[Feature: Considering Energy Security] Fumiaki Inagaki: The Ongoing Reorganization of the Former Soviet Space—From the Perspectives of Resource Geopolitics and Energy Security

2024/02/05

Nearly two years have passed since the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Unfortunately, it is still unclear how this tragedy will end. However, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia was not a sudden occurrence; it can be seen as a continuous movement to recover lost territory following the 2014 Russian invasion of Crimea. Furthermore, Ukraine and Russia have been in conflict over the supply of natural gas since even before that time. However, conflicts over energy supplies, such as natural gas in the former Soviet sphere, are not limited to the bilateral relationship between Russia and Ukraine but are observed elsewhere as well. Combined with Russia's movements to recover lost territory, this indicates that the reorganization of the order in the former Soviet space has been continuing without end since the dissolution of the Soviet Union (late 1991).

Here, I would like to examine the reorganization of the order in the former Soviet space from the perspectives of resource geopolitics and energy security, but first, I want to briefly organize the geopolitical perspective.

Halford Mackinder, often called the father of modern geopolitics, presented the "Heartland Theory" in the early 20th century, viewing international relations through the lens of conflict between continental powers (land power) and maritime powers (sea power). The Heartland described by Mackinder is the interior of the Eurasian continent, consisting of the Arctic Circle and the rivers that flow into it. Navigation in the frozen Arctic Ocean is difficult, and it is impossible to access the interior by sailing up rivers from the open sea. In other words, the Heartland is a region without direct access to the open sea, and he considered it to be in conflict with sea powers that conduct trade through the open ocean*1. This Heartland is almost identical to the territory of the former Soviet Union. The Russian Empire and its successor, the Soviet Union, as a land power, clashed with Great Britain, a sea power that controlled India and the Arabian Peninsula; their respective spheres of influence were established at the borders of Central Asia, Iran, and Afghanistan.

Thereafter, based on the Heartland Theory, the United States replaced Great Britain as the sea power resisting the southward expansion of the Soviet land power. The Soviet "invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979)" was a challenge by the land power Soviet Union against the sea power United States. Due to concerns over this Afghan invasion and prior Soviet intervention in the "Iranian Islamic Revolution," the United States announced the "Carter Doctrine" in 1980, stating a policy of using military force to counter Soviet intervention in the Middle East. In this way, Russia, a Heartland state with no outlet to the open sea, moved southward in search of one and clashed with sea powers. The territories gained through this Russian southward policy were institutionalized as states under the Soviet communist system and integrated into Russia.

Formally, the Soviet Union was a union of 15 republics, but in reality, it was a unitary state with a centralized system. Mackinder pointed out that nomads and horse-riding tribes traversed the southern part of the Heartland—the Central Asian region—becoming a threat to Europe, but as the "Silk Road" indicates, this land has been an East-West trade route since ancient times. However, under Russian rule, the role of the East-West trade route was closed, and a North-South vector formed the order of the Heartland. The dissolution of the Soviet Union meant that the Heartland was once again released to the East and West, and a reorganization of the order began. China's "Belt and Road Initiative" can be seen as one such movement.

On the other hand, the energy infrastructure developed as domestic infrastructure under the Soviet system organically linked the constituent republics and strengthened that unitary statehood. For example, while Kazakhstan is an oil-producing country, its refineries processed oil from Siberia rather than from Kazakhstan. Kazakh oil was sent to Russian refineries via pipelines. The same was true for power infrastructure. During the Soviet era, northern Kazakhstan was integrated into the Russian power grid, the "Unified Power System (UPS)," and was supplied with electricity from Russian power plants. Although there were power plants in Kazakhstan, there were no transmission lines between those plants and northern Kazakhstan; southern Kazakhstan was integrated into the "Central Asian Power System (CAPS)" along with the four other Central Asian countries. Within CAPS, power plants and consumption areas were also linked across national borders. For instance, Tajikistan's power plants are concentrated in the south of the country, but since transmission lines from those plants to the north were undeveloped, electricity had to be transmitted via neighboring Uzbekistan.

