they tried to solve the Ukraine problem. I think this was an agreement that made considerable concessions to Russia, but in the end, President Putin himself reached a military decision that undermined it. Of course, Russia criticizes Ukraine for not complying with the promises.

I believe that the key to truly ending the Ukraine war will be for Europe to inclusively and autonomously construct a stable post-Cold War European security order. Militarily, Russia might win, or it might lose. It might remain in a stalemate. However, separately from the continuation of combat, a stable order in Europe must be created.

This is a twisted phenomenon: while the European security order based on NATO, with the US and UK as the axis, is expanding and becoming stronger with the accession of Finland and Sweden, other options are now being lost. Where Russia should originally have joined to create a cooperative security order, things are moving toward the establishment of a European security order based on the US-UK centered NATO that Russia dislikes even more. I believe this will have a huge impact on the international order in Europe for the next 50 or 100 years.

From Russia's perspective, the objectives of the war have already failed grandly, but why did Russia have to make this choice now? What was Russia's own view of the international order? Mr. Ogushi, what are your thoughts?

Mr. Jimbo said he didn't think a classical war would become this large-scale, and I think Russia also initially intended to end it with a short-term decisive battle. However, things didn't go as expected.

As for why this is, protecting Donbas and keeping Ukraine out of NATO are fundamentally contradictory. This is speculation, but in the process of Putin making the decision, the Ukrainian army seemed to be strengthening its offensive, so I think he was pleaded with by the People's Republics. However, if he sent in troops saying "I will only protect the Donbas region" and took only Donetsk and Luhansk, it is clear that Ukraine would shift even further to the right and become more pro-NATO.

Therefore, it was originally difficult to reconcile protecting these People's Republics with keeping Ukraine out of NATO, and so I think it was decided that there was no choice but to overthrow the regime. However, there seems to have been quite a bit of conflict even within the military between the full-scale invasion faction and the Donbas-limited faction, and in the end, the full-scale invasion faction seems to have won.

However, it was almost clear even before starting that there were not enough troops to completely occupy Ukraine, so there was probably an assumption that Kyiv could be taken quickly with a small number of troops. Since that didn't go as expected, the current situation is that it is gradually becoming something closer to the Donbas-limited plan.

Before the war, I think Russia's plan was to make Ukraine accept Minsk II, push Donbas onto Ukraine to federalize Ukraine, and since Donetsk and Luhansk would have veto power, keep it out of NATO. However, Ukraine had no intention of accepting this, and in fact, the People's Republics side also had no intention of accepting it. Since it was an agreement that both parties had absolutely no intention of accepting, I think it was extremely difficult to make them swallow it.

Therefore, even if the subsequent order is created by Germany, France, and Russia, I think implementation will likely be difficult unless it is something that the parties involved can accept.

Furthermore, from Russia's perspective, NATO expansion looks like the containment of Russia, but in reality, Eastern European countries want to join because they are afraid of Russia, and the United States hesitantly lets them in because it can't be helped. I think there was a kind of unfortunate chain where Russia then perceives this as "containment."

Even there, even if there had been a choice other than NATO expansion, I feel it would likely have been difficult unless it was something that the Eastern European countries involved could accept. If so, it sounds like a story where "the war happened because it was bound to happen"...

As a result, they ended up going to war, and there is no doubt that this has become a grand own goal for Russia. For now, the fact that Russia is not succeeding even after doing all this is probably still better for the current international order. If Russia were to profit from this in some sense, as Mr. Hosoya said, countries that imitate it might emerge.

On the other hand, however, as was mentioned, there is surprisingly no support from countries other than the so-called advanced nations. Looking at it from that perspective, no matter how this war ends from here on, the gap between the West and other countries has become quite clear in this war and will likely remain for the time being.

Regarding the 19th-century international order that Mr. Hosoya mentioned, I feel that whether it was the Soviet Union or Russia, their view of order has been consistently 19th-century. During the Soviet era, up to the Eastern European countries were in their sphere of influence, which is why they suppressed the Hungarian Uprising and sent troops into Czechoslovakia. I feel that the invasion of Ukraine is an extension of that in terms of thinking. When the Cold War ended, it looked as if the Western order had covered the whole world, but in fact, the Russian side's view of order had hardly changed. I think there is also a part where this distortion exploded at this stage.

