[Special Feature: Outlook for Japan-South Korea Relations] Yoshihide Soeya: Can Japan and South Korea Regain Diplomatic Reason? — Focusing on the Impact of Ukraine and the Response to China

2022/05/09

When discussing international politics and security surrounding the Korean Peninsula, many people adopt the perspective of "the Korean Peninsula and the four major powers (Japan, the U.S., China, and Russia)." In contrast, I have advocated an analytical perspective in which Japan and the Korean Peninsula are surrounded by the three major powers of the U.S., China, and Russia (my book, "Nihon no Gaiko" [Japan's Diplomacy], Chikuma Gakugei Bunko, 2017). Strategic lenses are better when they are simple, provided they capture the essential points. From that viewpoint, it is clear that Japan and South Korea are, so to speak, in the "same boat"—meaning they face the same diplomatic and security challenges and should share a design for the future.

In the background lies the strategic competition and confrontation between the U.S. and China. There is no doubt that China's trends and the U.S. response will continue to influence the international environment surrounding Japan and South Korea. On top of that came Russia's military invasion of Ukraine on February 24. Not only its outcome, but also its impact on China's Taiwan policy and military/diplomatic strategy, is nothing less than a strategic challenge that Japan and South Korea, both in alliances with the U.S., must consider together.

Russia's military invasion of Ukraine can only be described as an aggression that exceeded the assumptions of international politics in recent years. However, now that the situation has occurred, we must say that those assumptions have collapsed. First, it has long been said that the Western euphoria of having won the Cold War was an illusion, but Russia's recent actions have completely shattered it. In President Putin, for whom preventing Ukraine's accession to NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) is an absolute imperative, the passions of a "Soviet Empire" that cannot accept defeat in the Cold War were swirling.

Second, during the U.S.-led Gulf War, Afghan War, and Iraq War after the Cold War, the United Nations and international law barely functioned despite numerous problems, but this time they were completely powerless. The post-war international order began with the establishment of the United Nations by the Allied Powers (United Nations) who defeated the Axis powers of Japan and Germany. Although the initial assumptions collapsed immediately after the war due to the onset of the Cold War, functions were partially restored with the end of the Cold War in the 1990s. During that time, Japan and Germany transformed into countries that could be called model students of the post-war order and contributed to the construction of a free and open international order. And now, Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, has emerged as a destroyer of the international order. It can be said that the post-war order has been completely turned upside down.

Turning our eyes to East Asia, the collapse of the post-war and post-Cold War assumptions described above seems applicable to present-day China as well. Although the timeline differs from Russia, China also harbors a deep-seated resentment toward history since the Opium War, often referred to as the "Century of Humiliation." Furthermore, China does not hesitate to challenge the values and mechanisms of the post-war, Western-centric international order. Moreover, the fact that such a psycho-historical imperial mentality serves as a background for the public's certain level of acceptance of a dictatorial political system may be a commonality between Russia and China.

In any case, if this psychology of a great power or empire is the fundamental impulse driving present-day China and Russia, a bond is born between them. I believe China's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine can be seen as a somewhat difficult applied problem based on that bond.

On the other hand, comparing the Ukraine issue and the Taiwan issue reveals important differences. There was almost no room for the U.S. or NATO to intervene in the war in Ukraine under the logic of individual or collective self-defense. Amid concerns that intervention could escalate into World War III, it would have been impossible to commit the same overreach as Russia by insisting it was part of self-defense. If the logic of self-defense does not apply, a UN Security Council resolution authorizing military action by the U.S. or NATO would be necessary, but it was obvious that China and Russia would exercise their veto power, making the possibility of such a resolution zero.

Regarding the Taiwan issue, since China defines it as an "internal matter," the hurdle for the use of force may be lower in terms of international law. However, the U.S. also has the domestic "Taiwan Relations Act." This law stipulates that the U.S. does not exclude the possibility of defending Taiwan, as follows (Section 3, Paragraph C):

The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.

Furthermore, since the 1970s, China has claimed sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, which are under Japan's effective control, but its claim is that they have been "part of Taiwan since ancient times." Therefore, a Taiwan contingency is highly likely to immediately become a Senkaku contingency for Japan. For Japan, that is a matter of self-defense and simultaneously becomes a situation under Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (joint Japan-U.S. response). Furthermore, if the U.S. responds to a Taiwan contingency, it could become a "situation that threatens Japan's survival" as defined by the 2015 security legislation, potentially leading to Japan's exercise of the right of collective self-defense. However, contrary to the brave rhetoric sometimes heard from some politicians, the Japanese government does not yet have the political or military resolve or preparation (for details, see my book "Anzen Hosho o Toinaosu" [Rethinking Security], NHK Books, 2016).

