[Special Feature: Outlook for Japan-Korea Relations] Chang Je-kuk: Aiming for a New Korea-Japan Relationship—Focusing on the "Busan-Fukuoka International Special Zone Concept"

2022/05/09

Korea-Japan relations are in their worst state ever. While bilateral relations have repeatedly experienced twists and turns whenever issues of historical perception surfaced in the past, the current state of deterioration has never lasted this long. During the five years of the Moon Jae-in administration, a Korea-Japan summit was never held, and during President Moon's term, no Japanese Prime Minister visited South Korea. This must be described as an extremely unusual situation. This cooling of relations began when the Moon Jae-in administration expressed an ambiguous stance toward the "Comfort Women Agreement" reached between the Park Geun-hye and Abe administrations in December 2015. The Moon administration claimed that there had been insufficient consultation with the victims regarding this agreement and put forward the concept of "victim-centeredness." "Victim-centeredness" holds that an agreement between nations that is unacceptable to the victims themselves cannot stand. The Japanese government maintained the position that "it is unacceptable to scrap an agreement between nations just because the administration has changed." Toward the end of its term, the Moon administration clarified its position that the Comfort Women Agreement remained valid, but since trust between the two countries had already collapsed, there was no particular response from the Japanese side.

Furthermore, the 2018 South Korean Supreme Court ruling ordering Japanese companies to compensate Korean forced labor victims from the Japanese colonial era made Korea-Japan relations irreparable. From the Japanese government's perspective, the forced labor issue was completely resolved with the signing of the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. On the other hand, the South Korean government argues that in a democratic nation with a separation of powers, there are limits to what the executive branch can do regarding a ruling handed down by the judiciary. In addition to this, the Japanese government's 2019 measure to tighten export controls on certain items to South Korea was enough to provoke the Korean public, and bilateral relations reached a state of extreme tension. To make matters worse, when the global COVID-19 pandemic struck in the spring of 2020, Japan immediately restricted the entry of foreigners, making it essentially impossible for Koreans to enter Japan. Visits by Koreans to Japan, which at one point reached 7.5 million people, vanished, and Japanese tourists who had flooded major Korean cities disappeared.

The causes of Korea-Japan relations falling into such a crisis can be analyzed as follows.

First, we must point out the difference in views between Korea and Japan regarding historical issues. South Korea underwent 36 years of colonial rule during the Japanese colonial era, and victims are still alive. Their pain lasts a lifetime, and a national sentiment of consolation for them is rooted throughout society. The South Korean people, who have a strong sense of national love, have a strong consciousness that the pain experienced by their grandparents' generation is none other than their own pain. For Koreans, historical issues are not a matter of law but a matter of the heart. There is a strong perception that historical issues can only be resolved when the heart is healed. In contrast, Japan's position is that historical issues have already been resolved through the search for solutions on numerous occasions, such as the 1965 Basic Treaty, the 1993 Kono Statement, the 1995 Murayama Statement, the 1998 Japan-South Korea Joint Declaration, and the 2015 Comfort Women Agreement. Public opinion is strong, asking, "How long will we be pushed around by South Korea's demands for apologies and compensation?" Overcoming such differences in historical perception will not be easy.

Second, we can cite the shift toward conservatism in Japanese society and progressivism in South Korean society. Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's conservative tendencies influenced Japanese society as a whole, resulting in the shrinking of so-called progressive forces in Japanese society that had previously shown understanding toward the South Korean position on historical perception issues. Moreover, anti-Japanese sentiment originating from South Korea also caused them to lose their place. In the case of South Korea, with the birth of the Moon Jae-in administration, the so-called democratization movement forces that were active in the 1980s came to the forefront of politics, and the progressivization of society advanced. While South Korea's conservative forces relatively emphasize relations with Japan, progressive forces tend to be relatively critical of Japan. It cannot be denied that both countries used anti-Japanese and anti-Korean sentiments to achieve the political goals of their respective administrations.

Third, the rise of South Korea's status in the international community and the relative decline of Japan's status are thought to be influencing the deterioration of bilateral relations. Japan's economy has been stagnant to the point of being called the "lost 30 years." Meanwhile, South Korea has grown steadily to become one of the world's top 10 economic powers. According to some statistics, the gap in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between Korea and Japan, which was about 1 (Korea) to 30 (Japan) in 1965, narrowed to 1 to 10 in the 1990s and recently to 1 to 3. This means that South Korea is no longer a developing country but has joined the ranks of advanced nations. Furthermore, South Korean K-POP has gained global popularity, and its status as a "popular country, South Korea" has improved considerably through the Hallyu (Korean Wave) boom, centered in Southeast Asia. In this way, South Korea has become a country that can now confidently say "No" to Japan. Japan may not yet recognize this change in South Korea's status, or perhaps it is deliberately pretending not to notice. South Korea's growth has become one factor making bilateral relations difficult.

