[Feature: The Presidential Election and the Future of America] Roundtable Discussion: Structural Changes in America and the Impact of the Trump Administration

As you are aware, in the U.S. elections held in November 2024, former President Donald Trump successfully staged a comeback to the presidency, and the Republican Party secured majorities in both the House and Senate.

In this roundtable discussion, we would like to look back on this election and examine what U.S. politics, society, and its engagement with the world will look like under the second Trump administration.

First, I would like to consider the November election. A very unusual situation occurred in this presidential race. While Trump steadily won the nomination for the Republican Party, on the Democratic side, incumbent President Joe Biden initially sought re-election and secured the delegates necessary for the nomination in the primaries. However, following a lackluster performance in the June candidate debate, he ultimately withdrew from the race, and Vice President Kamala Harris took over as the candidate.

This created an unprecedented electoral dynamic: a former president versus the vice president of an administration whose leader declined the re-election nomination. I believe the change of candidates is a very important factor when considering the election. First, even if Biden's advanced age was viewed as a problem, how much had the Biden administration actually achieved over its four years?

The early stage of the administration was in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, and while I think the pandemic response was an achievement, crisis management rarely leaves a lasting mark on history.

The "Build Back Better" legislation for inflation reduction, which Biden campaigned on, also feels somewhat low-key. I think he handled things solidly from a practical standpoint, but more than that, because of his age, there was always a fear that something could happen at any time, and there were doubts from the beginning about whether there would be a second term.

The failure of the June debate was the decisive blow, but even before that, there were many instances where his words and actions caused unease. Personally, I found it rather surprising that he aimed for a second term in the first place.

There is talk that the electoral defeat was Biden's fault, but Biden originally stepped down due to pressure from those around him. Why was the candidate only able to be replaced in that manner, and how did the change ultimately turn out? Mr. Iida, what are your thoughts?

First, why was Biden pushed as the Democratic candidate? He is not someone who is passionately supported by everyone. The biggest reason he was put forward as a presidential candidate was the belief that he could win the election.

The reason Trump won in 2016 was that the white working class in the Midwestern battlegrounds moved to support him, and he secured those areas. Therefore, to beat Trump, the votes of the white working class in the Midwest were needed. At that time, being a "white male" was an important characteristic to be liked by the white working class; age was not seen as much of an issue, and Biden became the only candidate who could win.

All the other major candidates were clearly too far to the left and would lose votes. So, I think Biden was the compromise. However, his performance in the June debate was so poor that people moved to remove him, realizing it was impossible. Ultimately, by the time of the party convention, the Vice President was the most logical choice for a replacement candidate, and so it became Harris.

Then, the liberal media hurriedly joined forces to hype up Harris. In reality, she didn't have particularly boastful achievements as Vice President and was a faint presence even from the liberal side. Furthermore, in terms of the concerning white working-class demographic, her attributes were seen as hopeless. As a woman of color, there were concerns about whether she could get the white working-class vote, which I believe is why Walz became the vice-presidential candidate.

Ms. Karasudani, you have been observing America from the perspective of conspiracy theory research and the role of the media. Is there anything you have noticed?

I am not a specialist in American politics like the rest of you; my specialty is political communication research, and I have been thinking about media and politics while conducting sociological research. My primary area of interest is the theme of symbols and politics, and in that connection, I have studied conspiracy theories as a type of symbolism.

I was staying in the U.S. during the first Trump administration, and I was surprised that the liberal media did not reflect on anything even after losing the election. They just kept attacking Trump relentlessly. When I asked a researcher working at an American think tank, "Why doesn't the liberal media reflect?" they got angry and said, "It's offensive to be told to reflect on Trump at this point" (laughs). For people living in New York who had been shown his gossip for years, their perspective seemed to be different.

As just mentioned, there is talk that the liberals have not reflected, and some are saying that the liberals brought about their own destruction in this election.

So, how should we evaluate Harris, who took over? Ms. Mimaki, in your book published in 2023, you wrote that there were critical views of Harris even among liberals, particularly among young people. Overall, what did you think of Harris this time?

There is a debate over whether this result was a Trump landslide or a close race. Trump won in all the swing states and also won the popular vote by a narrow margin of 1.6 points. In the 2016 presidential election, Hillary won the popular vote. Harris fell considerably short of Biden's vote count in the 2020 election. Considering these factors, shouldn't we see it as a landslide or a complete victory for Trump? Within the Democratic Party, there are opinions that they could have won if the candidate swap had happened earlier through a more legitimate process like a mini-primary. However, facing the harsh reality that supporters are drifting away is what will lead to a recovery in the next election. If they focus solely on tactical discussions like "we could have won if we did this," they risk averting their eyes from the fundamental causes of the defeat.