During the Soviet era, resources such as electricity, oil, and natural gas were distributed through this infrastructure according to instructions from the central government. However, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this energy infrastructure became international infrastructure requiring coordination between the states involved. Movements where supplier countries used energy resources as a diplomatic tool began to be seen. For example, in 1996, Russia stopped supplying electricity to Kazakhstan. This was triggered by Kazakhstan's refusal to accept electricity rate hikes accompanying power liberalization within Russia, but from Kazakhstan's perspective, it was perceived as diplomatic pressure. Additionally, Uzbekistan stopped supplying natural gas to neighboring Tajikistan in 2013. The reason was again unpaid fees, but the Tajik side viewed it as diplomatic pressure. This was because Tajikistan is located upstream from Uzbekistan, and the two countries were in conflict over water resource distribution. Furthermore, because the two countries were at odds over historical perceptions and territorial issues, negotiations on resource distribution did not proceed smoothly.

In this way, the dissolution of the Soviet Union turned its massive domestic infrastructure into international infrastructure. While interstate cooperation was essential for its maintenance, each country prioritized reorganizing it as domestic infrastructure contained within its own borders*2. However, this self-prioritization also became a cause of conflict with neighboring countries.

To begin with, the former Soviet states excluding Russia—especially the Central Asian countries—had no experience as independent states prior to the Soviet Union and lacked human resources; they were truly in a period of nation-building. While the EU was being born in Europe and internal borders were becoming less significant, borders appeared in the former Soviet space, and the role of the state along those borders was strengthened. For such nascent states, the instability of energy supply also threatened their legitimacy. The political change that occurred in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 was triggered by an increase in electricity rates, and the 2022 unrest in Kazakhstan, which led to the loss of power for the first president, Nazarbayev—who had been the leader since the Soviet era—was also sparked by an increase in LP gas prices. For resource-rich countries, energy security policy can be described as prioritizing domestic energy demand to strengthen public support while sometimes using those resources as a means of pressure against other countries.

On the other hand, Russia and the former Soviet states are international energy suppliers, and their energy security policies directly affect consumer countries such as Europe and Japan. Originally, the concept of energy security was a concept from the consumer side. Its origin is said to be when Great Britain changed the fuel for its warships from coal to heavy oil as a countermeasure against German U-boats (submarines) during World War I in the early 20th century. Britain aimed to increase the speed of its ships by using heavy oil to counter U-boats, but the supply route for oil then became an issue. In other words, unlike coal, oil had to be procured from locations far from the home country, and the stabilization of that supply became a challenge. Focusing on this stabilization of energy supply is called "classical energy security." Classical energy security came into focus after World War II, particularly during the first oil crisis (1973), when oil had also become an important energy source for the general public.

The oil embargo by Middle Eastern countries triggered by the Yom Kippur War led advanced nations to form the G7 and establish the International Energy Agency (IEA). The advanced nations, which were the primary consumers of oil, created a framework for collective action to ensure a stable supply of oil. Meanwhile, Japan promoted the development of new energy (geothermal, solar, hydrogen, coal liquefaction, etc.) and energy-saving technologies through the Sunshine Project (1974). European countries similarly worked on developing new energy while also approaching the Soviet Union to reduce their dependence on the Middle East. In this way, advanced nations sought stable supplies through the diversification of energy sources and supply locations. On the other hand, the Soviet Union exhibited the supplier side of energy security, using energy as a means of its own security, such as using energy as a tool to detach European countries from the United States.

However, this energy security is changing significantly today. European countries had strengthened their relations with the Soviet Union and its successor, Russia, for the sake of stable energy supply. However, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine destabilized that natural gas supply. Additionally, environmental issues, which were already a problem in the 1970s, shifted focus from pollution to global warming, and decarbonization also became a new target of energy security. Furthermore, as shown in Goal 7 of the "Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)" adopted by the United Nations in 2015, energy access also became an issue for energy security. This is the same problem seen in the aforementioned political changes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In other words, energy security since 2000 has come to include not just the stabilization of supply, but also new challenges such as global warming and providing an affordable and stable supply to the general public. This is called "new energy security."