Speaking from the Chinese perspective, when considering the future of the international order, the perspective of what China is learning through the invasion of Ukraine will be important.

One thing China confirmed once again is, as I mentioned earlier, that the international community is not monolithic regarding sanctions against Russia. If we turn our eyes to Southeast Asia, the fact that no one except Singapore has supported the sanctions means that, from China's perspective, a world with various possibilities is opening up.

Another thing is that I feel China itself might be learning how to use nuclear weapons through Russia's way of fighting. In the end, it might look to China as if Russia's nuclear weapons are effectively deterring intervention by US and NATO ground forces. I think how China uses nuclear weapons is a point that the international community, including Japan, should reconfirm now.

On the other hand, how about the United States?

Regarding the nature of US military support in the response to Ukraine this time, I think one important theme will be what the US strategy for defending the status quo will become in the "post-primacy" era.

To put it somewhat exaggeratedly, the US approach to defending the status quo in the era of primacy (the era of preeminent dominance) was to go out as the world's policeman wherever there was a rule violation, impose necessary economic sanctions on the violating country, and in some cases, sanction them with military force. I think this was the image of the US from Bush Senior to Bush Junior.

Under the leaders of the "post-primacy" era—Obama, Trump, and Biden—it appears, to put it somewhat extremely, that they are making judgments based on the idea of dividing foreign countries into two and changing the way they are protected. In other words, they seem to respond with the idea of the "Ukraine model," where they directly defend allies important to US peace and prosperity, and respond to other countries with a combination of military aid and economic sanctions against the aggressor country. In short, they are dividing allies and others based on the question of for whom the US will shed blood.

However, regarding Taiwan, which is attracting attention, although it is not a so-called ally, it is becoming positioned like West Berlin during the Cold War. National Security Advisor Sullivan explained, "Because there is the Taiwan Relations Act, Taiwan is different from Ukraine." President Biden has also clearly stated that if Taiwan is attacked by China, the US will defend Taiwan. In other words, even if it is not an ally, if it is a partner the US considers vitally important, it will protect them directly even without an alliance relationship.

I would like to point out two implications of what the emergence of this "post-primacy" United States means for foreign countries.

One is that countries in the West that want to protect the current order need to change their awareness that the primary bearer of the order is the US, realize that they must protect the order at their own cost, and actively take on the roles and responsibilities as bearers of a rules-based order.

The other is that the fact that the US is stopping being the "world's policeman" does not immediately mean it will abandon its allies, so there is no need to overreact. The will to protect allies from aggressor countries was strong even for Obama. Reading Obama's memoirs, his judgment when responding to the Ukraine issue in 2014 was cold-blooded, saying that Ukraine is not a country the US can protect by intervening directly.

If it were to come to a direct fight with Russia over Ukraine, in the end, if you compare the importance of Ukraine to Russia and its importance to the US, the importance to Russia is naturally higher. Therefore, he judged that if they were to have a contest of endurance in an escalation battle, the US would be the one to eventually back down, so they should not get involved in a way that would invite a spiral of escalation from the beginning. It's a very Obama-like, or rather, scholarly and logical criterion for judgment.

On the other hand, it is known that immediately after the movements surrounding the annexation of Crimea emerged, Obama told his aides, "We must make Putin clearly understand that if he touches NATO countries, the US will go to war." In short, just because the US does not take the option of directly intervening to defend Ukraine does not mean that the US defense commitment to its allies is wavering. Trump had some quite dangerous parts, but the recognition of defending allies while being prepared for war has been passed down to President Biden.

When the US exercises self-restraint in the use of force, extreme reactions immediately emerge, such as saying the US is finished because it is inward-looking, but such impressionistic or emotional arguments lead to an inaccurate understanding of the US and can cause overreaction.

I think Biden's judgment not to intervene militarily directly in Ukraine this time was largely due to the fact that it might lead to nuclear war and that a consensus to fight Russia had not been formed among NATO countries. Also, looking at US public opinion, in response to the question of whether they can fight even at the risk of nuclear war, about 60% answered that they should not fight. I think these three factors are stopping direct US military intervention.