This time, the departure from the Democratic Party by minorities, young people, and groups the party had considered its bedrock support base was made visible. In addition to white workers, Trump built up votes from minorities, especially Hispanic workers. While Gen Z (the generation born from the mid-1990s to around 2012) supported Harris overall, a majority of the men voted for Trump. This generation is seen as a liberal one with high interest in the environment and human rights; until a few years ago, there was even a view that the Democratic Party would enter a golden age as the Gen Z voter population increased, but this expectation was betrayed.

Immediately after the election results became clear, Senator Bernie Sanders, a heavyweight of the Democratic wing, posted on X: "It should come as no great surprise that a Democratic Party which has abandoned working class people would find that the working class has abandoned them." This statement needs to be taken seriously. Fundamentally, workers are becoming disillusioned with the Democratic Party. It's not necessarily that the Republican Party is putting forward better labor policies or has a track record of protecting workers.

However, if the Democratic Party has indeed faced the hardships of workers more properly than the Republican Party, then all the more reason to ask why that was not communicated to or appreciated by voters. Thinking about that from the voters' perspective will be the key to a comeback.

When Biden and Harris were asked about inflation, they replied, "The macroeconomy is good." Furthermore, in the September debate with Trump, Harris boasted that "Nobel Prize-winning economists and Goldman Sachs support our economic policies." The strength of the macroeconomy is a fact, and expert knowledge is important. However, in this election, voters were concerned with the fact that "it might be so statistically, but our lives are actually difficult."

Initially, Harris said she would make lowering the cost of living her top priority and proposed several specific measures, but as criticism of their feasibility and effectiveness emerged, she stopped talking about them as much. Amidst massive donations from corporations, criticism of big business also faded. In the latter half of the campaign, she pushed the threat to democracy and abortion rights to the forefront. While those are certainly important, they sounded somewhat abstract to people struggling to make ends meet.

Mr. Iida, your specialty is voting behavior theory. Looking at the results of exit polls and other data, how do you perceive this election compared to four years ago?

First, I agree with Ms. Mimaki's point that this was not a close race but a landslide for Trump. Everyone thought Trump might win the electoral vote but had no chance of winning the popular vote, and I thought so too. In that context, for the first time since Bush won in 2004 (if we look at the period since the 90s), the Republican Party also won the popular vote, so I think we can say Trump won by a landslide.

As for the cause, as Ms. Mimaki also mentioned, it is clearly the Hispanic vote. There is no other possibility. Looking at CNN exit polls and the like, the demographic whose voting behavior shifted most toward Trump between 2020 and 2024 was Hispanics, moving by 14 points. In 2020, only 32 percent of Hispanics and Latinos voted for Trump, but this time, 46 percent did. Also, the Catholic vote grew significantly, which is also an effect of Latinos and Hispanics moving to the Republican Party.

As for why they moved to the Republican Party, the cause is probably not the economy. Nor is it an aversion to Harris being a woman. While aversion to feminists is one factor for not voting for Harris among whites, it is different for Hispanics. So what is it? It's the immigration issue.

Until now, it was said that Hispanics were sympathetic to immigrants and critical of Trump. However, the situation has changed. When caravans of immigrants started coming from Central America, such as Honduras, in 2018, the Biden administration let them all in. The Governor of Texas, angered by this, sent them to New York by bus, and New York State rented out hotels in Manhattan to house immigrant families. Hispanic people who had been sympathetic to undocumented immigrants from Mexico and the like feel resentment toward such people, thinking, "We have worked hard to build our status until now." Such things likely drove Hispanics toward Trump.

So in a sense, it feels like the election result was decided a long time ago. When Trump won quite well in Florida in 2020, the voting behavior of immigrants from Cuba drew attention, and there were signs of a tectonic shift from that time; Florida had already completely become a red state.

On the other hand, I believe the economy was not that relevant. The inflation rate rose by more than 20 percent under the Biden administration, but it's not as if states with high inflation rates didn't vote for Biden. Among Hispanics, there is actually a tendency for those who feel more anxious about their current economic situation to vote for Harris. In other words, economically vulnerable Hispanics might have felt that Trump was scary.

Conversely, I think it was the Hispanics who have established their status in American society who intensified their resentment toward the Biden administration's preferential treatment of immigrants from Central America.

Listening to the discussion overall, it seems the argument is that medium-term structural changes were at play.

To change the subject slightly, conspiracy theories and fake news were again frequently seen in this election. I'd like to ask Ms. Karasudani from your professional perspective: regardless of East or West, old media is becoming unable to form the election narrative. Meanwhile, biased information, including conspiracy theories and fake news, flows from SNS and other sources, and I believe people are being influenced by it.

