[Feature: International Order from an East Asian Perspective] [Session 1] International Order as Seen by Authoritarian States

In today's first session of the symposium, "International Order as Seen by Authoritarian States," we will consider how China and North Korea perceive the regional and global order today and their outlook for the future.

We are currently living in a chaotic era with an uncertain future. The paradigm shift in the international order that has been pointed out for some time—in short, the retreat of the post-war order based on Western-style liberal democracy—has finally become apparent through the COVID-19 pandemic and the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.

In such a period of turmoil, creating a new order requires a fundamental philosophical breakthrough rather than mere strategic or tactical maneuvers. Personally, I believe that any new order must be based on the historical and cultural contexts of the world's diverse countries and regions. In that sense, I feel that the interdisciplinary and inherent perspectives of regional studies are becoming increasingly important.

Today, we have gathered the best experts to discuss this theme. Our first speaker is Professor Naoko Eto, who is active in the field of economic security with China as her research field. Professor Eto, the floor is yours.

Thank you very much for this valuable opportunity today.

I would like to speak about the diplomatic strategy of the Xi Jinping administration in connection with economic security. In addition to being a current issue, this is an area that China itself has begun to emphasize within its diplomatic strategy. Economic security—the overlapping area between economy and military security—will likely hold a major key in the future competitive strategy between the U.S. and China.

In particular, in the area of advanced technology, semiconductors are already a source of friction. Furthermore, regarding dual-use technologies, China strengthened its regulations last year; technologies that directly relate to military security but can also be applied to civilian use will become the next major key to economic security.

Discussions on economic security began with how to prepare for economic coercion from other countries, moved to technological competition, and now an understanding is spreading that the ultimate goal—the revitalization and development of the national economy—is the greatest lever for a country's own economic security. The concept of economic security itself is currently evolving to match reality.

Furthermore, the reason why China emphasizes economic security is directly linked to the discussion of how to form China's image within the international community. This is because the debate over where to find the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party's one-party dictatorship—a defining characteristic of China—is the basis for when China speaks about its international strategy today. Therefore, after first confirming the discussion on securing legitimacy, which is the Communist Party's ultimate goal, I would like to talk about the characteristics of the Xi Jinping administration.

The Communist Party has put forward a vision called the "Community with a Shared Future for Mankind," which outlines how the ultimate international society should be. I will talk about this structure, and then discuss the reality of economic security and the strategic narrative—what kind of discourse they use to appeal their ideas to the international community.

This forms China's perception of the world while simultaneously shaping the discussion on how to involve the countries called the Global South—developing and emerging nations—in its competitive strategy with the United States. At the same time, it leads to taking an advantageous position in the competition over who is telling the truth regarding current issues like Gaza/the Middle East and the war in Ukraine. The Communist Party regime has begun to put forward such meticulously crafted strategies. After explaining these, I would like to discuss the outlook for U.S.-China relations in 2025.

First, regarding the logic of legitimacy, to put it simply, it is explained in China that the Communist Party's one-party dictatorship is legitimate for three reasons: "past achievements," "present achievements," and "future achievements." Past achievements refer to history. It is the theory that the Communist Party is the one that defeated the invasion of the great powers and founded the nation. This is not necessarily wrong, and a characteristic of the Xi Jinping era since 2012 is that this discourse is being increasingly reinforced within history education in China.

This ultimately affects Japan-China relations, but at present, the emphasis is not on criticizing Japan as an aggressor as it once was. Rather, the emphasis is placed on the idea that China won against the "century of humiliation" of being oppressed by Japan, and on a strong China that overcame adversity. The current situation is that while issues of historical perception exist between Japan and China, they have not surfaced.

In contrast, "present achievements" harbor more complex problems. As a reason for maintaining the system where the Communist Party governs the country, there is the logic of economic development—that everyone becomes wealthy if the Communist Party governs—and this resonates most with the general public. If told, "Remember 30 years ago; you are definitely living a better life now," many Chinese people think that is indeed true. This has become a narrative that people can empathize with through their actual living conditions, and it still has a large influence.

However, the current generation of Chinese people is facing a situation where, perhaps for the first time, the assets they hold might decrease in value. Until now, real estate prices naturally rose, and assets were supposed to increase. For the first time, they are in a situation where values are steadily decreasing and losses are increasing. On top of that, there is anxiety about employment. Or regarding social security, local government finances are under pressure.

Things have become more convenient, but anxiety is growing that there is no guarantee things will get even better in the future. This is the reason why the government's wish to transition the Chinese economy to an internal demand-led model is currently stalling.

In other words, consumption is not growing. Because people have anxieties about the future, they think it is better to save to protect their lives rather than buy things. While newspapers report achieving 5% growth, this is partly due to policy-driven front-loading of consumption, so the economy might cool down even further this year. The Communist Party regime has not been able to implement effective policies so far, and its economic achievements are beginning to waver.

