[Feature: Outlook for Japan-Korea Relations] Roundtable: The New Korean Administration and the Future of Japan-Korea Relations

On March 9, a presidential election was held in South Korea. Yoon Suk-yeol of the conservative opposition party "People Power Party" defeated Lee Jae-myung of the ruling party to become the successor to the progressive President Moon Jae-in. The election was decided by a margin of only 0.73% in terms of vote share, or about 240,000 votes, making it the closest finish among the eight presidential elections held since democratization. The voter turnout was 77.1%, almost the same as the previous election in 2017, which I think can be considered a high turnout.

Today, following the results of this election campaign, I would like to ask about the changes in South Korean society reflected there, how Japan-South Korea relations will change under the new administration, and the outlook for the future.

First, looking back at the election campaign, what were your impressions? Ms. Haruki, shall we start with you?

In this election, an unprecedented amount of attention and interest was focused on the destination of the "votes of those in their 20s." The 20s vote held the casting vote, and the election campaign was developed with young people in mind, but as a result, extremely different voting behaviors were seen between men and women in their 20s.

Since around the 2007 presidential election when President Lee Myung-bak was elected, "economic growth" has become a major keyword, but the younger generation is characterized by many independent voters who act based on interests rather than being bound by conservative or progressive ideologies.

And this time, Yoon Suk-yeol of the conservative opposition party, mindful of the votes of men in their 20s, made pledges such as "abolishing the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family," which actually had the effect of increasing support among men in their 20s. It was an election campaign that fanned the division between "men vs. women" and used it politically. It was regrettable that gender conflict was emphasized so much, as if to turn eyes away from structural problems such as job shortages.

Until now, both Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun had made pledges mindful of the female vote. President Moon Jae-in even declared that he would become a feminist president if elected, trying to gather female votes. However, this time was different in that it focused on "men in their 20s" and tried to consolidate votes through "negative empathy."

As a result, social division has deepened.

I would like to ask for more details later, but you gave us a very interesting keyword: "negative empathy." Mr. Lee Won-deog, who was watching from South Korea, how did you see it?

I think there are four points to note in this election. First, as mentioned, this presidential election was a very close race that allowed for no prediction until the very last moment, and Yoon Suk-yeol's victory was like treading on thin ice.

One week before the voting day, there was a unification of conservative candidates, and candidate Ahn Cheol-soo joined the Yoon Suk-yeol camp. I believe Yoon won because of this unification, but conversely, there is also an analysis that a rallying force worked for Lee Jae-myung among those who opposed the unification.

Second, both leading candidates were newcomers as politicians, with no experience as members of the National Assembly. Mr. Yoon has only 30 years of experience in the prosecution, and Mr. Lee Jae-myung has experience as the governor of Gyeonggi Province and as a mayor, but no experience in national administration. It was a confrontation between such people.

Third, it was an election campaign where a very negative campaign was conducted. For Lee Jae-myung, allegations of corruption regarding land distribution in Daejang-dong were heavily featured, and Mr. Yoon was attacked over allegations of prosecutorial whistleblowing. To put it another way, was there really competition based on policy in this presidential election? I find it very regrettable that it was an election where constructive issues were lost.

The fourth point is, as mentioned earlier regarding generation and gender issues, I see this election as one where the four aspects of regionalism, generation, income disparity, and gender—which always appear in South Korean elections—each came very much to the surface.

Generally speaking, there was one central issue in this presidential election. That was whether to change the government or maintain the current liberal administration, and this was the major trend in the first half of the election campaign.

As a result, I see the most prominent aspect as being that the government changed from a progressive to a conservative one through the election.

You have comprehensively summarized the characteristics of this election. In a very close race, Mr. Yoon eventually won due to conservative unification. As you pointed out, evaluations are divided even within South Korea as to how effective this unification actually was. Indeed, looking at the results, there are many areas where Lee Jae-myung, who was initially not doing well, made a rapid recovery.

Furthermore, the second point you raised about having no experience in national administration is exactly right, and this is also a first for an election since democratization. In the process of the election campaign, there were people like Lee Nak-yon, who served as Prime Minister. Nevertheless, what does it mean that the public ultimately chose two people with no national administration experience as presidential candidates? That might be an important point.

The fact that policy debate was insufficient is, in a sense, business as usual, but I think there was certainly a part where the negative campaign was very strong this time.

Now, Ms. Lee Young-hee, who watched the South Korean presidential election in Japan as a Tokyo correspondent, how did you see this election campaign, and how did you feel about Japan watching the South Korean election?