Setting aside whether it influenced the result this time, in what form did such things appear as a phenomenon, and what kind of impact do you think they had on the election?

Regarding the story of Biden's replacement, I think the trigger was the televised debate. The footage exposed Biden's "aging" to a cruel degree through his unnatural movements, way of speaking, and choice of words.

In the conspiracy theory communities of Trump supporters, like QAnon, there had been constant slander against Biden. That finally appeared as the issue of his aging even in the liberal media and was immediately shared; moreover, Democratic leaders felt a sense of crisis with incredible speed. To me, it looked like they dragged him down very quickly, but it reaffirmed the power of television images.

In terms of interest in conspiracy theories, Trump's own 2020 election fraud conspiracy theory is, from my perspective, impossible, and I wonder why someone who has already been indicted on four counts can come forward so boldly as a presidential candidate. However, 60 to 70 percent of Republican supporters have continued to support his election fraud conspiracy theory, and it never drops below 60 percent no matter what happens. That ultimately pushed him all the way to the general election and he eventually won.

From the standpoint of conspiracy theory research, it was said that if he lost, he would activate conspiracy theories and things would become dire across the U.S., but since he ended up winning the election, the election fraud conspiracy theories that might have been prepared had no turn to appear.

As a topic, conspiracy theories also appeared on the left, with some journalists calling them "Blue Anon" after the Democratic color. However, in the end, leftist conspiracy theories were not seriously weaponized and ended after spreading momentarily on the internet.

Therefore, regarding how the use of conspiracy theories as a political weapon affected the presidential election, while there were various topics, my personal conclusion is that there wasn't as serious an impact as anticipated.

The January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol arose precisely from Trump's defeat, yet even recently, more than half of Republican supporters answer in polls that Trump actually won. On the other hand, it also feels like many Republican supporters know that Trump is saying outrageous things but support him anyway.

In short, what do most Republican supporters think of Trump and the conspiracy-like stories surrounding him? How should we understand this?

What can be said is that there is the same root cause, which manifested in one way as the act of voting for Trump and in another way as the spread of conspiracy theories.

For example, the story that "Haitian immigrants are eating pets in Springfield, Ohio" spread and was whispered as if it were true; it wasn't so much that people seriously believed it, but rather that the ground was already prepared for them to believe it. In other words, there is resentment toward immigrants among Republican supporters, which manifests on one hand as a vote for Trump and on the other as the spread of the conspiracy theory about eating pets. Because of this, I don't think the spread of conspiracy theories itself actually influences voting. I agree with what Ms. Karasudani said.

Regarding the Capitol attack, it's not as if every single Republican supporter believes the election was fraudulent. They are merely saying there was fraud as an expression of their support for Trump.

Ultimately, whether it's resentment toward the Democratic Party or resentment toward American society, one side of that manifests as a vote for Trump and the other as the spread of conspiracy theories; it's not that American society is going crazy because conspiracy theories are spreading. Conspiracy theories have been a staple of American politics for a long time.

I agree, but now, especially with what is called affective polarization, the number of people whose feelings of disliking the opposing party come first is increasing. They listen to conspiracy theories with a grain of salt, but they find them interesting, and if it causes damage to the opponent, they might as well jump on board.

Also, I don't get the sense that Trump himself is telling a systematic conspiracy theory. He probably just jumps on whatever is most interesting and convenient at the moment; Trump will use anything that can earn him political points.

I'd like to move into the discussion of what is happening to America in the medium term, and I think the issue there is, for one, the problem of political or social division.

Affective polarization was just mentioned. What kind of backlash exists at a certain pole on the conservative side? It's the idea that the claims of the liberal side are extreme, or that lately the Democratic Party only talks about the rights of women and non-whites and doesn't look at the lives of other people.

On the other hand, I think there are quite a few people in Gen Z, which Ms. Mimaki has focused on, who are at the very extreme of liberalism. How should we perceive the structural changes on the liberal side, especially among young people?

Certainly, considering that Biden's aging was shown in the televised debate and led to his withdrawal, we cannot say that television has lost its power, but this presidential election made known the importance of podcasts. Trump appeared on many programs of influencers who are particularly influential among men, such as Joe Rogan, who is said to be the "world's highest-earning podcaster." Furthermore, based on advice from his son Barron, Trump also approached influencers popular with Gen Z men and appeared on their shows. The intention to capture the votes of Gen Z men was clear.

These programs are not overtly political; they involve casual talk for as long as three hours, mixed with discussions about martial arts and sports. Even listeners with no interest in politics can listen easily and feel a sense of familiarity with Trump. In other words, the aim and appeal lie precisely in that apparent "non-political" nature.

