Yasuhiro Matsuda: Moments When China-Taiwan Relations Move, and Moments When They Stop

Last July, I published "China and Taiwan: The Politics of Crisis and Equilibrium" from Keio University Press. I conducted an interdisciplinary analysis of modern China-Taiwan relations and strove for an easy-to-understand description.

When I was young, I had few opportunities for overseas business trips, and I relied solely on reading official documents. However, reading documents is just as enjoyable as traveling. This is because I occasionally encounter interesting, decisive moments.

Following Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States in 1995 and the subsequent Taiwan Strait Crisis, the mechanism for practical consultations between China and Taiwan was suspended. The restoration of dialogue between the two sides seemed hopeless. However, there was a slight change in the phrasing used in the "People's Daily." Immediately after the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in September 1997, a certain high-ranking official used the unfamiliar expression "proceeding with arrangements for the procedures of cross-strait political negotiations."

When I brought this up at a study group and reported that "it seems China wants to restore dialogue with Taiwan," I was laughed off with comments like, "There are no such signs at all. China is maintaining its hardline stance toward Taiwan."

However, this was indeed the keyword for restoring dialogue. This change in phrasing, which appeared just before Jiang Zemin's visit to the U.S., was a precursor to the second Wang Daohan-Koo Chen-fu meeting that took place in October 1998. I learned research methods for Chinese political history from my mentor, Professor Tatsuo Yamada, at the Keio graduate school. I strongly felt the power of those methods then.

Later, in 1999, Jiang Zemin was angered by Lee Teng-hui's "special state-to-state relations" statement and cut off dialogue with Taiwan again. With the establishment of the Democratic Progressive Party administration under Chen Shui-bian, a supporter of Taiwan independence, in May 2000, "peaceful reunification" through negotiations became unlikely for the time being. The focus shifted to what Jiang Zemin would do next.

At the Fifth Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 2000, Jiang Zemin stated that national reunification was one of the "three major tasks after entering the new century." However, at the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China in July 2001, Jiang rephrased this as the "three major tasks in the new century" (emphasis added). When I read this, I remember being excited, thinking, "Jiang Zemin has quietly postponed the deadline for reunification by nearly 100 years."

Will the day come when I find the moment in official documents where Xi Jinping effectively gives up on the "resolution" of the Taiwan issue? This is my secret pleasure as a researcher.