In this election, partly due to COVID-19, early voting increased significantly compared to before, and with the unification of conservative candidates just before the vote, it was an election that was difficult to predict until the end. Each media outlet really struggled with creating their pages amidst various information.

This is the first time I have seen reports on the South Korean presidential election in Japan, but speaking only of my impressions this time, I felt that the Japanese media is quite interested in South Korean elections. In particular, morning information programs covered the issues surrounding the candidates' wives in detail, and I thought they were talking about things that even South Koreans don't know well (laughs).

When I asked others, some said that in the past there was more interest in policy, and since there weren't many newspapers that featured the election results prominently on the front page this time, they felt there was actually not much interest in South Korean politics.

I think the South Korean presidential election became a bit of entertainment in the Japanese media this time. I felt they were looking at it as if it were "entertainmentized," showing how South Korea is so divided and that strange things are happening.

The problem is that because it ended in such a close race, I think the aftereffects will be quite large from now on. Normally, when a presidential election ends, the approval rating becomes about 70% due to expectations for the new president. However, this time, even in yesterday's opinion poll, it was around 48.5%, not exceeding 50%. Even before the inauguration, the issue of moving the presidential office is causing controversy, and I am truly worried.

You provided interesting points regarding Japan's view of the South Korean election. Not limited to this election, I think the way Japan looks at South Korea has a strong tendency to be entertainmentized and viewed in an amusing way, as you pointed out.

Even though it was clear that the election results would have a very large impact on Japan-South Korea relations, I find it regrettable that there wasn't much reporting focused on those aspects.

Furthermore, regarding what is happening in South Korea right now, your point that the aftereffects might become serious is exactly right. Conflict between the ruling and opposition parties is already intensifying, involving the Moon administration, and the Yoon administration is in a difficult situation even before it starts.

Earlier, Mr. Lee Won-deog pointed out that there was a strong atmosphere for a change of government, which pushed Mr. Yoon to the presidency.

The reason why the atmosphere for a change of government became strong was, after all, the failure of the Moon administration's economic policies, especially the real estate and housing issues, and the employment issue that had been emphasized since the inauguration of the administration. Probably from the public's perspective, those appeared insufficient. It is said that this led to the results of this election, but what do you think, Mr. Abe?

In previous presidential elections, there was often some kind of issue, or the challenges for the next administration were relatively clear. For example, when Lee Myung-bak was elected, as Ms. Haruki pointed out, economic growth became the issue, and during Park Geun-hye's time, economic democratization was a major issue. And at the birth of the Moon Jae-in administration, the issue of employment (il-jari) was highlighted, but this time, what exactly the "issue" was was not very clear.

Throughout the election campaign, economic policy was rarely discussed; rather, both sides might have felt it was better not to show their policy colors clearly in order to target the middle class. In any case, there is no doubt that this election was one that the ruling party lost, and in that sense, the ruling party's policies were not evaluated favorably.

I think the economic policies and real estate/housing issues that Mr. Nishino pointed out were very significant. Triggered by the real estate issue, public dissatisfaction with ideology-led policies and the so-called "naeronambul" problem (justifying one's own actions while criticizing others for the same) emerged as a problem for the administration.

Furthermore, the "Candlelight Revolution" when the Moon Jae-in administration was born was largely driven by the power of young people, but it ended up giving those young people a sense of disappointment. Especially in real estate and employment issues, it failed to meet expectations. While the younger generation was also torn by gender issues, there is no doubt that the failure to respond to the underlying issues of employment and life disparity was a major factor leading to the change of government.

One of the pillars of the policies and slogans put forward by the Moon administration is the so-called "income-led growth," but quite harsh evaluations are heard from economists. How can the merits and demerits of the Moon administration's economic policies be evaluated?

The Moon administration, born from the "Candlelight Revolution," initially pushed through very left-leaning policies amidst the excitement of being a revolutionary government. I think the prime example of that is "income-led growth."

However, the large increase in the minimum wage, in particular, had significant side effects, and I think the evaluation that many of the policies they implemented were problematic is correct.

However, once they realized halfway through that it wasn't working well, they quickly abandoned it. This is, in a sense, South Korea's strength; ultimately, people from economic bureaucracy backgrounds remained rooted within the administration, and the administration eventually relied on them to return to stable economic management.

For example, at first they took a very strong stance against the chaebols, but realizing that chaebols are indispensable for growth, they improved relations and successfully corrected their course. They also handled COVID-19 measures nimbly, at least initially, and implemented economic measures to some extent, so I think it can be evaluated that they managed without major failure in the end.

