Understanding the Importance of Iran from a Russian Perspective

2019/06/07

Image: Imamzadeh Saleh Holy Shrine in Tajrish Square, Northern Tehran

Provided by: Mari Nukui

Iran holds high importance in Russia's regional and Middle Eastern policies. Particularly since the 2014 "Ukraine Crisis," Russia has faced economic sanctions from the West and global isolation. For Russia, a cooperative relationship with Iran is essential not only from the perspective of its own diplomacy but also for maintaining regional stability. Furthermore, in the "Syrian issue," where Russia seeks to take a leading role in resolution, cooperation with Iran and Turkey is indispensable.

On the other hand, the relationship with Russia is also vital for Iran, whose relations with the United States continue to deteriorate. Russia has long shared interests with Iran in opposing the U.S., and it can be said that Russia has generally maintained good relations with Iran, such as by opposing sanctions against the country. Recently, as the U.S. strengthens sanctions against Iran, Russia has continued to advocate for the continuation of Iranian crude oil exports. Iran is not only strengthening bilateral ties with Russia but also participates as an observer in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) led by China and Russia, with reports indicating it aims for full membership. While Iran has tense relations with Israel and many Arab nations, Russia maintains generally good relations with Israel as well as Arab countries, making it highly likely that Russia will hold the key to future Middle East peace.

The tightening of relations between Iran and Russia has become particularly prominent in recent years. In August 2018, an agreement was reached among the five Caspian Sea littoral states. Previously, the Soviet Union and Iran were the only coastal nations of the Caspian Sea—the world's largest lake—but with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the number of littoral states increased to five. As the use of Western technology became possible, allowing for the extraction of subsea resources such as oil and natural gas, issues regarding territorial waters and the legal status of the Caspian Sea emerged among the coastal nations. While resource extraction proceeded by creating faits accomplis, these issues caused regional tension and made the construction of subsea pipelines in the Caspian Sea difficult. Even in last year's agreement, the legal status of the Caspian Sea resulted in a vague conclusion, defining it as a special status that is neither a sea nor a lake. However, the decision that Caspian Sea issues will be decided only by littoral states and the prohibition of entry by warships from non-littoral states can be seen as a major victory for Russia and Iran, both of whom wish to repel Western—and particularly U.S.—influence.

Russia has strategically used the Caspian Sea in its Middle East policy, such as by launching cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea into Syria. With this agreement, Russia has established naval command of the Caspian Sea, and the strategic importance of the area is likely to increase further. Additionally, military cooperation between Russia and Iran in the Caspian Sea is expected to become even closer.

Furthermore, the extraction of resources and the construction of subsea pipelines became possible through the agreement of the relevant countries. However, the construction of subsea pipelines requires the littoral states to approve the results of environmental assessments. This allowed Russia, which had opposed subsea pipelines on the grounds that they would diminish its regional influence, to secure a loophole.

Even before this Caspian Sea agreement, regional cooperation among Caspian littoral states and neighboring countries had been revitalized to promote infrastructure development—such as railways, roads, and canals—as well as economy and tourism. This agreement further promotes that mood. In particular, Russia intends to complete the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) by 2020, a roughly 7,200-kilometer route connecting itself to India via ship, rail, and road through Azerbaijan and Iran. Once completed, it should serve as a transport network capable of competing with China's "Belt and Road Initiative." For Russia, which is strengthening cooperation with China on the surface while harboring growing distrust deep down, this could be an important tool for regaining influence in Eurasia. If that happens, Iran will also become a Eurasian hub, and its presence in the region will increase.

However, the U.S. has now pivoted toward a total embargo on Iranian oil, and the exemptions provided to countries like Japan were abolished in May 2019. This is a difficult situation for Japan, which views the Japan-U.S. alliance as the foundation of its diplomacy, but given the importance of Iran, I believe Japan should seek the best possible diplomatic policy.

In September 2018, Foreign Minister Taro Kono visited the three Caucasus nations that serve as a junction between Russia and Iran. This was the first visit to Azerbaijan by a Japanese Foreign Minister since 1999, and the first-ever visit to Armenia and Georgia. While the Caucasus is not very familiar to Japan, it is located at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, and Azerbaijan is a resource-producing country, making the region extremely significant strategically. Demonstrating Japan's willingness to strengthen relations with the three Caucasus nations and contribute to the stability and development of a region fraught with conflict is of great significance to Japanese diplomacy and should be highly commended. The Caspian Sea region—comprising Russia, the Caucasus, and Iran—is the central point for peace and stability in the Middle East and Eurasia. Japan should pursue comprehensive and flexible diplomacy while viewing these regions not as isolated "points" but as a cohesive "area."