As stated above, the U.S. and Japan are direct parties in the event of a Taiwan contingency, which is an important difference from the situation in Ukraine. Of course, what actions the U.S. and Japan actually take is ultimately a matter of political decision. However, there is no doubt that the bond between the two allied nations, Japan and the U.S., complicates China's judgments and decisions. Witnessing the delay of Russia's military operations, large-scale economic sanctions, and trends in international public opinion, we should view that China has been forced to become more cautious in its response to the Taiwan issue.

Now, the reason I have stated my thoughts on the Ukraine situation, which seems to have no direct relation to Japan-South Korea relations, is because of my belief that Japan and South Korea are precisely the countries that should become capable of discussing such international political situations from a broad perspective. This is even more so if, as not a few experts are beginning to argue, an important turning point occurs in "post-Ukraine" international politics. Next, based on that premise, let us consider the China issue from the perspective of Japan and South Korea.

It is often said that Japan's perception of the threat from China is prominent, while conversely, South Korea's sense of threat from China is thin, but the reality is a bit more complex. First, let us look closer at South Korea's perception of China, which is widely misunderstood in Japan (see also my book "Kankoku Chishikijin to no Taiwa II: Beichu no Hazama o Ikiru" [Dialogue with South Korean Intellectuals II: Living Between the U.S. and China], Keio University Press, 2015).

In recent years especially, the South Korean public's perception of threat and sense of caution toward China have been steadily rising. It is true that there is a certain segment in South Korea that does not feel a threat from China or does not actively express it. However, there are several different backgrounds to this. One is the economic relationship with China. Even those who speak of the Chinese threat in terms of security emphasize the importance of the Chinese market without exception. Of course, there is no convenient solution there, and diplomacy toward China becomes a process of trial and error.

More essentially, there is the wisdom and way of life of the Korean people who have sought "independence" in the shadow of the "Chinese Empire" for many years. In the aforementioned book of mine, a researcher who is also a representative advocate for Japan-South Korea cooperation stated that it is natural from a long historical perspective for a strengthening China to return to the center of the Asian order. I believe that showed a "resolve" that they must coexist with China, while not hiding their caution toward it. This also reflects the realism of South Korean diplomacy, which, combined with the North Korea issue, cannot take a confrontational stance face-to-face with China.

In fact, I believe that South Korea's stance toward China as described above, including the reality of economic interdependence with China, might also apply to Japan. However, in reality, Japan's perception of China is extremely severe and generally hostile. In the background are frictions over historical perception issues and the Senkaku Islands issue, as well as China's high-handed unilateralism toward Taiwan and the South China Sea, and emotionally, this is understandable. However, like South Korea, Japan does not have the option of confronting a strengthened China alone. As a result, Japanese diplomacy has fallen into a loop where the more it emphasizes the threat of China, the more it must deepen its dependence on the Japan-U.S. alliance.

Nevertheless, in recent years, as China's strengthening has become self-evident, Japan has begun to focus on cooperation with countries that share values and aspirations other than the U.S., literally from a perspective of standing "between the U.S. and China." Security relations with Australia, New Zealand, India, ASEAN, European countries, etc., are developing dramatically. We can see that structural pressure from international politics, centered on the strategic competition between the U.S. and China, is at work there.

However, that pressure has not yet acted on Japan-South Korea relations. It must be said that there is a gaping hole in Japan's diplomatic strategy. On May 10, a new conservative administration under President Yoon Suk-yeol will be inaugurated in South Korea. Below, I would like to overview the diplomatic policies of the new administration as told by President Yoon Suk-yeol's main advisors and explore the possibilities for Japan-South Korea cooperation.

The diplomatic policy of the new South Korean administration under President Yoon Suk-yeol was expressed many times by candidate Yoon Suk-yeol himself during the presidential election. It was based on the assertions of his diplomatic advisors rather than Yoon's own thoughts. The central figure is Professor Kim Sung-han of Korea University, and regarding the Korean Peninsula issue and Japan-South Korea relations, former Chancellor of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy Yoon Duk-min and Professor Park Cheol-hee of Seoul National University, who are well-known in Japan, played important roles. Coincidentally, these three individuals were each interviewed by the Japanese media in February during the presidential election. Below, using those as materials, let us look at the key points of the diplomatic policies they spoke of.

