[Special Feature: How to Understand Populism] Latin American Populism in Comparison

2020/02/05

Latin America is an important region for considering populism. It has not only provided typical cases that cannot be excluded from the discussion, but many instances of populism in the region are also considered to be of a different type from those mainly seen in so-called developed countries, centered on Europe. Consequently, many studies and considerations discuss "two types of populism." The purpose of this article is to provide a brief overview and focus on the characteristics considered to be the definitional features of the "Latin American" type, showing that focusing on this region deepens the understanding of the phenomenon of populism.

One might think that a definition of populism must be provided in order to introduce and consider it, but due to space limitations, I will omit it here. However, the cases mentioned below have been regarded as populism regardless of which definition is adopted. Furthermore, regarding "populism," I believe that various definitions have been devised largely so that they can accommodate all the cases that many people recognize as the same kind of phenomenon. Note that the politics of Brazil's J. Bolsonaro, who took office in 2019, differs significantly from the cases treated below. However, because of the differences from other cases traditionally considered populism (including those in Europe) and, relatedly, because there is significant room for debate as to whether it is populism based on several currently influential definitions, it is not handled below.

In Latin America, one can point to three periods when populist politics appeared prominently in several countries simultaneously. The first wave appeared mainly in the 1930s and 40s, with the most typical case being that of Juan Perón in Argentina. One of the central figures in the group of officers who carried out a military coup in 1943, he took the top position in the labor relations ministry, implemented pro-worker policies such as expanding welfare and raising wages, and organized labor unions into a base that supported him. Along with his spouse, Eva Perón (Evita), he strongly attacked the oligarchy and imperialism (the capital and power of great nations), asserting himself as the representative of the non-wealthy through intense public speaking and other means. Having gathered support in this way, Perón formed a political party and won the 1946 election. After becoming president, he continued similar policies and appeals, promoting economic development through policies that encouraged nationalization and industrialization via domestic capital. On the other hand, he also suppressed the opposition, and the concentration of power was evident. The sight of many people gathered in the square in front of the presidential palace, enthralled by the public speaking of the Peróns from the balcony, is a scene symbolizing populist politics. Arguments that take the "personal popularity of a leader who appeals directly to the popular masses" shown there as a definitional element of populism have been dominant. G. Vargas in Brazil and L. Cárdenas in Mexico at roughly the same time also had similar political styles and implemented similar policies, although their contexts differed.

The second wave consists of the politics of some politicians who carried out neoliberal reforms in the early 1990s, such as C. Menem in Argentina, A. Fujimori in Peru, and F. Collor in Brazil, who was driven from power by a corruption scandal while attempting reforms. In cases of populist politics, one can point to a tendency for neoliberal reforms to become rapid and extreme.

The third wave is a period when leftist leaders with populist characteristics gathered broad support based on the fact that many people were dissatisfied with neoliberal policies. These include H. Chávez in Venezuela, R. Correa in Ecuador, and E. Morales in Bolivia (though some theorists argue he has a different character from populism because his base is in social movements), who took office from the late 1990s to the early 21st century. Under conditions where world prices for oil and other commodities were high, these leaders, especially Chávez, strongly promoted the improvement of living conditions for the poor. In places with large indigenous populations, this overlaps with an emphasis on indigenous rights and culture, but they share with the first-wave leaders the fact that the symbolic empowerment of people who were not in privileged environments is also an important element.

From the second wave onward, there have been changes such as television playing an important role, but the commonality with first-wave populism is clear in terms of appealing directly to people with simple messages, attacking traditional organizations and institutions, disregarding rules, and advocating for major transformation.

In many discussions about populism, cases from Latin American countries are cited as an "inclusionary/inclusive" type, in contrast to the "exclusionary" type seen in many European countries and prominently appearing in the US in the form of D. Trump's victory. The arguments of Jiro Mizushima and C. Mudde, introduced later, are representative of this. However, in terms of economic policy, populism in this region is not necessarily inclusive. Neoliberalism, which was a policy characteristic of the second wave of populism, is at least not redistributive. While the treatment of "second-wave populism in Latin America" in discussions on populism is ambiguous, I believe it is inclusive for the reasons stated below, and at least fundamentally different from the "exclusionary populism" of developed countries. So, where does the inclusivity of Latin American populism mainly appear?

