[Feature: International Order from an East Asian Perspective] [Session 2] International Order Shaken by Domestic Politics

In the second session, we welcome two experts to discuss how the domestic political shifts currently occurring primarily in the United States and South Korea are affecting, or could potentially affect, the international order.

In the first session, there was also a discussion regarding the return of the Trump administration, so I believe there are many areas where the two are closely linked. First, I would like to ask Professor Mori to speak about the Trump administration's foreign policy.

I would like to present on the topic of "The Trump Administration: The Future of the International Order."

The first point is "What does Trump's reelection mean?" The key point is that the Trump administration pursues a dual transformation of order, aggressively pushing forward initiatives to change the existing status quo both domestically and in the international arena. I will talk about how voters actually expect this.

The second point is the main subject: "What impact will the next Trump administration have on the international order?" As the Trump administration takes office and advances various policies, how will the role that the United States has played in the world change? What impact will it have on the U.S.-led international order, often referred to as the liberal hegemonic order? I would like to examine the implications of the Trump administration.

First, regarding the election results, as you all know, the media often calls it a landslide victory, but the vote difference was 2.7 million, or 1.7% of the total. Looking at it as a whole, it is not a situation where Trump won by a landslide. The United States is split right down the middle, with each side holding different ideas about the nature of the federal government and America's role in the world. The number of seats in the Senate and House is also close, showing that ideological polarization is advancing within America.

This ideological polarization is generally defined by two attributes. The first is that the distance between party ideologies is widening. There are contrasting views on the direction and thinking regarding various socio-economic and political issues, and this distance continues to grow.

The second is that ideological cohesion and unity within each political party are increasing. These two situations occur simultaneously, and the ideas about government or the exercise of power differ greatly between the two major parties. When a change of government occurs, the party that becomes the minority feels the world is heading in the wrong direction, while the governing party feels the world is moving in the right direction.

In last November's election, on the surface, even though the U.S. macroeconomy was performing well, the pressure on household finances due to high prices was a major issue. Furthermore, a significant number of immigrants entered the U.S. under temporary parole measures during the Biden administration, and the resulting social anxiety drew attention.

Harris appealed for the defense of democracy and the protection of abortion rights, in a sense adopting a mainstream campaign tactic that addressed the concerns of Democratic supporters. In contrast, Trump appealed to frustrations and distrust surrounding the economy and immigration, saying that the economy was better and the world was more peaceful when he was president, and that illegal immigration had led to crime and social problems.

When the results came in, about 40% of voters prioritized economic and household issues, and the immigration issue was also of very high importance, so Harris's campaign strategy missed the mark. I believe what I have just described serves as a surface-level explanation.

As a deeper explanation, I believe there was a pent-up desire among ordinary American citizens to transform or break through the current situation in which the United States finds itself.

Looking at the results of public opinion surveys conducted regularly by the Pew Research Center, trust in Washington's central politics peaked at around 78% in the mid-1960s and has basically been on a downward trend, now standing at around 22%. In short, a sense of distrust has been accumulating—a feeling that the current political, social, and economic systems are wrong, that what the government is doing is incorrect, and that there is something untrustworthy about it.

In this context, when voters are asked what qualities they seek in a president, the top answer is "the ability to lead the country," and the second is "the ability to bring about change." Exit polls showed that 65% of voters who prioritized leadership voted for Trump, and 73% of voters who prioritized change voted for Trump.

What can be said from this is that Trump often claimed there was fraud in the (2020 presidential) election. On the other hand, Harris said she would defend democracy. The defense of democracy was, in essence, received as a message of maintaining the status quo. Meanwhile, the message of election fraud—while some certainly took it literally—served as a message to those dissatisfied with the current system, feeling that proper budget allocation was not being realized. In other words, I believe Trump was able to establish an image as a candidate for changing and breaking the status quo.

Trump is aware of this and appears to be aiming for a "dual order transformation." Specifically, one aspect is the mandate to break the vested interests in Washington. Some people refer to this as the "dismantling of the deep state."

On the other hand, regarding the "international order," which is today's theme, Trump has spoken of anti-globalism since his first term. This is the view that Washington's pursuit of so-called "liberal internationalism" without regard for cost has led to the exhaustion of American national power. He believes that unless America pushes back against liberal internationalism and shakes off this traditional foreign policy line, there will be no restoration of national power; to make America great, the conventional posture of foreign engagement must be rejected.

This liberal internationalism can be understood as a kind of ideology that dictates that America must support the liberal international order.

The first major initiative is the deterrence of large-scale regional conflicts through alliances. However, Trump criticizes this, saying that as a result, it has allowed economically developed allies to free-ride. In short, he believes America is being taken advantage of.

The second is the promotion of trade liberalization through a multilateral trade system. Regarding this, from Trump's unique worldview, he sees it not only as an outflow of jobs but also as a situation where foreign countries run trade surpluses and America loses.

