[Feature: America "After Trump"] Regime Change in America as Seen from the Middle East

2021/02/05

The U.S. presidential election was a focus of attention in the Middle East as well. Throughout the campaign, Middle Eastern media, including Arabic-language outlets, reported daily and in detail on the movements of Republican incumbent President Trump and Democratic candidate Joe Biden. This is, of course, because it is believed that changes in U.S. policy toward the Middle East actually exert a profound influence on Middle Eastern countries.

U.S. Middle East policy has transitioned through various eras: beginning with the post-WWII policy of protecting Israel and the supply of Middle Eastern oil; the two-pillar policy (Over-the-Horizon policy) of the Cold War era; the Carter Doctrine, which declared U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region to be of vital importance; the dual containment policy of restraining Iran and Iraq after the Gulf War; and the War on Terror following the September 11 attacks. In U.S. Middle East diplomacy, friends and foes have frequently swapped places depending on the progression of regional circumstances, and the regional power map and correlation charts have undergone kaleidoscopic changes, much like Japan's Warring States period.

On the other hand, Middle Eastern countries also believe that the Middle East region occupies an extremely important position for the United States. In particular, many people in the Middle East shared the perception that the U.S. would never leave the region in order to protect Israel, its greatest ally in the Middle East, and to secure oil, the lifeblood of the economy.

Furthermore, from the perspective of Middle Eastern countries, the U.S. presence in the region had meaning. Especially for the sparsely populated Gulf Arab states, a presence like the United States—which possesses formidable military power but lacks territorial ambitions—was indispensable for security to protect themselves from regional powers with territorial ambitions.

Paradoxically, the same can be said for anti-American countries. For anti-American nations, the presence of the U.S. (and Israel) in the Middle East served as a convenient excuse to justify their own undemocratic and inhumane authoritarian politics. Additionally, in countries that adopted a wartime footing and built various military organizations for that purpose, the existence of an enemy was necessary; to maintain and develop such organizations, the existence of a powerful enemy like the United States was indispensable.

However, by the 1990s, the arch-rival Soviet Union had already vanished, a relaxation of tensions was seen between the clashing nations of Iran and Saudi Arabia, and signs of a resolution to Middle East peace appeared with the Oslo Accords. Consequently, the necessity for U.S. involvement in the Middle East was decreasing, and the American public was losing interest in the region.

On the other hand, the September 11 attacks occurred in 2001, leading the U.S. to declare a War on Terror and overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which harbored the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda. Furthermore, the fact that the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks were from pro-American countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) was a shock to the U.S. administration. Forces known as "neocons" began to play a major role within the White House, and a foreign policy emphasizing ideals—such as prioritizing Israel and expanding democracy—gained influence, leading to the toppling of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003. The United States was dragged back into the Middle East once again. Moreover, as a result of the Iraq War, a pro-Iranian Shia government was born in Iraq, which conversely expanded Iran's influence in the Middle East.

Regarding Iran, suspicions of nuclear weapons development surfaced in the early 2000s, and the confrontation between Iran and the U.S./Israel intensified to a hair-trigger situation involving the international community. This was also true for the Gulf states neighboring Iran. Due to nuclear suspicions and the expansion of Iranian influence in the Arab world, Gulf Arab states like Saudi Arabia reverted instantly from the detente of the 90s back to a Cold War era. However, it was the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed in 2015 during the Obama administration, that eased those tensions to some extent.

Nevertheless, with the so-called "Arab Spring" starting in late 2010, long-term dictatorships in the Middle East collapsed one after another. When power vacuums were subsequently created, the terrorist organization "Islamic State" (IS) began to run rampant not only within the region but across the globe. Furthermore, during this time, many pro-American Arab nations developed a strong sense of distrust, believing the Obama administration had stood by and watched the collapse of pro-American regimes, such as the Mubarak regime in Egypt, without doing anything.

On the other hand, dissatisfaction grew over the fact that the U.S. did not take a hardline stance against the Assad regime in Syria, which had fallen into a state of de facto civil war and was oppressing its own citizens; voices from Gulf Arab states criticized the Obama administration as weak-kneed. Simultaneously, they grew increasingly wary of Iran further extending its influence into Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq by taking advantage of the destabilization of the Arab region.

Furthermore, triggered by the start of the shale oil industry in the U.S. around 2003, the importance of Middle Eastern oil to the U.S. economy began to decline. As oil—the vital element linking the U.S. and the Middle East—weakened, cracks gradually appeared between the U.S. and pro-American Middle Eastern countries (most of which are oil producers). Meanwhile, criticism of fossil fuels as the culprit of global warming intensified, which also affected U.S.-Middle East relations mediated by oil.