One aspect is the lack of "anti-immigrant sentiment (nativism)." The simplest explanation for this is that xenophobic feelings are not that strong in Latin American countries. While it cannot be said that there is no exclusion or discrimination against immigrants in Latin American countries in general, an argument can be made that the smallness of xenophobic feelings is the basis for that element not being important in populism that appeals to "the people" (though the difference that the number of new arrivals is not as large as in developed countries is likely also an important factor).

D. Filc provides such an interpretation and theorizes it by linking it to the colonial past. To summarize in my own way, Western European countries that held colonies have a concept of "nation" that is an extension of the fact that colonialism was characterized by the "exclusion of locals based on racism," and the popular masses to whom populism appeals are assumed as such. In contrast, Latin American countries are characterized by an "inclusive" concept of nation characterized by hybridity, such as mestizaje. And the latter is identified with "anti-colonialism as opposition to the economic dominance of great powers and the wealthy people of one's own country (the oligarchy) linked to it."

This argument seems to contain multiple layers of confusion. Above all, the concept of nation in Latin America should be considered to stem not from having been a colony in general, but from having been a colony with a specific character. In a large part of the region that became Latin America, politics based on social stratification existed at the time of colonization. In such cases, it is customary for the metropole to send administrators and business people who utilize the existing extraction system, resulting in a colony that basically lacks mass population movement. However, many Spaniards came to this region intending to make the land their own. From such colonies, independent nations were born with societies where the people who arrived were the wealthy elite, the mixed-race population was in the middle, and indigenous people were numerous in the poor strata. This differs from many colonies in Asia and Africa, which became independent by rejecting the rule of the metropole and remained lands where the original inhabitants formed the vast majority. At the same time, it also differs from cases where many people came to lands where the original inhabitants were few and had not formed a stratified society, and by driving out or killing the indigenous people and making the land their own, the colony became a country where the arrivals formed the majority upon independence (settler-type societies). (The above discussion is my own summary of Hitoshi Takahashi's argument.) In regions where there are many people brought from Africa as slaves, including Brazil, it is thought that societies with similar characteristics were formed, with people of African descent in a position similar to that of indigenous people. In those countries, it has been widely pointed out that a concept of nation centered on the aforementioned hybridity was formed. That would be a concept in which nativism is unlikely to become important. In that sense, if limited to Latin America, Filc's argument has a certain degree of persuasiveness.

However, Argentine society (the dominant part of it)—which produced the most typical populism, and where that populism did not have nativism, and which Filc introduces as a major case—has a settler-type character (this could include the fact that many people came from Europe, mainly Italians, from the late 19th century to the early 20th century after independence). While the aforementioned concept of nation is the official ideology in many Latin American countries, in Argentina, the concept of one's country as a nation of European-descended people is held quite widely, not limited to the Europeanism of the elite. Perón's populism also advocated the hybridity of the nation, perhaps in opposition to the fact that the elite's (and middle class's) contempt for the poor people in the interior or those who came to the cities from there included racist elements, but the core of that claim was anti-imperialism (economic "anti-colonialism").

Exclusionary nativism is not limited to "countries that held colonies / Western Europe" as Filc implies, but is seen in Europe in general and other developed countries. It might be possible to maintain and expand his argument by generalizing Filc's "colonialism" as an "exclusionary concept of nation linked to racism." However, Filc's argument, which fails to see the exceptionality of Latin America as a colony, is difficult to maintain regarding developing countries. By identifying racism, which views those of European descent as superior, with "colonialism in a broad economic sense," which means economic exploitation, he forces a categorization of two different things into a contrast on the same dimension of colonialism versus anti-colonialism. These two things are the "leftist nature that opposes economic inequality both internationally and domestically" seen in the first and third waves of Latin American populism (and leftist populism in developed countries) and the "emphasis on identity" held by the right-wing populism that makes up much of developed country populism, even though they are not contrasts on the same dimension (the argument of Mudde and others introduced later emphasizes that they are of different dimensions). (Furthermore, the argument that there is "inclusive nativism" in Latin America would also be misleading.)