Furthermore, the U.S. engaged in diplomacy and military intervention to promote democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. The prime example is the Iraq War, but Trump and his supporters say that unnecessary sacrifices were made there. Additionally, he blames the influx of a large number of immigrants, especially during the Biden administration, on the absorption of immigrant vitality through open political and social systems.

He believes that if this progression is allowed to continue, America will be further depleted. Systems that were originally supposed to enhance American power have resulted in a paradoxical situation where America exhausts itself by pouring energy into supporting them. Therefore, the basic awareness of Trumpism is that this must be changed.

So, how should America engage with the world without exhausting its peace and prosperity? This becomes the baseline upon which the thinking of those entering the Trump administration is built. It is observed that there are roughly two schools of thought.

One is the group of people with a mindset referred to as unilateralism, who believe that America's external obligations and burdens should be reduced as much as possible so that America can become unencumbered. While it is natural for any country to prioritize its own peace and prosperity, in America's case, it bore significant obligations and costs for the peace and prosperity of countries other than its own, so the idea is to shake those off and focus on itself.

The second is the idea that America's limited power and resources should be redirected from Europe and the Middle East toward dealing with China, its greatest rival and challenger. These two approaches represent the ways of facing the world.

Originally, within the Republican Party, there were about three ways of thinking about how America should engage with the world. The first is conservative internationalism, the second is conservative realism, and the third is conservative unilateralism. Of these three, those entering the Trump administration are the "prioritists" who hold a conservative realist worldview, and the "restraintists" who hold a conservative unilateralist worldview.

Conservative realism basically views the world through power rather than rules. It seeks to counter a rising China. Because it emphasizes the balance between ends and means, it is very conscious of the constraints on means. Furthermore, it does not impose ideals or values on other countries and basically does not consider exercising power based on them.

Specifically, to strictly counter China, the greatest challenger, it prioritizes the Indo-Pacific over Europe and the Middle East. It also emphasizes anti-China coalitions. In other words, it seeks to actively strengthen alliances of that sort. However, while it may criticize the Chinese regime, it does not aim for regime change.

However, what is interesting is that when conservative realists are asked under what conditions they think the strategic competition with China will end, they give two possibilities. One is when China loses the power to compete with the U.S. and becomes weak. The other is when the nature of the Communist Party's governance fundamentally changes. If either of these happens, the strategic competition ends. There, power and political systems still matter.

In reality, they will not actively initiate regime change for the time being. However, from a long-term perspective, the conflict is expected to continue until a situation is reached where the U.S. has a decisive advantage in terms of either the regime or power.

On the other hand, conservative unilateralism emphasizes national sovereignty. It views the world based on the premise that America's peace and prosperity can exist independently of the peace and prosperity of other countries. No matter what happens in Europe, the Middle East, or Asia, the view is that America is secure as long as it has the military capability to deter attacks on its own country and runs a trade surplus through commerce.

The concept of the "divisibility of security" contrasts with the Democratic Party. While the Democrats have a global view of security where everything is related to America's peace and prosperity, this view holds that America's peace and prosperity exist separately from the rest of the world. It thinks in terms of practical interests rather than ideals or principles.

Unilateralist restraintists prioritize military buildup for self-defense and trade surpluses in bilateral trade relations; the defense of allies is not self-evident. Since there is no premise that allies are indispensable to America's peace and prosperity, questions arise such as "Why do we need to defend allies?", "Why do we have to protect Ukraine?", or "Why do we have to protect Taiwan?" If regional conflicts occur in Europe or Asia, the effort to deter them should primarily be handled by the countries in that region.

Regarding Ukraine, the thinking of restraintists, including Trump, is: "Why should America, on the other side of the Atlantic, bear 70 to 80 percent of the support for Ukraine? The European countries right in front of Ukraine should do more."

If we break down the specific policies of the Trump administration into the three pillars of security, economy, and diplomacy, security becomes a "security policy of selection and concentration." They want to end conflicts in Europe and the Middle East as quickly as possible. At the same time, I believe they will move forward with efforts to counter China. Against China, there will likely be a military buildup, including nuclear and conventional forces, an expansion of forward deployment of U.S. forces, and most importantly, the expansion of the defense industrial base will be a major agenda item.

Regarding Taiwan policy, the impression is that it will proceed steadily. When I spoke in Tokyo last autumn with someone who was in charge of Taiwan policy during the first Trump administration, they said that continuity would be prominent across the first Trump administration, the Biden administration, and the second Trump administration. They suggested that the U.S. would steadily support the strengthening of Taiwan's asymmetric defense capabilities.