Consequently, they want to emphasize the anticipation of "future achievements." This is the explanation that "things will get better than they are now." And in 2021, as the Communist Party reached its 100th anniversary during the pandemic and compiled the Historical Resolution, they announced that after sufficient economic development, we would enter the stage of "Common Prosperity." They declared a society where not just those with economic power, but everyone in China would become wealthy.

But recently, the Xi Jinping administration does not say this much. This is because, in the midst of the current economic slowdown, it is difficult to feel wealth, making it hard to capture people's hearts. Instead, they are putting forward narratives to guide domestic public opinion.

The Chinese Communist Party originally has a specialized department called the Propaganda Department that forms narratives to stir people's feelings. Recent reports say that tightening has become stricter, with instructions not to point out the bad parts of the Chinese economy. When things do not go well domestically, the Communist Party guides the narrative to suppress people's dissatisfaction so it does not surface.

If suppressed too much, there is a risk that dissatisfaction will explode, but for now, they continue to successfully guide and control public opinion through surveillance cameras and technology to monitor discourse on social media.

And the concept put forward as an international vision is the "Community with a Shared Future for Mankind." What is this intended to mean? The Community with a Shared Future for Mankind says that all people in the world share a common destiny. For example, if global warming progresses, everyone will share that hardship, so let us develop together. This is constructed as a theory that is particularly easy for people in developing countries to accept. The point here is who will lead this Community with a Shared Future for Mankind.

Of course, inwardly, China wants to exercise leadership. Publicly, China says it never intends to become a strong country that goes ahead of the United States and does not expect to catch up with the U.S., but if the possibility of catching up arises, they want to become the leader and make it a China-centered Community with a Shared Future for Mankind.

To that end, they have put forward the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative. The vision of the Community with a Shared Future for Mankind held above these three pillars is the major blueprint of China's international strategy.

These three pillars of economy, security, and values are, so to speak, a re-explanation in China's own words of the overwhelming power in the three domains of economy, military, and values held by a hegemonic power. In addition, what China is emphasizing now is the initiative in science and technology.

In terms of becoming a game changer in the modern world, the intention to exercise initiative in rule-making and technological development has emerged. And three initiatives have been announced: the Global Data Security Initiative, the Global AI Governance Initiative, and the Global Cross-Border Data Flow Cooperation Initiative.

However, the first one, the Global Data Security Initiative, was announced a bit earlier in 2020 and is not mentioned much. While Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced this data security initiative, all the other global initiatives were announced by Xi Jinping himself at international conferences, giving it a slightly downgraded status.

The key as a concept is the international strategy; in particular, AI governance and cross-border data flow cooperation are clearly messages for the international community, not just for domestic use, as they are also broadcast in English.

And another key is that within these initiatives, they say they want to form rules based on the standpoint of developing countries and strengthen cooperation with user countries.

China is an AI superpower alongside the United States and is on the side that provides platforms. In any economic activity, the side providing the platform is overwhelmingly advantaged. The same applies to AI; in particular, the system provider gains an advantageous position in data collection. However, while being an AI superpower, China is putting cooperation with the Global South, which will be the users, at the forefront. This aim has the meaning of appealing the importance of technology while simultaneously sending a message that involves other countries.

In Xi Jinping's current diplomacy, the intention of how to form narratives of economy, technology, and military security while involving other countries is clearly evident. This is, in fact, part of the strategy toward the United States. Who will join their team when competing with the U.S.? They are broadcasting this in a way that is as unobvious as possible, yet suggests that partnering with China is definitely beneficial. This is the characteristic of the current international strategy.

So, specifically, what kind of diplomatic tools are they using? The largest one is the appeal of a massive market that no one can deny. Every country wants to sell goods to China. However, for companies that have entered the market, they also absorb technology by making them follow rules like "please follow these rules" or "these are the business practices within China." Making corporate personnel follow domestic rules has become one tool.

Furthermore, they apply export controls to companies. They impose export restrictions on critical minerals such as gallium, germanium, and graphite. Between 2023 and 2024, they clearly demonstrated that China can exercise influence worldwide in this way. By being told that China will not provide the critical minerals for which it has the most production capacity, other countries are coming to recognize that they must follow China's rules.

In using such tools, China has organized its domestic laws. Since around 2020, it has created various laws such as the Foreign Trade Law, the Export Control Law, the Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items, and the Customs Law. The last two came into effect on December 1st last year, but the Customs Law feels as though it was timed well as the Trump administration's tariffs became an issue.

