Why Enact the National Security Law?

2020/10/20

The legislation of the Hong Kong National Security Law and the subsequent criticism from the international community are being viewed through the lens of rising authoritarianism versus liberal democracy attempting to push back.

Under the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese leadership's choice of hardline actions is creating tension in the international order.

Why did the current leadership legislate the National Security Law? This question falls within the scope of why the leadership chooses actions that do not shy away from confrontation with the international community.

The leadership decided on the legislation of the National Security Law before the pandemic. A Communist Party meeting held last October decided to strengthen control over Hong Kong, including the enactment of the law. Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, Hong Kong's constitution, clearly stated that legislation to maintain national security was necessary, but it had not been realized for over 20 years. This legislation demonstrates the leadership's strong determination that "if Hong Kong does not legislate, Beijing will." At the time, this decision was understood as a strong instruction from the leadership to once again begin legislation based on Article 23. However, the leadership chose an action that exceeded expectations.

What prompted this judgment? It is the leadership's sense of insecurity regarding the international order.

Since the early 1990s, when the Communist Party confirmed that socialism and a market economy are not contradictory, it has upheld a developmentalism where "development is the absolute principle." It presented a "reform and opening-up" line where the Communist Party's rule guarantees the construction of the stable domestic and international environment necessary for this.

Successive leaderships since the end of the Cold War have understood themselves as late participants in the existing international order and believed they were placed at a disadvantage. In other words, they understood that building an international environment favorable to China's development meant adapting to the existing international order. While harboring what is called a sense of insecurity in Chinese, they observed the international order carefully and cautiously.

However, around 2015, the leadership changed its diplomatic stance. They shifted their efforts to build an international environment favorable to China's development from "adaptation" to "embedding" their own demands into the existing international order.

The concept of "discourse power embedded in institutions" appeared in the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020), which was drafted in 2015 and formulated the following year.

Discourse power is the power to make others feel empathy and respect through the narrative nature of the speaker's claims, leading them to accept the content.

What does it mean to strengthen discourse power embedded in institutions? For example, it means expanding China's agenda-setting and voting rights in international institutions like the World Bank; strengthening the influence of international institutions led by China, such as the Belt and Road Initiative; cultivating the power to promote reform of existing international institutions; and leading the construction of international systems in new domains such as the deep sea, cyber, polar regions, and outer space.

The current leadership calls its diplomatic line "Major Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics." Officially, "major country" is translated as such. However, books published by the Communist Party Propaganda Department explaining President Xi Jinping's remarks describe it as "the decisive force that influences issues of world peace." The leadership's interest lies in the expansion of power. And this was the power the leadership emphasized.

Why does the leadership pursue the expansion of power? It is to dispel the sense of insecurity regarding the existing international order. Even though no nation currently attempts a military invasion of China, the sense of insecurity remains high. Another reason is that as a result of economic development and increased national strength, China now possesses the diplomatic means to make others accept its demands. This is "Major Country Diplomacy."

Even before the pandemic, as the structure of U.S.-China confrontation deepened, the leadership had been sounding the alarm about the fluctuating international order using the expression "great changes unseen in a century." This is the recognition that the international community is at a major turning point where the balance of power is shifting and the rules of the game shared by international political actors are changing.

Xi Jinping has pointed out the necessity of acting proactively to prevent risks arising under these "great changes unseen in a century" and to turn crises into opportunities. The meeting last October, which decided to strengthen control over Hong Kong, confirmed that policy as the consensus of the Communist Party. In other words, the leadership's decision regarding Hong Kong policy was not motivated solely by the fact that Hong Kong was pushed to the brink of anarchy. It should be understood as part of the preparation for the "great changes unseen in a century." This awareness caused the leadership's policy priorities to favor national security over international reputation.

While possessing the consciousness of a major power, the current leadership is increasing its sense of insecurity toward the international community. China anticipates a prolonged U.S.-China confrontation and advocates for a "protracted war" domestically. Revisionist behavior can be seen as a long-term trend. Japan needs to grasp the motives behind China's external actions and confront them.