However, partly due to the significant expansion of social welfare, they considerably increased fiscal spending. In this regard, I think it was significantly different from the path of past administrations that maintained sound finances.

From the public's perspective, the main interest in this election was likely how much the next administration would improve their lives. That would be the real estate and housing issue. However, Mr. Yoon also says he will build 2.5 million units in five years, but this is an issue that takes time and cannot be realized immediately.

Even with the employment issue, although the Moon administration and previous successive administrations have put effort into it, resolution remains difficult. Furthermore, regarding the improvement of wealth concentration and the correction of disparities that the Moon administration aimed for, there is a view that they have actually widened depending on the evaluation method.

Given this situation, where will the Yoon administration place its priorities, or how significantly will it shift its policies?

As you say, it is very difficult. Especially regarding real estate, for the time being, supply must be increased, but it cannot be built immediately.

Also, if supply is increased, there is naturally a possibility that market conditions will drop sharply. Then, people who currently own property will see their assets decrease significantly and will be dissatisfied. Also, if prices drop significantly, the problem of debt will become more apparent, so steering will be very difficult.

As issues for each generation, there are youth unemployment and poverty among the elderly, but the youth issue is particularly serious. For the elderly, the Moon Jae-in administration achieved some results by increasing direct payments called basic pensions and by the government providing short-term direct employment.

On the other hand, what young people want is not just money, but better jobs. If they want regular positions and jobs where they can achieve self-realization, that is not something that can be done with short-term government measures, and the Moon administration failed to meet that demand. Since the Yoon administration also does not have any specific measures with immediate effect, I think they will struggle significantly there.

However, what is clear about the Yoon administration's economic policy is that it will leave the economy to the private sector as much as possible and actively relax regulations for that purpose. Yoon Suk-yeol has frequently cited Friedman's "Free to Choose" as a book that influenced him, expressing sympathy for the idea of respecting market freedom.

The focus will likely be on how to relax regulations and create new industries, as well as making it easier to create startups. However, growth through these policies also takes a certain amount of time, so the key will be whether the public will wait for it.

Related to what we just discussed, various rifts are occurring in South Korean society. In addition to the traditional ideology of conservative vs. progressive, regionalism, and the intergenerational conflict that has become prominent since the 2000s, the social situation of young people became a focus in this election, and within that, gender conflict and friction emerged as very important factors.

To what extent can the Yoon administration resolve these social disparities and rifts? In particular, the backlash from young people against the current mainstream generation, known as the "586 generation," whom they view as a vested interest group, seems quite strong. Ms. Haruki, what do you think?

As Mr. Abe pointed out, the underlying economic problem is large. The South Korean government is promoting a national project to encourage highly educated young people to work overseas. From such things, young people facing future anxiety are appealing to politics that they are vulnerable and want social stability to be guaranteed.

I think the Moon administration had various problems, but as of 2021, there are 18 unicorn companies in South Korea. I think this is amazing. They were putting effort into research and development investment, and the results are probably starting to show.

On the other hand, looking at the job market for young people, there are about 620,000 young people who have given up on job hunting, but South Korean youth have a spirit of challenge and high entrepreneurial motivation.

There are dramas called "Itaewon Class" and "Start-Up" that were popular in Japan on Netflix. Both are success stories where protagonists who are not college graduates succeed in ventures. While these are fantasies, I think they are dramas that give hope to young people. Making such opportunities, ways of working, and hopes a reality is what the next administration should do.

I am a woman in my 40s, and around me, it feels like the gender issue exploded in this election. In 2016, there was the "Gangnam Station Murder Case," and while the motive for this murder was said to be misogyny, young women began to study feminism. In 2018, there was "#MeToo," and it feels like feminism had permeated and then surfaced in this presidential election.

Opinion polls show that ultimately about 58% of women in their 20s supported Lee Jae-myung. Women in their 20s, who were floating voters, felt like "Yoon Suk-yeol is no good" at the end, and I felt the power of women of this generation is quite strong.

The number of people voting for Lee Jae-myung's Democratic Party increased, and there was also a movement to send donations to Sim Sang-jung, a woman who ran from the Justice Party. I am paying attention to how Yoon Suk-yeol will handle this problem of division between genders from now on.

The "Ministry of Gender Equality and Family" might also disappear. However, while there may be no gender discrimination in South Korea legally, everyone knows that there is discrimination in actual life. Even among women in their 40s, many think there are problems with the "Ministry of Gender Equality and Family," but then, in what kind of institution and how will the remaining challenges in the gender field be handled? This is truly important.