This means that based on the experience during the first Trump administration, legal frameworks have been developed so that sanction cases can be handled. The Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law and the Unreliable Entity List serve as messages of what they recognize as problems while simultaneously being laws that inflict pain on the opponent. The development of such laws also keeps the strategy toward the U.S. in mind and clarifies a rule-oriented stance. China is making it known both internally and externally that it is competing on a rule-based basis.

Being rule-oriented is precisely part of the international public opinion war, and in China, this is called strengthening "International Discourse Power." "Discourse power" is often translated as such, but it is a state of having the power where, in addition to the right to speak, the people who hear what was said follow it. Since the mid-2010s, China has been actively putting forward the idea of increasing this discourse power in the international community.

International discourse power is also incorporated into Chinese-style modernization; since China will explain China itself, the international community is asked to accept this. They are working hard to have the international community, including the West, accept the image of China they explain, saying that the China the U.S. talks about is wrong. They appeal this by using the economy as a lever, using laws, and sending various messages.

This was clearly reinforced by the anti-dumping investigation against the EU launched last year. China says it investigated based on domestic requests that dumping was coming from Europe, but the world, including Europe, understands this as a retaliatory measure against the EU's tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles (EVs). By conducting anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations against tariff measures, their stance is that they are taking retaliatory measures based on rules. However, since calling it a retaliatory measure would put it outside the rules, they take the stance that they are taking measures based on domestic requests, in accordance with domestic law, and in a form that does not deviate from WTO rules.

This is a positioning that China has not deviated from the international economic order. For example, Canada announced last August that it would impose a 100% tariff on Chinese-made EVs. In response, while it did anti-dumping and anti-subsidy against Europe, it conducted an anti-discrimination investigation against Canada for the first time. An anti-discrimination investigation is only included as one item within Article 7 of the Foreign Trade Law, and no one expected them to use it.

When the EU imposed EV tariffs on China, it issued a thick investigation report of over 200 pages and properly explained that because subsidies were going into such areas, they were imposing tariffs as a countermeasure. In contrast, Canada imposed EV tariffs on China with little evidence of such an investigation. Then, China pointed this out as an anti-discrimination measure, asking, "Has Canada conducted a proper investigation?" Externally, China has acted more logically than Canada in this instance.

In this context, they will confront the Trump administration. Looking at the personnel, people called China hawks are entering the administration. While there are nuances of difference as to whether they are realists or essential China hawks, there is a consensus among Chinese experts that they are basically tough on China.

Trump has already announced an additional 10% tariff on China and a 25% tariff on Mexico and Canada (officially announced on February 1st). From Congress, a legislative bill has also emerged suggesting that PNTR (Permanent Normal Trade Relations) should be revoked. A discussion has emerged that China's Most Favored Nation status itself should be ended.

Regarding both tariffs and PNTR, China has clearly stated in its Customs Law that it will take countermeasures, so it has made it possible to respond with domestic law. Regarding Most Favored Nation status, they have newly written in things that were not included in previous customs-related laws, preparing themselves in response to the emergence of such discussions.

Regarding financial sanctions, financial sanction plans against Chinese high-ranking officials related to actions toward Taiwan have resurfaced. Various moves that ripple through technology, economy, and even finance are being prepared.

However, in Xi Jinping's New Year's address, I interpret that it was put forward that China's diplomatic strategy basically remains unchanged. While there are various changes in the international situation, China's own response will not change. Regarding Taiwan, the discourse has not changed significantly, nor has the amount of discourse increased. In other words, I think China is in a stance where it is steadily moving to the stage of executing what it has set as goals and prepared for.

Interestingly, at the beginning of this year, a Research Center for the Community with a Shared Future for Mankind was established under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign Minister Wang Yi gave the opening speech, saying that the idea of a "Community with a Shared Future for Mankind" is China's answer to the challenge of what kind of world to imagine and how to construct it. I think this means they are entering a stage of theorizing this at the research center and approaching the world more strategically. In terms of discourse as well, preparations for competition with the United States are progressing. In such a situation, the current state of East Asia is that there are concerns about the relationship between the Trump administration and Taiwan, while on the other hand, Japan-China relations are reaching a momentum of reconciliation.

So, what will Japan choose in this? I believe we must not make a fixed decision. We must consider appropriate things from time to time as the situation changes moment by moment. However, a strategic blueprint of where to head is necessary. We should not sail without a nautical chart. I believe that we are now being asked for a strategic theory regarding the situation in East Asia, including China.

Thank you very much. As you have discussed, when China proceeds with increasing its power, it attempts to secure its legitimacy not only through military, economic, and technological power but also by increasing its "discourse power" in the formation of international norms.