Fourth, Korea-Japan relations are still heavily influenced by the relationship between Seoul and Tokyo—that is, the political relationship. In fact, Korea-Japan relations involve not only relations between central governments but also very active exchanges between local cities. Most local governments in South Korea have signed friendly exchange agreements with local governments in Japan. Busan Metropolitan City alone has a friendly cooperation city agreement with Osaka City and sister city agreements with Shimonoseki City and Fukuoka City. Nevertheless, if political relations deteriorate, grassroots exchanges rooted in local areas cannot play any role and instead have a structure subordinate to political relations. If relations between central governments deteriorate, the local regions should restrain the center based on the friendship and trust they have built over a long time, but they have been unable to play such a role at all. The phenomenon where exchanges between Korean and Japanese local cities are completely suspended when Korea-Japan relations deteriorate clearly illustrates this reality.

As long as the above causes persist, the recovery of Korea-Japan relations seems distant. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that favorable factors that could restore Korea-Japan relations have recently emerged.

Above all, new leaders have been born in South Korea and Japan. In South Korea, on March 9, candidate Yoon Suk-yeol of the conservative People Power Party was elected as the 20th president, and the new administration will be inaugurated on May 10. President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol is showing a proactive stance toward improving Korea-Japan relations. During the presidential election period, candidate Yoon stated that "Korea-Japan relations fell into the worst situation because diplomacy entered domestic politics instead of prioritizing national interests," and he clearly stated his intention to resume "shuttle diplomacy" between Korea and Japan. In the case of Japan as well, Prime Minister Kishida is attempting to differentiate his policy line from that of former Prime Minister Abe, and many experts expect new movements between Korea and Japan once the House of Councillors election scheduled for July this year is over.

Nevertheless, other than the change of leaders in both countries, the various causes mentioned above will not change. In that sense, it implies that Korea-Japan relations may still remain in a state of stagnation or, even if they improve, could lead to further deterioration. If that happens, stable maintenance and development of Korea-Japan relations cannot be achieved.

In the latter half of this article, I would like to focus on the fourth factor mentioned above and introduce past efforts and future challenges toward building a new paradigm that can restrain the relationship between Seoul and Tokyo.

The distance between Busan and Fukuoka is only 220 km. It is closer than the 400 km distance from Busan to Seoul. It is a distance that can be reached in 35 minutes by plane or about 3 hours by high-speed ferry. By actively utilizing this geographical proximity, the launch of an international economic special zone can be considered. This is because if a cross-border economic special zone can be launched, it can contribute significantly to building a "stable" Korea-Japan relationship that is never influenced by central politics. If the construction of such an international special zone becomes possible, it could have the symbolism of being the only cross-border economic cooperation zone in Northeast Asia. Securing symbolism is very important. This is because it carries the meaning of local cities, Fukuoka and Busan, playing a role rather than the central governments in Korea-Japan relations.

As is well known, there are many cross-border regional collaborations in Europe, including Euregio. The strategic collaboration between Copenhagen, Denmark, and the Malmö region of Sweden is already a well-known story. The sight of people crossing the Oresund Bridge in the morning to commute across the border has become a symbol of a trans-border economic cooperation body. More recently, the Pearl River Delta region connecting Guangzhou, Hong Kong, Shenzhen, and Macau in China is another example of an international special zone. If you open a map and look closely, you can see that Busan and Fukuoka are the only regions in Northeast Asia where such international collaboration is possible.

There are many overlapping areas in the future industry fields pursued by Busan and Fukuoka. In the case of Busan, efforts are being made to foster new industries such as digital content and film/video combined with IT. In the case of Fukuoka as well, since it is pursuing a special employment zone specialized in fields such as digital content and video, the synergy effect that can be created by the two regions building an international special zone is expected to be very large. Digital content and film/video are cutting-edge future industries, and Korea-Japan cooperation in these fields is highly significant in terms of presenting a new Korea-Japan cooperation model in future industry fields. It would also be possible to launch international crowdfunding for venture entrepreneurs with ideas.

