Eriko Oshima: French Parliamentary Elections and the Dynamism of Domestic Politics

The year 2024 will likely continue to be spoken of as a turbulent year for French politics. In 2022, the presidential election was held amidst the unique international situation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the centrist incumbent Emmanuel Macron won re-election. In the general election immediately following, Macron's camp failed to secure an absolute majority but managed to win a relative majority of seats and remain in power. However, in the European Parliament elections held in June this year, the National Rally—classified as "far-right" or "radical right"—emerged victorious, exposing the unpopularity of the Macron camp and Macron himself. On the night the election results were announced, Macron declared the dissolution of the National Assembly (lower house), leading to the first round of voting on June 29 and 30, and the runoff on July 6 and 7. While any dissolution had been expected around autumn, the various political forces were suddenly forced to prepare for elections with the Paris Olympic and Paralympic Games just around the corner.

Adding to the surprise, the four left-wing parties (Socialist Party, Communist Party, The Greens, and La France Insoumise), whose conflicts over the situation in Palestine had become apparent since 2023, formed a coalition called the New Popular Front the day after the dissolution announcement to create a force opposing the Macron camp and the National Rally.

Meanwhile, a realignment of inter-party relations was observed, as part of the Republicans—who follow the lineage of Charles de Gaulle—decided to join forces with the National Rally, while others sought to maintain their identity as a right-wing force distinct from the far-right.

As a result of the first round of voting, the National Rally took the lead, and many opinion polls predicted that even if they did not win a majority in the runoff, they would become the largest force. Consequently, with only one week until the runoff, a "Republican Front" was formed. This phenomenon, previously seen during the 2002 presidential election, refers to a cooperative relationship between the left and right to prevent the victory of far-right parties deemed not to adhere to the principles of the Republic. Ultimately, the "Republican Front" proved effective; while the National Rally increased its seats, it remained the third force. With no group securing a majority, the New Popular Front unexpectedly became the largest force. Attention then turned to the person the President would appoint as Prime Minister.

After spending a significant amount of time, the New Popular Front put forward Lucie Castets, a completely unknown civil servant, as their candidate and demanded her appointment as Prime Minister. While the President may appoint anyone—including those who are not members of parliament or have no political experience—it is customary to appoint the person recommended by the largest force in the lower house. However, Macron, who was reluctant to allow the left-wing coalition (which held only a relative majority) to form a cabinet, held repeated meetings with various forces and waited for the Olympics to end. Two months after the runoff of the National Assembly elections, he finally appointed Michel Barnier, a member of the Republicans (which had become the fourth force in parliament) with experience as a minister and European Commissioner. It goes without saying that the disappointment and anger of the New Popular Front and its supporters were immense.

The Barnier cabinet, which lacks majority support in parliament and constantly faces the possibility of a no-confidence motion, is primarily composed of members from the Macron camp and the Republicans. Particularly noteworthy is the appointment of Bruno Retailleau as Minister of the Interior. Having served long as a member of the Senate (upper house), Retailleau is well-known as a hardline conservative who has proposed tightening regulations on immigrant acceptance and opposed the legalization of same-sex marriage in 2013, the ban on so-called conversion therapy in 2022, and the constitutional amendment to specify the freedom of abortion in 2024. True to that image, in his public speaking upon taking office as Minister of the Interior, he emphasized "restoring order." In the policy speech delivered by Prime Minister Barnier on October 1, immigration policy was positioned as one of the priorities, citing stricter conditions for obtaining visas and strengthening border controls in compliance with EU law. Although Didier Migaud, a former member of the Socialist Party, was appointed to the important post of Minister of Justice, when combined with Retailleau's position, it is clear that the Barnier cabinet is putting forward conservative policies to regulate immigrant acceptance.

Finally, I would like to add a note on whether the current system constitutes "cohabitation." Cohabitation refers to a state where there is a split between the parliamentary majority and the President's party or force, often translated as "coexistence of the left and right." Examples include the period when the right-wing Jacques Chirac was President and the left-wing Lionel Jospin was Prime Minister. What about this time? Since no Prime Minister was appointed from the Macron camp, some within the Republicans interpret it as cohabitation; however, many ministers from the Macron camp have also joined the cabinet, making the situation significantly different from traditional cohabitation. The President's office has expressed the view that it is not cohabitation but a "demanding coexistence," and Barnier himself has stated clearly that it is not cohabitation. This is a first under the Fifth Republic, and it may be time to re-examine the scope of the meaning of cohabitation, and perhaps even its translated terms.