If that is the case, could we consider a situation where China, which is strengthening its involvement in norm formation, becomes the defender of the international order, while the United States, which advocates for its own national interests first, and its followers lose their external explanatory power in this regard? As a legal space led by China is being created in the world, the question of how Japan should maintain its national interests and increase its presence in the formation of the international order has come to mind.

Our second speaker is Professor Shunji Hiraiwa. He is a leading expert who inherently elucidates the logic of governance and external behavior of North Korea, the neighbor that is most invisible to us. Professor Hiraiwa, please.

Today, I would like to speak about the "International Order as Seen by Authoritarian States" with North Korea as the subject.

As you know, Chairman Kim Jong Un used the term "New Cold War" in 2021, but what does the New Cold War mean for North Korea? From the following year, the situation in Ukraine changed significantly, and in that process, Russia and North Korea have drawn closer. It is at this timing that the new Trump administration in the U.S. will start again.

So, from the perspective of the international order as seen by North Korea, there is a keyword for North Korea called "Juche" (subjectivity/self-reliance), so I would like to use this as a clue for my talk.

First, as an authoritarian regime, North Korea has seen power inherited over three generations—Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un—and I would like to consider this from the side of the regime. The most important thing is that it is a divided nation, which is predicated on the denial of South Korea; the fact that they are the only legal government on the Korean Peninsula becomes the basis for the legitimacy of their own regime. This concept of a divided nation is quite difficult to understand.

I once had the opportunity to speak with Mr. Jeong Se-hyun, who was the Minister of Unification during the Kim Dae-jung administration in South Korea. When I asked what was difficult about being the Minister of Unification, he said, "In diplomacy, there are long-term give-and-takes, but from South Korea's position in a divided nation, the relationship with North Korea is always questioned moment by moment as to which side is right. There is absolutely no yielding to the other side. That is very difficult. It is different from other diplomacy."

When North Korea faces South Korea, if conflict is the premise, they are denying the very existence of the other side, so they are constantly facing the question of which side is right compared to the South Korean regime. At that time, the basis for legitimacy is their claim—though there are actually many fictional parts—of the anti-Japanese partisans and that they won Korea's independence by themselves.

Yoon Suk-yeol, who is currently facing impeachment proceedings in South Korea, is a conservative administration. Back when the people called progressives who oppose him were still in the student movement, their basic idea was that the South Korean regime had no legitimacy. Rather, they believed North Korea had more legitimacy.

The basis for this was the understanding that South Korea did not win independence by itself, but that it was brought about by the victory of the Allied Powers. In contrast, there was a group called the Juche Idea faction that said extreme things like North Korea had more legitimacy because they won independence through anti-Japanese partisans, and they have even been part of the government.

In this way, being a divided nation is a characteristic of both South Korea and North Korea. Those of us who studied at Keio are always conscious of being a divided nation, and there is a stance of considering South Korea and North Korea with a certain sense of unity, or as a single unit, which I believe is a tradition since Professor Masao Okonogi.

Regarding North Korea's power structure, in terms of power, the Party, the State, and the Military are the three pillars of an orthodox socialist country, and one characteristic is that the supreme leader holds the top position in all pillars. I think a characteristic of North Korea is that this basically never disperses. For example, when transitioning from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il, Kim Il Sung was the top of the three pillars, but at the 6th Party Congress in 1980, Kim Jong Il was number two in everything. Therefore, it was said since then that Kim Jong Il was the successor. I believe this has not changed even now.

In addition to that, the issue of authority is deeply involved. As North Korea's authority, Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un are called the "Paektu Bloodline." What is this Paektu Bloodline? Kim Il Sung's great-grandfather, Kim Ung-u, is said in North Korean history to be a person who was active in the General Sherman incident, and his father, Kim Hyong-jik, is also supposed to have been active in the Korean revolution. The Paektu Bloodline in North Korea—that is, why Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un can be the supreme leaders—is because inheriting something like a soul called the "revolutionary tradition" from generation to generation becomes the succession of authority in North Korea.

Now, his sister, Ms. Kim Yo Jong, and his daughter, Kim Ju Ae, have appeared, and it is often said that Kim Ju Ae will be the successor in the future. While there is no discussion at all about how to inherit Party posts or State and Military posts, authority can be fully explained by the flow I just mentioned.

As a way of thinking about the power base, I think one characteristic of North Korea's external stance is that the external environment and domestic politics are closely linked, and this is the concept of "Juche."

The word Juche appeared in December 1955 when Kim Il Sung gave a public speaking and said that the time had come to create our own style, no longer the Soviet style or the Chinese style. This was an idea that emerged during the power struggle with groups connected to the Soviet Union and groups connected to China within the country. The domestic power struggle in North Korea inevitably had to be conscious of international relations. I believe this also greatly influences North Korea's current view of the international order.