Harris also appeared on podcasts in response, but she could not compete with Trump at this level. According to polls, while Gen Z women are increasingly awakening to feminism, an increasing number of Gen Z men perceive feminism as "something that sacrifices men" and feel resistance to it. Trump skillfully appealed to those men, saying, "You are not wrong" and "You don't need to give up being manly."

I see.

A noteworthy aspect of this election is that it took place while the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, where Israeli military action continues, was deteriorating by the moment. Around the spring of 2024, polls showed that the majority opinion was that "Israel should stop its military action" and "weapons and ammunition should not be sent to Israel."

Such opinions were particularly strong among Democratic supporters. In August, when the candidate switched from Biden to Harris, there was a poll (YouGov) in which nearly 80 percent of Democratic supporters answered that the transport of weapons and ammunition to Israel should be stopped.

While Republican supporters are united in support of Israel, Democratic supporters are split between pro-Israel and pro-Palestine. To win the election, they had no choice but to take an ambiguous stance that would not decisively anger either group. I think that's what Biden and Harris thought, and while I understand the difficult political situation, I question whether it was a wise choice, not only humanitarily but also politically. Even if they expressed sympathy for Palestinian lives and human rights in words, the stance of Biden and Harris in continuing to send weapons and ammunition did not hold the hearts of those who were angry and saddened by the massacre of Palestinians. America's credibility in the international community was also greatly damaged.

Harris was attacked by the Republican Party for being "too liberal," but I believe this view, whether positive or negative, misses the essence. Many of Harris's statements about Gaza were opportunistic attempts to please every supporter and did not convey a commitment to human rights or liberal convictions. In July, when Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu visited the U.S., Harris spoke sharply, saying "many innocent civilians have been killed" in Gaza and "I will not be silent." In her nomination acceptance public speaking in August, she declared, "I will also support the lives and right to self-determination of the Palestinian people." However, she clearly stated she would "not consider" stopping the transport of weapons and ammunition to Israel and maintained that stance. Continuing to send weapons while talking about human rights and lives—because of this deceptive stance, there were likely votes that were lost.

We've moved from domestic issues to Gaza. The situation seems to be that the Democratic Party is divided between the traditional mainstream and the left, and because Harris took an non-committal stance, it was difficult for those on the left to commit to her.

On the other hand, from outside the Democratic Party, even though the Democratic mainstream is reasonably moderate, does it feel like they were seen as much more radical liberals than they actually are, which led to people distancing themselves?

The Democratic mainstream is more "old guard" than "moderate," and that relatively made Trump look like a candidate who would bring "change." The prime example of this was Harris's alliance with Liz Cheney. They even toured swing states together. Since the Capitol attack, Cheney has broken with Trump and clearly criticized him. In this regard, she is an existence that should be called the conscience of the Republican Party.

However, this presidential election took place while many people in Gaza and even Lebanon were being killed by Israel, supported by American weapons. Speaking of Liz Cheney, she is a person who, along with her father, former Vice President Dick Cheney, supported the "War on Terror" as an official in the George W. Bush administration—a war that produced hundreds of thousands of victims in the Middle East and the world.

America spent 8 trillion dollars on the "War on Terror" over 20 years, but during that time, the Lehman shock and the COVID-19 crisis occurred domestically, making the contradictions within America visible. This situation became the background for the rise of Trump, who advocates "America First" and explicitly focuses on domestic issues.

In a way, Harris allied herself with a politician who was part of the cause that created Trump. Even for people who don't feel a particular charm in Trump, they wouldn't find a future in a Bush-Cheney style interventionist line.

In my view, it feels like the Democratic and Republican parties of the 80s have swapped. The Democratic Party has become too decent and refined. In the two major parties that had covered up all the dirty parts of America, I think Trump's strength was that he let all the murky dissatisfaction that had accumulated at the bottom burst out at once.

If you ask what that burst-out material was, in a sense, it was things like racial prejudice. Since the time of the Tea Party movement (from 2009), dissatisfaction among the grassroots conservative base toward non-whites had been accumulating, but the 2012 Republican candidate Romney did not represent those views at all. He was the representative of the decent, refined Republican establishment, and many people in the grassroots conservative base didn't know who to vote for. I think Trump is the one who emerged and won in that context.

Looking back, the party that used to be like the Trump Republican Party was the Democratic Party of the 1980s. At that time, there were labor union people in Texas who were smashing Japanese cars. Those kinds of Democrats are gone, and it has become a place where there are many highly educated people.

As Sanders says, the Democratic Party may need to return to being more like Trump.