Mr. Yoon's pledge to abolish the "Ministry of Gender Equality and Family" mentioned in the talk has become a major issue in South Korean society and is likely to significantly influence the course of the administration.

Mr. Yoon used the quite strong word "abolish," but Ms. Haruki, who has observed and analyzed this issue for a long time, how do you see it?

The "Ministry of Gender Equality and Family" initially started as the "Ministry of Women," but to prevent it from being abolished by a change of government, it also took on family policy, which comes with a large budget.

However, the problem of the reproduction of the gendered division of labor remained. A major problem with the "Ministry of Gender Equality and Family" under the Moon Jae-in administration was that its response when sexual harassment cases involving major politicians of the ruling party occurred was insufficient, and it was not fulfilling its role as an institution for protecting women's human rights.

Beyond the existence or abolition of the "Ministry of Gender Equality and Family," I think we should discuss gender policy and the diversification of families that South Korean society aims for.

Specifically, what kind of points of contention are there?

One is the issue surrounding reproductive labor. In South Korea, resistance to the family system based on the gendered division of labor has led to an increase in non-marriage and a decrease in the birth rate (total fertility rate in 2021, 0.81 [preliminary value]). Of course, economic factors are also large for the declining birth rate.

If economic problems are alleviated, will those points of contention be resolved, or are there still things that must be addressed?

I think the way families should be is being strongly questioned right now. Regarding the poverty problem of the elderly, until now, life in old age was somehow managed through allowances from children—in other words, it leaned on the family system—but that no longer functions. If so, there is no choice but to enhance welfare policies.

There is a need to hasten the transition from family welfare to a welfare state where the state takes responsibility. The speed of the aging population with a declining birth rate is faster than in Japan.

I see. Mr. Lee Won-deog, you interact with South Korean youth and students daily; how do you see the differences in thinking between generations and the problems of gender?

I personally feel a bit of a sense of incongruity that the gender issue became a major point of contention in this presidential election.

I think it cannot be denied that Yoon Suk-yeol put out various policies to gather support from men in their 20s, and that gender friction is surfacing as a current state of society. However, compared to other developed countries, I do not think that South Korea has truly feudal and serious gender problems.

Then, why did this surface as a point of contention and a political issue? Probably because the friction in politics is so great, I think there was a part where the dynamics of trying to utilize the aspects of such friction to the advantage of one's own camp during the election campaign process were at work.

Both conservatives and progressives admit that a department to realize gender equality is necessary. The issue of abolishing the "Ministry of Gender Equality and Family" is also a matter of how to incorporate the functions held by the "Ministry of Gender Equality and Family" within the overall organization of the government, and it would be a mistake to see the Yoon administration as taking policies that discriminate against women because it is conservative. I think such things have been politicized and the misunderstanding has become too large.

Looking at various awareness surveys, the younger the generation, the stronger the sense of equality. They want to build democratic families, men also want to cooperate in raising children, and they want to be liberated from patriarchal consciousness, so I think the role of adults is not to hinder that.

Even though they have such a sense of equality, what are adults doing fanning the division? However, gender discrimination certainly exists in society. It is also serious in Japan, and women are speaking out with considerable courage. I want it to be properly received.

How will the changes in South Korean society we have heard about so far affect South Korea's diplomacy, its involvement with the international community, and South Korea's position and status in the international community? As is always the case, I don't think foreign and security policy became a major point of contention in this election either.

How do you, Mr. Lee Won-deog, evaluate this area at this point?

As mentioned, generally speaking, foreign policy did not become a major point of contention in this presidential election. Looking at the pledges of both camps, I don't think there was much visible difference. However, in reality, I believe there are elements in the foreign and security policies of both camps that can be significantly differentiated.

First, before looking at that, I would like to point out a little bit how international political variables influenced this election.

One is Russia's invasion of Ukraine. I think this had a certain impact because it reminded South Korean voters that the issues of sovereignty and national security should not be taken lightly.

Then, there have been about 10 North Korean missile tests since the beginning of this year. I see that this also had a slight impact on the voting behavior of South Korean voters.

Another thing is that the Beijing Winter Olympics took place in the middle of the election campaign, and there were some unfair judgments regarding China, which sparked some anti-Chinese sentiment. I believe such international variables also had some influence on the election.

I think Mr. Yoon's basic thinking on foreign policy is very different from that of the Moon administration or Mr. Lee Jae-myung. The Moon Jae-in administration placed the basis of its foreign and security policy on relations with North Korea, and the so-called "Korean Peninsula Peace Process" was the center of its foreign and security policy. Next were relations with the U.S. and U.S.-China relations, and I think relations with Japan were positioned following those.