There is a possibility that they will demand increased defense budgets from other countries, including Taiwan. Regardless of the timing or who they ask for what, at the core, from the perspective of unilateralists and restraintists, regional countries must make more defense efforts; they inherently have demands for allies to increase defense budgets, increase defense burdens, and expand their security roles. In Europe, the policy that European countries should bear the cost of European defense will likely emerge quite clearly. At the NATO summit in The Hague in June, the Trump administration will probably demand such increases in defense spending by European countries.

In contrast, in the Indo-Pacific, the discussion that defense cooperation with allies should be promoted will come to the fore, and I currently predict that it will not cause as much friction as in Europe.

The second is trade policy. They will move forward with initiatives such as high tariff policies, rejection of the legitimacy of the WTO system, the application of security exceptions to various trade policies, and the pursuit of energy dominance.

The third is de-valued diplomacy. It can be said that they do not impose values such as democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, or it can be said that they do not hesitate to make deals with leaders of authoritarian states and feel no barriers in doing so.

While Biden spoke of democracy versus autocracy, in Trump's de-valued view of foreign affairs, special treatment for democratic allies will disappear. Allies that are liberal democracies will no longer receive privileged treatment. Therefore, additional tariffs will be applied mercilessly, and countries with large trade surpluses with the U.S. will be targeted alongside China. I don't think restraintists have the perspective of providing warm hospitality just because a country is an ally.

Until now, the liberal hegemonic order of the post-Cold War era had a hierarchy, and being a market-economy liberal democratic state was a status. Such states were at the top because they were close to the United States and shared various values and norms. Below them were groups of non-democratic states that shared certain behavioral norms, and at the very bottom were "rogue states." Order was conceived under this hierarchical normative structure.

アメリカが、今お話ししたような世界における安全保障と経済と外交における役割を変えていくと、この階層構造は変わってきます。例えば安全保障分野ではセキュリティープロバイダーとしての信頼性が揺らいでくる。そして、開放的経済システムの推進勢力としての役割はすでに減退しています。これはもう超党派で、民主党もそうだと思います。脱価値的な外交をやるようになれば、民主主義、法の支配、人権といった価値が埋め込まれたルールの推進勢力としての信頼性も低下していくことになります。

同時に、国家資本主義型の権威主義国家としての中国の大国化はもう現実化しています。リベラルデモクラシーで市場経済型でなくても強国ないし大国になれるということを証明した。同時にグローバルサウスの存在感が高まり、かつ民主主義国家で政治的な混乱が起こり、ポピュリズムが台頭する。このようになると、かつて縦に並んでいたグループがどんどん横に倒れていく。そして秩序の多元化みたいなことが起こってくるということが、一つの見立てとして言えるのかと思います。

ただ、アメリカではトランプ的な外交が未来永劫一貫して続くわけではなく、また民主党政権がそのうち誕生するかもしれない。すると、アメリカ外交というのは、もっぱら利益や取り引き、そして力による威嚇に基づく外交と、価値や信頼を強調する外交との間で振幅を繰り返すことになります。もちろん、どの政権もこの両方をやるわけですが、民主党政権と共和党政権で比重が変わるわけです。そのような一貫性のなさが出てくるので、その結果、様々な約束、コミットメントの信頼性を高められない事態が増してくると思います。

中国であれロシア、北朝鮮であれ、アメリカとディールをしても次の政権がまたそれをどう変えるかわからないと、外交で何か約束をして均衡をつくる取り組みが非常に難しくなってくる。すると、国際政治、国際関係が流動化し、秩序が希薄化していきます。政治体制が異なる国の間で安定をもたらすような、あるいは均衡をもたらすような協定や了解をつくることが非常に難しくなってくると思います。

さらに力の行使を抑制的にやることが超党派的になってくると、合意やルールを下支えして、裏付けるその担保となるアメリカの力が期待できないということになる。するとますます新たな改革、新たな均衡みたいなものを支え、それを持続化させていくような取り組みが非常に難しくなるので、多くの場合はせめぎ合い、不信感を拭えないような大国間関係、あるいは国際政治が続く可能性があるかと思います。

有り難うございました。トランプ政権発足後の国際秩序というセッションのテーマに見合ったお話をいただきました。

第1セッションでは、中国とロシアが多極化という言葉を使って秩序を語っているという議論が出ました。森先生の報告では多元性という言葉が出てきました。いわゆる米中戦略競争が続いていく中で中国・ロシア側は多極化を目指す。アメリカはトランプ政権の下で政策が推進され、多元性というものが実現していく。となると、この権威主義の中国ロシア側と、アメリカが目指す秩序の折り合い、落ち着きどころはどういうところになるのか。森先生のお考えを伺いたいと思いました。

