[Special Feature: Confronting the Gender Gap] Aspects of "Familialism" Obstructing Gender Equality

2020/04/06

In the "International Survey on Declining Birthrate Society" conducted by the Cabinet Office in fiscal 2015, when asked whether they thought their country was a "good place to have and raise children," the percentage of people in Japan who answered "I strongly think so" was only 8%, the lowest among the four countries surveyed. What lies behind this sense of "constriction" regarding child-rearing? In this article, I would like to consider this by focusing on the "familialism" that remains deeply rooted in Japanese society.

For a long time in Japan, it was believed that the rise in women's employment rates caused the declining birthrate. However, many international surveys have now made it clear that this common belief regarding women's employment rates and the total fertility rate is incorrect. Based on EU data, Danish welfare sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen revealed that countries where women's employment is more widespread tend to have higher birthrates, and pointed out that there is even a correlation between employment rates and birthrates (The Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies, 1999).

In modern society, a keyword when thinking about the declining birthrate is "familialism" in welfare. "Familialism" here refers to a system in which the household is expected to bear the primary responsibility for the welfare of its members. It is a concept used to critically capture a society where the responsibility for care, such as childcare and nursing care, is forced upon the family both normatively and institutionally.

Ironically, family formation is stagnating in countries where "familialism" is strong. International comparative surveys show that countries with ultra-low birthrates include Japan, South Korea, and Southern European countries such as Italy and Spain. What these countries have in common is that "familialistic" norms and systems are deeply rooted. Familialism is suppressing both women's employment rates and birthrates.

In modern welfare policy, the "de-familialization" of care is a basic premise, and the question is how to reduce the dependence on families for care. Andersen also points out: "There is a widespread belief that externalizing family work will fundamentally destroy family bonds and damage the quality of home life. However, all data show exactly the opposite." In other words, in modern society, "traditional familialism" has become a hindrance to family formation. He presents the paradox that moving away from "familialism," which relies on the family for welfare, is precisely what strengthens "family bonds" (The Incomplete Revolution: Adapting to Women's New Roles, 2009).

Japan is a society where familialism is particularly strong, in the sense that the roles of the state and the market are limited and there is little support from relatives. This is also reflected in the fact that the financial scale of overall family policy is significantly smaller than in European countries. The first condition for achieving gender equality lies in moving away from the familialism of welfare.

Furthermore, Andersen says that "men's childcare" holds the key to increasing the birthrate. International comparative data shows that countries where men spend more time on housework and childcare, and countries with high childcare leave uptake rates, show high birthrates. Andersen emphasizes not only national welfare policies but also the improvement of relationships between couples, pointing out that in response to the "masculinization of women," the "feminization of men" is what is important. Anne-Marie Slaughter also states that for gender equality to be achieved, it is essential not only to support women's employment but also for "men to become providers of care." To achieve this, the value system of "masculinity" that emphasizes competition and the social significance of care work itself need to be re-evaluated (Unfinished Business: Women Men Work Family, 2015).

What is important is the introduction of various systems that allow for the balancing of work and childcare, and the creation of a childcare leave system to promote childcare by fathers. Many studies have already demonstrated that the degree of a father's involvement in childcare has a significant impact on the birth of children. For example, in Japanese single-income households, a second child is less likely to be born if the man works long hours, while in dual-income households, a second child is more likely to be born if the father spends more time on housework and childcare (Nagase and Brinton 2017). The key to the birth of a second child lies in men's working hours and housework/childcare hours.

Although the childcare leave uptake rate for Japanese men reached a record high of 6.16% in fiscal 2018, the level is extremely low from an international perspective, and the time men spend on childcare is the shortest among developed nations. The tendency to favor those who work long hours in the workplace remains strong, and a major factor is the lack of appreciation for men who take childcare leave.

What is needed to make men care providers? It goes without saying that appealing to the "ideal" of gender equality is important. However, we must also explore ways to "correct" men's awareness and behavior through institutional ingenuity. The number of men who "want to take childcare leave" has increased significantly in recent years. Nevertheless, the reason the actual uptake rate remains low is that even if there is a system, there is no culture for it.

The introduction of the "Daddy Quota" system was the catalyst for almost all men in North-Western European countries to start taking childcare leave. This system, which began in Norway in 1993, allows for a maximum of 59 weeks of childcare leave per child, with the requirement that 10 of those weeks be taken by the spouse. In fact, the uptake rate, which was only 5% before the introduction, improved to over 90%, and the birthrate also rose. While the details of the quota system vary by country, it is effective to change men's awareness and behavior by intentionally creating "role models" to correct disparities and designing systems and environments.

One factor hindering gender equality in Japan is a uniform and fixed view of the family. Let us call a view of the family that regards only a specific family form as "standard" and others as "deviant" or "pathological" as "standard familialism."

Looking abroad, partner relationships are diversifying. A symbolic phenomenon is the rise in the out-of-wedlock birthrate. As of 2012, the proportion of out-of-wedlock births in developed countries was 2.2% in Japan, whereas it accounted for more than half in countries like Sweden and France, and 30% to 50% in other countries. In other words, it is no longer self-evident that "married couples have children," and there are even countries where children born to married couples are now in the minority. Comparing developed countries, it can be seen that family formation is promoted in societies that recognize and support diverse partner relationships and their births and childcare, without being bound by legal marriage.