It was into this environment that President Trump emerged. From a position of rejecting the Obama administration, he overturned Obama's legacies across the board, withdrew from the JCPOA in 2017, and began applying "maximum pressure" on Iran. Furthermore, to reinforce this anti-Iran policy, the Trump administration involved Arab countries that shared an anti-Iran stance. By turning a blind eye to human rights violations and exporting state-of-the-art weapons, he kept countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE in his camp, brought them closer to their arch-enemy Israel, and attempted to build a new anti-Iran encirclement. It is symbolic that President Trump's first overseas trip after taking office was to Saudi Arabia.

In response, although physical evidence is insufficient, it is said that Iran used various pawns to carry out attacks targeting the interests of the U.S. and regional pro-American countries in and around the Persian Gulf. Behind this was the Quds Force, responsible for external operations within Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. In January 2020, the U.S. military assassinated the commander of the Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani, in Iraq. This increased the possibility of an armed conflict between Iran and the U.S., but it was somehow avoided.

On the other hand, the Palestinian issue, long a pillar of U.S. Middle East policy, gradually lost the interest of the U.S. administration after Palestinian autonomy began with the Oslo Accords. Particularly under the Trump administration, the stance became unilaterally pro-Israel, and consideration for Palestine was lacking. During the Trump era, it is said that presidential aides—notably Senior Advisor to the President Jared Kushner, the President's son-in-law and an Orthodox Jew—were at the core of Middle East policy planning. Kushner is said to have played a major role in the relocation of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, the "Deal of the Century" regarding Middle East peace, and the normalization agreements between Israel and Arab countries, starting with the UAE.

Regardless of the evaluation, it cannot be denied that the Trump administration brought about significant changes regarding Middle East peace. However, these "achievements" do not appear to have been very useful in President Trump's election campaign. In fact, during the presidential election, Middle East issues were hardly ever a point of contention.

Biden also rarely touched upon Middle East issues during the campaign. As can be inferred from the fact that Biden himself once called himself a Zionist despite not being Jewish, he is an ardent supporter of Israel; therefore, he likely will not completely overturn Trump's achievements regarding Middle East peace, such as the embassy relocation to Jerusalem. Nonetheless, as an actual policy, it is highly probable that he will aim for the realization of a negotiated "two-state solution," which is the official Middle East peace policy of the Democratic Party, and take policies that show some consideration for the Palestinian side.

The shift in the weight of U.S. Middle East policy from the Israel-Palestine issue toward the Persian Gulf has been a long-term trend, and even in the Biden administration, it is Gulf policy that is most likely to change visibly. For example, while the Trump administration took a hardline policy toward Iran with regime change in mind, Biden has clearly stated a return to the JCPOA. Both Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan in the new administration were involved in Iran policy during the Obama era, so the personnel structure for a U.S. return to the JCPOA is in place. However, to achieve this, in addition to abolishing the "maximum pressure" imposed by Trump, the nuclear development that Iran pursued in defiance of regulations after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA must also be rolled back, which is a considerably high hurdle. In fact, the Iranian side is attempting to raise uranium enrichment to 20% in defiance of the nuclear deal.

There will also likely be backlash from the most important allies in the Middle East during the Trump era, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, which are in conflict with Iran. There are also reports of the possibility of involving Saudi Arabia and others in a new JCPOA. In any case, it is unlikely that the Biden administration will tolerate Iran's "intervention in Arab countries." It is difficult to imagine that the U.S. will immediately take concrete steps toward improving relations with Iran.

On the other hand, the concerns of Arab countries include the fact that President Biden is interested in human rights and the environment. Most countries in the Middle East have non-democratic political systems. During the Trump era, they could hope for a blind eye by purchasing large quantities of weapons or investing massive funds into lobbying activities, but it is unclear whether that will work under the Biden administration. In particular, the Gulf Arab states that had built a solid friendly relationship with the Trump administration may be trembling with fear.

Perhaps already anticipating the Biden administration, Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar have launched policies that—while not exactly democratization—show consideration for the human rights of foreign workers, relax religious restrictions, and expand the political participation of their citizens.

However, this does not mean that these measures are sufficient. Regarding Saudi Arabia in particular, President Biden, with the murder of a Saudi journalist in the fall of 2018 in mind, has asserted, "I am not going to sell any more weapons to (Saudi Arabia), and I will make them pay the price (for the journalist's murder)," and has also said, "I intend to end support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen."

