[Special Feature: How to Understand Populism] European Integration and Populism: "Liberal EU" vs. "Illiberal Populism"

In democratic nations, it often happens that even if a policy is absolutely necessary for the welfare of the people as a whole, politicians may lose elections and fail to implement it if the policy is unpopular with voters. In such cases, populist parties may expand their support by proposing populist policies. Consequently, politicians are forced to adopt policies that appeal to voters in order to remain in power. However, in Europe, by utilizing the mechanism of the European Union (EU), politicians in member states can implement policies that are unpopular with their own citizens. In other words, they shift the responsibility onto the EU.

This is possible because the EU is operated primarily by technocratic, non-majoritarian institutions that are not elected. This means that European citizens are not given the right to organize an "opposition" within the EU polity. Although there is a directly elected European Parliament, the party that wins a majority there does not organize an "EU government." In other words, there is no government-opposition relationship at the European level. For this reason, European citizens are forced to organize an "opposition" against the EU itself. As a result, European populism has emerged, rejecting the EU itself and advocating for the "reclamation" of national sovereignty. In other words, the EU is a structural factor that brings populist parties to Europe. This is particularly true for right-wing populist parties that share commonalities such as Euroscepticism, nationalism, and anti-establishment sentiment (this article has such parties in mind).

This EU mechanism functioned until the construction of the Single Market, which signifies the free movement of goods, people, services, and capital. However, as common rules began to take precedence over national laws in numerous policy areas beyond that, anti-EU sentiment gradually rose, peaking particularly during the 2015 refugee crisis. Faced with the influx of over one million refugees into the region, the EU attempted to forcibly allocate refugee quotas to member states. Triggered by this, xenophobic populism in Western European countries and illiberal populism in Hungary and Poland rose to prominence, advocating anti-immigrant and anti-refugee stances. Furthermore, in an EU where the "European Green Deal" is the top priority, there is a trend where populist parties gain support by opposing climate change measures in places like Poland and eastern Germany, where the coal industry still holds an important position. Below, I will discuss this particularly from the perspective of the conflict between the Liberal EU and illiberal populism.

The EU defines human rights, democracy, and the rule of law as value norms in the EU Treaties, which serve as its "constitution." The conditions for membership including these norms are called the Copenhagen criteria. Countries wishing to join the EU are required to achieve these criteria and undergo rigorous screening during the accession negotiation process. However, these criteria are conditions for joining, not conditions for remaining a member. Even if a member state violates human rights, democracy, or the rule of law after joining, the EU has almost no authority to intervene directly. The EU only has rights-suspension procedures, such as suspending a member state's voting rights, and their activation requires unanimity excluding the country in question. A country that violates the Copenhagen criteria cannot be expelled.

However, member states have emerged that openly challenge the EU's value norms. One is Hungary, led by Prime Minister Orbán with the Fidesz party as the ruling party. In 2014, Prime Minister Orbán declared that he would build an "illiberal state" modeled after China and Russia. Furthermore, in 2018, he advocated for "illiberal democracy" based on non-liberal Christian democracy, expressing a stance that rejects multiculturalism, open immigration/refugee policies, and LGBT (sexual minorities).

By implementing "illiberal democracy," Prime Minister Orbán is actually revealing the true nature of populism. Although it is tautological, it can be described as "illiberal populism." That is, under the guise of realizing the will of the majority through elections, he is neutralizing the pillars of "liberalism"—the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary, the neutrality of the media, and the protection of minorities including immigrants and refugees (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "rule of law")—through constitutional and legal amendments to move toward "autocratization," while attempting to prolong his administration's life by maintaining voter support through pork-barrel economic policies. Such methods are also being imitated by the "Law and Justice (PiS)" party government in Poland.

Incidentally, in Freedom House's "Freedom in the World 2018" rankings, while 19 out of the 28 EU countries (including the UK) scored 90 points or higher, Poland remained at 84 points, and Hungary fell to 70 points (the same as Timor-Leste), the lowest in the EU, positioning it as a "Partly Free" country.

