[Special Feature: The Presidential Election and the Future of America] Ryo Sahashi: The Restart of the Trump Administration and the Future of U.S.-China Confrontation

2025/02/05

The Donald Trump administration has begun once again.

The so-called "Trump 2.0" will hold significant meaning for both the United States and the international order.

I do not intend to label President Trump as isolationist or as someone who loves war. In fact, the reality differs from such impressions. Trump 1.0 remained involved with the world in its own way, engaged in diplomacy regardless of the counterpart, and occasionally secured agreements. While he mentioned military force as a threat, he was restrained in its actual use.

The problem lies in his goal-setting and administrative style.

Trump is not a person who seeks unity within diversity, as successive presidents have valued. He has prolonged his political life by accelerating divisions in American society, using themes such as religion, race, and inequality. Furthermore, in the international community, he shows no interest in increasing overall benefits through multilateral cooperation. He prioritizes only his own country's immediate interests. Skilled journalists quote Trump's words in their books.

"I don't believe in win-win. I believe in me winning." (Baker & Glasser, 2024)

This short phrase expresses his essence well. For him, victory is, above all, about self-preservation—nothing other than protecting the assets and honor of the Trump family. In addition, he reflects a self-centeredness in diplomacy that places extreme importance on American security and interests. If it serves that purpose, he will engage in dialogue even with leaders of authoritarian regimes, while demanding major concessions from long-standing allies through threats.

Trump's administrative style is also unique.

In the previous Trump administration, many veterans—sometimes called "the adults"—initially joined the cabinet, but factional struggles among high-ranking government officials were extremely fierce. Trump sought to maintain his superior position by making subordinates compete. Eventually, having enjoyed the grip on power gained through the exercise of personnel rights, Trump fired high-ranking officials one after another, until finally, only those chosen for their loyalty remained.

Expertise was often disregarded by the president. What mattered was the image of Trump, an outsider to Washington politics, fighting against the traditional vested interests known as the "Deep State." Those who entered the administration then sought to realize policies reflecting their own desires—policies that could never be achieved under any other administration. The "greatness" and American interests implied by the phrases "Make America Great Again" and "America First" were, in the end, left to Trump's judgment.

Trump 2.0 is characterized from the start by the concentration of power in the president seen in the final stages of the previous administration; it is better viewed as an extension of Trump 1.0.

Of course, even if the Trump administration pursues diplomatic and security strategies self-righteously, as discussed below, it may often yield favorable results for challenges the world must face, such as a tough response to China. One might also argue that, ultimately, every country is "self-first." Nevertheless, the narrow-mindedness visible behind Trump's diplomacy and the impact of previously unthinkable, unexpected policy methods on the international order are immeasurable. And even if favorable results are obtained, whether they will continue is, after all, uncertain.

The U.S.-China confrontation is likely to be a major focus in Trump 2.0 as well.

While the previous Trump administration left various marks on international politics, the most important was likely the full-scale escalation of the U.S.-China confrontation. Although the U.S. and China can now be called two superpowers, the first Trump administration removed the framework of the relationship that had been maintained for nearly half a century and sent a clear message that it would not tolerate China's growth. This was the abandonment of the so-called engagement policy toward China.

The succeeding Biden administration followed the policy of shifting the approach toward China. Maintaining a worldview of an era of U.S.-China competition, it worked to refine its economic security posture beyond just military and political responses. While it was also eager to engage with President Xi Jinping and other high-ranking Chinese officials due to the need for crisis management, it was an administration that did not change its view of China as a rival and did not loosen a wide variety of economic regulations on China.

So, what will the Trump 2.0 strategy toward China look like?

In Trump 1.0, particularly in its final stages, extremely harsh criticism of the Chinese Communist Party was voiced, and a series of economic sanctions related to Xinjiang and Hong Kong were imposed. I have already argued that Trump 2.0 is an extension of 1.0; will the China strategy be the same?

Certainly, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has continued to view ideological aspects, such as China's governance system, as problematic. As a senator, he introduced bills last year to block Chinese companies from moving manufacturing bases to Mexico or Southeast Asia to evade tariffs, as well as the CCP Stopping Act. He also showed interest in increasing taxes on profits from investments in China and strengthening the resilience of critical mineral supply chains. Rubio's movements have the momentum to lead a hawkish executive branch, making him worthy of being called an "ultra-hawk."