In other words, Latin American populism suggests that if another element that attacks the elite and gains popularity among the masses is important, that element becomes the core of successful populist claims, and the concept of nation is not important (Perón's populism makes it clearer—due to Argentina's exceptionality within Latin America—that leftist populism in Latin America does not make anti-racism a major element). The dichotomy of Mizushima, Mudde, and others can be interpreted as such an argument. If there are many people who are "excluded" in the order dominated by the elite, then naturally "anti-exclusion," i.e., "inclusion," becomes the appeal of populism. And in cases where one appeals to people who assume a political society that includes themselves and think it is being threatened from the outside, the conflict with the elite is not schematized as "a small number of included people vs. a large number of excluded people," so competition with other ideas about the country's problems is likely to arise, and the number of people who accept populist claims is likely to be smaller.

However, one can question the fact that, particularly in the argument of Mudde and others, which has strong simplification even among the dichotomies of populism, the difference is sought in the fact that "Latin American countries are not yet economically wealthy." In the theorization of Mudde and others, while post-material identity is important in Europe, material distribution is said to still be important for many people in Latin America. In that argument, because people who lack political representation in the form of political parties and are placed in a low social and conceptual status are also economically poor, it is taken for granted that populist appeals to correct social and political exclusion are linked to the advocacy and implementation of objectively redistributive policies. I mentioned that error earlier. Second-wave populism, which lacks a leftist nature that emphasizes economic distribution, also appealed to being the representative of the popular masses without the exclusion of "others viewed as inferior." The existence of people who feel they are being excluded would be considered important. Both Menem and Fujimori gathered support at the time of presidential elections because they were expected to implement policies opposite to neoliberalism, and the fact that they turned to neoliberal policies after gaining power can be cited as evidence of the commonality held by Latin American populism.

As stated above, the second core element of the inclusivity of Latin American populism can be said to appear in the fact that the character of support for populist leaders is more strongly concentrated among the poor, and that support becomes more widespread for that stratum. The fact that movements that take power at the national level are more numerous than in Europe is also related to this characteristic (it is also clear that the fact that Latin American countries are generally presidential systems is important as a reason why they often take power). The premise for this is that there were many people who considered themselves socially and politically excluded. However, as shown by the fact that it does not correspond one-to-one with economic policy, this cannot be understood through a simple schema like that of Mudde and others, where there are many poor people or "modernization" is delayed. One should consider that the historical context in which a large number of people who consider themselves excluded and have strong dissatisfaction exist in society is important.

By focusing on periods when social strata that lacked political representation and considered themselves socially excluded existed widely, one can explain why populism appeared as waves and why there were cases that did not necessarily coincide with "economic inclusion." In typical cases of the first wave, especially in Perón's populism, factory workers were important. In that explanation, the dominant argument was that the support base was the so-called "easily manipulated masses" who came to the cities due to the progress of industrialization, lost their previous social ties, and were easily attracted to simple appeals. As the fact that labor unions supported Perón was verified, that argument came to be strongly criticized (regarding research trends, see various works by Hiroshi Matsushita). However, it cannot be denied that there were large numbers of people who thought they had lacked political representation and had been socially discriminated against until then, and who strongly supported Perón, who presented himself as their representative. It is a conventional understanding that first-wave populism is based on the development of light industry (with populism in Ecuador as a partial exception).

From the second wave onward, many studies have clarified that the main support base for populism is people in the so-called informal sector who are not regular workers, and the unemployed. On the premise that democracy had become continuous, and against the background of socio-economic changes (two sides of the same coin as globalization) in which that stratum expanded while established major political parties did not represent those people, leaders who appealed to the dissatisfaction of such people gathered support. Menem and Fujimori, who took power and carried out neoliberal reforms in accordance with the demands of the times and succeeded temporarily in economic growth and solving inflation, were able to maintain broad support for a certain period. In periods when the cause of economic difficulties came to be recognized as neoliberalism, leaders who appealed to being representatives of the popular masses by emphasizing anti-neoliberalism in their policy claims gathered broad support, centered on people in the informal sector.

(Among those mentioned, only specific English-language literature)

Dani Filc, “Latin American Inclusive and European Exclusionary Populism: Colonialism as an Explanation,” Journal of Political Ideologies, Vol.20, No.3 (2015), pp.263-83.

Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America,” Government and Opposition, Vol.48, No.2 (2013), pp.147-74.