[Feature: America "After Trump"] The New "Coopetition" Relationship Between China and the New Biden Administration

2021/02/05

In January 2021, Joe Biden will be inaugurated as U.S. President. Will the launch of the new administration bring about major changes in U.S.-China relations? The world is currently watching and debating this issue, which will influence future global affairs.

In this context, the Chinese government's "official view" regarding U.S.-China relations under the new Biden administration was presented. A few days after the announcement that the transition process to the Biden administration would begin, an essay by Fu Ying, Vice Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People's Congress of China, was published in the New York Times. She stated, "Even if competition between China and the United States is unavoidable, both governments need to manage it well through cooperation. While addressing each other's concerns, it is possible for the two countries to build a 'coopetition' (cooperation and competition) relationship.*1" Furthermore, in the same essay, while criticizing U.S. policy toward China, Fu Ying called for the establishment of mechanisms for strategic dialogue and the friendly management of potential crises, proposing that the two sides work hand-in-hand to cooperate on global issues such as pandemic response and climate change.

Fu Ying has long been a prominent figure in the Chinese government's external communications and has also served as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. Considering the essay was written by a high-ranking official in such a position and the timing of its publication, Fu Ying's contribution is generally perceived as a message from the Chinese government to the new Biden administration.

In fact, after this essay was published in the New York Times, Chinese domestic media, including state-run media such as Xinhua News Agency, began publishing commentaries and analyses of Fu Ying's essay all at once. Furthermore, early in the new year, Foreign Minister Wang Yi also spoke in an interview with domestic state-run media, stating that "U.S.-China relations have reached a crossroads" and emphasizing the need to resume dialogue and cooperation between the two countries.*2

In the series of messages from the Chinese government to the new Biden administration, specific areas where the U.S. and China can cooperate were also indicated. The most specific and logical summary of the necessity and framework for cooperation between the U.S. and China is a Xinhua editorial dated December 23, 2020. The editorial stated that the U.S. and China face three challenges: "dialogue," "cooperation," and "management of conflict," and listed COVID-19 response, stabilization of economic and trade relations, climate change, and people-to-people exchanges as areas where the U.S. and China can coordinate. The editorial also noted that there is room for cooperation in the fields of weapons of mass destruction, the Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues, counter-terrorism, and disaster relief.*3

Of course, the dialogue route with the United States proposed by China comes with conditions. A common point emphasized in Fu Ying's essay, Foreign Minister Wang Yi's remarks, and the Xinhua editorial is that "U.S. respect for China's political system and the Communist Party of China is the bottom line for U.S.-China cooperation."

Under the Trump administration, relations between the U.S. and China continued to deteriorate, appearing as if they had entered a New Cold War reminiscent of the former U.S.-Soviet Cold War. As bilateral tensions rise to the point of fierce exchanges not only in politics, diplomacy, and security, but also in the realms of economy, technology, and ideology, the Chinese government has proposed the construction of a new "coopetition" relationship.

Regarding the term "coopetition," whether in the English "coopetition" or the Chinese "jinghe," it carries a somewhat positive image. Consequently, when reporting on this new "coopetition" relationship proposed by the Chinese government, many media outlets discussed it with headlines to the effect of "This is an overture from China to the United States."

However, a careful observation of domestic reporting in China reveals that commentaries interpreting the new "coopetition" relationship are by no means optimistic. In China, the new "relationship of competition and cooperation" between the U.S. and China is understood as "competition that does not lead to grave consequences*4" (emphasis by the author). Fu Ying herself, during last year's U.S. presidential election, described the "coopetition" relationship between the U.S. and China as a "better destination.*5" According to Fu Ying, the U.S. side lacks the desire for cooperation, and all China can do is "persuade" the U.S. to cooperate.

In this way, the new "coopetition" relationship proposed by the Chinese government to the new Biden administration is, in reality, nothing more than a best-case scenario envisioned by China. In other words, regarding U.S.-China relations under the Biden administration, China is by no means optimistic and believes that even if the best-case scenario is achieved, competition will remain the mainstream.

China's strategy toward the U.S., which can be glimpsed behind the proposal of a "coopetition" relationship, can be summarized in one phrase, to borrow China's own expression: "fighting but not breaking." Looking at the history of relationship-building between the U.S. and China, this Chinese strategy toward the U.S. is not a novel approach. In fact, expressions such as "fighting but not breaking" or "fighting to the extent of not breaking" began to be used frequently in China during the early years of the Obama administration. The Obama administration shifted its foreign policy focus to the Asia-Pacific and actively promoted a strategic hedging policy toward China under the "Pivot to Asia" strategy. In response to these U.S. moves, the Hu Jintao administration at the time used the expression "fighting but not breaking*6" to appeal to rising domestic nationalism and demonstrate that the administration's foreign policy was not weak-kneed.

