[Feature: Questioning Japan's Space Strategy] Internal Organizational Convenience Takes Precedence Over External Demands and Technical Necessity—The "Weakness" of Japan's Space Development Projects

2019/03/05

Japan's space development system can be broadly divided into four periods: (1) The Formative Period (from the Pencil Rocket experiments at the University of Tokyo's Institute of Industrial Science to the establishment of the National Space Development Agency of Japan: 1955–1969); (2) The Development Period (a two-line system consisting of the National Space Development Agency of Japan and the University of Tokyo → Institute of Space and Astronautical Science, focusing on practical application and space science: 1969–2001); (3) The Transitional Period (from the reorganization of central government ministries, through the enactment of the Basic Space Law, to the establishment of a unified system under the Cabinet Office: 2001–2012); and (4) The Practical Application Period (promoting space utilization led by the Cabinet Office with an emphasis on security: 2012–).

To summarize this like a story synopsis: first, from the systemic chaos of the Formative Period, the Space Activities Commission was established under the Prime Minister's Office. This established a dual-track system consisting of space science research by the Ministry of Education, centered on the University of Tokyo, and technological development for practical space utilization by the National Space Development Agency of Japan (a special corporation under the jurisdiction of the Science and Technology Agency, the Ministry of Transport, and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications).

Under this dual-track system, Japan's space development progressed smoothly through the 1970s and 1980s. However, at the end of the 1980s, the United States, feeling threatened by the growing Japanese economy, initiated the Super 301 trade negotiations. As a result, Japan was forced to promise to open the procurement of practical satellites to international competition. The path for launching a space industry—where "the government designates domestic manufacturers to order satellites, and manufacturers accumulate technology through satellite development to use as a foothold for entering the international satellite market"—was severed.

As a result, Japan's space development in the 1990s specialized in government-led technological development. The new H-II rocket was launched, development of the H-IIA began immediately after, the M-V rocket began operations for launching scientific satellites and probes, and technical test satellites and scientific probes were launched one after another. While technology advanced, the industry itself was in a state of decline.

In 2001, due to the reorganization of central government ministries, the Space Activities Commission, which had been directly under the Prime Minister's Office, was downgraded to a committee within the newly established Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT). This marked the beginning of a period of confusion without a national command center. The Prime Minister's Office is an agency that assists the Prime Minister's duties, and space development, which had been politically linked directly to the Cabinet, was downgraded to the work of a single ministry, MEXT.

From within that situation, an argument arose from the political side that "space should be used as a tool for policy"—in other words, "space is an important element for national security and should be controlled by politics." In 2008, the Basic Space Law, which serves as the foundation for overall space policy, was enacted. Along with this, the Strategic Headquarters for Space Development, composed of Cabinet members, was established, and the space sector once again returned to a system under direct government control. Subsequently, after the creation of the Cabinet Office's Space Policy Committee to replace the Space Activities Commission, a unified Cabinet Office system was completed with the establishment of the Cabinet Office's Office of National Space Policy in 2012.

One cannot help but say that the course of Japan's space development over the past 60-plus years has been wandering. The system of direct Cabinet control under the Prime Minister's Office's Space Activities Commission, which had been successfully established, was dismantled during the 2001 reorganization (one theory suggests that MEXT, newly formed by the merger of the Ministry of Education and the Science and Technology Agency, took in the Space Activities Commission in an attempt to gain unified jurisdiction over the space development field). It took 12 years to finally bring it back to a system similar to the old one, now as the Cabinet Office's Space Policy Committee.

However, it has not returned completely to the way it was.

The Cabinet Office is a gathering of personnel seconded from various ministries, and the interior of the Cabinet Office is a site for turf wars between those agencies. With the enforcement of the Basic Space Law, jurisdiction over space development moved from MEXT to the Cabinet Office, but if the people seconded from MEXT are the ones running things within the Cabinet Office, the reality remains unchanged.

It took four years from the enforcement of the Basic Space Law in 2008 to the completion of the new system with the establishment of the Cabinet Office's Office of National Space Policy. In fact, the Basic Space Law had a supplementary provision stating that the transition to the new system should occur within one year of enforcement. There are several reasons why what was intended to be one year took four (including the Great East Japan Earthquake that occurred on March 11, 2011). However, the biggest reason was the internal struggle between ministries within the Cabinet Office. It was a battle between MEXT, which did not want to lose its authority, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which wanted to seize it.