I believe such foreign and security policies will change significantly with the change of government. Mr. Yoon places the basis of his foreign and security strategy on the ROK-U.S. alliance, and I expect that he certainly has a pro-American direction even amidst the strategic competition between the U.S. and China. Naturally, fundamental changes will also occur in relations with North Korea, and he will likely take a firm stance against North Korea's nuclear and missile crises. I think he will consider North Korea policy while cooperating with the United Nations, including the United States.

I will leave the relationship with Japan for later, but I think there will also be major changes in the relationship with China. There were the Moon administration's so-called "Three Noes" policy toward China (1. No additional deployment of THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] in South Korea, 2. No participation in the U.S. missile defense network, 3. No establishment of a military alliance with the U.S. and Japan), but Mr. Yoon has said he will not maintain these.

I suspect that the change of government will show a greater shift in direction for foreign and security policy than for socio-economic policy.

You mentioned that not much difference was visible in the election pledges, but in what ways could they be said to be similar?

For example, regarding the response to North Korea, looking only at the wording, both candidates said they would take a firm response but solve the problem through dialogue, so not much difference was visible.

In terms of policy toward Japan as well, both said they would inherit the so-called "Kim Dae-jung–Obuchi Declaration" or consider the relationship with Japan from a practical perspective; I thought not much difference was visible in their words. Despite the fact that there are actually major differences in foreign policy, the impression is that those differences were not highlighted much during the election campaign.

What about you, Ms. Lee Young-hee?

I don't think foreign policy became a major issue, but in the midst of the invasion of Ukraine, I think there was quite a bit of anxiety about whether the current Moon Jae-in administration's foreign policy was acceptable as it is.

In particular, antipathy toward China has grown, and since North Korea has not changed at all for five years, I think many people felt that a policy shift was necessary.

However, and I am the same way, while South Koreans think that teaming up with the U.S. and Japan will benefit South Korea, there is also anxiety that if we turn North Korea into an enemy and show a strong stance, a war might break out in South Korea. I think people have the anxiety of not knowing which choice is better for the peace of South Korea. Even if they think there are problems with the status quo, many people cannot clearly say that it is okay to go to the opposite side like Mr. Yoon Suk-yeol. I think it is a difficult problem.

I also have a feeling that if relations with North Korea worsen, "this might be dangerous." All South Koreans feel a sense of crisis. I basically think that change is necessary, but I also worry about how Mr. Yoon Suk-yeol's foreign policy will adjust this difficult situation.

I think the point you just made is something many people in South Korea are feeling. There is a feeling that more effort should be put into security policy. However, if the things President-elect Yoon is saying—for example, preemptive strike capabilities against North Korea or the additional deployment of THAAD—are actually implemented, military tensions on the Korean Peninsula could rise considerably in the short term. People must be wondering if that is really okay.

Furthermore, while the Moon administration's "Korean Peninsula Peace Process" may have ultimately failed, there is also an evaluation that it played a role in settling the military tensions that had escalated extremely between the U.S. and North Korea in 2017. Mr. Lee Won-deok, how do you see this?

I think that is perceived very differently by conservatives and progressives. What became an issue with Mr. Yoon's remarks during the election campaign was the theory of preemptive strikes against North Korea. This was criticized as being stirred up too much by political propaganda and increasing military tension between the North and South, but this is also written in South Korea's "Defense White Paper," and as a strategic concept, I think it is not a problem at all.

Then, regarding military cooperation with Japan, there was a controversy over whether Japanese Self-Defense Forces would be allowed into the Korean Peninsula. That was also an exaggeration; Mr. Yoon never said such a thing, and in reality, Japan and South Korea have been building a cooperation system in terms of security via the United States for a long time, so it is not that strange.

Regarding relations with China as well, if the additional deployment of THAAD is necessary for South Korea's security, I see it as not being strange even from the principle of sovereignty. I think these parts were largely distorted during the election process.

When looking at the international situation in Northeast Asia, including the current relationship with North Korea, I see the Yoon administration finally returning to realism.

During the Moon administration, dialogue with North Korea was emphasized excessively, and South Korea's realistic foreign and security policy wavered. Even though the peace process was pursued, there were no results. North Korea continues its nuclear development and missile tests, and as a result, I don't think it can be said that it was a plus for South Korea's peace and security.

In that sense, I feel like the opportunity for the normalization of foreign and security policy has finally returned.