In terms of the diversification of partnerships, an even larger global change is the legalization of same-sex marriage. Starting with the Netherlands in 2000, marriage for same-sex couples is now recognized as completely equal to marriage for opposite-sex couples in more than 30 countries and regions worldwide. In 2014, the United Nations also clearly announced a statement that "same-sex marriage should be given the same rights as opposite-sex marriage." Child-rearing by lesbian and gay partners through adoption and assisted reproductive technology is also becoming common. The common sense of the "heteronormative family," which uses only male-female heterosexual couples as the foundation of family life, is heading toward disappearance.

In Japan as well, there is a need to move away from "standard familialism" and shift toward laws and policies that focus on the reality of care relationships regardless of "form." Not limited to the partner relationships mentioned above, countries that recognize and institutionally guarantee diverse forms of family formation and child-rearing, including single parents and non-biological parent-child relationships such as foster parents, tend to have higher birthrates.

In order to eliminate the "constriction" surrounding family life and provide diverse opportunities for people's life courses, it is also necessary to rethink the "way of living" that prescribes people's awareness and behavior.

In recent years, it has been pointed out that "familialism" regarding co-residence is related to the birthrate. Until now, research on late marriage and the declining birthrate has accumulated mainly from the perspectives of labor market instability and changes in individual family views and awareness. However, there is data showing that policies and culture regarding housing have a major impact on family formation, and the importance of "residential welfare" has been pointed out.

Let's refer to comparative data from OECD countries regarding household formation among young people (here, ages 25-34).

In North-Western European countries, where a high percentage of young people form independent households from their parents as householders or their spouses (including cohabitation), there is a strong norm that one should leave the parental home upon becoming an adult. In Sweden and Finland, more than 95% of young people live independently from their parents. Countries with low parent-child co-residence rates are characterized by high birthrates, and housing support is substantial, such as high public rental rates and housing allowances.

On the other hand, there are countries where young people tend to stay with their parents even after graduation. In addition to Japan, this includes Southern European countries such as Italy and Spain. In these countries, approximately 40% of young people live in their parents' households. Behind this is a tradition of viewing parent-child co-residence positively, but also the fact that mutual aid within the family is taken for granted and public housing support is poor. And they share the commonality of low birthrates. In societies where mutual aid within the family is expected, such as Japan and Southern Europe, there is also a strong tendency for young people who have become economically unstable to return to their parents' homes.

While there can be various discussions about the declining birthrate and the pros and cons of parent-child co-residence, providing diverse "ways of living" and options for communal living and having society guarantee them has become an urgent task for maintaining and developing society. It is necessary not only to focus on partner relationships but also to rethink common sense regarding co-residence and communal living.

A familialistic society is, in other words, a society where the people one can depend on are limited to family. In reality, although diverse forms of mutual aid and possibilities for cooperative relationships exist, familialistic stereotypes may be narrowing the range of our imagination. Although there are various types of support such as single-parent support, childcare support, women's employment support, and elderly support, the difficulty in practices that connect these various types of support is also because familialistic premises prescribe our thinking. Even if we try to create a system where diverse generations and people with diverse difficulties cooperate, the walls of social systems and administration bound by the illusion of the "standard family" stand in the way. It is important to move away from the "familialism" that has permeated every corner of society and envision a new sense of community and publicness.

At the same time, we are required not only to expand such public welfare but also to rethink and reconstruct the "private connections" that we consider common sense. In her critique of modern family policy, gender legal scholar Martha A. Fineman criticizes those who "assume that function is determined by form" and argues that policies should be established that emphasize the "functions we want the family to perform" rather than the "form of the family." She also states that "there is no doubt that one of the most important functions imposed on the family is care" (The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency, 2004). In modern times, we must idealize the family not as a "form" but as a "strong unit of care" and rethink relationships from the perspective of "function."

Perhaps by moving away from the "familialistic" framework, ways to resolve various social problems existing in modern Japan will open up. In doing so, it will be necessary to focus on the "shortages" and "surpluses" of resources that people have, without being bound by conventional common sense, and connect people based on their needs.

New attempts have already begun. Examples of such practices include communal living between single parents, shared housing between single mothers and single elderly people, and home-sharing where single elderly people living in houses and students live together. Governments and companies are also gradually beginning to realize the limits of policies and businesses targeted only at the conventional "standard family" and are starting initiatives that look at diverse relationships.

Negative opinions such as "it's not realistic," "it can't possibly work," or "not everyone wants that" will likely be directed at these new forms of communal living and cooperative relationships. However, society cannot be changed if we take the existing "reality" and the "preferences" of people formed based on it as a given. People cannot bear to live with the disappointment that "preferences were not satisfied," and they often adapt their preferences to the reality in which they are placed.

The fact that conventional methods are not working is the reason why these proposals and practices are being born, and policies based on a long-term perspective are needed to transform the very foundation of individual "preferences" and "choices." By society providing diverse options for connections for people to cooperate, a new culture will be created, and changes should also occur in people's preferences. What is required is the design of communal living and institutional support that is not bound by traditional gender roles, family functions, or even legal marriage, sexual relationships, or biological relationships.