第2期トランプ政権の人事ではルビオ長官、ウォルツ補佐官、そしてコルビー防衛次官という、いわゆる対中強硬派と言われている方々が布陣することになると思います。そうなると、中国との対抗という中でアメリカの同盟、あるいはいわゆるミニラテラリズム（小数国による協力枠組みを重視するアプローチ）と言われる、日米韓、あるいはAUKUS（米英豪）、QUAD（日米豪印）という枠組みが持続していくのか。それとも何らかの形で変質、あるいは衰退していくのか。このあたりをどのように見ればいいのでしょうか。

実は、森先生のアレンジで昨年10月ワシントンに一緒に行かせていただいた時、コルビーさんにお会いしました。その際、これまでの日米韓協力というのは対北朝鮮中心であった。しかし、今後も日米韓協力を強化するのであれば、中国に対抗するための枠組みとしてでなければ意味がないという趣旨のことをおっしゃっていて、大変興味深かったです。

これまでバイデン政権下で、あるいは日本も韓国尹政権も目指していた多国間あるいはミニラテラルの枠組みがどういう運命を辿る可能性があるのかという点について、ぜひ後ほどお伺いできれば有り難く存じます。

Actually, for the past year or two, I have been struck by a fairly strong sense of nihilism. The reason is that part of my research was about how North Korea was trying to reconcile the two aspects of security and the unification issue in its relationship with South Korea, but at the end of the year before last, North Korea declared that unification was no longer necessary and that South Korea was a hostile state.

実は私はこの1、2年、かなり強い虚無感に襲われています。なぜかと言うと、北朝鮮が韓国との関係で、安全保障、統一問題の2つの側面をどのように整合させようとしているかということが私の研究の一部だったのですが、一昨年末に北朝鮮が、もう統一はしなくていい、韓国は敵対的な国家であると言ってしまったからです。

北朝鮮が分断の現状維持に傾斜していることは、私だけでなく多くの専門家が認識してきたと思うのですが、「統一をしなくていい」と言ったことは少なからぬ驚きでした。

そして昨年末の韓国の戒厳令、これもまた一種の失望を感じました。民主化以降、韓国の民主化過程を見てきました。それほど韓国が直線的に上手くいくとは思っていなかったのですが、紆余曲折はあるにせよ、徐々に民主主義が制度化されていくと考えていたら、あの戒厳令です。まさにもう先祖返りしてしまったわけですよね。

冷戦終結直後、私の恩師の一人が言った言葉を今反芻しています。それは「北朝鮮の不安定性を過大評価してはいけない。そして韓国の安定性も過大評価してはいけない」ということです。

北朝鮮が冷戦終結後、「苦難の行軍」だとか飢餓の問題などありながらもサバイブして今日に至っているということを考えると、様々な不安定要因があるにせよ、やはりあの国には体制の強靭性がある。他方、韓国は安定しているようで実は不安定要因がいくつかあって、それが今回の戒厳令にもつながっていったのだと思います。

では、この戒厳令に導かれるような要因がどこにあるのかというと、全部が全部ではないですが、韓国の中の理念の対立だと考えています。それをあえて最大公約数的なもので区別すると、韓国型リアリズムと韓国型リベラリズムに分けられるのではないか。その2つの勢力はあらゆる面で対立しているわけではなく、いろいろなグラデーションがあるのだけれど、対立の局面というのが今回、戒厳令の発動まで至らしめた一つの大きな要因ではないかという問題意識を持っています。

リアリズムというのは力関係を最重要視し、国と国との関係に理念や道徳、価値観を持ち込むことを抑制するという特徴がありますが、韓国のルーツを遡るとこれは朝鮮解放直後に辿り着きます。1945年に朝鮮が解放された当時、連合国は国際信託統治構想を発表し、5年を限度とする国際的な枠内で朝鮮半島を単一の朝鮮にすることを考えた。しかし、そんな枠組みには反対だと言った一人が李承晩です。

李承晩は、国際信託統治構想は受け入れられず、まず南朝鮮だけで単独政府を樹立する、自由な韓国を作るという構想を発表したわけですね。そして、南朝鮮で単独政府を樹立した後、北に攻め込んで解放するんだというのが「北進統一論」です。その「北進」は武力行使を含むわけですが、単独では無理なのでアメリカを巻き込んで南を拠点として統一する構想をもっていました。それが朝鮮戦争と休戦を経て、再び戦争をしてまで北進統一するのは現実的ではないので1960年に「北進統一論」は公式に否定されます。

以降、朴正煕の下でむしろ北朝鮮の南進にどう備えるかということで、米韓同盟で北朝鮮の南進、再び朝鮮戦争が起きることの抑止が考えられ、今日の韓国的なリアリズムの原型ができたと解釈しています。

なので、彼らにとって重要なことは抑止なんです。圧倒的な抑止態勢をまず固めてその下で南北対話をする。抑止が入口、対話が出口という順番なんですね。したがって彼らにとって米韓同盟が揺らぐことは避けなければいけない。でも実際には朴政権や他の政権において、在韓米軍が削減されることもあり、その過程の中で彼らは「自主」を捉えたわけです。