On the other hand, this trend also affects the world view captured through geopolitics. The time when Mackinder proposed the Heartland Theory overlaps with the period when energy security was born, as mentioned earlier. In terms of energy trends, it was during the "Third Energy Revolution," when the shift from coal to oil began*3. Mackinder stated that the imbalance of growth between states changes due to differences in resource endowment and strategic advantages or disadvantages—namely the arrangement of land and sea, natural resources, and natural transportation routes—and considering the historical background, it is not difficult to imagine that the key resources at that time were oil and coal. Natural environments and geographical conditions, such as resource endowment and the arrangement of land and sea, can be called geopolitical conditions in terms of fossil fuel endowment and natural environmental conditions for access to them. And strategies based on those conditions can be called energy security.

However, Mackinder pointed out a lack of manpower as the reason why the horse-riding tribes and nomads who dominated the Heartland could not build a permanent empire, and he did not necessarily focus on resources. Indeed, even if resources exist, if there is no technology to utilize them, they are merely minerals rather than resources. It is technology that creates value in those resources, and the human resources that produce it. Furthermore, the nature of geopolitics will change depending on whether those human resources and technologies are classified as part of the natural environment or as part of strategy.

To begin with, what are resources? In international politics, resources are viewed as the source of power to change the policies of other countries to one's own advantage; not only natural resources like energy and materials, but also military power, economic power, and cultural elements such as norms and values are considered resources. Naturally, the endowment of fossil fuels is a resource that serves as this source of power. That is why OPEC, the international organization of oil-producing countries, has maintained a certain superiority by controlling oil production. Additionally, the technology to develop and utilize the resources mentioned earlier, and the human resources that create that technology, can also be called resources. Perhaps resources can be described as the raw materials and means (= technology) for creating a comfortable living environment. And 100 years ago, when geopolitics and energy security theory were born, the utilization of energy that could provide more heat was considered essential for a comfortable living environment, leading to the Third Energy Revolution. However, current comfort requires low greenhouse gas emissions, and the required resources are shifting from fossil fuels to decarbonized resources.

The author thinks of geopolitics, which organizes natural environments and geographical conditions, as the OS of a computer or smartphone, and energy security as an app that runs within that OS. Conventional resource geopolitics as an OS has been built around fossil fuels like oil and natural gas, and energy security can be seen as the thing that performs optimal resource procurement and utilization on that resource geopolitics OS. However, as the required resources change within the trend of decarbonization, the OS is inevitably updated, and energy security, the app, is also required to update. For example, China is a leading producer of mineral resources such as rare metals and rare earths necessary for renewable energy, and aspects of energy security policy naturally enter into strategies toward China.

On the other hand, if one asks whether the importance of the former Soviet sphere as the Heartland will decrease, it could be said that its importance is increasing even more, as the former Soviet sphere is blessed not only with oil and natural gas but also with base metals (copper, zinc, tin, etc.), precious metals (gold, silver, etc.), rare metals, and rare earths. For example, China is actively developing resources in Central Asia. Western countries also show interest in resource development in Central Asia, but the problem is the transport routes after development.

Transport routes from the former Soviet Heartland, especially Central Asia, have gone through either Russia or China, partly due to the situation in Afghanistan—a remnant of the competition between land and sea powers—and US-Iran relations. In that context, the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine war, which is a movement to reorganize the order of the former Soviet space, will leave a deep impact on energy security in terms of securing resources. The Japanese government is said to be seeking cooperative relationships with Central Asian countries in the field of renewable energy, but the development of transport routes is essential for importing mineral resources from Central Asia. In other words, relations with China are naturally important, but will Russia after the Russia-Ukraine war be a state that can build cooperative relations with the West and Japan? This is an important issue from the perspectives of resource geopolitics and energy security. And it can be said that the shift to renewable energy will exert new influences on the reorganization of the order in the former Soviet space.