There is something I want to ask all of you who specialize in American politics. When I think about the background that created people who fall for conspiracy theories, since my background is in sociology, I tend to accept things like the theory of a divided society quite straightforwardly. Reading Hironari Aida's "Still, Why is Trump Supported?", the impressive question is asked: where does Trump's Godzilla-like vitality spring from?

What's interesting is that data can be confirmed in various places showing that the factory worker class, who have low education and couldn't keep up with the flow of the so-called New Economy, have been steadily leaving the Democratic Party.

I think this is related to the survival strategy of the Democratic Party, called the New Democrats or the Third Way, which tried to bring the party back to the center after it had leaned too far to the left as liberals.

This line ultimately tried to balance fair distribution with neoliberal economic policies but didn't work very well, and as a result, it encouraged a divided society. I wonder if that created the so-called "forgotten people" and led to the Democratic Party being abandoned today.

How do you specialists evaluate the so-called New Democrats or the Third Way?

I actually wrote my doctoral dissertation on the New Democrats. First, to put it differently from Ms. Mimaki and Mr. Iida, I think calling the result of this presidential election a landslide might be an overstatement. In the medium to long term, the two major parties are neck and neck, and within that range, he won clearly. A more significant landslide was in 1984.

At that time, Reagan took the electors of 49 states, and the origin of the New Democrats was actually the Southern Democrats who reflected on that. They started saying, "Why can't we win anymore when the South used to be a Democratic stronghold?" and created a centrist policy organization called the DLC (Democratic Leadership Council). The DLC was successful to an extent, and the pair of DLC members from the South, President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore, won the '92 presidential election. Biden was also a long-time member of the DLC.

However, speaking centrism honestly didn't go over well. They were pushed by the liberals and called "big government" by the Republicans. While saying such things, they were able to compromise in the 90s, but the misfortune for the New Democrats was the 2000 election between Bush (Jr.) and Gore; Bush didn't say things that were that different from the New Democrats during the campaign, yet Gore lost. And eight years later, the more leftist Obama emerged.

Once Obama won the 2008 presidential election, the New Democrats completely lost momentum, the DLC organization was closed in 2011, and its remains are now housed in President Clinton's library. That is the history, but as a structural factor, it's the story that we've entered an era where speaking centrism seriously doesn't go over well and you get hit from both ends. I think that is now a universal phenomenon.

Regarding the economy, it is also said that both the Republican and Democratic parties have become parties led by the wealthy elite, and within that, an increasing number of people, such as white workers, are choosing the Republican Party as being "at least better."

However, if the trend of the more socio-culturally conservative layer among white workers flowing to the Republican Party has continued, the question becomes "how far will it go?" Since they have mostly moved to the Republican Party this time, will the outflow from the Democratic Party stop there, or will it continue? I think this issue is also the dividing line between whether we should see Trump as having won by a landslide or whether the neck-and-neck situation will continue.

Ultimately, the result of this election showed that the percentage of white non-college graduates voting for Trump was almost the same as last time. Therefore, I think the growth of Trump's vote among whites has stopped to some extent here.

The relationship between education and voting behavior didn't have such a linear relationship until around 2012, and even in polls, the accuracy didn't particularly suffer even without weighting by education. However, in the 90s, the New Democrats emerged, the dot-com bubble occurred under Clinton and Gore, the IT industry expanded, West Virginia coal mines were closed, and the Rust Belt in the Midwest grew wider.

Even in that context, they managed to hold onto white workers through labor union mobilization, but then Trump appeared in 2016 and sent the message that the interests of white workers were being lost, and here the correlation between education and voting behavior suddenly came to the fore. Now, a clear relationship has been established where those with less than a college degree are Republican/Trump, and those with a college degree or higher are Democratic. The reason the 2016 election predictions were so far off was precisely because they looked at poll results without education correction and concluded that Hillary had an 80 percent chance of winning.

However, I think this trend among white workers has reached its limit. I believe the slight increase in Trump support among non-college graduates this time is linked to the growth of Trump support among people of color, Asian Americans, and Hispanics.

Now, while facing such structural changes, a new Trump administration is coming once again. What is drawing attention is, of course, the appointments for key cabinet positions and other roles, which have been reported on quite extensively in Japan. Some very controversial selections have been announced, but compared to the first term, what are the characteristics?

As a researcher, it's scary to say "I don't know," but I will dare to say I don't know. The reason is, after all, the predictability of Trump's actions is low. Trump himself seems to have a tendency to intentionally create surprises.

Regarding appointments, the Republicans have 53 seats in the Senate this time, so if four people vote against someone, it's a no-go. This number is quite tight. Additionally, what we learned in the first term is that even if someone is a "yes-man" now, you never know when the relationship might sour. I think the "personal shop" nature of Trump's operation will likely continue into the second term.