I would like to start hearing your thoughts on Japan-South Korea relations. Ms. Haruki, how do you see the current situation surrounding Japan-South Korea relations?

Foreign security is not my specialty, but I am very surprised that antipathy toward China is rising so much, especially among the younger generation. The younger generation in South Korea was the generation with the highest favorability toward Japan.

This generation has had no consciousness of being behind since they were born; they have a strong consciousness of being a developed nation, so they have a sense of equality toward China and Japan as well. Therefore, it seems that if something hurts that self-esteem, backlash strengthens all at once.

And young people in Japan now also say, "We, Japan and South Korea, are people of the same developed nations." While the older generation in Japan looks at it with a sense of hierarchy, the younger generation sees each other in a flat, equal relationship. I believe that if we don't take that into consideration, the relationship between Japan and South Korea for the next generation will not go well.

So the way young people view international relations is completely different from the older generation. I take it your point is that this has a good chance of acting as a plus in the relationship with Japan.

Connecting to the previous discussion, I think the common point in foreign and security policy for both the ruling and opposition parties is the sense that South Korea has become a developed nation and the world's 10th largest economic power, along with the accompanying pride and self-confidence. It can be said that they share the view that South Korea occupies an honorable international status and will develop foreign and security policy based on that.

In the case of the Yoon administration, this is even stronger; from the election campaign, he advocated for solidarity with liberal democratic nations, a proactive stance toward participating in the "Quad" framework of Japan, the U.S., Australia, and India, and further international contributions including ODA.

Mr. Abe, what are your thoughts from the aspect of South Korea's achievement of economic growth?

If anything, it is Japan that has recently begun to have the consciousness of "being overtaken by South Korea," while I think people in South Korea have had a strong consciousness since about 10 years ago that Japan is not such a big deal. At least regarding the economy, I have the impression that the sense of inferiority toward Japan is disappearing.

In terms of developed nation consciousness, things like the "K-Quarantine" measures against COVID-19 strengthened South Koreans' awareness that "we are not behind, but rather advanced." However, I think there are various opinions on how to occupy a status commensurate with that awareness in the international community from now on.

For example, South Korea was a step behind in the movement of developed nations against Russia this time. The current administration might have been considerate toward Russia with the North Korea issue in mind, but South Korea is largely a trading nation, and I think there were also parts where they first worried about the impact on trade.

In fact, in terms of energy, imports from Russia occupy a significant position, and in terms of exports, they sell many cars. So, I think there is a strong way of thinking that considers the impact on trade first, rather than acting as a member of the democratic camp or a member of the developed nations.

I think how that changes in the future is a challenge for South Korea as a member of the developed nations.

Exactly. From the perspective of so-called economic security, South Korea possesses important products such as semiconductors and batteries, and the Yoon administration is also conscious of that, so there is a possibility they will take more in-depth policies in the future. That is precisely why there seems to be a possibility for Japan to cooperate more with South Korea.

Also, while South Koreans have overtaken Japan in a natural way and have no sense of inferiority, in Japan recently, the media has been frequently reporting that we are "being overtaken" in various areas. Perhaps a sense of impatience has emerged.

There is the idea that South Korea has overtaken Japan, but there are also opinions that Japan is still more of a developed nation than we are. Furthermore, I feel that young people don't care much about such things.

It is a fact that the number of people saying it is necessary to get along with Japan has increased, and I think young people also feel that even if they cannot go back and forth because of COVID-19, it doesn't have much impact. I feel that feeling an equal relationship and interacting will be an opportunity for South Koreans to break out of a victim mentality, which is a good thing.

In South Korea, while there is quite a bit of expectation that Japan-South Korea relations will improve from now on, Japanese public opinion polls show that 60–70% do not expect much improvement in Japan-South Korea relations even if Yoon Suk-yeol becomes president. I think Mr. Yoon Suk-yeol has a strong desire to improve Japan-South Korea relations, but I worry that improvement might become difficult in this state.

I think it's not bad just to have an atmosphere of "maybe things will get better from now on." It takes time to solve various problems, but once COVID-19 is over, exchanges such as studying abroad between Japan and South Korea will return, so I am thinking hopefully that we can start from there.

In fact, many young Japanese people around me want to go to South Korea quite a bit due to the influence of music, dramas, and so on.

Certainly, looking at public opinion polls and the like, there are many cautious views from Japan regarding the Yoon administration's policy toward Japan and the future of Japan-South Korea relations. However, it's not that they aren't expecting anything; they want to expect something, but from past experience, if they have high expectations and are betrayed, the damage is great, so in a sense, they might be doing expectation control.