したがって、伝統的に韓国のリアリズムにおいては「自主」というのは強制された「自主」なのです。そのため、米韓同盟を犠牲にした「自主」というのは基本的にないわけです。

今の米韓同盟においても「戦時」作戦統制権というのがあります。戦争が起きた場合、韓国軍の作戦統制は米軍が持っているという垂直的な指揮統制関係になっている。韓国軍が従属的な立場にあることは甘受し、それを克服することはしない。実際、作戦統制権返還の問題は何度か出るんですが、抑止のためには垂直的な指揮統制関係でいいのだというのが保守政権の立場です。とはいえ、もしこれから先、アメリカが韓国の安全保障に責任を持たないという傾向が強くなれば、この「自主」の極致として核武装論が出てくると私は考えています。

過去の軍出身者政権下では米韓同盟とともに安全保障上、日本との関係が重要であるので、それを可能にすべく特に朴正煕政権は対日ナショナリズムを制御したこともありました。それができなくなったのが民主化以降です。対日関係、特に歴史問題、領土問題についてそういった制御が困難になっているのではないかと思います。

保守政権において、アメリカのように、市民的な価値を拡大するという傾向はあまりないのですが、彼らにとって守護すべき価値は民主的、市民的価値で、それは民族的価値よりも優先すべきであるということです。そして、市民的価値というものが極限に達した場合、北朝鮮に対して武力を使わずに体制転換を試みるといった「和平演変論」に辿り着くのだと思います。

The roots of Korean liberalism, though this is also an old story, may lie in the nationalist line of Kim Ku, an independence activist. He was also opposed to the international trusteeship plan and thought they should reach a single Korea through their own power. At that time, he did not consider using military force against North Korea but thought that a path to unification would open for both sides through dialogue; he prioritized unification over deterrence.

I believe it was after democratization that this kind of liberalism surfaced. At this time, let's consider in what context "liberal" emerged.

このようなリベラリズムが表面化されたのが民主化以降なんだと思います。この時、リベラルというのが一体どういうコンテクストで出てきたのかを考えてみます。

In South Korea, liberal forces are also called progressives, and progressives are also referred to as left-wing forces. These "leftists" are indeed liberal in terms of domestic politics—for example, being more tolerant of gender equality and diversity, and emphasizing fair distribution—but that is not the case in foreign policy. To put it bluntly, these "progressives" should rather be called "nationalists," and I feel considerable resistance to calling them "leftists."

In Japan, liberal and left-wing forces evaluate pre-war nationalism negatively and distance themselves from nationalism, as seen in the textbook issue and the Yasukuni Shrine visit issue. However, in South Korea, the opposite is true. The more liberal someone is, the more they are a "nationalist," so they become integrated with nationalism. In Japanese politics, "nationalists" would be quite far to the right, but in that country, they are called "leftists." It is the reverse of the Japanese left and right.

Since democratization, these liberal people have increasingly entered the National Assembly—that is, the institutional sphere. These "nationalists" also advocate for "autonomy," but their "autonomy" differs from the "autonomy" of the "conservatives" I mentioned earlier. They advocate for "autonomy" in the sense of transforming the US-ROK alliance, where the US has high speaking power, and increasing South Korea's speaking power and influence in relations with North Korea.

For example, they try to at least horizontalize the vertical command and control relationship between the US and South Korea. They argue that when a "wartime" situation occurs, the US and South Korea should fight on equal terms, and therefore, they demand the return of wartime operational control (OPCON). These kinds of arguments always come from the "progressives."

They are a kind of "Korea First," believing that their own ethnic/national values should be the top priority. The "Korea" they refer to there has the nuance of including not only the Republic of Korea but also North Korea.

Unlike the "conservatives," they place ethnic/national values higher than civic values. Interestingly, although they are supposed to be liberal, they have rarely demanded civic values such as democratization or human rights from North Korea. These people, who are supposed to be liberal, are shockingly insensitive to democratization and human rights in North Korea. There is this kind of twisted structure.

When this reaches its extreme, it leads to the idea of protecting the country with only the power of the ethnic nation, or seeking nuclear armament as a means of challenging the great powers. Therefore, to put it in extreme terms, there is a structure where both "conservatives" and "progressives" head toward nuclear armament.

During the Cold War, because there were no democratic institutions, all democratic and progressive forces protested outside the National Assembly, which was a factor of instability. However, I believe the martial law at the end of last year was a situation where ideological conflict was brought into the National Assembly through democratic institutions, and an attempt was made to crush it with the military from outside the assembly by declaring martial law.