The most unknown factor among them is Elon Musk. It is completely unpredictable when things might sour with Musk and how that would affect the administration as a whole. I believe the relationship with Musk is what we must watch most closely.

It is clear that the first Trump administration ended up in a state where it couldn't do what it wanted because things went poorly with those who became cabinet members, or people without expertise were appointed to positions. I thought that if they had learned from that, they would appoint people with at least some professional competence. However, looking at the appointments so far, there isn't much of that atmosphere.

And, under the American constitutional system, legislation is absolutely necessary to realize full-scale policies. Therefore, the relationship with Congress becomes an issue, but in a situation where the two major parties are so ideologically and emotionally polarized and extremely evenly matched, what do the next four years look like?

This is my specialty, but I think if Trump had truly won a landslide victory this time, the Republicans would have won more in the congressional elections. However, they lost seats in the House. I think it might be better to view Trump's election this time essentially as the reelection of an incumbent president. If so, it is consistent with how the seats in Congress increased or decreased.

Also, a big difference between the first and second terms is that, at least under the current Constitution, there is no third term. In the second term, once the midterm elections are over, there is a high possibility of becoming a lame duck for the remaining two years. That means there are only the first two years left.

I don't know what Trump will do regarding legislation. The reason is, first, even if you read Trump's campaign platform "AGENDA 47," you don't know how he plans to realize it. It goes without saying, but Trump has absolutely no interest in procedures, jurisdictions, or legal matters. He is someone who thinks of leadership as an extension of being a one-man company president.

At the very least, he is likely to do tax cuts, but tax cuts must naturally go through legislation. The most likely scenario is to use a method called budget reconciliation, just like how the 2017 tax cut bill was passed, to avoid a Democratic filibuster in the Senate and pass it in the House with the power of a razor-thin majority.

However, there is actually a possibility of losing the majority in the House. The election result was 220 to 215, but it is expected to decrease by three people due to appointments for the Trump administration and other factors. If they lose three consecutive special elections, the majority and the authority to manage proceedings will all go to the Democrats, making it impossible to pass legislation even through budget reconciliation.

Another reason I think it's better to view Trump as an incumbent president is that he has essentially dominated the House Republicans over the past four years. Regarding the current Speaker of the House appointment, after former Speaker McCarthy was removed, Trump tweeted this and that on social media, and it finally settled on Mike Johnson as about the fourth candidate.

So, for now, a master-servant relationship where Johnson works under Trump is completely established. However, we don't know when this relationship might sour either. Johnson is not a member of the Freedom Caucus, the most hardline caucus in the House. That's because he is a Speaker of the House born of compromise.

The Freedom Caucus is the one that gets the best deal with such a narrow seat margin. In other words, they can make threats like, "Do you want us to do to you what we did to McCarthy?" Trump can also egg on the Freedom Caucus to make Johnson do what he says.

So even after considering various things, prediction is difficult after all. I agree. Especially in this election, there was no Trump coattail effect (the effect where a presidential candidate's popularity adds seats for their party in a presidential election year) at all. I can't think of a recent case where someone won the presidential election but lost seats in the House.

In this situation, if Trump does not coordinate to pass legislation and results expected by his supporters are not achieved, what will he do?

One way is to bypass as much as possible the means that require passing legislation. That's where executive orders come in. However, if a policy that must be legislated and passed through Congress fails, he will likely take actions to avoid blame. In short, he'll talk about how it's the fault of the Congress that didn't pass it, and let the voters vent their frustration that way. Trump is good at that sort of thing.

Conversely, if it passes, even if it's a bill that's a product of compromise, he'll talk as if "I did it." In the first Trump administration, the border wall didn't amount to much, but he could shamelessly insist that it was a "great achievement." I think that is Trump's strength.

Earlier it was said that Biden is not enthusiastically supported by anyone, but Trump is the opposite; there is a bedrock support base of about 30% who will follow Trump no matter what. That is indeed Trump's strength. Furthermore, since it's his second term, he doesn't need to aim for reelection, and in a sense, he can do anything, so I think he's scary in an invincible state.

On the other hand, right now as appointments are being made, death threats are coming out against the people whose names are being mentioned. This means people opposing Trump are doing this. Earlier, Mr. Karasutani mentioned things like "Blue Anon." Until now, conspiracy theories have mainly centered on the right wing, but can we consider that movements involving violence are spreading considerably, not just on the right?