In contrast, the EU is operated primarily by independent non-majoritarian institutions that are not elected, such as the Commission (the EU's policy-making and executive body), the European Central Bank, and the Court of Justice of the European Union. It promotes European integration by limiting the sovereignty of each country for the benefit of Europe as a whole, embodying liberalism. Populist parties view this "Liberal EU" with hostility. The EU has already activated rights-suspension procedures against Hungary and Poland on the grounds of violating the "rule of law" principle, but both countries seem unconcerned. They may believe they can escape sanctions if they mutually exercise their veto power in each other's rights-suspension procedures.

According to an EU public opinion survey (Eurobarometer) conducted in October 2019, the percentage of citizens who consider EU membership to be a good thing was an average of 59% across the 28 EU countries and 42% in the UK. Meanwhile, the percentage of citizens who consider it a bad thing was an average of 11% across the 28 countries and 24% in the UK. In this way, the UK, where anti-EU sentiment was deep-rooted, decided to "Exit the EU" in the 2016 referendum, incited by populist politician Mr. Farage, and the withdrawal was finally realized at the end of January 2020. However, on the European continent, since the majority of EU citizens are pro-EU, populist parties in most countries are pursuing "Seizing the EU" rather than "Exiting the EU." That is, they aim to influence EU decision-making and ultimately take over and "autocratize" the EU, restructuring European integration to suit their own convenience. Specifically, this means adopting an "A la Carte Europe" approach, reducing European integration to the scope of national interests such as the Single Market, and reclaiming authority from the EU. There are two routes for this "Seizing the EU": the European Parliament route and the intergovernmental route (see figure).

First, in the European Parliament route, the goal is to control EU legislation and the budget by securing a majority of the total 751 seats (705 after the UK's withdrawal) or the status of the largest party for the combined seats of national populist parties. However, while the European Parliament has co-decision powers along with the Council of Ministers, it is not equivalent to a national lower house (such as the House of Representatives in Japan), and a "change of government" in the EU does not occur there. Nevertheless, as the only directly elected institution in the EU, the European Parliament can be called the source of the EU's democratic legitimacy. Therefore, particularly for populist parties that view securing a majority in elections as absolute, expanding support there is considered essential.

Prime Minister Orbán believed that anti-immigrant and anti-refugee policies could garner voter support across the EU and asked his supporters to focus all their energy on the May 2019 European Parliament elections. He calculated that by doing so, he could expand influence within the European People's Party (EPP), the center-right group to which Fidesz belonged, and put an end to liberal democracy. However, about two months before the election, Fidesz was suspended from the EPP due to violations of the "rule of law" principle, and Prime Minister Orbán's plans were thwarted.

On the other hand, Interior Minister Salvini (at the time), leader of Italy's "Lega" party who advocates for the exclusion of immigrants and refugees, advocated for a "Common Sense Europe" before the European Parliament elections and expressed a vision for national populist parties to unite and form a single political group in the European Parliament. The "Identity and Democracy (ID)" group, in which "Lega" (28 seats) participates, was joined by France's National Rally (22 seats), "Alternative for Germany (AfD)" (11 seats), and parties from six other countries, but the total number of seats remained at 73, far short of a majority. Hungary's Fidesz, which was suspended from the EPP, won 13 seats, and Poland's "Law and Justice (PiS)" party, belonging to the "European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)" group, won 26 seats, but they did not join the ID group.

Second, in the intergovernmental route, the targets for populist parties are the European Council (EU Summit), where national leaders attend to decide the EU's basic policies and top appointments, and the Council of Ministers, where government ministers from each country gather for 10 policy areas and have broad decision-making authority beyond EU legislation. The European Council and the Council of Ministers base their decision-making on forming a consensus among all member states. By forming a single-party or coalition government in their own country, politicians belonging to that populist party can block the formation of consensus or extract concessions in the European Council or the Council of Ministers.

An example of this is the selection process for the Commission President candidate in 2019. The Commission President candidate is to be decided by the European Council by a qualified majority (in this case, 72% of member states + 65% of the EU population) after consultations based on the results of the European Parliament elections, and then proposed to the European Parliament. At that time, national leaders in the European Council are supposed to simultaneously consider the appointments of the President of the European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, while balancing the geographical location and population size of member states. In response, the European Parliament demands that the lead candidate (Spitzenkandidat) of the party group that became the largest party in the election be the candidate for President.