National Security Advisor Mike Waltz may not be called an ultra-hawk, but he follows the average view of recent hardline stances on China. In his recent book, he lists the basic principles of China policy, highlighting points such as approaching the China problem by strengthening the U.S. military posture, alliances, Taiwan, and economic security. His deputy, Deputy National Security Advisor Alex Wong, is seen as being close to traditional security experts, and the announcement of his appointment was welcomed in Washington.

It is unclear whether ultra-hawk arguments like Rubio's will immediately gain Trump's support. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that hardline views on China are fully incorporated into this administration from its inception. In this line of thinking, alliances and economic security will likely be emphasized, much like in the Biden administration.

To be sure, even in Trump 1.0, hardliners such as Matt Pottinger (former Deputy National Security Advisor) and Michael Pillsbury (Hudson Institute) formed the China team from the transition period. Still, there were initially voices positive about solving problems through negotiations with China, such as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who came from the business world. Compared to that, Trump 2.0 possesses a "harsh" hardline stance toward China from the start.

However, in Trump 2.0, another type of hardline view on China may emerge. If the aforementioned hardline view was interventionist regarding China's internal affairs and based its overall strategy on American strength, this other hawkish view can be described as a realistic one that recognizes the limits of American power and believes that strength should be consolidated solely to achieve military preparedness against China.

A central figure in this could be Elbridge Colby, who is appointed as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. This post is the highest-ranking position for a civilian defense official and has been regarded as the most pivotal post for policy planning. Even in recent Democratic administrations, representative strategists such as Michèle Flournoy and Colin Kahl have served in this role.

In Trump 1.0, Colby led the planning of the National Defense Strategy as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and launched a force planning concept focused on war with a single major power (Fukuda, 2021). As clarified in works such as "The Strategy of Denial" (2023) and "Asia First" (2024), Colby believes that the U.S. should concentrate on China and leave the Russia-Ukraine war to Europe. He also calls for drawing out the efforts of various countries to build an "anti-hegemonic coalition" against China.

What is important for Colby is the restoration of the balance of power; he argues that if China exercises self-restraint within a new balance, there is no problem even if it has a different political system. From his perspective, at this rate, the U.S. will be unable to stop China from establishing hegemony in Asia, and the U.S., along with Asian countries, must prepare overwhelming capabilities to "deny" China's aggressive actions.

Colby's argument deviates from traditional thinking in several points. First, his coldness toward the Russia-Ukraine war fundamentally shakes U.S.-European relations.

Second, despite having great concerns about China's ambitions and future power, the goals set are modest. China's political system is not an issue for him, and he dismisses matters like the TikTok problem as non-essential.

Third, he demands even greater efforts from U.S. allies such as Taiwan and India. For him, the preparedness of various countries is insufficient, and he strongly asserts that they should pour far more of their budgets into national defense. Colby is by no means an isolationist. It is precisely because he has a clear awareness that China's military power is a threat that he calls for the formation of an anti-hegemonic coalition. Nevertheless, the idea that allies should shoulder an extremely large amount of responsibility to confront China could cause unrest among those allies.

From China's perspective, both types of hawks are hardliners. Particularly in the military strategy overseen by Colby, the progress of a system concentrated on China is undesirable. On the other hand, pressure on allies may instead disrupt the alignment between the U.S. and various countries, and the indifference he shows toward anything other than military power may appear favorable to China. Originally, the White House would take the position of bundling different policy theories, but this is the unconventional Trump administration. Depending on the president's stance, it is necessary to account for the possibility that the policy axis may shift.

In economic policy, appointments have been indicated for Scott Bessent as Secretary of the Treasury, Howard Lutnick as Secretary of Commerce, Stephen Miran as a member of the Council of Economic Advisers, Kevin Hassett as Director of the National Economic Council, and Jamieson Greer as Trade Representative.

Bessent and Lutnick are figures who represent the interests of the business community, differing from aggressive negotiator-type lawyers like Greer. While Lutnick, Miran, and Greer agree on utilizing tariffs as a policy tool, there is no consensus on decoupling the U.S. and Chinese economies regardless of the cost, as Robert Lighthizer, who served as Trade Representative in Trump 1.0, advocated in various places during the election period.