To be honest, the extent of the spread is hard to gauge, but I think it's important to consider conspiracy theories along with the problem of extremism. Rather than viewing conspiracy theories as just disinformation, I think they are a driving force that radicalizes current conservative thought while mutually influencing white supremacy, far-right militia ideas, and anti-Semitism.

One source when conspiracy theories surged during the Trump administration was the anonymous message board called "4chan," where there were so-called misogynists, white supremacists, and a stew of the worst elements of the political unconscious in American society, and that's where conspiracy theories grew.

The spread of conspiracy theories and the spread of political extremist ideas are quite synchronized. Also, in response to the Trumpist faction of the Republican party reaching into risky areas like conspiracy theories and white supremacy to increase supporters and send radical messages, the left wing also thinks, "If they're going to do that, we will too," and there's an aspect where extremism stimulates each other and expands.

Extremism is spreading further to both the left and right ends. How can this phenomenon be stopped? I'm also interested in what researchers of American politics think about this.

Barbara Walter's "How Civil Wars Start" and the movie "Civil War" became hot topics. Since they are a citizenry with that many guns at the end of polarization, can we actually consider the possibility that they are headed toward a civil war?

I actually have a part of me that thinks the United States Constitution is a masterpiece of humanity. In the end, the only time America was truly in bad shape was around the Civil War; basically, it's stable. So while people say America is in crisis or divided, I've recently started saying that's an exaggeration and it's okay to be more optimistic. The late Professor Naoyuki Agawa also mentioned such things.

I also saw "Civil War," and it's a story with a very realistic setting; the reason the civil war is happening is that the president in DC is in his third term. In other words, if you break the Constitution, things get serious. I think it depicts how American loyalty to the Constitution is quite strong.

I'd like to move on to the topic of foreign policy soon. If there is this much uncertainty even in domestic affairs where the president can't move everything, what about foreign policy, where quite a lot can be done through the president's initiative?

Also, looking at the world, various things are moving in terms of security, such as the Israel-Gaza war, the Ukraine war, and the Syrian situation which recently took a sudden turn. Ms. Mimaki, as a specialist in international politics, what do you think?

First, on the question of whether it was a landslide or a close race, I stated that the fact that the Democratic candidate fell significantly short of the votes in the previous presidential election and lost the popular vote means there are areas where the party's line is not supported, and they should accept this as a complete defeat in the sense that they should take this fact seriously and rebuild the party. However, as you said, the votes were actually close, so I don't think our perceptions are that different.

The next Trump administration is moving forward with unconventional appointments. For Secretary of Health and Human Services, Robert Kennedy Jr., a vaccine skeptic. For Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, who has defended the Assad regime in Syria. Concerns are rising about what will fundamentally happen to American diplomacy and public health, and voices from experts and former bureaucrats are rising one after another calling for them not to be confirmed.

However, there is deep-rooted support among the people. One background that brought about Trump's victory this time was distrust toward politics by the bloated bureaucratic organization and expert groups. Trump greatly stirred up these people's emotions. Experts point out that Kennedy and Gabbard lack experience and knowledge and are not appropriate appointments, but they are popular with the people precisely because they are "amateurs."

Regarding foreign policy, the Trump line of withdrawing from regions that do not directly involve American security or national interests appeals more to the current sentiments of American citizens than the Biden-Harris line of advocating for the defense of democracy and human rights worldwide.

American power has limits, and America cannot respond to every crisis happening in the world. This idea is spreading across party lines. Since its founding, America, which had advocated isolationism, turned toward interventionism through two world wars in the 20th century. Even after the end of the Cold War, interventionism was kept alive because of the September 11 terrorist attacks. However, against the backdrop of exhaustion from the "War on Terror" and the deepening of domestic contradictions, we are approaching the end of the long era of intervention after World War II. We might be at such a phase in history. I think it's important to look at Trump's foreign policy from this historical perspective.

Even in an America strengthening non-interventionism, there is an important exception: Israel. Looking at the appointments for the Trump administration, the lineup is full of "Israel First" members who will stick to supporting Israel even if it damages American national interests or reputation.

For UN Ambassador, Elise Stefanik. She led the crackdown on Palestine solidarity protests that spread across university campuses nationwide starting in 2024, forcing presidents to resign. She has already begun claiming that "the UN is no longer an anti-Semitic organization" and calling for a "halt to funding." For Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee. He is an evangelical pastor who has said in the past, "There is no such thing as a Palestinian; they are a people created politically to take land away from Israel." Regarding Israeli settlements in the West Bank, he also claims they are not a violation of international law and believes they should be promoted more and more.

However, the world is also changing. An overwhelming majority of countries at the UN support an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, Palestinian membership in the UN, and the end of Israel's occupation policy. By uncritically defending Israel's military actions, American soft power is seriously shaken, and it could give a stamp of approval to moves by Russia and China to change the status quo through military force.