So, what will happen from now on? What we must keep in mind is that while "conservatives" and "progressives" are in conflict, they also have shared areas, and both believe that the US-ROK alliance should be maintained. The issue is how it should exist.

An alliance is basically a status quo maintenance device. Concerns about being "abandoned" if the US does not take responsibility for South Korea's security led to the advocacy for "autonomy." For conservatives, the premise is that the US-ROK alliance and US Forces Korea (USFK) exist solely to deter North Korea's use of force. While the US has reduced USFK in the past, it has generally committed to South Korea in line with South Korea's concerns, and that pattern was maintained until the end of the Cold War.

The phenomenon that occurred after the end of the Cold War was the US breaking the status quo through preemptive action. This created concerns that the US would start a war and South Korea would be "entangled" in it. In other words, a situation arose where the US's use of force had to be deterred before North Korea's use of force could be deterred.

Recently, with the US and China in such conflict, there has been a debate about what South Korea should do and whether USFK can remain unrelated. There is a sense that both the South Korean military and USFK have some role to play. South Korea has come to have concerns about being "entangled" in this US-China confrontation.

Now, regarding how much difference there is between "conservatives" and "progressives" about being entangled in that, there isn't a huge difference, though there are differences in degree. Under the Yoon administration, while it is necessary to cooperate with Japan and the US to deter North Korea, Japan and the US are emphasizing deterrence against China. How South Korea cooperates with Japan and the US has become a major theme. In August the year before last, the Japan-US-ROK "Camp David Agreement" was announced, but looking at President Yoon's statements, one can see a will for South Korea to engage with China independently so as not to be "entangled" in the Japan-US deterrence against China.

I think the concern about being "entangled" in such US-China confrontation is shared with the "progressives," but the concern about USFK or South Korea being "entangled" in the Taiwan Strait issue is probably greater among the "progressives." In other words, progressive administrations are more critical than conservative administrations of the argument to make USFK, which was a rigid force specialized in deterring North Korea, more flexible.

I shouldn't speak carelessly, but with this situation moving from martial law to impeachment and the president being detained, I believe we must probably be prepared for the return of a progressive administration.

A progressive administration would likely seek "autonomy" from the US. I think they will bring up the return of operational control, which ended halfway through the Moon administration—meaning that in "wartime," the South Korean military and the US military would be at least equal, or conversely, the South Korean military would command and control USFK.

Until now, when a war occurred on the Korean Peninsula, the US military took operational control over the South Korean military, so it was enough to consult with US Forces Japan and US Forces Korea. However, if operational control is returned to the South Korean military, consultations must be held not only with the US military but also with the South Korean military, which I think will make this contingency response extremely difficult.

And since progressive administrations prioritize ethnic/national values, they will almost certainly reset the Yoon administration's policy toward Japan once again. In particular, they will reset the issue of former requisitioned workers and start over, which I think will greatly shake the Japan-South Korea relationship that is the foundation of the Camp David Agreement.

And if they resist being entangled in the Indo-Pacific strategy, deterrence against China, and the US-China confrontation including the Taiwan Strait, I think a debate will arise over whether South Korea will participate in the Indo-Pacific strategy or not.

Thank you very much. You pointed out that while South Korea's so-called conservative and progressive forces are very different, they have common ground in their position that the US-ROK alliance should be maintained. However, there are differences in their thinking regarding what kind of US-ROK alliance it should be.

You mentioned that if a progressive administration takes power, Japan-US-ROK cooperation will inevitably be shaken considerably. Nevertheless, at least for the past two years, the three countries have made significant efforts to strengthen Japan-US-ROK cooperation. Considering the current situation where the institutionalization agreed upon at the Camp David summit has progressed to a certain extent, I am curious about how much of a rollback there will actually be.

It is true that many among the so-called progressive forces in South Korea are basically passive or negative toward Japan-US-ROK cooperation, to the point where the initial draft of President Yoon's impeachment motion even included language saying he was conducting diplomacy biased toward Japan.

Furthermore, South Korean progressive forces tend to believe that the more Japan-US-ROK cooperation is strengthened, the more North Korea will deepen its relationship with the so-called Northern Triangle—China and Russia. They likely see that strengthening Japan-US-ROK cooperation will instead lead to instability in the international situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula and military tension.

Given the high possibility of a change in government between the ruling and opposition parties, I would like to ask Professor Kurata what kind of preparations Japan should make for such a possible situation, and I would also like to hear from Professor Mori from the perspective of Japan's response.

As you mentioned, polarization is progressing in South Korea in the form of conservatives and progressives, or in terms of diplomatic lines, the alliance faction and the nationalist faction. Another noteworthy rift in South Korean society that has often been pointed out in recent years is the difference between generations. Specifically, those in their late 60s and older are conservative, while the 40s and 50s, who are currently at the center of society, are generations with strong progressive leanings. However, the 20s and 30s below them are said to be a so-called post-ideological generation.