When the Trump administration was first inaugurated, China moved by inheriting the "fighting but not breaking" strategy. For this reason, after the two-day meeting between President Trump and President Xi Jinping in Palm Beach, Florida, in April 2017, mainstream media in China highly evaluated the clarification of dialogue channels as an achievement of the meeting, citing the agreement to utilize four dialogue mechanisms: "diplomacy and security, economy, cyber security, and social and people-to-people exchanges."

Under the Trump administration, the cooperative framework to prevent a break failed to function, and the mood of competition surrounding the U.S. and China only increased. Nevertheless, the reason China has revived a strategy from about ten years ago at this point is likely because Mr. Biden served as Vice President for eight years in the Obama administration and has a track record of launching many policy consultation mechanisms with China. However, unlike the Hu Jintao era, China's current strategy toward the U.S. places emphasis on "competition," and the U.S. and China will be "fighting to the extent of not breaking."

While imbuing the term "coopetition" with positive connotations, China recognizes in its heart of hearts that U.S.-China relations will remain difficult even under the new Biden administration. Nevertheless, toward this best-case scenario, the Chinese government took the initiative even before the birth of the new administration to send "proactive" signals, attempting to draw out a cooperative stance from the Biden administration. What drove these government actions was China's rising confidence and the need to buy time to build up its strength.

In the government work report issued at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Fifth Plenum) held in November 2020, a numerical target was set to bring per capita gross domestic product (GDP) to the level of moderately developed countries by 2035. In the 1980s, then-supreme leader Deng Xiaoping set a goal of basically realizing modernization by 2050, but the Xi Jinping administration is attempting to achieve the goal set by Deng Xiaoping 15 years ahead of schedule.

Regarding the future international order, the perception that it is moving toward a U.S.-China bipolar system is becoming mainstream in China. According to Yan Xuetong, a prominent international relations scholar, in ten years, no country's GDP will reach half or a quarter of that of the U.S. or China, and he predicts a world where the two superpowers, the U.S. and China, compete.*7

In line with this G2 theory, the international environment surrounding China has become harsher and U.S.-China confrontation has sharpened, but it is widely understood in China that this is a result of China's rising national power and a path that China must experience sooner or later. This point was first proposed by Zhang Yuyan, Director of the Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Zhang Yuyan was the only expert from the field of international relations to attend a symposium of experts hosted by Xi Jinping, and it goes without saying that his remarks reflect the official views of the administration.

That said, China currently faces a situation where it is being "strangled" by the United States in fields such as science and technology. To escape this predicament, the Chinese government has presented three keywords as the direction for future policy. That is, a policy aimed at catching up in advanced technologies such as semiconductors, centered on the 35 items under U.S. sanctions, and ensuring the stability and competitiveness of industrial supply chains through the strengthening of technologies in which China excels.*8 Then, at the Central Economic Work Conference held last December, a policy of "self-reliance and self-strengthening in science and technology" was established, and enhancing "self-reliance and self-strengthening" scientific and technological capabilities through a "whole-of-nation system" became an important national strategy. The most important task was to focus on areas that indicate the future direction of global scientific and technological development, such as artificial intelligence, quantum science and technology, integrated circuits (IC), life and health, brain science, genomic breeding, aerospace, and deep earth and deep sea.*9

In short, as tensions between the U.S. and China rise, China is aiming to create a supply chain that is not influenced by the United States in the field of advanced technology and to become a science and technology powerhouse through innovation. Through these efforts, it aims to create a G2 world order during a once-in-a-century period of transformation in the international order. This is the blueprint for China's national strategy. However, until China can stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States, it needs time to build up its strength, and for that purpose, a "coopetition" relationship with the United States is necessary.

On December 6, 2020, Xinhua News Agency published an article titled "The 'Osteomalacia' (Weakness) of 'Worshipping America' and 'Kneeling to America' Must Be Corrected."*10 In the article, it scathingly criticized rhetoric that compromises with the United States as having "not a shred of Chinese integrity or spirit." The timing of this article's publication coincided exactly with the Chinese government's call for cooperation with the United States. This suggests that while China recognizes that U.S.-China relations under the Biden administration will inevitably focus on competition, China itself is unlikely to compromise.