For Trump 2.0, upholding "America First" and instrumentalizing tariffs is the basic line. However, it is quite difficult to easily allow the U.S. economy to bleed in order to eliminate economic dependence on China. Economic trends are actually an important issue for the Trump administration, which defends the interests of the wealthy, and tariffs and decoupling also place a heavy burden on the U.S. economy.

Therefore, even if the president uses the word "decoupling" frequently as a verbal threat—making "de-risking" and "small yard, high fence" obsolete—and even if he shows a stance of not shying away from a trade war with China, we may be able to find caution in the response of Trump 2.0's economic policy toward China.

Of course, since the economic security policy posture that has been sufficiently strengthened from Trump 1.0 through the Biden administration will still be maintained, supply chains, including those of the U.S. and its allies, will gradually move toward separation from China. The movement of investment and people will also likely dwindle.

By the way, for some reason, one occasionally sees optimism regarding the Trump administration. The idea that we have the experience to face the Trump administration because it is the second time is extremely dangerous. There is optimism in Japan, but it actually exists in China as well.

Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University, in an essay titled "Why China Isn't Scared of Trump" contributed to an American magazine, even argued that Trump 2.0 would work in China's favor. According to him, "Beijing (having learned much from Trump 1.0) can successfully avoid conflict. Furthermore, Trump's commitment to allies is questionable, and those countries will seek to build relationships with Beijing to diversify risks and offset Washington's unpredictability. The possibility of military conflict with the U.S. is also low." (Yan, 2024)

There are also many views that a second round of Trump diplomacy will cause America's international status to decline and accelerate the reorganization of the international order. Jie Dalei of Peking University states that both Trump and Biden reflect a "deep-level strategic adjustment" in America that "could last for a considerable period," and predicts the arrival of a new era. Jie says that the movement of a United States that avoids interference abroad and is not so eager to pursue universal values through diplomacy will lead the post-Cold War period into the next "post-post-Cold War period." (Jie, 2024)

Of course, in the immediate future, specific conflicts must be avoided. At the U.S.-China summit held alongside APEC in Peru last November, President Xi Jinping raised four red lines. In other words, he clearly showed the U.S. the lines that must not be crossed: keep past promises on the "Taiwan issue," respect each other on points where the two countries differ such as "democracy and human rights" and "path and system," and do not engage in trade wars or economic decoupling in order to protect China's "right to development."

It should be assumed that the Chinese government is facing the fear that Trump might cross these red lines very easily. The pessimistic outlook that the U.S. will press China hard regardless of the cost seems more dominant. While expectations for the acceleration of changes in the international order, as Jie argues, are spreading, there seems to be criticism that relations with the U.S. will not become as manageable for China as Yan says. Generally speaking, it can be said to be an outlook that while there is a certain expectation that Trump 2.0 will create a situation favorable to China in the long term, there are many difficulties in the bilateral relationship in the short term.

The Chinese government will likely increase efforts to establish an autonomous economic zone and expand the world where its political influence reaches, while continuing to seek management of relations with the U.S. and the realization of dialogue. Furthermore, in recent years, China has increased the means by which it can impose sanctions on foreign countries, such as the "Unreliable Entity List Provisions," the "Export Control Law," and the "Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law." To what extent will it exercise so-called economic statecraft? If things go poorly, the U.S. and China could fall into a cycle of retaliatory economic sanctions. We should watch with vigilance.

The U.S.-China confrontation will not end so easily. And the United States remains the cornerstone of the global economy and possesses power that should be utilized for the security of Asia and the world.

Even if Trump 2.0 tries to take more self-righteous policies than before, we should not neglect efforts to correct them. Summit diplomacy will hold greater meaning than ever before. We should seize opportunities and repeatedly provide thorough explanations of how closely American interests are tied to alliances and order-building.

It will also be essential for Japan not only to remind the U.S. of the strategic importance of East Asia but also to convey the prudence that America's long-standing Taiwan and Korean Peninsula policies possessed.

* Yan Xuetong, “Why China Isn’t Scared of Trump” Foreign Affairs, December 20, 2024