In the case of Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist based in the U.S. who criticized the policies of Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) and was murdered inside the Saudi Consulate General in the ancient Turkish city of Istanbul, the theory that MbS himself was involved remains strong in Western media. If the U.S. were to strictly hold MbS accountable, it is obvious that relations between the two countries would sour. For Saudi Arabia as well, a deterioration of relations with the U.S. could have a negative impact both in terms of security and the post-oil dependency reforms initiated by MbS, so it is not a wise move.

However, there are not many options available to Saudi Arabia that the Biden administration is likely to find acceptable. The most promising would be a breakthrough in the Yemen conflict, which Biden also mentions. If Yemen moves toward a resolution, the humanitarian crisis said to be the worst of this century (about which the West has expressed extremely strong concern) would likely improve, and relations between the Saudi-UAE coalition and Iran might also get a little better. However, the Yemen conflict is extremely complex, and it is unlikely to be resolved so easily.

Furthermore, with the expansion of shale oil development, the United States has already become the world's top crude oil producer. The "special relationship" based on the exchange of oil and security between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. since the 1940s has transformed significantly. However, many countries still depend on Middle Eastern oil, and if a giant oil producer like Saudi Arabia were to become unstable and the supply of oil were to be interrupted, the global economy could fall into chaos, which would also have a negative impact on the United States.

Gulf Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, were concerned that if Biden became president, he would follow the policies of the Obama administration, which responded conciliation toward Iran and sought to distance itself from Arab countries. For the Biden administration to avoid wanting to improve relations with Iran and to continue an unwavering commitment to Israel's security, a solid relationship with Arab countries is essential. To achieve this, Biden must convince the Arab countries that rejoining the JCPOA—his campaign promise—and reconciliation with Iran are separate things, and that the U.S. will prevent Iranian interference in the Arab world.

When Biden's victory became certain, many Middle Eastern Arab countries immediately expressed their congratulations, but the expressions of congratulations from Saudi Arabia and Israel were delayed. Both countries eventually offered proper congratulations, but a sense of wariness toward President Biden can be glimpsed in this delay as well.

Furthermore, President Trump continued his involvement in the Middle East even after his defeat in the presidential election became almost certain. In November, it was reported that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu secretly visited Saudi Arabia, and U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo was also said to be present (the Saudi side denied this). Already, through Trump's mediation, the UAE, Bahrain, and Sudan have agreed to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel, followed by Morocco in December. From Israel's perspective, whether Saudi Arabia—which considers itself the leader of the Arab and Islamic world—will follow suit is extremely important for Israel's diplomacy and is on a different level than the cases of other countries. It also remains to be seen whether this will be the final summation of Trump's diplomacy or be carried over into the Biden era.

On the other hand, in the so-called "Qatar Crisis," where Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt severed diplomatic ties and imposed an economic blockade on Qatar in 2017, the U.S., along with Kuwait, has been mediating the improvement of relations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. In fact, at the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit at the beginning of the year, the four countries including Saudi Arabia announced the restoration of diplomatic relations with Qatar. It is unclear whether this will lead to a complete resolution, but such positive movements are expected to continue under the Biden administration.

Furthermore, regarding the War on Terror, Biden himself has stated that the majority of troops should be withdrawn from Afghanistan and the Middle East, and the mission should be limited to the annihilation of Al-Qaeda and IS. This policy itself is no different from that of the Trump administration. In fact, even after his defeat was reported, Trump announced that he would reduce the number of U.S. troops stationed in Afghanistan and Iraq to 2,500 each by January 15, just before the inauguration, and he actually carried this out. The withdrawal of U.S. troops stationed in Afghanistan and elsewhere was an important campaign promise for President Trump, but in reality, it also raises the possibility that terrorist organizations and anti-government armed groups will revive, increasing the threat to the U.S. and the governments concerned. For this reason, voices of concern were raised not only by the military but also by the Republican Party and related countries. Suddenly executing a campaign promise that had been neglected for four years at a time when his term was nearing its end could also narrow the policy options for the War on Terror to be inherited by the next administration.

In 2020, Gulf countries suffered serious damage, such as the collapse of oil prices due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and China has been launching a diplomatic offensive by taking advantage of that gap. It is difficult to imagine that they will change their pillar of security from the U.S. to China, but if the Biden administration takes a cold attitude, China's presence will likely grow even larger. For Japan, whose economic presence in the Middle East is shrinking, this is not someone else's problem.