"Juche" specifically consists of three things. The first is "Independence in Politics." Our view is that this was established at the "August Plenary Meeting Incident" in 1956 and the First Party Conference in 1958.

The second is "Self-sufficiency in Economy." This was when they were forced by the Soviet Union to join COMECON and refused it. The logic at that time was the theory of a self-sufficient national economy. The logic for refusing COMECON membership was that the Korean Peninsula was still in a divided state and joining COMECON would not be very helpful; they would join after unifying and becoming a single economic unit.

The third is "Self-defense in National Defense." Seeing the Soviet Union's response to the Cuban Missile Crisis, they moved toward strengthening self-defense capabilities based on the idea that they must protect themselves in national defense as well. These three things constitute Juche, and in the 1960s and 70s, it was to the extent that kindergarten children would sometimes sing "Independence, Self-sufficiency, Self-defense."

Expanding that to the external stance is the independent line, and the general view is that this was established at the Second Party Conference in 1966. With "Independence toward China and the Soviet Union," the trigger was considering how to keep a distance from China in response to China's Cultural Revolution. This North Korean independent line dislikes the absolute influence of specific countries. While utilizing the conflict between major powers, they acquire their own independence within that balance. This would be what North Korea calls "Juche."

Recently, there have been points made that the use of the Juche era as the primary calendar and the counting of years from Kim Il-sung's birth are disappearing, and mentions of Juche ideology itself are decreasing, suggesting a shift toward promoting Kim Jong-un himself rather than Kim Il-sung or Kim Jong-il. While it is likely true that the system is changing to center on Kim Jong-un, I still believe that the concept of "Juche" remains sufficiently effective when explaining North Korea's current politics, diplomacy, or international relations.

So, what is the specific international order of the Korean Peninsula? For North Korea, the international order was formed by the Korean War. Looking at the structure of the conflict at that time, North Korea launched a war of national liberation against South Korea. UN forces intervened in response, and what initially started as a civil war turned into an international war. Furthermore, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army joined the war. The Korean War is considered an "international civil war," but the conflict structure on the Korean Peninsula has a multi-layered structure consisting of two conflicts: the ethnic conflict between North and South Korea, and the conflict between the East and West blocs. After the armistice, North Korea concluded two Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (with the Soviet Union and China) in 1961, further deepening this conflict structure.

It was not impossible for this structure to be dismantled during the process of the end of the Cold War starting in the late 1980s, but unfortunately, it did not go well. First, in September 1990, the Soviet Union normalized diplomatic relations with South Korea. Normally, it would have been North Korea's turn to normalize relations with either Japan or the United States next, but China, in order to counter the flexible diplomacy of then-Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui, rushed to realize the normalization of China-South Korea relations in August 1992.

From North Korea's perspective, they became isolated within the conflict structure. They did not know if the Soviet Union would continue to provide a nuclear umbrella as it had before. I believe their logic is that they will possess nuclear weapons themselves to eliminate the situation of being unilaterally exposed to the U.S. nuclear threat.

The prototype of the New Cold War that North Korea imagines is how to face its adversary, the United States. North Korea is facing the United States, not South Korea, and they have China and the Soviet Union as their backers, while South Korea and Japan are behind the United States. I think this is the rough image of North Korea's conflict structure.

From North Korea's perspective, the United States is the only entity with the intent and capability to eliminate their regime. How to coexist with it or build a relationship is the most important task for maintaining the North Korean regime. From North Korea's perspective, Russia exited the conflict structure of the Korean Peninsula during the dismantling of the Cold War, so China became the sole backer. This is the situation that has continued for decades.

Considering North Korea's position from the perspective of Juche, this state is not very comfortable. China's influence is too strong, making it difficult to maintain a balance. They seem to have considered balancing between the United States and China temporarily, but that also does not go very well. In that case, a comfortable conflict structure for North Korea would be to face the United States with both China and Russia as backers. This would be the desirable international order for North Korea.

Thinking this way, one meaning of the rapprochement between Russia and North Korea I mentioned at the beginning might be to relativize China's influence. Regarding Russia-North Korea relations, some viewed it as a rapprochement where North Korea is not that important to Russia, so North Korea will be discarded once the Ukraine situation ends, and North Korea is approaching while knowing that. However, I have come to think that North Korea may not just want short-term military technology or aid from Russia, but may be betting on its own survival strategy within a larger framework.

On the other hand, what about South Korea? Although the political situation in South Korea has become difficult to understand due to the current circumstances, I think it is meaningful to consider what the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's North Korea policy was like.