METI had been enthusiastic about the industrialization of space development since the era of its predecessor, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). In the 1970s, under the pretext of "searching for underground resources with earth observation satellites," its Agency of Industrial Science and Technology promoted R&D of component technologies at the Mechanical Engineering Laboratory, the National Research Laboratory of Metrology, and the Geological Survey of Japan (all of which have since been integrated into the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology). In the 1980s, it collected investment from the industrial world to establish what could be called the "MITI version of the National Space Development Agency": the Institute for Unmanned Space Experiment Free Flyer (USEF), the Earth Resources Data Analysis Center (ERSDAC), and the Japan Resources Observation System Organization (JAROS) (these three foundations are now integrated into the Japan Space Systems). Since the launch of the Earth Resources Satellite "Fuyo-1 (JERS-1)" in 1992, it has a track record of launching and operating several satellites. As for internal organization, it has watched for opportunities by establishing a Space Industry Office within the Aircraft and Ordnance Division, making it an independent Space Industry Division, and then moving it back to a Space Industry Office.

The movement to enact the Basic Space Law originated from political dissatisfaction that "MEXT only does technological development for the sake of technological development, and it hasn't become space development that is at all useful for the country." The root cause of this was that politics had made major concessions to the United States in Super 301, giving away the seeds of space industrialization, but politicians conveniently forgot this and harbored dissatisfaction toward MEXT.

I do not know whether it was METI that guided that dissatisfaction toward the Basic Space Law. However, it is a fact that in enacting the Basic Space Law, politicians conveniently used METI as an operational force to counter MEXT, and METI also moved actively.

As a result, an internal struggle occurred within the Cabinet Office after the enforcement of the Basic Space Law regarding the power struggle between METI and MEXT. Although called a struggle, it was a battle of words. Based on the text of laws and the track records of each ministry's work, they clashed over arguments like, "Since this means XX, we should do it this way under the new system."

METI wanted to move actual power to the Cabinet Office. If they did, personnel seconded from METI to the Cabinet Office could effectively run space policy. MEXT wanted to keep the Cabinet Office as a mere figurehead as much as possible and preserve actual power within MEXT.

What moved the situation in METI's favor was the satellite positioning system. This is the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) "Michibiki," Japan's unique satellite positioning system currently under development.

測位衛星システムというのは、複数の衛星からの電波を受信して自分の位置を知る仕組みである。現在、アメリカの「ＧＰＳ」、ロシアの「ＧＬＯＮＡＳＳ」、欧州の「ＧＡＬＩＬＥＯ」、中国の「北斗（Beidou）」という、それぞれ30機規模の全世界をカバーする巨大システムが４つ稼働しており、さらにインド亜大陸をカバーするインドの「ＩＲＮＳＳ」という地域システムが動いている。日本のみちびきはＩＲＮＳＳと同じく日本周辺限定の地域システムであり、準天頂軌道という特殊な軌道の衛星５機と、静止衛星２機の合計７機で構成される。

The Quasi-Zenith Satellite System has gone through various twists and turns since its technical possibility was proposed in the 1970s, but at the stage of the Basic Space Law's enforcement in 2008, it had reached a deadlock.

The Quasi-Zenith Orbit is an orbit where a satellite remains almost stationary directly above the Japanese archipelago, located at 30–40 degrees north latitude, for more than eight consecutive hours. In other words, if three satellites are launched, one satellite will always be visible near the zenith of Japan 24 hours a day by taking turns. Including backup satellites in case of failure, the total would be five. Sending radio waves from directly overhead means they are not blocked by terrain or buildings. This allows for a radio environment with excellent reception.

In the 1990s, the use of the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System for satellite mobile phone services was considered. However, this concept vanished because demand sufficient to justify the cost of three satellites could not be expected. Next, a use was proposed for multi-channel digital broadcasting to mobile objects such as automobiles. Toward its realization, in 2002, Mitsubishi Electric took the lead and even involved Toyota Motor Corporation to establish a business company called New Satellite Business Corporation, but this also failed to see profitability and the company was dissolved in 2007.