The most worrying point about Trump's foreign policy is, after all, his disregard for allies. Regarding NATO member countries, he is saying things like he won't fulfill defense obligations if they don't pay their fair share. He will naturally demand a lot of burden-sharing from Japan as well. In that context, what kind of actions will allies take? There are two possibilities.

There might be moves to strengthen alliances so as not to be abandoned by America. On the other hand, from the perspective of NATO countries and others, they might move away from America because they can't rely on it. In other words, there is a possibility that a situation will occur where America is abandoned by its allies.

So, while America tells Japan to bear more of the burden in the future, if NATO countries stop listening to what America says, I think the big question is what position Japan will take.

Whether to intervene if Japan is attacked. Or if there is an invasion of Taiwan, or if Russia invades a NATO member country, will America intervene? Naturally, it should intervene based on the alliance, but Trump supporters take a passive stance, especially toward Russia.

The exception, as you mentioned, is Israel. Regarding Israel, Trump supporters like intervening as much as or more than Harris supporters.

As Ms. Mimaki said, the America First idea itself—that America should pursue its own interests even if it conflicts with the interests of other countries or international treaties—potentially resonates with Democratic supporters as well. In that sense, I have a feeling that Trump is unexpectedly evaluated well in terms of foreign policy.

The word "division" is used when talking negatively about the recent political situation in America, but in terms of foreign policy, I wonder why more "division" doesn't occur in America regarding the Israel issue.

While many countries in the world condemn Israel's Palestinian policy and citizens around the world strengthen Palestine solidarity, the US Congress still supports Israel on a bipartisan basis. In July, Netanyahu, for whom the International Criminal Court (ICC) is seeking an arrest warrant for war crimes and crimes against humanity, visited the US and gave a public speaking engagement in Congress. Lawmakers gave him a huge welcome. When the arrest warrant was formally requested for Netanyahu, both the Biden administration and Congress reacted fiercely against the ICC and began seeking sanctions against those involved. Liberal papers like the Washington Post also have a tone like, "The ICC is for judging politicians from countries like Russia and Sudan, and should not judge Israel." When it comes to the Israel issue, conservatives, liberals, Republicans, and Democrats are all one-sidedly in defense of Israel, and there is no "division."

However, society is changing. Among Gen Z, support for Palestine has overtaken support for Israel. The number of people criticizing the "apartheid" against Palestinians by Israel is also increasing.

Now, regarding future Japan-US relations, they have been relatively good at least on the surface, and what might be most important is the idea from Toshihiro Nakayama that "Japan has no Plan B"—in short, the recognition that we basically have no choice but to stay on good terms with America is quite widely accepted.

However, as Mr. Iida said earlier, other American allies might reconsider how they deal with America in the future.

Japan might not have the option of suddenly leaving America, but while leaders of various countries are starting something like a pilgrimage to Trump, is it enough to just keep a line open to Trump? Considering that structural changes are progressing within America, I feel like it's finally time to seriously think about our relationship with America.

At the UN, Japan does not easily follow America and shows persistence. It voted in favor of Palestinian membership in the UN and also voted for a resolution calling on Israel to end its occupation of the West Bank. The Japanese government has touted the "sharing of values" between Japan and the US, but hasn't there been an aspect of continuing to avoid looking directly at an America that deviates from international norms by lining up such words? In the second Trump term, the phase of considering the option Mr. Iida mentioned—"we abandon them"—might finally come.

There are rising expectations for Prime Minister Ishiba to meet Trump early and build a personal relationship, using the former Abe-Trump relationship as a model. However, the idea of building a "honeymoon" relationship between the two leaders to somehow get through the demands for increased defense burden from America might reach its limit sooner or later. The rise of Trump, who shamelessly advocates "America First" and repeatedly makes remarks denying alliance relationships, can be seen as one phase of the end of the long era of intervention. It might not be something that ends if we just manage to hold on for four years. The imaginative power of Japanese diplomacy is called into question.

To summarize today's talk, there is a conflict between the two major parties today that is different from the conventional, ideologically polarized "polite" conservative-liberal conflict, and the Trumpian element has come to the fore. We are now facing such structural changes, and I think we have come to a timing where we need to seriously think about understanding and dealing with America while looking directly at that to some extent in both domestic and foreign affairs.

However, on the other hand, Trump himself is a person with very high uncertainty, and with Congress being very evenly matched, the future trend is unclear in terms of whether policies will move or not. Just like this election, is it that today's America holds uncertainty in the sense that truly small changes produce large differences in results?

Everyone, thank you very much for your time today.