However, there is a part where they cannot help but expect, and that is precisely why Prime Minister Kishida expressed his congratulations the day after the election and even called Mr. Yoon the following day. I felt that there is a strong desire on the Japanese side as well that this opportunity must absolutely not be missed.

I think the current Japan-South Korea relationship is a very strange and abnormal one. If you ask if there was an essential reason why the relationship between Japan and South Korea had to deteriorate and conflict this much, I think there wasn't much of one.

The forced labor issue and the comfort women issue certainly exist, but it is strange in itself that they have become such major points of contention in Japan-South Korea relations. I admit that the issue of historical perception exists to some extent unavoidably, but why must we fight in all areas of Japan-South Korea relations because of that? I think the influence of leadership was significant.

In that sense, the reason Japan-South Korea relations became so bad during the Moon Jae-in administration was, from a South Korean perspective, that there was an evaluation of Japan in foreign and security strategy that lacked balance too much. Therefore, if there is a change in leadership, I think Japan-South Korea relations will gradually improve from now on. I am aware that the perception on the Japanese side is pessimistic, but looking objectively at the direction the current Yoon Suk-yeol administration is seeking, I think the elements that cause conflict or friction with Japan have almost disappeared.

Looking at the basics of the foreign and security policy the Yoon administration is seeking, it will strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance and make it a comprehensive alliance. This is no different from Japan. Then, it will promote ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation. And since it says South Korea will also join the so-called Indo-Pacific strategy, I think the directions will align from now on. Perceptions and policies toward North Korea will also be in the direction of handling the North Korea issue while cooperating with Japan, so there will be no gap.

The problem is what to do with the so-called forced labor issue and the comfort women issue. I see that the ball is in South Korea's court. I think the Yoon administration will handle this carefully, but ultimately, I think they will move in a direction to process and solve it somehow.

Even during the election campaign, Mr. Yoon said he would solve the three points of contention: the so-called forced labor issue, the Japanese side's export control issue, and GSOMIA (General Security of Military Information Agreement). However, the GSOMIA issue has already vanished, and I think the export control issue also no longer exists as a substantial pending matter.

Then, the pending matter to be solved is narrowed down to the single issue of forced labor, and I think only the question of how skillfully the South Korean government can handle it remains. The solution to the forced labor issue involves 34 to a maximum of fewer than 200 people in terms of numbers, and 500 million to 3 billion yen in terms of amount. Legally, there is a statute of limitations, and as of October last year, three years have already passed since the Supreme Court ruling, so further additional lawsuits are unlikely. If you count the lawsuits currently in court where the Supreme Court is likely to finally win, it is thought to be roughly that scale.

On the Japanese side, I think many people see this as a large problem, but it is a problem that can be solved with 3 billion yen at most. There are various discussions in South Korea as well, but to solve this forced labor issue, it would be okay if the South Korean government pays the compensation on behalf of the companies—so-called subrogation—or if the president makes a decision that no monetary demands will be made at all regarding historical and colonial issues involving the Japanese side.

The process of discussion with opposing forces is important, but looking closely at the actual situation, I don't think it will be that big of an obstacle. I am a bit optimistic that if we discuss this issue more rationally and take the process to solve it, it will no longer be an obstacle in the relationship with Japan.

Currently, no matter how much the South Korean side tries to make improvements, the Japanese government's attitude is that it can do nothing until the forced labor issue is solved. I believe that if even that attitude is improved, Japan-South Korea relations will go well.

In the case of subrogation, would discussions in the National Assembly or legislative measures be necessary?

The executive branch would take the initiative, and after that, cooperation from companies or private funds could be included, and it would be best if it were finally solved through legislative measures.

However, I think it will take time to reach legislation, so first, as a direction, if they clarify the answer as to whether or not to enforce the assets of Japanese companies and take them, subsequent technical problems will not be such a big deal. If they go with the direction of not enforcing the assets of Japanese companies and deferring liquidation, it will lead to talks about how to create various funds and legislation. If that is the case, I don't think the Japanese side needs to react negatively.

Now, finally, I would like to hear everyone's thoughts on the future of Japan-South Korea relations.

From the perspective of economic security, Japan and South Korea are basically in very close positions. I think we need to re-recognize this fact with each other. As decoupling progresses, there are movements to reorganize high-tech supply chains centered on the United States, and within that, both Japan and South Korea occupy important positions, and furthermore, Japan and South Korea are closely linked to each other.