The last remaining use was GPS complementation: "transmitting positioning signals compatible with the US GPS from directly above Japan." GPS consists of 24 satellites (30 including backups) orbiting at an altitude of 20,000 km, transmitting positioning signals. A receiver on the ground can determine its latitude and longitude if it can receive waves from at least three of them, and its altitude as well if it can receive waves from four or more. However, GPS satellites are not always directly overhead, so signals can be blocked by terrain or buildings. Furthermore, signals reflected by terrain or buildings are a major cause of positioning errors. Therefore, if there is one satellite transmitting positioning signals from directly overhead, stable positioning becomes possible at all times—at the 2008 stage, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) was in the middle of developing an experimental satellite "QZS" (launched in 2010 and named "Michibiki") for that purpose. Budgeting had only been provided for one QZS satellite, and there was no roadmap for how to move toward a practical system after that.

METI picked that up.

How did they pick it up? They argued, "The satellite positioning system is a space infrastructure related to the work of all ministries. Therefore, it is inappropriate to place it under the jurisdiction of a single ministry like MEXT, and it is appropriate for the Cabinet Office, which oversees national policy as a whole, to hold it." They used the satellite positioning system as a weapon to strip MEXT of its authority and transfer it to the Cabinet Office.

In fact, there was a hole in METI's argument. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism had launched the Multi-functional Transport Satellite "Himawari 6" in 2005 and "Himawari 7" in 2006, and had already begun transmitting "MSAS" signals to improve the accuracy of GPS signals. If MEXT had said, "The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism is already doing it," they should have been able to refute METI's claim. Had that happened, the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System "Michibiki" we see today might not have existed.

However, MEXT did not notice this and was forced to accept METI's argument. METI's plan to transfer authority from MEXT to the Cabinet Office succeeded. As a result, budgeting for successor satellites to "Michibiki," whose future had been uncertain, was provided all at once, and it became the centerpiece of space development under the new system centered on the Cabinet Office as the "Quasi-Zenith Satellite System," a social infrastructure developed by the government.

How should policies regarding the satellite positioning system have been decided originally?

First, a fundamental debate was likely necessary: "Should Japan have a satellite positioning system or not, and if so, what would be the merits and demerits?" Next, there should have been a discussion on "If we are to have one, what kind of system is optimal across various fields such as administration, diplomacy, and security?" Space technology should have been reconciled with the demands of policy and administration to choose the most cost-effective method that is technically feasible and incorporate it into actual space plans.

In reality, it was not so. For a long time since the 1970s, the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System had been smoldering because "profitability could not be seen even if we wanted to use it," and if left alone, it should have ended with a single technical test satellite, "Michibiki." METI picked it up not because it was the "optimal satellite positioning system for Japan," but because it could be used as a "tool to transfer administrative authority from MEXT to the Cabinet Office," and eventually built it up into the centerpiece of the new system. Of course, in doing so, there is no doubt that a common understanding had permeated that "a satellite positioning system is a necessary space infrastructure for Japan." However, originally, the first step should not have been based on the premise of a Quasi-Zenith satellite, but a more fundamental discussion of "what kind of satellite positioning system is optimal for Japan."

The Quasi-Zenith Satellite System leaped to become the centerpiece of Japan's space policy not as a result of reconciling the demands of administration, diplomacy, and security with space technology, but due to the convenience of organizations within the government structure.

The process leading to the realization of the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System can be said to encapsulate the chronic ailments of Japanese administration. Something that originally should have been planned by reconciling policy demands with feasible technology is instead elevated to a major issue of national policy due to internal organizational dynamics and convenience.

"Using space as a tool for policy" was the basic philosophy behind the enactment of the Basic Space Law. However, the resulting new system ultimately just rebranded the former Prime Minister's Office's Space Activities Commission as the Cabinet Office's Space Policy Committee, and the group of bureaucrats pulling the strings simply switched from MEXT (formerly the Science and Technology Agency) to METI.

Even now, we have not reached the point of determining space plans after properly discussing "what kind of tools are most optimal for what kind of policies," and the structure where inward-looking organizational reasons sway policy remains.