In the May 2019 European Parliament elections, the center-right EPP was the largest party with 182 seats, and the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) was the second largest with 154 seats. The EPP's lead candidate was Mr. Weber, belonging to Germany's Christian Social Union (CSU), but he was passed over due to opposition from French President Macron. Consequently, Mr. Timmermans of the Netherlands (former First Vice-President of the Commission), who was the lead candidate for S&D, emerged as a candidate for the next Commission President with support from France, Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands. However, because Mr. Timmermans had a history of criticizing Poland and Hungary for violations of the "rule of law" principle and strongly demanding corrections, he was rejected by those two countries plus the Czech Republic and Slovakia as being unsuitable to lead the EU. As a result, Ms. von der Leyen, who was the German Defense Minister, was selected as the candidate for President. In this way, Ms. von der Leyen became the candidate for President by incorporating the support of countries with populist governments. However, because she was selected regardless of the lead candidate of the largest party in the European Parliament elections, her democratic legitimacy was considered weak, and she was approved by a narrow margin of 383 votes in the approval vote by a majority of the members of the European Parliament (374 votes at that time). It is said that those votes in favor included votes from members of the European Parliament belonging to Poland's PiS party and Hungary's Fidesz party. This means that President von der Leyen may show a lukewarm attitude toward populist parties due to the need to rely on the support of countries with populist governments for the future operation of the EU.

As evidence of this, in September 2019, when President-elect von der Leyen announced the responsibilities of each commissioner candidate before obtaining final approval from the European Parliament as a whole, it was decided that one of the Vice-Presidents would oversee a policy area called "Protecting our European Way of Life," which included immigration/refugees, employment, security, culture, and education. In response to this, while leader Le Pen of the French National Rally, who advocates for the exclusion of immigrants and refugees, praised it as an "ideological victory," center-left and centrist members of the European Parliament opposed it, saying it was like promoting the claims of populist parties that link immigrants/refugees with increased crime. In the end, a compromise was reached by President von der Leyen changing the name of the policy area to "Promoting our European Way of Life" (emphasis by the author). However, this conflict is interpreted as a demonstration of the influence that countries with populist governments have on the EU, as shown in the process of deciding the Commission President candidate among EU leaders.

The EU's share of global GDP was approximately 22% in 2016, ranking second after the United States at approximately 25%. Furthermore, the EU has a population of approximately 500 million and accounts for 15% each of global exports and imports, making it one of the world's largest trading blocs alongside the US and China. Although the EU's position will decline with the UK's withdrawal, its economic power remains formidable.

In November 2019, Ms. von der Leyen gave a public speaking in the European Parliament, stating that a "geopolitical Commission" is urgently needed in the EU. Generally, geopolitics refers to a stance that considers national security and foreign policy by emphasizing geographical factors in international relations. Furthermore, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Borrell (Vice-President of the Commission) also advocated realism as the principle of action for the Common Foreign and Security Policy in his inaugural public speaking on December 1, stating that a "clear common vision on strategic goals and interests" is required in a world of power politics. Behind this is the fact that US President Trump, a "disruptor" of multilateral frameworks such as the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Iran nuclear deal, is "hostile" toward the EU; the rise of China, which the EU considers a "systemic rival" in terms of governance models due to its authoritarian regime utilizing digital surveillance technology; and the increasing military threat from Russia under President Putin. In such a context, while maintaining its position as a "champion of multilateralism," the EU is setting out a stance of pursuing security and economic interests by forming alliances with other countries using trade—the EU's forte—as a weapon, in opposition to superpowers pursuing foreign policies that combine geopolitics and economic interests.

Trade policy is a matter of EU competence and, in principle, does not require unanimity among member states. However, unanimity is the principle of action for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. For this reason, for a "geopolitical Commission" that links trade and security to function sufficiently, unanimity in the European Council (composed of national leaders) and the Foreign Affairs Council (a Council of Ministers composed of national foreign ministers) is always necessary as a prerequisite. This is not necessarily easy. For example, while Prime Minister Orbán of Hungary uses Russia and China as models for his own country as an "illiberal state," in diplomacy he supports the Trump administration in the US, and in May 2018, along with the Czech Republic and Romania, he refused to issue a joint statement by the EU criticizing the decision to move the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

In this way, the EU is not only being shaken internally by populist parties but also faces the risk in the fields of diplomacy and security that countries with populist governments will side with the intentions of Russia, China, or the US to block the EU's common actions. The trends of the Liberal EU will determine the future of the free order of global society.