In August last year, Yoon Suk-yeol released a new unification policy as his North Korea policy, and at that time, he spoke of unification through liberal democracy. There has been a series of events where the Yoon administration said from its inception that it would pressure North Korea on human rights issues, and in response, North Korea abandoned its theory of peaceful unification. When the Yoon administration put human rights issues at the forefront, North Korea naturally reacted, and there was no way North-South relations would go well, so I wondered why they were doing such a thing. However, one view seems to have been that South Korean society is currently undergoing major changes. In particular, the government is becoming unable to control the younger generation, who are devoted to Hallyu (Korean Wave) content. The idea was to work on this and cause a collapse from within.

I don't know what the result was, but North Korea itself is sensitive to domestic social changes and is sounding the alarm, especially to the younger generation. Kim Jong-un has also mentioned the Socialist Patriotic Working Youth League and other organizations, saying that they must tighten control in various places.

North Korea today is thinking about foreign relations based on such domestic situations, but since they want to somehow relativize China's overwhelming influence, I think they tried to strengthen relations with Russia. North Korea was excessively cautious about COVID-19 and shut out trade with China. Before COVID, 95% of North Korea's foreign economy was related to China, but even after COVID ended, China-North Korea relations have not easily returned to the way they were before.

It reminds me of something a Chinese expert told me a long time ago. China was trying to get North Korea to reform and open up. When Kim Jong-il, the supreme leader at the time, visited, they would try to show him places where reform and opening were progressing, such as Shanghai. In Shanghai, during the Jiang Zemin era, the approval rating for the Chinese Communist Party was the highest despite reform and opening being the most advanced. Therefore, the intention was to convey to Kim Jong-il that reform and opening and the approval rating for the regime are not necessarily contradictory.

However, at one point, a Chinese expert on the Korean Peninsula told me that North Korea no longer needs to reform and open up. If they just open up to China, since China is reforming and opening up, North Korea is effectively the same as reforming and opening up. I once thought that this would make North Korea's position no different from a vassal state of China. The fact that such an idea came from the Chinese side must have been very unpleasant for North Korea.

North Korea is currently pursuing a five-year defense plan, and it is said that they might conduct a seventh nuclear test as part of it. There is an explanation that the reason they are not doing this is due to pressure from China, and I myself think that influence exists. However, from North Korea's perspective, this must be a very unpleasant situation. From the perspective of Juche, not being able to do what they want to do because of Chinese pressure is exactly a situation where Juche is not established. I believe that the relationship with Russia is intended to relativize that.

North Korea has supported Russia's invasion of Ukraine from the beginning, and has provided not only weapons and ammunition but also dispatched troops. They concluded the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and North Korea, raising their military treaty to the same status as China's, and also seeking Russia as an option for the economy.

What North Korea is thinking about for the future is likely to normalize relations with the United States, have various sanctions lifted, and diversify trade. They probably want to revive trade with South Korea as well, and diversify trade to include Southeast Asia, Europe, and even Japan to relativize China's influence. How to achieve independence from China by balancing while economic relations with China are overwhelmingly strong—I think this is North Korea's international order.

Thank you very much. While listening to your talk, questions arose within me as to whether diplomacy for North Korea is positioned simply as something that should serve the maintenance and expansion of "Juche," or whether it is also a means to pursue some other national interest.

For example, in China, as mentioned in Ms. Eto's talk, national development, including the economy, is important as the basis for the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party's one-party rule. Such an orientation is the motivation for aiming for a rule-based international order, at least on the surface.

In contrast, for North Korea, breaking away from dependence on China and maintaining Juche are important. Does the proposition of economic development and improving people's lives not serve as a basis for legitimacy or a motive for diplomacy for the Kim regime? I thought about these things while listening to your talk.

Now, I have invited Dr. Shinji Yamaguchi from the National Institute for Defense Studies, who is well-versed in modern Chinese history and the present, as well as security issues in East Asia in general, as a discussant today. Dr. Yamaguchi, please.

I believe that regional studies, especially research on the East Asian region, are becoming increasingly important today. This involves deepening academic research on the region and how to return the analysis of regional developments happening right before our eyes to society and policy.

What is happening before our eyes now is, for one, the deepening of the U.S.-China confrontation. Furthermore, if I may say so without fear of being misunderstood, a trend toward bloc formation is becoming visible. In particular, the relationship between China, Russia, and North Korea is becoming a key point. I think that is an important point in looking at this region. Of course, looking at the actual situation in the region, it may not be such a simple bloc, but it is also a fact that something beyond our expectations is emerging as a major trend, and I think it is important to analyze this.

With that premise, I will first comment on the reports of the two speakers, starting with Ms. Eto. In looking at the era of U.S.-China confrontation, especially from China's perspective, this confrontation does not stop at a simple military security confrontation. It involves issues such as economy and technology, and I think it is a broad confrontation that also involves parts such as ideology, discourse, rules, and norms.