Precisely because it is an administration that considers the risk of nuclear war, domestic public opinion, and allies, the brakes are applied there. I understand there is a slight anxiety toward a US that tries to respond with a strong awareness of domestic public opinion, but I think it is also important to have the understanding that they are not deciding their response based solely on trends in domestic public opinion.

I believe it is extremely important that Mr. Hosoya spoke about the European security framework in the 30 years since the Cold War.

Europe has also tried many times to determine what kind of order could transition stably and how Russia should be treated within that. During that time, there were attempts to make NATO compatible with Russia, and periods of strengthening "intermediate solutions" like enhancing the EU's strategic autonomy to build a European order. However, I feel we have entered an era where it is difficult to define institutions in a unified way.

From late March to early April, there was a period when Ukraine indicated it might accept neutrality. In other words, they took a negotiating position that they could start discussions from the premise that there would be no future NATO membership, just as Russia demanded.

And while there was certainly a period of seeking multilateral security different from NATO, since the discovery of the Bucha massacre and the failure of negotiations in Turkey, talk of those unique security models has vanished. It is difficult to establish a new multilateral "security guarantee" for Ukraine that includes the US, Europe, and Russia.

The remaining path is one where the order is defined in reverse, based on how the specific battle situation evolves and how that leads to the end of the conflict.

Within that, there is a swing between what might be called a Versailles System type or a Munich type. The Versailles type involves making Russia decisively admit defeat, return all seized land, restore Ukrainian sovereignty, and imposing economic penalties including reparations. But considering the historical analogy, can that truly build a medium-to-long-term relationship between Europe and Russia? I believe the nightmare of the rise of Nazi Germany persists within Europe.

The other is the Munich type, but recognizing the Donbas evokes the recognition of the Sudetenland cession during the Munich Agreement. In other words, the history of failing by compromising with the Nazis is ingrained in Europe as a kind of physical knowledge. Therefore, I feel there is quite strong resistance to the idea of settling things in the Donbas.

In fact, considering that after Russia gained a military advantage in the Donbas, the possibility of invading Kyiv again is being talked about as plausible, I feel it is very difficult to define a ceasefire, and the landing point for the European side supporting it is also difficult. This is likely why the outlook is for fighting to continue until the end of this year.

Finally, there is anxiety about whether the global order in a broad sense will truly continue in the future. Expectations for the UN Security Council were not high to begin with. However, over the past 10 or 20 years, many international organizations have been created that involve Russia in an inclusive way.

The G20, APEC in Asia, and the East Asia Summit were all intended to foster cooperation as multilateral frameworks at the leader level. However, it is unimaginable for a leader who "fundamentally shakes the international order" to appear in a meeting hall and shake hands.

If that is the case, will it be necessary to create new frameworks or adopt the idea of temporarily suspending the eligibility of countries that are parties to a conflict? I haven't reached a judgment on this yet, but I think it is an important point of discussion.

I was thinking exactly the same thing regarding the analogy between the Donbas and the Sudetenland that Mr. Jimbo mentioned. This is very similar to the Munich situation; at Munich, the intentions of Czechoslovakia were ignored, and it was a failed agreement where major powers reached a deal and tried to impose it. While the logic of the failure differs, as Mr. Ogushi said, Russia and the Soviet Union have consistently held a concept of spheres of influence, and I completely agree that they hold a 19th-century view of order.

I think the idea that liberalism, democracy, and capitalism would spread throughout the world, as envisioned after the Cold War, was an illusion. The countries and regions where these can be shared are very limited, and when considering the Global South, there is the cold reality that the forces currently criticizing Russia in cooperation with Japan, the US, and Europe are not necessarily the majority in the international community.

This includes Germany, but if each country acts under its own national interests, there is the idea that they want to prioritize trade in natural resources with Russia, and the cost of sacrificing that is too great. Or, there may be intentions to avoid a full-scale confrontation with Russia over the Ukraine issue, which is not directly related to their own national interests.

I believe that at the root of peace and order in Europe and Asia after the Cold War, there was the difficult question of whether there are "legitimate interests" that should be recognized for Russia and China, and if so, what they are. As long as China and Russia are addressing security issues through diplomacy, a dialogue on "what are legitimate interests" is possible. However, when they stop negotiating and begin unilateral changes to the status quo or coercion of other countries driven by unilateralist great-power chauvinism, dialogue and negotiation become impossible. I think we can see the relationship between Russia/China and Western countries since 2014 as having followed such a process.

