Published papers

Japan's foreign and defence policy is changing in response to new developments in the regional security environment and in the wider international arena. As Tokyo looks to strengthen its relationship with Western partners and especially NATO, the EU and their member states, the UK appears a natural choice both in itself and as a link to Europe. Michito Tsuruoka analyses the many strategic considerations driving Japan's efforts to build stronger partnerships in the defence and security field and explores what the UK can do to strengthen its engagement in Asia. © 2013 RUSI.

In January 1999, the biggest project in the history of European integration, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), was realized and a dream of having a single European currency finally came true. The achievement of it was neither foreordained nor just a logical consequence of market integration in the EC. It was rather a project highly political in nature. This article tries to explain the significant initial phases of the political process to create a European single currency from the early 1988 to the end of 1989. In January and February 1988, some proposals for a monetary union in the EC were aired by the French, Italian, and German ministers, which were, however, rather vague in content and proposed mainly as political balloons at the time. But two years later in Strasbourg in December 1989, the leaders of the European Communities came to the agreement to convene an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to draw a new treaty on EMU, which was to begin its work by the end of 1990. Why and in what ways was such a great leap from just a vague balloon to the concrete agreement to revise a treaty made possible during this relatively brief period of less than two years? What has changed the nature of the EMU discussions? The main line of argument is as follows. When some calls for EMU notably the Balladur Memorandum were tabled and the discussions on its possibility became lively in the early 1988, there was no political commitment to the realization of EMU at all. Though the subsequent decision in Hanover in June that year to create a so-called Delors Committee on the study of EMU, and the approval of the Committee's report at the Madrid European Council meeting in June 1989 were of course significant steps forward, they by no means determined or ensured the way to the single currency. In fact, the Madrid summit failed to set a date to convene the IGC to make a new treaty on EMU. We had to wait six more months to have a concrete political commitment to EMU from Paris and Bonn, the two most significant actors on this issue. And the decision at the Strasbourg European Council in December 1989 to start an IGC by the end of 1990 made the road to EMU irreversible. Leading up to the Strasbourg agreement, the ever-accelerating upheavals in the Communist countries in the East, the eventual fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, and the ensuing acceleration of the issue of German unification all played the significant role of stimulating the emergence of the political commitment to EMU. The situation under which the issue of EMU was discussed thus went through a radical change, which inevitably influenced the positions and perceptions of the actors. As the political commitment particularly by France and West Germany emerged in the fall of 1989, the road to EMU became irreversible, which was a great leap from the situation of two years earlier.

田中俊郎教授退職記念号はじめに一 「ベルリン・プラス」における棲み分けの論理二 時代遅れになった「ベルリン・プラス」 : 新たな状況と課題おわりに

Common foreign, security and defence policy has become one of the main pillars of the European Union. Given the nature of European integration that had more or less focused on economic fields for several decades, this is a new phenomenon. The governing principle of the areas of foreign, security and defence policy cooperation in Europe has been intergovernmentalism, featuring the unanimity principle (which essentially guarantees national veto) and a limited role for supranational institutions like the European Commission. Despite the fact that successive treaty revisions brought more power for the Commission and the European Parliament, the basic principle of foreign, security and defence policy of the Union remains to be guided by intergovernmentalism. However, this does not mean that the practice of foreign, security and defence policy in the EU has never changed. On the contrary, while maintaining the principle of intergovernmentalism, exemplified by policy and decision-making process that is different from the 'first pillar' even under the Lisbon Treaty, the practice has undergone substantial changes over the past few decades. This article, first, revisits the tradition of intergovernmentalism in foreign, security and defence policy cooperation in the context of European integration, and second, examines various aspects of transformations of the intergovernmental principles that can be observed today. The main purpose of this article is to shed a new light on intergovernmentalism and to chart new research agendas in the field. Such models/theories as 'intensive transgovernmentalism' (Helen Wallace) and 'constrained intergovernmentalism' (Catherine Gegout) as well as the idea of Europeanization and socialization all preset fresh looks at the area. This article also argues that policy models developed in the context of internal policy such as OMC (open method of coordination) can also be applied to foreign, security and defence policy. At the same time, the practice of pragmatic cooperation seen particularly in the ESDP/CSDP field can be applied to other fields as well. More interactions between models/theories traditionally applied to internal policy and those on external relations are necessary more than ever before.

Since the 9/11 attacks, Japan has entered a new period of co-operation with NATO - but little analysis in the English literature exists on this topic. There has been a swath of joint work, ranging from political engagement to military education and operations in Afghanistan. While partnership between a Pacific power and Atlantic military alliance might not seem obvious, in fact both have much to gain from this emerging relationship, argues Michito Tsuruoka. © RUSI JOURNAL DECEMBER 2012.