Kurino, Morimitsu

My research field is market design. Here, “markets” are understood broadly to include not only transactions based on prices, but also allocation mechanisms without prices, encompassing a wide range of socio-economic institutions. Market design builds on microeconomic theory and game theory, with the goal of designing and improving real-world institutions. In addition to theoretical analysis, I evaluate institutions using simulations and laboratory and field experiments. My work has primarily focused on the design of matching markets. Prominent examples of matching markets include the assignment of medical residents to hospitals, school choice systems, student-school matching in high school and college admissions, organ allocation between donors and recipients, and professional sports draft systems. In recent years, I have studied the design of organ exchange programs for lung transplantation in Japan and the assignment system for students’program choices at universities. More recently, I have expanded my research to new frontiers in market design driven by advances in quantum and digital technologies. In particular, I explore how quantum computing and quantum networks can address large-scale and complex allocation problems that have traditionally been computationally intractable. I am also interested in market design for smart energy systems, where the increasing penetration of renewable energy and the adoption of electric vehicles call for efficient allocation and coordination of distributed energy resources. Through these research directions, my aim is to contribute to the design of next-generation socio-economic systems that achieve fairness, efficiency, and incentive compatibility.

• Market Design

Economic theory