What is even more characteristic in this generational distribution is the so-called aging effect—that is, it is unlikely that those in their 40s and 50s will become conservative as they get older. Rather, it is seen that the generational effect based on the experiences of each generation is strong.

In the older generation, the experience of economic growth during the Park Chung-hee era; in the 40s and 50s, the experience of democratization and the birth of progressive administrations; and in the younger generation, the experience of being born and raised in a South Korea that has already become an advanced nation. It can be said that what each generation has experienced strongly influences their perceptions and behavioral patterns.

Given this generational distribution in South Korean society, while there may be major changes in foreign and security policy due to a change in government in the near future, what will the direction or the range of the swing in South Korea's foreign and security policy be when considered over a medium- to long-term span? Will it settle down, or will the situation of violent swings continue for the time being? I would also like to hear Professor Kurata's outlook on this point.

And from the perspective of the international order in East Asia, what should be noted in the future—this would be the Indo-Pacific rather than just East Asia—is the importance of regions and countries such as India and Southeast Asia. Coincidentally, the Yoon administration formulated an Indo-Pacific strategy, and the Moon Jae-in administration also formulated and promoted the New Southern Policy, which emphasized relations with India and Southeast Asia.

Looking at the development of such regional policies in South Korea, I would like to ask what South Korea's role and positioning in the Indo-Pacific or East Asia will be in the future.

It is said that the Trump administration may not have much interest in Southeast Asia, but I would like to ask Professor Mori what changes can be foreseen in the order of this region from the perspective of US involvement. May we start with Professor Mori?

First, since the concepts of multipolarization and pluralization of the international order were mentioned earlier, I would like to comment on them.

According to my understanding, the concept of multipolarization is used in the political and diplomatic context of the real world, and sometimes as an analytical concept in international politics. The former has an aspect where it emerged as a discourse from countries like Russia, China, and India as an antithesis to a world with the US as the sole superpower, arguing that because that is undesirable, we should move toward a multipolar world. Another aspect, which is also abstract, is that the term is used to indicate that the distribution of power is not concentrated in the US because the US no longer has as much influence as it once did, and other major powers and regional countries are beginning to have influence.

On the other hand, as an analytical concept, it originally refers to power as a resource. In easy-to-understand terms, there is a debate about where the poles are when military and economic power are quantified using various indicators. Looking at power as a resource, the power of the US still stands out. Representative scholars like Stephen Brooks say that when looking at various indicators, US national power still stands out even compared to China.

Even if we limit it to the region, there is an argument that it is at most bipolar between the US and China.

When looking at international society, there are spaces where relationships are built based on rules, there are interstate relationships based on transactional relations, and in fact, there are relationships of intimidation by force or symbiosis where norms are not shared at all, and these are distributed among states in various forms.

In such a situation, blocks like the US and the G7 exist. And perhaps blocks like China and Russia, plus countries that voted against the UN General Assembly resolution on Russia's invasion of Ukraine. And blocks that voted in favor of the condemnation resolution but have not imposed sanctions. Several groupings have been formed, and moreover, there is no hierarchical relationship where these countries recognize each other; instead, a situation is emerging where their respective morals and authorities have become nearly parallel. This is completely different from the situation in the 90s, and I used the word "pluralization" to indicate that.

Regarding Professor Nishino's question about where the strategic competition between the US and China will settle, it probably depends on how you define "settling."

This is a rough answer, but one point is that the US originally expected China to become Americanized and for the relationship to improve, but what might be happening now is a situation where US diplomacy is subtly becoming similar to Chinese diplomacy. In short, it is a mode of forming various diplomatic relations based on interests and power. Relationships that incorporate values might change under the Trump administration.

However, such things are temporary and change every time there is a change in government. Therefore, we still cannot create a "settling point"—that is, a sustainable equilibrium or a stable relationship where both sides repeatedly fulfill agreed-upon settlements or understandings and foster mutual expectations that the other will keep their promises. Especially as long as each side has a consciousness of wanting to prove that they are superior to the other, I feel that an equilibrium will not be formed there.

As was the case with the US and the Soviet Union, ironically, going through a crisis might lead to a consciousness from both sides that the relationship must be stabilized, leading to the creation of understandings and rules. I sometimes think that only after going through a crisis that is one step away from armed conflict will the momentum to seek equilibrium emerge from both the US and China.

Secondly, regarding how minilaterals will be positioned while China hawks are present, generally speaking, as Professor Nishino said while quoting Colby, I think they will be emphasized as frameworks to counter China.

On the other hand, when holding specific consultations beyond generalities, as Colby says, the role those three countries can play in balancing against China within existing minilaterals over the issue of how to handle China will be tested. If they do not play the role the US expects at all, a trend may emerge where that framework or the partner country is disregarded.