Second, through economic cooperation between Busan and Fukuoka, the mismatch of human resources between Korea and Japan can be considerably resolved. In the case of South Korea, the youth unemployment problem is very serious. Despite having sufficient educational backgrounds and experience (internships, overseas training, volunteer activities, etc.), the reality is that there is a severe shortage of workplaces where people can find employment upon university graduation. In contrast, in the case of Japan, as the low-birthrate and aging society progresses, companies are complaining of labor shortages. The fact that the job offer rate for Japanese university seniors recently reached 95% has significant implications from the supply side of the job market. A way to resolve this mismatch between job seeking and employment faced by Korea and Japan is to cultivate the human resources needed by Japanese companies in South Korea.

Third, it is to activate the university consortium between Busan and Fukuoka. In 2007, 24 universities located in both cities already participated and signed an agreement. Nevertheless, it has not yet been activated, and substantial results remain insufficient. By actively utilizing this, it is conceivable to establish a tentatively named "Busan-Fukuoka Joint Summer School" and conduct large-scale exchanges. If mutual understanding is achieved through such exchanges and a human network between the youth of both cities can be built from their student days, it will become a great asset after graduation. If trust is built through such projects, higher-level collaboration and alliance, such as international credit exchange between universities and joint use of campuses, will become possible. It goes without saying that training young talent who deeply understand both countries and both regions is very important for building future Korea-Japan relations.

Another measure for inter-university cooperation would be mutual online course exchange. Recently, MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses), online open lectures centered on American universities, have gained great popularity. Building a B (Busan)-F (Fukuoka) MOOC system by gathering excellent lecture content held by universities in Busan and content from universities in Fukuoka in one place, and opening a path for university students in both cities to freely take each other's classes by mutually transmitting this system, could also be a good strategic alliance between universities in both cities.

Finally, activating exchanges at the citizen level is important. In that sense, it is necessary to develop and execute mega-projects that can attract the interest of and involve many citizens. As a large-scale event planning that citizens of both cities can easily enjoy, for example, it would be interesting to hold a "Korea-Japan Food Stall Festival" by gathering famous food stalls from Busan and Fukuoka. Now that food is becoming a tourism product, if unique food stalls appear on the streets of Busan and Fukuoka, it is expected to have the effect of attracting tourists from all over the country.

In addition, mutual travel could be encouraged by jointly marketing famous performances such as musicals in both cities. Also, holding a Black Friday sale to sell Busan-made products and Fukuoka-made products on a large scale online is worth considering. China's Alibaba holds a Double 11 (Singles' Day) shopping event every year and once sold 15.5 trillion won in a single day. If products made by companies in Busan and Fukuoka can be jointly released to the global market, I believe it would be a landmark event.

To realize this concept regarding the "Busan-Fukuoka International Special Zone," both cities have been carrying out substantial activities for the past 20 years. First, in 2006, the "Busan-Fukuoka Forum," composed of representatives from the industrial, government, media, and academic sectors of Busan and Fukuoka, was founded, and meetings are held annually while traveling between Busan and Fukuoka. Based on a proposal from this forum, 2009 was designated as the "Busan-Fukuoka Friendship Year," and the aforementioned "Busan-Fukuoka University Consortium" was formed. In 2010, a report was published researching the economic effects that the establishment of a Busan-Fukuoka International Special Zone would bring. In addition, Busan City and Fukuoka City established an Economic Cooperation Council and presented four basic directions, nine strategies, and 23 detailed promotion projects for creating a super-regional economic zone. In 2015, the "Busan-Fukuoka Journalist Forum," a dialogue body between journalists from both cities, was held, and discussions took place on the role of the media in Korea-Japan relations. Chambers of commerce in both cities established the "Busan-Fukuoka CEO Forum" and have built a dialogue channel for businesspeople every year. We have reached a time when we must move beyond discussion and into concrete practice.

A sustainable Korea-Japan relationship cannot be achieved by chance or simply by shouting for "friendship and goodwill." It must be predicated on building trust through tireless efforts and establishing closely linked economic interests.

In that sense, the activation of the university consortium mentioned above, the expansion of opportunities for mutual city advancement through the establishment of corporate contract departments (departments opened at the request of specific companies), and the joint cultivation of future industries through the construction of the Busan-Fukuoka International Special Zone will not only help upgrade Korea-Japan relations but also contribute to creating a foundation for fostering a sense of community between Korea and Japan.

It is true that a new atmosphere is recently being formed in Korea-Japan relations. However, as long as differences in perception between the two countries regarding history exist, a state accompanied by anxiety, like an active volcano, will continue. It is necessary to build a relationship between the two countries that is more valuable than conflict through cooperation. For this reason, the presentation of a new paradigm for bilateral relations is required. I believe the "Busan-Fukuoka International Special Zone Concept" will likely be one such method.