On the other hand, China cannot be ignored because both Japan and South Korea have high trade ratios. Our positions are very similar in that we cannot necessarily go all-in with the United States. I think we need to re-recognize that there are common interests where we can cooperate. In that sense, the new Yoon administration's views on the U.S. and China are quite close, and I think the common interests of Japan and South Korea will be easily recognized.

Another thing is that once COVID-19 is over and the flow of people becomes free, we can expect the movement of people, especially young people, to become very active. Also, as each other's cultures permeate, services for Japanese youth by South Korean startups are already spreading considerably. These movements are very promising as new seeds connecting Japan and South Korea.

When people talk about Japan-South Korea economic exchange, it has been discussed mainly by governments and economic organizations, but I think it is important for the existing generation to recognize that a new world that was not necessarily captured there is now expanding, and at least take a stance of not getting in the way of the younger generation.

Listening to Mr. Lee Won-deok's talk made me feel brighter, but I think the Japanese government also needs to change its attitude and give the South Korean side space to move. If Japan continues as it is now, saying it will do nothing unless South Korea comes up with a solution it can agree with, there is a possibility that South Korean public opinion will also worsen.

I think it is difficult for the Japanese government to change its principles on the forced labor issue or the comfort women issue, but I think the situation where South Korean Ambassador to Japan Kang Chang-il has not yet met with the Japanese Foreign Minister or the Prime Minister is a problem. So, while keeping principles as principles, I hope the Japanese side will also create an atmosphere where new dialogue and actions can begin from now.

As Mr. Abe said, I have expectations for the actions of young people after COVID-19. When Japan-South Korea relations were bad, people around me were like, "How is it? Is it okay to go to Japan?" but I think just returning to a state where people can go on a trip to Japan freely when they want to will be quite promising.

I really thought Mr. Nishino's point that why a person with no experience in national politics was chosen as a candidate is an important point. For me, the remark by Mr. Yoon Suk-yeol that had a big impact was when he said, "I do not swear loyalty to people." This sounded fresh in that he does not yield to power.

South Korean political culture has been very personalized until now. I think the reason we couldn't expect much from Japan even when the government changed lies in this personalized political culture. It's a place where partisanship and personal relationships take precedence over systems and rules. Because of this South Korean political culture, this remark was fresh.

Recently, there are voices saying they expect the next generation to improve Japan-South Korea relations, but I sometimes feel that is irresponsible. Why are Japan and South Korea in such a relationship now? This is the responsibility of the adults in both countries, and I think the current problems must be solved by the current administrations.

Since new leaders have been chosen in both Japan and South Korea, I hope they will make the most of this timing and build a relationship that can pass the baton to the next generation.

The current Japan-South Korea relationship has become very abnormal. So we should make various efforts to normalize it from now on, and thinking from a slightly larger perspective, South Korea and Japan are currently placed in the midst of the U.S.-China conflict, and the threat of North Korea remains a major obstacle in this region. If South Korea and Japan cooperate strategically, it is obvious that national interests and strategies will benefit each other, so why can't that be realized?

Thinking about the future, I think we should realize that Japan and South Korea are in a bilateral relationship where national interests and strategies can be shared, and make efforts to bring it to a normal state for each other.

This change of government in South Korea is a perfect opportunity for the relationship to work toward normalization, so I think we should just make efforts together.

Certainly, South Korean society is changing, and signs of change are appearing in Japan-South Korea relations as well. On the other hand, while the domestic political environment surrounding the political leaders of both countries, including public opinion, remains severe, as Mr. Lee Won-deok pointed out, the international situation and international politics surrounding Japan and South Korea are rather making cooperation in Japan-South Korea relations unavoidable and are acting as a major centripetal force.

Even with the constrained domestic situation, listening to everyone's talk, I realized once again that changes are indeed occurring, and how to capture them well and lead them to improved relations will become important.

After the inauguration ceremony on May 10, there will be unified local elections at the national level in South Korea in June, and there will be a House of Councillors election in Japan in July. A period will continue for both administrations where they must approach this difficult Japan-South Korea relationship cautiously.

On the other hand, in May, there will be a Quad summit in Japan, and U.S. President Biden is expected to come to Japan and also go to South Korea. Whether such opportunities can be linked to the improvement of Japan-South Korea relations is something to watch.

Regarding the future of Japan-South Korea relations, I have received many materials for thought from everyone. I hope this roundtable discussion will be an opportunity for readers to re-examine the current South Korea and Japan-South Korea relations. Thank you very much for today.

(Held on March 22, 2022, at the Mita Campus, including some online participation)