In international politics, there are the terms "order" and "justice." One is the state activity that emphasizes "balance" above all else, backed by an understanding as a greatest common denominator that satisfies the security of major powers to some extent—what Mr. Hosoya called a 19th-century view of order. It is a balance built on sharing minimal rules, but it has a certain value-neutral aspect.

The other is the state activity that emphasizes justice, valuing liberal norms such as individual spiritual freedom. This is the idea that if each country accepts liberal norms by its own choice, other countries should respect that, and that this ultimately contributes to the development and progress of humanity; it has a universalist aspect.

In order to skillfully manage conflicts of interest between states with different political systems, these two ideas must be well-balanced. I believe the essence of the major trend in international relations over the last decade lies in the dynamics of international politics where, as China and Russia under leaders obsessed with unilateralist great-power chauvinism repeatedly engage in status-quo-changing actions and acts that trample on liberal norms, the emphasis on justice has strengthened in Western countries, to which China and Russia have reacted further. In Ukraine, this problem manifests as the question of where the exit for the war should be set, making the nature of negotiations extremely difficult.

Ultimately, the "legitimate interests" that countries that do not agree on a "legitimate status quo" might be able to recognize in each other are not determined objectively, but rather change significantly depending on whether trust can be built through diplomatic processes and interactions. I believe that in the so-called post-Cold War period, the United States made considerable efforts to build trust with China and Russia, though there were various inadequacies, such as supporting China's accession to the WTO and realizing Russia's entry into the G8. And the voices criticizing such efforts were an overwhelming minority.

However, the leaders of China and Russia pursued policies and actions based on unilateralism while superficially advocating international cooperation. As a result, they met with backlash from other countries, and the legitimacy of the interests they considered "legitimate" and tried to have recognized by the international community has steadily declined.

Furthermore, there is another major problem with leaders of regional powers trying to realize their interests through military force. That is the "dictator risk," where a dictator commits acts of aggression based on their own beliefs, and I think that has become a reality in Ukraine this time.

In negotiations with a dictator, liberal norms do not function as a common ground for conflict resolution, so provisional agreements reached as a result of power struggles become extremely unreliable. If that is the case, the idea inevitably emerges that "in the medium to long term," the regime itself must change. Of course, this is not to say we desire turmoil or chaos, but for Russia, by rolling back the aggression while imposing extensive sanctions, I think that will become a long-term containment. A major challenge for Western countries is on what basis to build relationships with countries that do not share the same ideas.

In this international situation of increasing uncertainty, what role should Japan play?

The joint statement after the Japan-US summit on May 23rd included the text: "Regardless of the ongoing crisis in Europe, the two leaders reaffirmed that the Indo-Pacific is a vital region for global peace, security, and prosperity, and faces increasing strategic challenges to the rules-based international order." This is an extremely important point. It is an important message for us to strongly recognize that this war in Ukraine is not just a problem happening in Europe, and to think about the future order of East Asia and what role Japan should play within that order.

More than a century ago, in 1905, Józef Piłsudski, a leader of the independence movement in Poland (which was then under Russian rule), came to Japan during the Russo-Japanese War and requested Japan's support for Polish independence. What this means is that the situation in Europe and the situation in Asia have been linked since a century ago.

An analogy I thought of regarding this was how, during Finnish Prime Minister Marin's recent visit to Japan, her intentions regarding Finland's NATO membership and her criticism of Russia in strong words found widespread resonance in Japan. I think it is very important for Japan to have the perspective that European issues and Asian issues are linked as matters concerning the international order as a whole.

Another point is that, while saying that, Japan has actively engaged in autonomous actions over the past decade, such as the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" concept and order concepts that the US is not part of, like the CPTPP (TPP11), where Japan has taken the initiative to map out the order. We are seeing a certain level of sympathy toward Japan from the Global South for demonstrating principles of action different from those of the US. I think Japan needs to be aware that such autonomous diplomatic actions have very significant value.

Finally, and this actually contradicts what I just said, when considering that the international community operates on power politics, Japan must rely on the Japan-US alliance and act with a logic of sufficient force and deterrence against China and Russia; otherwise, it will ultimately be buried in the power games of major powers.