In that context, we used to think of economy and technology as somewhat of a safety valve. We thought that because economic relations were good, even if political relations were bad or there was a security confrontation, it would be possible to somehow manage U.S.-China relations and Japan-China relations. However, now it has conversely become a kind of weapon and a factor that further promotes division.

What was interesting was that China is not only aiming for a form different from the U.S.-led economic order in terms of ideas, but is actually preparing tools. I listened with interest to the explanation that they are also acquiring means to counter-attack against the other party's sanctions.

Based on that, I have two questions. One is, who is at the center of China's promotion of such economic security policies within the Xi Jinping administration? Is it something Xi Jinping thought of personally, or is there someone leading it?

The other point is, if it is in the form Dr. Eto points out, I suspect that a trend like a certain kind of split between the U.S. and China in the economic field will probably appear clearly in the future. In that, on the U.S. side, we can imagine countries like the West that have maintained the order so far, but what kind of countries would be the members of the China-led economic order that China envisions? That is my question.

Next, I listened to Dr. Hiraiwa's report with interest as it clearly showed North Korea's logic. I will limit my questions to two points. One is a somewhat large question about how to view the relationship between China, Russia, and North Korea.

In your report, you explained that it is important for North Korea to balance the countries that serve as its backers, China and Russia. You mentioned that the rapprochement with Russia has started again, and it is clearly visible that the relationship between Russia and North Korea has become close. Also, the relationship between China and Russia is generally considered good.

However, what is not clear is the relationship between China and North Korea. How is the relationship between China, Russia, and North Korea perceived? Currently, both China and Russia are deepening their confrontation with the United States. If so, they would end up leaning quite heavily toward the anti-U.S. side, but is this okay?

Another point I would like to ask is about the point Dr. Hiraiwa pointed out at the end. It was a very interesting story that South Korea is taking a strategy to break down from the inside using human rights and K-POP as a policy. This is highly likely to be seen as a color revolution-like method that China and Russia dislike very much. I would like to ask if such movements are causing repulsion or caution within North Korea.

Finally, I have one common question for both of you. As expected, I am concerned about the story of the Trump administration, and within that, the situation in Ukraine seems very significant. Regarding Ukraine, I think the basic foreign policy of the Trump administration is to make peace quickly and concentrate on Asian issues as much as possible, but how do China and North Korea view this? Please tell us how you think the Trump administration and the situation in Ukraine will affect the situation in East Asia.

Regarding the first question of who is in charge of economic security within China, I myself have wondered about this, and to be honest, I don't know. Even if I ask Chinese people, they don't know. If I think about it externally and compare it to Japanese cases, it is probably the Central National Security Commission, but since I don't know what this commission is doing in the first place, there is no way to confirm it.

I don't even know who the person will be to become the U.S. counterpart for Trump 2.0. The position corresponding to Mr. Liu He during 1.0. This time, Mr. Han Zheng is going to the inauguration ceremony, so he may play a role as a messenger, but no one has emerged who has gained Mr. Xi Jinping's trust and will be the window for strategy toward the U.S. based on a good understanding of economic issues and the United States. Mr. Li Qiang is also a bit difficult. It's also hard to think it's Mr. He Lifeng.

I think one of the reasons for this is the problem of the downfall of people Mr. Xi Jinping had promoted. If they stand out, they don't know when they will be cut off, and everyone is afraid and cannot take that position. This domestic political constraint in China makes the policy-making process very difficult to understand. Unfortunately, my honest answer is that I don't know the key person for economic security either.

Regarding the other question, within the economic split between the U.S. and China, the three international frameworks that China has long emphasized most are the UN, BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Also, just as they go to Africa at the beginning of every year, there is no doubt that they emphasize Africa as a position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and are actively engaging in discussions involving developing and emerging countries.

This also relates to the third question, but I think the key countries this year will be Russia, Iran, and North Korea. While the Trump administration is starting to move to bring a ceasefire to Ukraine, Iran, which has influence in the Middle East, is approaching China. Russia's dependence on China has been increasing from the start. North Korea is in the state as discussed. Furthermore, Russia is also approaching North Korea and Iran. It is evident that the three parties all need each other, so from China's perspective, I think they have in mind that they can use this as a political card against Trump.

Alternatively, in the Middle East and Ukraine, when the discussion of post-war economic reconstruction emerges as a practical issue, how to appeal to the international community the role to be played by China's economic power will also affect the subsequent competition with the United States.

The exercise of influence in a ceasefire and the exercise of influence in economic reconstruction are both parts that China can use as diplomatic cards. Since there is no direct damage and no out-of-pocket expense, I think they are thinking about successfully leaving a mark.

Before answering Dr. Yamaguchi's questions, I would like to answer the question I received from Dr. Kojima.