This hardline stance toward the United States is backed by the policy direction of the Xi Jinping administration. "Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy" is currently required to be studied and understood throughout China, and "cooperation through struggle" is emphasized as one of its key characteristics, stating that "we must fight thoroughly against any words or actions that harm China's core interests."*11 In September 2019, in remarks made during a visit to the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China, President Xi Jinping reportedly used the word "struggle" 58 times.*12 Against the backdrop of this domestic political atmosphere, many Chinese diplomats have appeared on the international stage who are eager to fight, ridiculed as "Wolf Warrior Diplomacy." This trend will likely continue after the emergence of the Biden administration, and the Chinese government will probably not compromise on important issues.

On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, in the Chinese government's messages to the United States, it has proposed identifying areas for early cooperation with the new administration and establishing cooperation mechanisms as a way to stabilize bilateral relations, stating that there is room for cooperation in COVID-19 response, stabilization of economic and trade relations, climate change, people-to-people exchanges, as well as weapons of mass destruction, the Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues, counter-terrorism, and disaster relief.

At the UN General Assembly held in September 2020, President Xi Jinping announced carbon neutrality, aiming to have carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions peak by 2030 and achieve net-zero CO2 emissions by 2060. Since entering the Xi Jinping era, China has emphasized domestic environmental issues and has shown proactive efforts to demonstrate global leadership on climate change issues. If the Biden administration responds to cooperation with China, U.S.-China coordination in this field holds the potential to produce significant results.

On the other hand, the Biden administration has already made clear its policy not to immediately abolish the 25% retaliatory tariffs imposed by the Trump administration on imports from China, and it is expected that it will also be difficult to lower the high hurdles regarding people-to-people exchanges set by the Trump administration amidst the technology competition unfolding between the U.S. and China. Bilateral tensions are likely to continue even in the fields of trade and people-to-people exchanges, which have historically played a role in stabilizing U.S.-China relations.

Amidst great attention on whether the WHO COVID-19 investigation team can enter Wuhan and to what extent the investigation can be conducted while excluding the influence of the Chinese government, there are far too many challenges that both the U.S. and China must clear, such as the sharing of infectious disease data.

Early in 2021, it was revealed that Iran had injected gas into centrifuges to increase enrichment levels. The Iranian nuclear issue has rapidly emerged as the most important diplomatic task to be addressed after the inauguration of the new Biden administration. In 2016, President Xi Jinping visited Iran, and the two countries established a comprehensive strategic partnership. Since then, negotiations have been underway between the two countries for an agreement to promote cooperation in fields such as infrastructure, finance, information and communications, and military affairs. China will reportedly invest a total of $400 billion in Iran over the next 25 years for nearly 100 infrastructure projects, port development, and the establishment of free trade zones.*13 As China and Iran rapidly draw closer, it remains to be seen how much the new Biden administration can extract concessions from the Xi Jinping administration.

In this way, U.S.-China relations under the new Biden administration are based on "fighting," and even the areas deemed possible for cooperation show signs of a rocky road ahead. The relationship between the two countries will be one of "fighting to the extent of not breaking," but the maneuvering is likely to be intense.

*1 Fu Ying, “Cooperative Competition is Possible between China and the U.S.”, The New York Times, Nov. 24, 2020. “Veteran Chinese Diplomat Fu Ying: Compete but also Cooperate”, Veteran Chinese diplomat Fu Ying: Compete but also cooperate - World - Chinadaily.com.cn

*2 "Wang Yi: U.S.-China Relations Reach a New Crossroads"

*3 "Xinhua Special Commentator: Only by Focusing on Cooperation Can China and the U.S. Move Toward a Better Future"

*4 "Fu Ying: Facing U.S. Provocations, China Should Consider 'Taking the Initiative'"

*6 "U.S.-China Leaders' Seoul Meeting: 'Fighting but Not Breaking'"

*7 "Yan Xuetong: Changes in the International Political Landscape in the Next Ten Years"

*10 "Xin Renping: The 'Osteomalacia' of 'Worshipping America' and 'Kneeling to America' Must Be Cured"

*11 "Distinctive Characteristics of Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy"

*12 "'Struggle'! This Speech by Xi Jinping Has Great Significance"

*13 “Defying U.S., China and Iran near Trade and Military Partnership”