Therefore, Japan must possess sufficient national strength and strengthen deterrence based on the Japan-US alliance. In other words, balancing the seemingly contradictory vectors of autonomous action in diplomacy and the strengthening of deterrence centered on the Japan-US alliance will continue to be the key for Japanese diplomacy.

Regarding what role Japan should play, I believe the foundation should be the construction and promotion of an international order based on rules that we believe will guarantee global and regional peace and development.

The vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific is about spreading a network of cooperation and ensuring openness so that regional countries do not have to lean exclusively toward China. Within that, I think the major goal is to create an environment where each country can develop while its free will and independence are respected. While it is common in rhetoric to emphasize the former—the construction, promotion, and dissemination of a free and open rules-based order—and downplay the latter—preventing Chinese hegemony or regional dominance—I believe these are essentially two sides of the same coin.

Japan is now advancing various regional initiatives in Asia together with the US, including the Quad. From the perspective of preventing war, strengthening a deterrence system in terms of security and military affairs, with the Japan-US alliance or the trilateral Japan-US-Australia relationship at its core, is indispensable.

Regarding the increase in Japan's defense budget, there is an opinion that the figure of 2% of GDP should not come first, and I think that has some merit, but I believe such figures carry a political message. An international environment is already before us where Japan must play a greater role in global security beyond homeland defense, deter the use of force, and serve as part of the status-quo forces opposing changes to the status quo. Japan is required to clearly demonstrate through action that it is taking on the role of a provider rather than a beneficiary of security. Simply put, the measures necessary to guarantee peace are now changing significantly, and showing Japan's commitment to defending the status quo through concrete actions, not just words, over the next 5, 10, or 15 years will lead to peace and stability.

I think a phase has come where Japan's pacifism must be redefined in a way that embeds internationalism, in the sense of protecting peace while cooperating with other regional countries. I believe the premise for Japan to survive while protecting its freedom and independence is the recognition that the era when we could leave defense and security to the US and avoid taking risks ourselves has already passed.

I don't have much of a fixed opinion on what role Japan should play. In Japan, there seem to be various people saying things to Ukraine like "work harder" or "you should surrender," but for me, specific faces come to mind.

I have many friends there, and when I see posts on social media saying they made Molotov cocktails, I just think, "Please don't die." At the same time, since they have made the decision to fight, it would be very presumptuous of me to say anything about it. Even so, if I were to say "good luck" and they happened to die, I wonder what I would think, and I find myself at a loss for words.

Regarding the exit from the war, I have a feeling that the ownership of the Donbas and Crimea will only be decided militarily.

First, regarding the Donbas, Ukrainian national sentiment is to "take it back," but I think it would be a huge problem if they actually did. In other words, the local residents don't have the slightest desire to return to the Ukrainian government. Rather, the voice of the residents is, "How could you put us through such a terrible time?"

Since the regular Ukrainian army entered in 2014, their way of fighting was quite one-sided, which led to the Donbas region seeking help from Russia and the regular Russian army entering. If it were taken back, a massive number of voters who are extremely critical of the current Ukrainian government would be born.

To counter this, the Ukrainian government would also likely suppress them with force. So, I think there may be no choice but to let them be independent under international monitoring or take some other method, but ultimately I feel it will only be decided by the course of the war.

Even more difficult is Crimea. Since Russia annexed Crimea and made it "domestic," if the Ukrainian army were to enter, for Russia, it would be a case of an invasion of its territory. The Russian government has said many times that it "will not use nuclear weapons outside of Russia," but an incursion into Crimea would, by Russian logic, be an entry into the country, so it would become a target for nuclear deterrence. Thus, if Ukraine were to take back Crimea in some form, I think it would be an even more difficult story than the Donbas.

In Crimea as well, setting aside the Crimean Tatars, it's not as if the local residents support the Ukrainian government. Rather, the annexation of Crimea happened because the political leaders at the time in 2014 asked Putin to "annex us." Ukraine probably cannot concede it, but taking it back would be a major ordeal, so I think it will ultimately only be resolved by military force.

What does that mean for the international order in a broad sense? My view is that it will ultimately only become a world of the law of the jungle. Whether the Russian side pushes in to some extent or Ukraine ends up pushing back, a massive amount of weapons has gone to Ukraine, so I think a mini-military power will likely be born in that place. There is also the risk of people with weapons becoming terrorists.