In the Japan-US-ROK framework, North Korea strategy and China strategy will likely become issues, and I think that theoretically, we must align on what goals should be aimed for between Japan and South Korea and pitch this to the Trump administration.

For example, in the current situation where the relationship between Russia and North Korea is deepening, I think there is a very difficult question of what outcome is desirable for Japan and South Korea. While basing it on deterrence, of course, what can be done and to what extent? It would be good if some agreement could be reached, but perhaps they will not agree on everything.

However, in any case, it is necessary to align opinions on what kind of initiatives the three countries should pursue toward North Korea as Japan and South Korea, and the same can probably be said for China. If a difference in temperature appears there, the role that can be played in the context of balancing against China will be considerably limited.

So, while they are emphasized in general, the Trump administration's view of that framework might change as specific consultations are repeated.

Finally, Southeast Asia. As pointed out, Trump himself probably does not have a very high interest in Southeast Asia and pays almost no attention to issues like the South China Sea. Rather, prioritists will likely look at Southeast Asian countries or the South China Sea issue from a military or strategic perspective, so Trump's high-level engagement with Southeast Asia is expected to be very intermittent and irregular, just like in his first administration.

However, for existing initiatives, such as maritime security with Southeast Asia or cooperation over digital infrastructure—specific initiatives that do not catch Trump's radar—cooperation will likely proceed steadily at the working level.

Thank you very much. Now, Professor Kurata, please.

These are all difficult questions, but first, regarding the degree of shaking and rollback in Japan-US-ROK cooperation.

Since the "Camp David Agreement," there have been various follow-up measures, and talk of joint training has emerged between Japan and South Korea, but if a progressive administration takes power, I don't think they will move that forward. I believe they will sabotage it, even if they don't break the framework. We must be prepared for at least that much.

Regarding what Japan should do in such a situation, the relationship between US Forces Japan and the Self-Defense Forces that has been continuing since last year—the trend where the US Forces Japan headquarters is gaining some operational control from being an administrative headquarters and is achieving results as a combat headquarters, so to speak—will probably have meaning in relation to the Korean Peninsula as well.

US Forces Japan cannot replace US Forces Korea, but being able to actually fight from what was previously administrative has great significance. I believe it is important to strengthen this trend regardless of what kind of administration is formed in South Korea in the future.

You spoke about the generational gap. I don't have much interaction with "progressives," so I can't say anything definitive, but regarding "conservatives," for example, students from South Korean military academies come to study at the National Defense Academy of Japan. I think it's fair to say they are quite conservative people within South Korean society. But how are they at the National Defense Academy? They are quite liberal. In other words, they are quite sensitive to issues of gender and harassment. While they are conservative, they are tolerant of social diversity.

Now, does the reverse hold true? I don't know how many people there are who are progressive and quite sensitive to diversity but think in terms of foreign policy that "the Japan-South Korea relationship is important, so it's better not to raise historical issues."

I explained conservatives and progressives using the greatest common denominator this time, but in reality, it cannot be simplified that much. In other words, even if someone is a "conservative" in foreign policy, they might be a "progressive" in terms of gender and diversity; the axes of conflict are not as simple as they used to be. So, I question whether this kind of division will continue to be effective in the future.

However, broadly speaking, if so-called conservatives hold the views I mentioned and progressives hold the views I mentioned, the possibility of a conservative president being born will probably decrease more and more. In other words, there is a trend where it will become harder to win presidential elections. The election Yoon won recently was also very close. Furthermore, considering the series of events starting from this martial law, I think we are entering an era where it will be difficult for conservatives to win.

Some may think that President Yoon obtained a 40% support rate and that conservatives are doing quite well, but that is not a simple support rate; it includes votes against the opposition party. There are many people who are progressive themselves but just dislike Lee Jae-myung, so those people probably voted for Yoon as a protest vote. The 40% figure is quite suspicious.

I call this situation a "civil war without gunfire," and with power being so divided under the conservative forces, I think it will be a huge trauma for conservative forces and conservative people, especially among the youth.

So, this isn't much of an answer, but I want to say two things. First, the axis of conservative/progressive is shifting, or at least diversifying, so the generational gap is not that simple. And second, with the conservative forces split this time, I think we are entering an era where it will become increasingly difficult for conservatives to win, especially in presidential elections.

Thank you very much. It was striking to see Professor Kurata's expression gradually darken as he spoke about the harsh reality facing the conservative forces.

As you said, the fact that President Yoon was impeached following President Park Geun-hye, and the fact that there is little prospect of the conservative forces uniting, is an important consideration not only for the future of South Korean politics but also when thinking about the international order in East Asia.

I would like to express my gratitude for your valuable talk over a long period today.

(Composed based on the Keio Institute of East Asian Studies (KIEAS) public symposium held on January 18)