It's about whether the economy doesn't become a motive for national strategy. Of course, I think it would be a motive, but North Korea is a divided nation, and furthermore, South Korea is overwhelmingly winning in terms of the economy, so if they make the economy the goal, it would lead to the story that South Korea has a better regime. Therefore, I think a certain characteristic is that they seek superiority over South Korea in other areas.

Next is the story of whether they have shifted too much toward the anti-U.S. side in the relationship between China, Russia, and North Korea in Dr. Yamaguchi's question. They have experience in holding summit meetings at least three times during the first Trump administration. Therefore, I think they consider the relationship with the U.S. not just as a confrontational relationship but as having some kind of opportunity.

In doing so, while there is a meaning for North Korea to keep China as a backer in a situation where China is in conflict with the United States, on the other hand, China's attitude can be unpleasant.

Immediately after the start of the Biden administration, the U.S. and China held a 2+2 in Anchorage, and Yang Jiechi and Blinken exchanged words. The conclusion that came out at that time was that they could cooperate in four areas. The four areas were the environment, Iran, Afghanistan, and North Korea, and from North Korea's perspective, there must be nothing more unpleasant than this. What do they mean by saying we are an area where they can cooperate in relations with the U.S.? I think how to keep a distance from China is important for North Korea.

During the first Trump administration, U.S.-North Korea summit meetings were held three times, but there were also North-South summit meetings before and after them. Kim Jong-un went to report to China every time there was a U.S.-North Korea or North-South summit meeting. He must show maximum consideration to China, the sole backer. However, I think the answer to the first question is that being treated unilaterally like a vassal state is very unpleasant for North Korea.

The second point is Yoon Suk-yeol's unification policy in South Korea, but to my memory, this is the second time South Korea has taken such a policy toward North Korea. The first was during the Kim Young-sam administration in the 1990s. At that time, they used money to cut into the Socialist Patriotic Working Youth League (SPWYL), and the SPWYL fell apart as an organization. From North Korea's perspective, they have that trauma, so they are particularly cautious toward the SPWYL.

When I went to China last September for the first time in five years and talked with experts, they called this "peaceful evolution" (heping yanbian) and said that peaceful evolution is not effective. On the other hand, when I discussed it with South Korean experts, they said that in the 1990s, North Korea was in a difficult economic situation and we won them over with money, but China provided a lifeline and as a result, North Korea held out. But this time it's not money. They say it's culture. They say that the devotion to K-POP and Hallyu dramas will not change no matter how much China lends a hand.

I think there is no doubt that North Korea is very cautious about this. For example, during COVID, North Korean defector groups and anti-North groups were attaching various things to balloons and sending them to North Korea. The reason they overreacted to this is because they are very cautious about things like Hallyu dramas contained in USB chips. In an official announcement, North Korea repeatedly said, "Do not touch the balloons sent from the South because they have COVID germs on them," but I think what North Korea definitely disliked were the USB chips attached to the balloons.

Regarding the third question, what North Korea will do under the Trump administration, there are voices within the United States saying that it's no use talking about denuclearization anymore and that there's no choice but to do it through arms control. IAEA Director General Grossi has even started saying things like they must negotiate with North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, so I think they will bet on that and face the Trump administration.

In Ukraine, I think North Korea is involved in a war between major powers with its own determination. I initially thought they just wanted short-term technical cooperation in the relationship with Russia, but Dr. Masao Okonogi told me, "Aren't you looking at it with the image of when the Chinese People's Volunteer Army participated in the Korean War? Since a small country is involved in a war between major powers, it's better to look at it with the image of when South Korea was involved in the Vietnam War." He pointed out that I should consider that they are doing it with the determination of betting the national fortune, and I realized he was right.

Regarding the Ukraine war itself, it's not a story where North Korea itself can influence the trend, so they will probably respond based on the Russia-North Korea relationship. There may also be a way of thinking that if U.S.-North Korea relations go well, it would be better for Ukraine to settle down as well. Since U.S.-North Korea relations are the axis for North Korea, it is not very desirable for the U.S. and China to be in conflict when that is going well. There are also parts where they might be stopped by the Chinese side, so I think they will act while watching the situation.

Listening to the talk so far, I have reaffirmed that both the Xi Jinping administration and the Kim Jong-un administration are envisioning an order with the maintenance of the legitimacy of their rule as the top priority, based on the history of their respective countries. Conversely, it means that only by internally understanding the position of each regime and social changes can we have a down-to-earth discussion about the formation of international order. I believe we were able to have a very substantial discussion thanks to the efforts of the professors who reported and the discussant, Dr. Yamaguchi. I would like to express my gratitude to everyone here and close the first session. Thank you very much.

(Based on the public symposium of the Keio Institute of East Asian Studies (KIEAS) held on January 18)