Regardless of which side wins, there is a very high possibility that gaining recognition by winning through force will become the standard, so I think there aren't many happy elements.

What options does Japan have within a fluid international order? In considering this, there is no doubt that diplomacy toward China is one of the important points of discussion. Over the 30 years since the end of the Cold War, China has achieved dramatic economic growth, driven the global economy, and increased its presence as a major power. On the other hand, China did not choose to follow a path of democratic politics alongside economic growth, as had been expected. Furthermore, while China chose to actively participate in the global economy, including joining the WTO, to achieve its own economic growth, it has grown not as a state seeking international cooperation through economic interdependence as expected, but as a state that believes the international community operates on power politics. The expectations held for China 30 years ago were far too optimistic.

Even as we are confronted with this reality, we must think about how to face China. How can we discipline China, which believes in power politics, within the rules of the existing law-based, free, and open international order? There are many international cooperation frameworks Japan is currently involved in: TPP, RCEP, IPEF, the Quad, and AUKUS (US-UK-Australia security cooperation). Numerous frameworks ranging from economic/trade frameworks to military/security frameworks are unfolding—either with China as a member or to counter China—and the fact that Japan is a member of all of them likely means that Japan has the conditions to draw a blueprint for an international order with China in view.

How Japan involves itself in the formation of the international order moving forward seems to be a matter of how we position China within the international order we have chosen. That attempt will likely be long and painful, but we must maintain that strong will.

Originally, I focused my research on Japan's role in international security, but I have fallen into a situation where I cannot say anything particularly sharp. I would like to talk about a few points that concern me.

One is that awareness of the solidarity of the US-Europe alliance through the Ukraine war has increased in Japan, and national consensus on increasing defense spending is higher than ever before. According to reports, 80% of people are in favor—a level of excitement unthinkable in the past—and the discussion has become inseparable from support for the alliance with the United States.

However, despite this trend of strengthening so-called transatlantic and transpacific relations, the United States, which should be the source of centripetal force, is not particularly proactive about intervention. I think this is quite a dilemma.

Of course, President Biden personally is trying to hold things together by clearly stating commitments to NATO or Taiwan, but I don't think the posture for responding to the changes in the balance of power currently occurring is that well-developed.

If that is the case, unless allies build more resilient strength and the power to restore things when something happens, even the alliance beyond that will not function well. As Mr. Mori said, I think it is very important for allies to work hard.

Another point relates to what Mr. Hosoya said. I think Japan's strategy was characterized by jumping into various countries without making its colors too clear regarding values, while maintaining its diplomatic and security axis with the United States.

As a result, many options were born, and there was room for the idea of complicating China-Russia relations by advancing relations with Russia to a certain extent. While the US was stalling on free trade principles, Japan also managed to balance Japan-US and Japan-China relations while promoting the order of the Indo-Pacific. That stance also served as the foundation for creating ideals that involved much of the Global South.

However, places like Russia, China, Turkey, and even Myanmar—where Japan had relatively promoted its own interests in various ways and said, "I can talk to them"—have become regions of far too high risk.

I believe that in certain situations, the judgment to make one's colors clear and clarify Japan's position on the international order is very important, but on the other hand, that naturally constrains Japan's strategic flexibility. Before we knew it, while Japan views China as the main threat and competitor, it has fallen into a situation where it is forced to confront North Korea and Russia on three fronts, having to allocate vast resources to each, leaving little room to move.

As for how to break out of this, there is very little Japan can achieve alone, and various forms of cooperation with like-minded states are necessary. We have to endure with the Quad and link India in the medium to long term. For frameworks like AUKUS, I think we have no choice but to build up frameworks like Japan-US-Australia, Japan-Australia, or Japan-ASEAN one by one, giving each strategic meaning and letting them coexist.

Once the board is set, as Mr. Kamo said, a foundation can be created to seek a stable relationship with China by showing areas for shared interests and cooperation. I think the reality is that Japan is in an extremely harsh world, so I believe the starting point is first to be prepared to fight through that competition.

That was a wonderful summary. I think we had a very useful discussion today about the future of the international order. Thank you all very much.