Kim Sung-han emphasizes the perspective that South Korea and Japan are in similar situations. While they have strong economic ties with China, in terms of security, he focuses on cooperation among the "South Korea-U.S.-Japan" democratic nations (Asahi Shimbun, February 24, 2022). Furthermore, while proceeding with economic cooperation with China, he states that the importance of economic security is also increasing for South Korea and Japan, and he wants to promote strengthening relations with European countries in addition to Japan, the U.S., and South Korea. Furthermore, he says South Korea should also actively participate in the Quad, the framework for Japan-U.S.-Australia-India cooperation. Regarding this point, Yoon Duk-min is also clear, stating that since South Korea is a member of the China-led "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)," there is no need to worry about China's reaction when participating in the Quad or Indo-Pacific diplomacy (NHK Special, February 9, 2022).

Regarding Japan-South Korea relations, all three agree on regaining the spirit of the 1998 "Japan-South Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan-South Korea Partnership towards the 21st Century" by Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and President Kim Dae-jung, and on the policy that issues regarding comfort women and forced laborers are difficult to solve individually and a comprehensive solution should be sought. Yoon Suk-yeol himself often publicly stated these policies during the presidential election. Regarding pending issues between Japan and South Korea, Yoon Duk-min, in the aforementioned NHK program, presented the idea of setting up a forum for long-term negotiations with a representative holding considerable authority when aiming for a comprehensive solution by putting all pending issues between Japan and South Korea on one table.

Furthermore, Yoon Duk-min stated a policy that combines deterrence and diplomacy: creating "extended deterrence" obtained by strengthening the alliance with the U.S. against North Korea's nuclear weapons, and conducting North Korea policy flexibly after having reliable deterrence. Park Cheol-hee envisions a picture where they respond to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats within the framework of Japan-U.S.-South Korea security cooperation, while Japan and South Korea cooperate flexibly to encourage change in North Korea. And now that public sentiment in both countries has cooled, he points out the immediate task of leaders reaching out to the public (Tokyo Shimbun, February 16, 2022).

Now, how will the cabinet of Fumio Kishida, which just started last October, respond to these overtures and questions from the new South Korean administration?

Looking back, the Shinzo Abe administration's policy toward South Korea was largely dominated by emotion rather than diplomatic reason, as clearly shown by its public declaration of a "history war" (the Moon Jae-in administration was the same). In past Japan-South Korea relations, there were many instances where the Japanese side watched calmly as South Korea tended to become emotional regarding historical perception or territorial sovereignty issues. However, in recent years, it seems that both Japan and South Korea have been bickering on the same level.

The most representative recent response from the Japanese side was the "Review of the Operation of Export Control for South Korea" on July 1, 2019. These were export control regulations centered on three semiconductor-related items that could be called the heart of South Korean industry, and although their substantial impact has now mostly dissipated, the psychological pressure they exerted on South Korea at the time was significant.

As is well known to those involved, Prime Minister Abe lost patience with the October 2018 ruling by the Supreme Court of Korea regarding the forced labor issue and the response of the Moon Jae-in administration, and had relevant ministries consider measures that could be called a de facto retaliation. The plan adopted as the one likely to have the most impact was the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry's "Review of the Operation of Export Control for South Korea." In the public comment process conducted prior to implementation, out of 40,666 opinions received, 95% were "generally in favor" and 1% were "generally opposed," indicating that the frustration of the Abe Prime Minister's Official Residence and public sentiment were unified.

The Kishida administration seems forced to navigate carefully while this political atmosphere and public sentiment remain. In fact, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration is also about to set sail while structurally harboring similar domestic problems. The new administrations of Japan and South Korea must build a new relationship on top of the negative legacy of the five years when the Abe and Moon Jae-in administrations were ideologically like oil and water. The basis for that is not to close the door to building a cooperative relationship due to emotional entanglements over historical issues. If we think realistically and rationally, it should be clear that Japan and South Korea should cooperate for the prosperity and stability of Asia and the world. Only beyond that will diplomacy to manage friction over historical issues become possible.

The immediate Ukraine situation and the various problems in the future "post-Ukraine" world are important common challenges for Japan and South Korea, the most advanced democracies and market economies in Asia. Furthermore, the current situation where Japan and South Korea, which are closest to China, Taiwan, and North Korea, cannot build an effective cooperative relationship is not only damaging the national interests of both Japan and South Korea but is also a great loss for the stability of Asia and the world. Now that new administrations have been born in Japan and South Korea, both countries must exclude emotion and regain diplomatic reason.